

The Gallipolian

*The Journal of the
Gallipoli Association*

No. 143 - SPRING 2017



The Gallipolian

The Journal of the Gallipoli Association
founded by Major E. H. W. Banner in 1969 on the Campaign of 1915

The Gallipoli Association

Registered Charity No. 1155609

Website: <http://www.gallipoli-association.org>

Mailbox 630, Wey House, 15 Church Street, Weybridge KT13 8NA

[Please Note: Correspondence about membership should be sent to the Membership Secretary at the address shown below - not to the Mailbox address]

PATRON

HRH The Duke of Edinburgh KG KT

PRESIDENT

Captain Christopher T F Fagan MBE DL

PAST PRESIDENTS

The Lord Granville of Eye

Vice-Admiral E. W. Longley-Cook CB CBE DSO

Lt General Sir Reginald Savory KCMG KCIE DSO MC

Brigadier B B Rackham CBE MC

Lt Colonel M E Hancock MC

TRUSTEES

Chairman: Brigadier James R H Stopford CBE

Secretary & General Enquiries: Foster Summerson, 23 Tavnaghan Lane, Cushendall, Ballymena BT44 0SY Tel: 028 217 72996 : secretary@gallipoli-association.org

Treasurer: Vicki Genrich, 78 Foxbourne Road, London SW17 8EW
treasurer@gallipoli-association.org

Webmaster & Historian: Stephen Chambers : webmaster@gallipoli-association.org

Membership Secretary: Peter Luff, 19 Old Exeter Rd, Tavistock, Devon, PL19 0JE
Mobile: 07979 541 256. Home: 01822 612864 : membershipsecretary@gallipoli-association.org

Education Coordinator: Peter Butterworth, 9 Redcote Place, Dorking, Surrey RH4 1PE
education@gallipoli-association.org

Legal Officer: Ian Philliskirk

Other Appointments

Editor: Bryn Dolan : editor@gallipoli-association.org

Material in hard copy for the Editor should be sent to the Secretary for forwarding.

Association Events/Quartermaster: James C Watson Smith, Chelsea Lodge, Coopers Hill Lane, Englefield Green, Surrey TW20 0JX Tel: 01784.479148 : events@gallipoli-association.org

Web Author: Mal Murray 282 Galtymore Road, Drimnagh, Dublin 12, ROI
webauthor@gallipoli-association.org

Historian Panel: Enquiries should be directed to: historian@gallipoli-association.org

Contents

Pages 2 - 3	Obituary: Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Birdwood
Pages 3 - 5	Anzac / Gallipoli Day ceremonies in London
Pages 4 - 5	Other Anzac / Gallipoli Day ceremonies
Page 5	Major General's Review
Page 5	Collingwood Memorial Parade
Page 5	The Role of the President
Pages 6 - 10	The Story Behind a Headstone: Sgt H R Aiken
Pages 10 - 24	HMS <i>Manica</i> at Gallipoli
Pages 24 - 28	Gallipoli Revisited, 1924
Page 28	Last Post
Pages 29 - 36	Colour photograph section
Pages 37 - 45	Dead Man's Flask: Lieut B P Nettleton
Pages 45 - 46	Burdett Philip Nettleton
Pages 46 - 48	A letter from Sub-Lieut Twyman, HM Submarine <i>E7</i>
Page 49 - 50	Further to the Myth of the Gallipoli Current
Page 50	Gallipoli Association Tour 7 - 12 May 2017
Pages 51 - 53	2nd Lieut Gordon Herbert Wace, Royal Munster Fusiliers
Pages 53 - 62	Documents on Russia's attitude to the Dardanelles Operations
Page 62	Information Please
Pages 63 - 65	Last of the Six? George Samson VC
Page 65	Book Review : <i>The Glorious Madness</i>

Articles for The Gallipolitan

Articles and items of interest about any aspect of the Gallipoli campaign are always welcome. These should be submitted direct to the Editor, preferably as an e-mail attachment, at the email address shown opposite. Because there is sometimes a significant amount of material awaiting publication, it is not always possible to feature articles in the issue following submission although where there is an element of topicality the Editor will try to accommodate them, or refer them to colleagues responsible for the Association website.

For those considering the submission of articles the Editor can provide a copy of 'Notes for the Guidance of Contributors' on request.

This edition's cover features a portion of the cover of the 1 April 1935 edition of *Reveille*, the official journal of the New South Wales branch of the RSSILA. Twenty years after the Gallipoli Campaign, and only 17 years after the end of the Great War, a spirit of reconciliation between old enemies is evident.
The artist was Harry John Weston (1874 - 1938).

OBITUARY: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GORDON BIRDWOOD

James Stopford, Chairman

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Birdwood (photograph page 29), who has died aged 68, commanded the Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment and later became Head Gentleman Usher to The Queen during a life devoted to public service, as well as pursuing a successful career in property. A much-loved figure in The Royal Household, when asked one day what the Gentleman Ushers did, he replied, "For most people coming to the Palace is the best day of their lives. Our job is to make it even better."

Gordon was the great nephew of Field Marshal Lord Birdwood, of Anzac and Totnes, commander of the Anzacs. He was an enthusiastic and loyal member of the Gallipoli Association who played a key role in the 2015 centenary commemorations of the campaign. He chaired the Gallipoli 100 sub-committee which was established in June 2013 to plan and deliver the centenary activities on behalf of the Association and its membership. It identified three primary objectives:

- to create an education legacy (Gallipoli Centenary Education Project);
- to encourage and assist local community involvement in the commemoration of the campaign and the remembrance of all those who took part;
- to keep alive the memory of the Gallipoli campaign with a commemorative service of thanksgiving in 2015.

Gordon used his extensive networks at the Palace and in government, diplomatic and military circles to ensure the national commemorative events properly reflected the service and sacrifice of those who served on the peninsula. The most successful elements of the educational project included three battlefield trips to the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Schools Conference held in March 2016, the use of digital media and an awareness-raising social media presence. The project made a deep impact on all who took part in it and the commemorations were a resounding success; much credit for this rightly rests with Gordon.

Gordon, known by many as Fluffy, was born in 1948 and brought up in North Devon, a county that would always mean so much to him. He joined the Royal Horse Guards (The Blues) from Wellington in 1968, one of the last officers to be commissioned before the amalgamation with The Royals. Gordon's charm, enthusiasm and way with people saw him rise swiftly through the ranks.

He was ADC to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in NATO, appointed assistant to the minister for the armed forces during the Falklands War, and served as press officer for British forces in Cyprus during the difficult period of the 1980s. This was interspersed with distinguished periods at regimental duty, on operations in Northern Ireland, and later as adjutant. He commanded a squadron, both on tanks in Germany towards the end of the Cold War, and also on armoured reconnaissance at Windsor.

In 1990 he was appointed to command The Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment, a job for which he seemed to be tailor-made and both he and the regiment enjoyed two very happy years at Knightsbridge.

Leaving the army in 1992, he went to work in the world of property management. Unsurprisingly he made an equal success of this, working with David Workman of Workman Partners for

most of the next 25 years. He knew nearly all the firm's 600 employees by name.

He also joined the Gentleman Ushers, being promoted in 2011 to Head Gentleman Usher to Her Majesty The Queen, and played a key role in the smooth running of countless investitures, garden parties and major state events. He was so well suited to this role, which he loved; his charm, interest and sense of humour put people from all walks of life immediately at their ease. A long-standing liveryman of The Worshipful Company of Broderers, he was Master in 2011.

He was also Deputy Chairman of The Royal Humane Society, to which he devoted considerable energy, and a Knight of the Order of St. John. He did a huge amount for the Household Cavalry Foundation, established to help the wounded and bereaved from the regiment's heavy toll on recent operations.

Despite his full and busy public life, Gordon always found so much time for others. He was never too busy to stop and have a word with a nervous guest nor to help countless Household Cavalry officers and NCOs make the transition from military to civilian life. Much loved by his soldiers, one of the most moving tributes to him was from a Household Cavalryman who wrote "You were really good to me when things were in the depths." He also possessed that unique quality of not only enjoying every minute of his own life but making all his many friends enjoy every minute of theirs while in his company. His courtesy was legendary, his interest in the welfare of others boundless - whoever they were - and his sense of humour inexhaustible.

A keen sportsman, he was for over twenty years a devoted member of the St. Moritz Tobogganing Club and a regular in the Army Cresta team. St. Moritz played a large part in his life and he loved his regular visits. He was a first class skier, and travelled every year to Alpbach with his family, but he also hunted and played polo, was a fine shot and, in early life, a distinguished cross country runner.

Gordon collapsed and died on 15th January. He was above all a family man, and our deepest sympathy goes to his adored wife, Bella, daughter of the well-known Grenadier General Sir David Fraser, and to their two beloved daughters, Katie and Attie. Gordon leaves a huge hole in many lives but most of all in theirs.

ANZAC / GALLIPOLI DAY - TUESDAY 25 APRIL 2017

CEREMONIES IN LONDON

Dawn Service

A Dawn Service will be held at 5.00am (please arrive in good time) at the Wellington Arch, Hyde Park Corner followed by wreath-laying at the Australian and New Zealand memorials. The service is expected to end at 5.45am. Tickets are not required, however you will need to show photographic identification and undergo security checks on entry.

St Paul's Cathedral

A short service and wreath-laying ceremony will take place at the Gallipoli Memorial in the crypt of St Paul's Cathedral at 9.15 am for 9.30am. Wreaths will be laid by a representative of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by senior representatives of the Royal Navy, the Army and by the High Commissioners of Australia and New Zealand, and other high-ranking officials from France, the Irish Republic, and Turkey. Tickets are not required for this event

but you may need to show photographic identification and undergo security checks on entry. Members are encouraged to attend this service which is arranged by the Association. It concludes in time to travel to the Cenotaph.

The Cenotaph

Two minutes silence will be observed at 11.00am during a service at the Cenotaph in Whitehall. A wreath will be laid on behalf of the Association. Security measures will be in place in and around Westminster and only members and guests with named tickets will be allowed access to the west side of Whitehall. Access details will be given on the tickets. Those taking part in the Parade are asked to assemble in King Charles Street, close to the entrance to Whitehall, by 10.25am.

Members who expressed interest in viewing or taking part in the march to the Cenotaph, and completed the form enclosed with the Winter issue of *The Gallipolian* have been contacted and we expect tickets to be issued in mid-April. Depending on the publication date of *The Gallipolian*, it may be possible to arrange tickets for those who did not complete the form and now wish to participate. Applications must be received by the Hon. Secretary (preferably by e-mail – secretary@gallipoli-association.org) no later than 26 March. The following information must be provided for members and any guests wishing to attend: name (first and surname), home address, passport number, country of passport issue and passport expiry date. Members should also state whether they wish to take part in the Parade, or watch the service from the west side of Whitehall. If these details are not supplied when applying it will not be possible to process the application.

Westminster Abbey

As in previous years, we have been invited to join the 'Anzacs' at Westminster Abbey for a Service of Thanksgiving and Commemoration, which will commence at 12.00 noon. Members should be seated by 11.45am. Those who expressed interest in attending the service and completed the form enclosed with the Winter issue of *The Gallipolian* have been contacted and we expect tickets to be issued in mid-April. Depending on the publication date of *The Gallipolian*, it may be possible to consider late applications for the Abbey service on the same basis outlined above (i.e. applications accompanied by the personal information specified for the Cenotaph service must reach the Hon. Secretary by 26 March).

Medals should be worn at St Paul's, The Cenotaph, and at Westminster Abbey.

Gallipoli Day Lunch

A Gallipoli Day Lunch is to be held at the Union Jack Club, Sandall Street Waterloo. It will be 'hot buffet style' and comprise 2 courses; the cost is £25 excluding drinks / wine. Those who expressed interest in attending a Gallipoli Day lunch and completed the form enclosed with the Winter issue of *The Gallipolian* have been contacted and bookings invited. At the time of preparing this notice the event was fully booked but please get in touch with the Hon. Secretary by 1 April if you wish to be placed on the reserve list in the event of cancellations and tickets becoming available.

OTHER ANZAC / GALLIPOLI DAY CEREMONIES

Details of other Anzac/Gallipoli Day ceremonies and events can be found on the Association web site. Those without internet access can obtain details from the Hon. Secretary. Please

enclose a stamped (A5 size) and addressed envelope.

We ask that members unable to join with the Association in London make every effort to attend their nearest ceremony. The Editor is always pleased to receive reports and photographs of these ceremonies.

MAJOR GENERAL'S REVIEW

The Association hopes to receive a small allocation of tickets for the Major General's Review on Horse Guards Parade on Saturday 3 June. Members wishing to apply for tickets should complete the enclosed booking form.

COLLINGWOOD MEMORIAL PARADE

The Parade and Service at the Collingwood Memorial on the Downs, east of Pimperne, Dorset will take place at 3.00pm on Friday 2 June. For further information contact the organiser, Stuart Adam, email stu.adam@outlook.com (telephone 01823 432076) or James Watson Smith (address inside front cover).

THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT

As announced in the Autumn 2016 issue of *The Gallipolian* (No 141), the trustees unanimously decided to reintroduce the role of president in February 2016 and were delighted when Captain Christopher Fagan agreed to accept the position; the appointment becoming effective on 1 June 2016. But in all the excitement I neglected to tell the membership what exactly the president would do for the Association – now is the time.

The Gallipoli Association has a long and distinguished list of past presidents but since the death of Lt Colonel M E Hancock MC in May 1989 the position has remained vacant. The position is now an honorary one with a key role of promoting the Association in the wider community by representing it and to assist in the development of relationships with individuals, other associations and institutions, as appropriate.

The president is appointed by the trustees and has no executive function or role in the charity but through position and experience raises the profile of the Association, and supports the activities of the trustees. The president can act as the Association's lead on ceremonial and commemorative commitments and in such matters as presenting awards, hosting receptions, performing representational duties or attending other events as an official representative of the Association. All these duties are carried out at the request of the trustees.

In addition to representing the Association, the president is encouraged to give support to the trustees on all matters connected with the activities of the Association. The president may attend trustees' meetings in an advisory capacity. The tenure of appointment is 3 years, renewable by a majority decision of the trustees.

The trustees are delighted that Christopher has accepted this role and that he will continue to play an active part in the Association after more than 30 years at the helm. In this capacity I am pleased that Christopher will lay wreaths at St Paul's and at the Cenotaph, as well as represent the Association in Westminster Abbey, on 25 April 2017.

- James Stopford, Chairman

THE STORY BEHIND A HEADSTONE

Sgt. Harry Richard Aiken AIF

Foster Summerson

Background

This article came about following a visit I made in the mid-1990s to an old friend, Stephen Dawson, who at the time was in hospital recovering from a serious operation. While visiting him I was introduced to an elderly lady at his bedside – April Dawson; this came as something of a surprise as I knew Stephen's wife, Jill, quite well and I was not aware that Stephen had any sisters. After April left, I enquired about her. "Oh she was my first wife," Stephen replied. "We were divorced many years ago but we still keep in touch." He added with a slight smile, "don't worry Jill knows all about it."

Stephen also deserves a brief mention; his father served on the Western Front with the Royal Naval Division and his son was very proud of him. Stephen also had reason to be proud of his

own role in the Second World War.

He served with the Essex Yeomanry, seeing action during the early part of the war in Egypt, Libya and Tobruk, which he revisited in 2001 when he was nearly ninety.¹

When I saw Stephen some time later he mentioned that April's parents were buried at Woodgrange Park Cemetery in East London (where some of my family are also interred) and asked me if I would be willing to take April with me when I next went there. Stephen also mentioned – perhaps to encourage me – that her father, although born in east London, had served with the Australian Army at Gallipoli.

The Friends of Woodgrange Park Cemetery (FoWGPC) organise regular 'clean-up days' and one was due to be held a few weeks later so I collected April and we drove to the cemetery equipped with an array of gardening tools – a necessary prerequisite as the cemetery was, and

sadly still is, in a bad state. It is a problem faced by most of the privately-owned Victorian cemeteries in London; namely that when there is no more space for burials, there is no income beyond that for maintaining graves, and since most of the next of kin of those interred are also now dead, there is little income from that source either. The upshot was that the cemetery was put up for sale and passed through several hands, and in the 1990s houses were built on



a small section of it.² The owners also achieved additional income by clearing large areas of old, unmaintained graves (as they were entitled to do), and selling plots in those areas for new burials - mainly to members of the local Muslim community. Fortunately, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission managed to ensure that most of the identified war graves (187 from WW1 and 101 from WW2) and their headstones were left untouched; the graves of relatives of members of the FoWGPC are also mostly still in place by private arrangement with the cemetery owners.

When we arrived at April's family plot she showed me the grave, the headstone to her parents being in remarkably good order - the result of much hard work by April and her late mother (who used to travel some 30 miles to the cemetery on public transport.) The grave carries the inscription:

*In Loving Memory of
My Dear Husband
HARRY RICHARD AIKEN
Who Passed Away
18 March 1928 Aged 32 Years
'Rest After Suffering'*

It also commemorates his wife Violet Selina Aiken who died in 1983, aged 85, with the moving inscription '*Together Always*' (see photographs on pages 6 and 29).

Over the next year or so I discovered a little more about Harry Aiken from April but she could not tell me a great deal as she was only a child when he died. All she could remember was that her father often talked about his Australian 'mates' and the warm climate in Australia. She could also remember him telling her about visiting the pyramids in Egypt and how beautiful the Aegean Sea looked from Gallipoli, but nothing more. However, through contacts in Australia I managed to obtain Harry Aiken's service records at a time before these were put on-line so I was able to give these to April and to fill in some of the gaps for her. I also obtained her permission to write about her father but sadly other commitments prevented this and during the years that followed April died and with her death, the last of the immediate family had gone. The folder of 'Aiken papers' has rested in my filing cabinet for too long but with further research and the help of Bryn Dolan I have been able to piece together a little of the story 'behind the headstone' and I thought it should now be shared with a wider audience.

Life in England and Australia

Harry Aiken was born in Poplar in East London in 1896 (now part of the London Borough of Newham), the third son of James and Sarah Elizabeth Aiken who had five children. James was a 'jeweller' although it seems unlikely that he was in business on his own account as none of his children appear to have been employed in that line of work. As was usual at the time, Harry Aiken left school at 14; the 1911 census shows him employed as a Pawnbroker's Assistant - perhaps a job found for him by his father? He was later employed in a ladies clothing shop. Clearly 'shop work' was not altogether to Harry's liking because in 1913 he left England for Australia where he took employment as a farm labourer at Leongatha in Victoria.

In mid-January 1915 Harry travelled the hundred miles or so to Broadmeadows near Melbourne, where he enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force on 19 January being recorded as joining the 4th Reinforcements of the 14th Battalion on 1 February, aged 19.

Gallipoli Bound

After seven weeks at Broadmeadows Camp, where Harry presumably undertook some basic training, the 4th Reinforcements embarked at Melbourne on HMAT A9 *Shropshire* on 20 March 1915 bound for Egypt, which they reached on 17 April. A month was spent at the training camp in Egypt before the 4th Reinforcements embarked for Gallipoli, the Battalion War Diary recording their (and Pte. Aiken's) arrival under Lieut. Neale for duty at Courtney's Post on 27 May 1915.

We have no personal details of Pte. Aiken's service on the peninsula but we know that the battalion was relieved by the New Zealanders and left Courtney's Post on 31 May, never to return (except for the MG section which remained behind for a short time to assist the New Zealanders). The battalion then took up positions in Reserve Gully with the rest of the 4th Brigade as Divisional Reserve. During this time they performed heavy manual work, such as digging communication trenches out to No. 1 Outpost and constructed dumps for stores in Mule, Reserve and Supply Gullies. They also unloaded stores from barges and worked the water pumps. The unit history notes that these were 'dangerous duties, often performed under shell fire.' The battalion turned out each morning at 3:30am and every fourth day acted as brigade reserve.

The gully was hot and dusty, and the flies were 'innumerable,' and 'swarmed into and poisoned the food.' Water was very scarce and had to be disinfected with chloride of lime, which made it 'unpalatable.' Food was 'meagre and monotonous,' consisting mainly of bully beef, biscuits and jam, and occasionally some cheese, bacon and potatoes. Large numbers of men became ill with dysentery and para-typhoid, and many also became covered with septic sores. Despite the unpleasant conditions, however, it appears from Harry Aiken's service record that he was not hospitalised during his stay on the peninsula.

There was a brief pleasant break from 11 to 14 July when the battalion went to Imbros, though apparently this was not a 'rest' as work was carried out even there. On 6 August the battalion strength, aided by the arrival of further reinforcements and the return of sick and wounded men, was 24 officers and 858 Other Ranks. That night, at 9 o'clock, the battalion marched out of the gully as part of the attack on Sari Bair. The advance that night '... consisted of a series of marches, halts, and skirmishes, combined with a certain amount of running and ducking.' By dawn the battalion had reached what later became known as 'Australia Valley.' They entrenched along the ridge overlooking the Kaiajik Dere and here started to suffer more severe casualties.

Exhaustion was now becoming a major problem, as there had been no sleep. On 8 August the brigade was caught in the open by machine guns as it advanced over a patch of stubble, devoid of cover, known as 'The Cornfield' (near Hill 60) and suffered major casualties. The brigade was forced to withdraw to its position of the morning. 'Half of the personnel of the battalion was killed, wounded or missing.' More than 100 were later confirmed dead, and it was said to have been, with one exception (11 April 1917 at Bullecourt, the day Sgt Aiken was badly wounded), the 'bloodiest day the battalion ever had.'

After some days of comparative quiet the remnants of the battalion engaged in the first assault on Hill 60, which by then had become an enemy strong-point. The attack was a failure and the unit history notes that '... the fighting strength of the battalion had been shattered.' There were now 12 officers and 304 Other Ranks. Yet on 27 August the battalion supplied 100 men and four officers for the second major attempt on Hill 60. 'Three-quarters became casualties as soon as they left the trench.' This was the last serious fighting that the 14th had on the

peninsula. The three August attacks – on the 8th, 21st and 27th - had been sheer massacres.

The battalion then established a new position on Cheshire Ridge known as ‘Durrant’s Post,’ opposite ‘The Farm’ on the slope of Chunuk Bair. On 3 September the strength of the battalion was down to 9 officers and 149 ORs. The unit history states that ‘The majority of the survivors still on the Peninsula were worn and haggard, with long hair and hollow cheeks, covered with dirt, vermin and sores, wearing brimless hats with uniforms torn and stained.’ On 13 September the battalion was relieved by the newly-arrived 25th Bn. and marched back to Anzac Beach, then embarked aboard HMT *Abassia* for Lemnos, which was reached on the 14th. Here it remained for six weeks, during which it absorbed the 7th Reinforcements. It was then back to the Peninsula where it relieved the 28th Bn. at Durrant’s Post on 29 October.

At the end of November snow fell and in early December it was noticed that many sick men were being sent away. The battalion was evacuated on the night of 18/19 December. It was taken off Anzac Beach by motor barges, transferred to the steamer *Hazel*, then to the battleship *Zealandia*, arriving at Mudros Harbour during the day of the 19th. It appears that Harry Aiken was already sick when he got to Mudros because on New Year’s Day 1916 he was embarked on the transport *Cardiganshire*, arriving at Ismailia on 6 January. Here he was admitted to No. 4 Field Ambulance and then to the 2nd Australian CCS suffering from influenza, being discharged to duty a few days later. So ended Pte. Aiken’s Gallipoli service.

After Gallipoli

Harry Aiken was taken on the strength of the 46th. Bn AIF at Tel-el-Kebir on 3 March 1916 and proceeded with the battalion to France in June. During his time on the Western Front, he progressed rapidly through the ranks – to lance-corporal, corporal, lance-sergeant and finally to sergeant in August 1916; he also spent short spells in hospital suffering from influenza. He was granted leave in England that year, during which time he married Violet Selena Woodward, who lived near his family’s home in east London.

In April 1917 the 46th Bn took part in the ill-fated attack on Bullecourt; Harry Aiken suffered a serious gunshot wound in his left foot. After treatment in the 13th Australian Field Ambulance, he was first transferred to the 6th General Hospital at Rouen and, on 27 May, to England where he was admitted to the Southwark Military Hospital. This was the start of a long period of treatment which continued at the 1st Auxiliary Hospital, Harefield, in September. It would appear from his records that after his discharge from hospital in November the army may have hoped he would return to duty in some capacity but he was eventually discharged from the AIF in January 1918 as ‘being permanently unfit for all service.’ As he had no relatives in Australia and a wife resident in the UK he was permitted to take his discharge in England. Also referred to in the discharge papers was the fact that he had obtained an offer of employment from the shop in east London where he had been employed prior to leaving for Australia.

Postscript

For the next few years Harry Aiken was able to enjoy family life; he had been awarded a small war gratuity and a disability pension (subject to annual review) which later helped him to buy a modest home in Vange, Essex which he and his wife named ‘Terori.’ It was here that his daughter, April, was born. Sadly, after a few years the wounds he had suffered at Bullecourt made it impossible for him to continue in limited employment and he also developed tuberculosis, possibly due to the rigours of his war service, to which he succumbed, aged 32, on 18 March 1928.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my friend Burnie Nitschke, then a teacher in Victoria, for obtaining Harry Aiken's service papers, and to Bryn Dolan for the information about the 'doings' of the 14th Bn. on Gallipoli.

Notes:


1. The visit to Libya was the first made by a group of British and Australian ex-soldiers when Colonel Ghaddafi was in power. Stephen made a second visit several years later. Sadly, his second wife, Jill, had died suddenly just after Christmas 2000.
2. Remarkably, the land developed for housing contained the remains of air-raid victims which were re-interred elsewhere in the cemetery. The Woodgrange Park Cemetery Act 1993 - the only one of its kind - was required to achieve this.

HMS *MANICA* AT GALLIPOLI

Ian Burns

[For articles on different aspects of HMS *Manica's* service, see also the articles in *The Gallipolian* by Robert Ford (Spring 2013) and John Mackworth (Spring 1996) - Editor].

This article is an edited version of the much longer *Kite Balloons at Sea - Gallipoli and Salonika, 1915-1916*, published in the *Cross and Cockade International Journal*, V46 Nr1, Spring 2015.



HMS *Manica* taken shortly after her arrival at Gallipoli in 1915, the forward 12-pdr gun has not yet been fitted. The kite balloon is fully inflated with the stern toward the ship's bow. The canvas wind break is suspended above the starboard side of the forward hull. (TNA, AIR 1/479/15/312/239)



Just waiting for the observers, *Manica's* kite balloon is ready to ascend. Space to handle the balloon was extremely limited, and it was essential to keep the ship's stern exactly into wind. Note the canvas wind break installed on a cable permitting it to be unfurled like a curtain. (IWM HU66626)

The balloon ships were uniquely purposed for the Gallipoli campaign. Three of the five created served at Gallipoli, and the other two served briefly as Balloon Depot Ships at Dover and Scapa Flow. No more were created after the campaign ended. Without that campaign they may arguably have never existed. They originated as a stop-gap method to provide observation over the peninsula following a request to London on 4 March 1915 by General William Birdwood for provision of a 'manlifting kite or captive balloon' to spot gunfire. Forwarded to the Admiralty, where it was received on 8 March, an immediate reply was sent that they would send RNAS aeroplanes and a Kite Balloon Section. But why the Admiralty and RNAS instead of the RFC? Before the war the RFC consisted of two Wings – Military and Naval. They were uncomfortable bedfellows, having different requirements and methods, and a split was inevitable. The RNAS, in addition to naval aeroplanes, was given responsibility for balloons and airships.

First a brief look at the kite balloon itself.

Spherical balloons are very stable when allowed to run free, but they do not take well to being tied to the ground, plunging and twisting in the slightest breeze. Military observers needed a stable balloon, which eventually emerged as the kite balloon. There were two main types of kite balloon in use during the war. The *Drachen*, originally developed in Germany but copied by France, and the *Caquot*, developed in France but copied by Germany. Both types were manufactured in Britain by C G Spencer and Sons who had been constructing 'Balloons, Parachutes and Aerostatic Apparatus' since the middle of the nineteenth century. The following brief description addresses only the *Drachen* as it was the type used at Gallipoli.

The first kite balloon was a simple cylindrical balloon rigged at a 20° nose up angle. The kiting

effect providing additional lift. The kite balloon was a little more stable than a spherical balloon. Further development added an air-filled rudder at the rear of the gas bag - or envelope - and sails to provide stability on both sides towards the rear.

The balloon envelope was made from rubberised fabric comprising two plies of finely woven cotton; one laid at 45° to the other; with a layer of liquid rubber between them and another coating on the inside ply to make it gas proof. The cloth was waterproofed and sewn into rings three feet wide and 22.4 feet in diameter; 18 or 19 rings sewn together with hemispherical ends formed the envelope. On the inside of the rear lower half of the envelope was a ballonnet separated from the lifting gas by a gas tight fabric membrane. An air scoop on the lower centre of the body permitted wind to enter the ballonnet, which expanded and stabilised the hydrogen pressure, maintaining the shape of the balloon envelope. If the gas pressure increased the air was forced out through simple non-return flaps into the rudder. If the ballonnet was fully collapsed, excess hydrogen was released through an automatic pressure valve in the nose of the envelope. Basket suspension, sails, handling and mooring cables and the winch cable bridle were attached to a fabric rigging band sewn around the envelope. The sails were each approximately 30 feet by 3 feet and made from a single thickness of fabric.

The rudder was a fabric air bag attached to the stern of the envelope. It helped centre the balloon into the wind. It was inflated through an air scoop, air exiting through a hole at the upper end of the bag. However, its control was somewhat coarse and a yawing motion could result. To reduce this a tail of small stabilizing parachutes was suspended below the rear of the balloon. They were attached to the upper part of the winch cable bridle by means of two lines which passed either side of the balloon through eyes suspended from the rigging band, aft of the sails.


The kite balloons operated with two observers in the basket with telephone communication to the bridge. One observer watched the firing ship and the other the target. The basket was a simple open wicker box less than four feet square and of similar depth. Equipment was limited to a compass, map board, binoculars and the telephone. A reel for the telephone cable was attached to the outside of the basket. Parachutes for the observers were not available during the period under discussion.

Total weight of the *Drachen*, including rigging and empty basket, was around 1100 lb. The lifting power of 830 m³ (29311 ft³) of high purity hydrogen is approximately 2000 lb, thus leaving a maximum of 900 lb lift to carry the observers and their equipment and to support the weight of the winch cable. The static lift - or buoyancy - due to the gas could be supplemented by dynamic lift from the wind acting on the balloon itself. The balloonists at Gallipoli found that the maximum safe wind speed for operations was 35 knots. Any higher and the cable showed signs of over-strain.

The kite balloons brought a splash of colour to Gallipoli. There are several paintings by Norman Wilkinson and Herbert Hillier showing *Manica's* kite balloon to have been a shade of bright yellow (see colour plates page 30).

HMS *Manica* and 1 KBS.


SS *Manica* (4120 grt, 12 knots.) was built at Sunderland by Sir James Laing and Sons for Ellerman Bucknall Steamship Co, and launched on 25 September 1900. She was a typical cargo ship of the period with deep holds forward and aft of the centre castle, which housed the engine and boiler rooms, the bridge and accommodation for a small number of passengers. Engaged in trade mostly between South Africa and Australia prior to the war, she had arrived



Officers and men of HMS *Manica* and 1 KBS, RNAS. I have only been able to identify a handful of personnel; any additional names would be welcome. Sub Lt John Edward Loveluck, RNR, is the fifth seated officer from the left. Commander William Mellor, RN, is holding the telescope, next to him is the Ward Room dog — lost at sea during August 1915. Mackworth may be the officer, in khaki, next to the dog. One of the ratings is nursing the ship's cat under the life belt, and the ship's bugler is on the upper row centre. The devices on each bridge wing are mechanical semaphores. (Courtesy John Dixon, whose article on Sub Lt John Edward Loveluck, RNR, appeared in *The Gallipolian* No. 142, Winter 2016)

at Manchester docks early in March 1915 from Sydney with a mixed cargo which included a large quantity of sheep skins and wool. Stories that she was an 'ex-manure ship' are moot, but her cargo may have left her holds somewhat redolent of ageing mutton.

Taken over by the Admiralty and commissioned as Fleet Messenger No.17, *Manica* was placed in the hands of H & C Grayson Ltd, of Birkenhead, and given a quick and very basic conversion into a balloon ship. The foremast was removed, all fittings between the bridge and forecastle cleared, and a wooden balloon deck built over the tops of the hatch coamings. A steam-powered winch was positioned on the port side, at the aft corner of the balloon deck. Limited shelter for the inflated balloon was provided by removable canvas screens installed along the sides of the hull. The holds held transport and equipment necessary for working from a shore base, balloon spares, and assorted special equipment.



Manica's balloon deck looking forward. A net is over the partially inflated portion of the kite balloon, and the steam winch is in the left hand foreground. The men weighing down the fore part of the kite balloon suggests that this may have been taken before arrival at Gallipoli. (*The Illustrated War News*, 17 Nov 1915)

A 'Silicol' hydrogen generating plant was installed on the starboard side aft, with storage cylinders for compressed gas to port. The gas generated was filtered to 99% purity then sent to a low pressure nurse balloon to cool before being compressed in storage cylinders, or sent directly to the kite balloon. The nurse balloon took the form of a collapsible gasometer stiffened by thin wooden struts and held in a light wooden frame.

1 Kite Balloon Section (1 KBS) joined *Manica* just a few days before sailing. Their training had been rushed and was incomplete, and half the unit - volunteers from the Royal Navy Anti Aircraft Corps - had received next to no training. Accommodation for the approximately seventy RNAS officers and men making up the section had to be found. The officers claimed the passenger cabins while the men hung their hammocks in mess decks created in the after holds. They had a French kite balloon - one of two provided by the French to help set up RNAS training earlier in March - plus an old spherical balloon.

In command of 1 KBS was Squadron Commander John Dolben Mackworth. He had received

his commission in the Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment in May 1910. Whilst serving on garrison duties in Bermuda he made an application to join the RFC. On home leave early in 1912 he learnt to fly at the Bristol School, Brooklands, taking his ticket (209) on 30 April 1912. Transferring to the RFC, he completed his military aviation training at the Central Flying School near Upavon, Wiltshire, in May, subsequently specialising in lighter-than-air aviation. Mackworth gained both Aeronauts Certificate 32 and Airship Pilot's Certificate 17 in September 1913. He was transferred to the RNAS as a Flight Commander when it assumed responsibility for lighter-than-air aviation in 1914. He never really came to terms with the transfer and always signed his wartime reports as Major J D Mackworth.

Manica sailed for Gallipoli, by way of Gibraltar and Malta, on 27 March 1915, less than three weeks after the receipt of General Birdwood's request.

The passage to Gibraltar was notable mainly for seasickness in the balloon sailors and for meat that had gone bad or, as the ship's butcher put it, 'right outside my jurisprudence, sir.' Reporting to the admiral at Gibraltar Mackworth was berated for flying the blue RNR ensign from the stern of his ship, use of which had been discontinued on the outbreak of war. That business over with, and Mackworth vowing to fly a white ensign in future, the admiral expressed an interest in seeing this odd vessel for himself. When the admiral arrived, Mackworth had arranged an armed guard with fixed bayonets from those of more military mien. The admiral was duly gratified by his reception, but wrinkled his nose, the rotten meat having been placed in an advantageous location. The admiral rapidly approved its replacement and hurried on to inspect the balloon (which had been inflated with air), showing great interest in the strange beast.

Manica sailed the following day with a fresh supply of meat, the blue ensign still flying at her stern, and Mackworth hurrying aft to replace it with a white ensign.

After leaving Malta, Mackworth made the first full gas inflation and flying trial. It was quickly found that the most difficult part of the operation was handling the balloon in the restricted space on deck and raising or lowering it whilst close to the ship. Once clear of the disturbed air, it behaved in a normal fashion.

Paul Bewsher was one of the balloon-handling crew aboard *Manica*. He provides an account of balloon operations.¹ After morning parade the section are sent to balloon stations.

At once we break off, and hurry down the dim crooked gangway connecting the aft deck with the balloon deck forward. Soon we break once more into the sunlight, with the tall canvas wind screen on the left, and on the right the clumsy orange bulk of the kite balloon lying along the wide wooden deck, on which it is held by rows of canvas bags filled with sand, which are hooked in clusters, like ripe fruit, to its netting.

The whistle is blown, and we lift the bags up, and remove the hooks from the netting, and hang them lower down. As bag after bag is moved the great bulk of the balloon




John Dolben Mackworth

begins to rise up, until beneath its body can be seen the men working on the opposite side of the deck. Then the balloon, its loose underside flapping slightly in the wind, is allowed to rise sufficiently to permit the basket party to carry the willow-woven basket to its position in the centre of the deck. As soon as the basket is fixed to its rigging the balloon is dragged down again by the men at the ropes, the sandbags are removed, and the balloon is let up till the basket is just resting on the deck. The two observers, with their charts and binoculars, climb aboard, and then the order is given, 'Let her up gently!'

We allow the balloon to rise until at last the ropes leave our hands and hang rippling in the air above us. With a sudden hiss of steam and clatter of machinery the winch in the corner begins to work, and slowly the shining cable unwinds from the drum as the quaint orange shape rises up, up, up, into the pale Wedgwood blue of the sky. At last the whine of the winch ceases, and far above us the yellow balloon hangs like a strange fruit, faintly swinging from side to side.

Later the balloon is brought back on to the deck.



Manica's balloon deck looking aft. The kite balloon is partially inflated and held down by a net. The steam winch is located on the port side at the aft end of the balloon deck. (George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress. LC-DIG-ggbain-20543 – public domain)

Now the whine and clatter of the winch recommences, and the balloon begins to descend slowly. When it is some five hundred feet above the deck the whistle is blown to call us to balloon stations, and we hurry along to our appointed positions beside the tall wind-screens. Nearer and nearer comes the balloon; larger and more ungainly grows its yellow bulk, and soon the handling ropes are within reach. Catching hold of the ends, we quickly thread them through ring-bolts and pull them steadily till at last the balloon reaches deck, and the two observers climb out of their basket.

Manica arrived at Mudros on 9 April, where Commander William Mellor, RN, was placed in overall command of the ship and balloon unit. Admiral de Robeck requested a trial with the balloon spotting for the guns of the armoured cruiser HMS *Bacchante*. Overnight on the 14/15 April the two ships sailed to arrive at a position off the Peninsula just before dawn.

The chief interest of this trial lay in its unexpectedness. The enemy was not aware of the presence of a balloon ship, and had taken no special precautions against being overlooked. The consequence was that when *Manica* put up her balloon, the first sight which greeted the observers was a sleeping camp, neatly arranged in a dip in the ground, out of sight of *Bacchante* but within easy range of her guns. Through their excellent field-glasses the observers could see an occasional dot moving about, but for the most part the camp was not yet astir. If there were sentries, they doubtless regarded the distant

balloon hanging in the sky as a harmless form of amusement for the jaded British, and saw no connection between it and the long guns of the *Bacchante* which were nuzzling round toward them.

But the boom of the cruiser's forward turret opened their eyes, and a rude awakening followed when the top of a hillock some hundred yards beyond the camp was hurled into the air. No *reveille* ever blown commanded so instant a response. Every tent burst into life, and the ground was soon swarming with running specks. A second shot burst on the northernmost fringe of the camp and third right in the midst of the tents. *Bacchante* had the range to a nicety, and began to fire salvoes of 6-inch.

A scene of indescribable confusion followed. Tents were rent to pieces and flung into the air, dust spouted in huge fans and columns, and brightly through the reek could be seen the flashes of the bursting shells. Like ants from an overturned nest, the little brown dots swarmed and scattered. Across the plain galloped a few terrified mules, and in an incredibly short time the wreckage was complete.

Of the once orderly camp nothing remained but torn earth and twisted canvas, and when the smoke cleared away, no movement was to be seen. The trial was simple but convincing. *Manica* signalled 'Cease fire', and lumbered home behind her consort, metaphorically wagging her tail.²

After this success de Robeck held *Manica* back until the morning of the landings, 25 April 1915. However, she did a number of trial firings with units of the fleet.


On the morning of the landings, *Manica* was stationed off Anzac Cove to work with the battleship *Triumph*. Her balloon rose shortly after 5 am and remained up until 3.20 pm, a long day for the observers in the basket. The following day, her balloon made seven ascents in support of the Anzacs. So it continued whenever weather and suitable targets permitted. With the balloon at between 2000 and 3000 feet almost the whole of the Peninsula, the Narrows and the Asiatic shore could be seen by the observers. They found it was possible to control shoots at up to 25000 yards range. Spotting corrections were passed down the phone line from the balloon directly to the bridge, and then semaphored to the firing ship.

Mackworth recalled that, 'The *Queen Elizabeth* made especial use of her, and she was generally to be seen lumbering behind the huge warship like a faithful dog.' On 27 April *Queen Elizabeth*'s big guns sank a Turkish transport on the other side of the Peninsula. The following day two Turkish batteries were targeted.

These batteries opened fire on our troops, and the balloon located them almost immediately; the *Queen Elizabeth* silenced them promptly. There is a strong probability that the guns were almost completely destroyed, as both six and fifteen inch shell were burst right onto the guns. No batteries have fired from that position since, and an overturned gun was observed next day.³

As the campaign continued *Manica* acquired her own 'faithful dog.' The single kite balloon struggled to answer all demands for her services, so Mackworth attempted to put the spherical balloon into service. The inflated balloon and winch were installed on the aft deck of a salvage tug, *Rescue*, the balloon detachment being commanded by Flt Lt Irving Henry Bebbly Hartford. The spherical balloon behaved no better at sea than it would on land, and the experiment was terminated after a few days. However, the tug was retained as a tender to *Manica*, the hydrogen plant and storage cylinders being moved to her. *Rescue* generally remained at Imbros whilst balloon operations were conducted, coming alongside when required to top up the kite

balloon. This happy arrangement continued until shortly before the Suvla landings in August, when *Rescue* was needed for more important work.



HM Tug *Rescue* with the spherical balloon *Venus* on her aft deck. (Author's collection)

Not all observed shoots were successful. The problem with naval guns was that they were intended to fire over long distances using a relatively flat trajectory. To engage land targets a high trajectory, as used by an army howitzer, was often more effective. For example, on 7 May, at the commencement of the Second Battle of Krithia.

Though the admiral did all in his power to obliterate the Turkish post near Y Beach by sending the *Swiftsure* and *Talbot* with the balloon ship *Manica*, to blow the top off the cliff, the kite balloon could find no trace of an enemy trench. The post remained undiscovered and therefore undismayed by the fire of the ships guns.⁴

Nonetheless, naval gunfire could be devastating to troops caught in the open, as Lt Buller recounts.⁵

One hot afternoon the balloon had been up for over an hour, with the *Queen Elizabeth* a mile off waiting for a target, when the observer reported a double company of infantry marching on the far side of a low hill. One round of shrapnel⁶, reported 1000 yards short, the fuze lengthened, another round, after which the spotter was able to report hardly a man left standing!

The Turkish troops and artillery quickly learnt that the presence of the balloon presaged bad news for someone, the guns usually ceasing fire when the balloon was seen. Troops ashore reportedly requested the balloon be sent up to enable them to 'get their washing done in peace.'

She did not, however, have things completely her own way. There were several reports of torpedoes passing close by or under the ship. Turkish guns, including *Asiatic Annie*, took objection to her presence on many an occasion, and aeroplanes attacked more than once. *Manica* was under fire from both gun and bomb on 30 April. During the afternoon, whilst the balloon was up working with *Prince George*, several shells bracketed the ship. They began

to bring the balloon down and hoist the anchor to get out of range. The anchor chain fouled a mine cable, which was parted by rifle shots from the bow. Once free, *Manica* went astern, to keep the balloon clear of the ship, and re-anchored out of range.

Up went the balloon again with two thousand feet of hawser out. We were discussing our late experience when the whistle sounded once more – ‘All hands on the balloon. Enemy aeroplane approaching. Haul in!’ Round goes the winch at its best pace once more. All heads are turned to the sky and at last a Taube is spotted, flying high in the sun’s eye, coming direct for us. The enemy evidently hated the balloon, and meant to strafe us as much as they could now that we were beyond their guns.

It was our first experience of a hostile plane and most horribly fascinating. One could not help thinking of the immovable mouse terrified by the cruel eyes of a snake; or the bird which has sighted a hawk and crouches down close to the ground for cover, watching its foe circle above. Here was the ship at anchor, and we, the very-much-alive crew, absolutely dependent on life for the good or bad aim of the Taube’s occupant. One hit would blow the ship out of the water. We had a large amount of high explosives on board, and a great quantity of petrol. In fact, the *Manica* was a floating box of fireworks. The SOS signal sounded from our hooter. The Taube came up fast, flying lower and lower. ‘Why the blazes does not some ship fire at her?’ Our two Maxims meanwhile opened fire and were spitting out bullets at the on-coming plane. Some of these came rattling down on the decks of *Dublin*, and her commander sent us a caustic signal afterwards, asking us to direct our fire elsewhere than at one of His Majesty’s ships.


The balloon now was very nearly over the ship and a bigger mark was thus offered to the bomb dropper. On came the Taube. She was apparently right above us. Then she veered a little, steadied herself, turned and we knew that she had dropped her first missile. Bang! Up went a column of water thirty yards on the port side. Bang! Another, fifty yards on the starboard. ‘Thank God, she’s missed! – How stiff my neck is!’ were the thoughts that rushed through my head as I lowered it to the usual angle of ordinary observation.⁷

On 25 May *U-21* (*Kapitänleutnant* Otto Hersing), sank the battleship *Triumph* and two days later *Majestic*. Overnight, the big ships disappeared behind torpedo nets or sailed to safer harbours. Throughout June and into July *Manica* remained behind the nets at Kephalo, sailing occasionally to spot for one of the older ships, *Lord Nelson* or *Talbot*.

On 18 June, HMS *Hector* arrived at Mudros. Slightly larger than *Manica*, she had been given a very similar conversion, although with improvements in storage arrangements and men’s quarters. Her balloon unit - 3 KBS - was placed under the experienced command of Flt Lt Hartford from 1 KBS and used the next few weeks for training to operational standard. On 8 July she arrived at Kephalo and a few hours later *Manica* set off for Mudros to refit. *Hector* spent July working with *Lord Nelson* and *Bacchante* around the Cape Helles area.

After a month at Mudros *Manica* rejoined *Hector* at Kephalo, in time for the landing at Suvla Bay on 6 August. *Hector* was part of the naval squadron (*Edgar*, three monitors and two destroyers) supporting simultaneous attacks from the Helles and Anzac lodgements; assigned to the left flank of the Helles attack, facing the Krithia and Achi Baba positions. *Manica* was with the naval squadron (*Talbot*, *Grafton*, *Theseus*, three monitors and a single destroyer) at Suvla. She spent much of her time at Ejelmer Bay (Ece Limani), to the north of Suvla in a good position to enfilade Turkish positions on the Kiretch Tepe Ridge and Anafarta plain.

On 6 August *Hector* was on station with her balloon up. She spotted her ships on to several batteries on Achi Baba, succeeding in silencing at least seven of them. But the Achi Baba attacks, intended as feints to distract from the main event at Suvla, soon ground down to another bloody stalemate. At Suvla initial surprise was not fully exploited and the landing bogged down. By the end of the month the Anzacs had connected with the British at Suvla but once again stalemate settled over the front, which remained static until the end of the campaign.



The battleship HMS *Lord Nelson*, launched in September 1906, was armed with four 12 inch, ten 9.2 inch, and 24 12-pounder guns. HMS *Hector's* balloon observed for her and HMS *Bacchante* off Cape Helles during July 1915. (*Warships*, Atlas Editions UK).

Manica's work was hampered by winds and low cloud. The artist William Wiehe Collins, serving in 1 KBS, recalled a particularly blustery day.⁸

During the day the wind got up to a gale, and a thick bank of slatey-grey cloud like a sheet, came along at a rapid pace from the north while the balloon was up. The temperature dropped quickly. A line of white foam on the sea told us we were in for it, but still the balloon stayed aloft. The *Manica* began to run before the approaching storm, to ease the great strain on the hawser. Suddenly we were struck by the squall; in a second out went the balloon's tail in a straight line, the parachutes blew open like umbrellas, but the attachment gear could not hold the strain; away went the whole tail and dropped into the sea. Without its steadying influence the balloon swayed dangerously. The basket with the two observers was tossed about from side to side wherever the wind listed. We expected to see them thrown out any minute, but they had dug their knees into the wicker sides and held on to the ropes above for dear life. We got the balloon safely on deck at last after a great struggle, but it was an extremely awkward and very ticklish job.

Her customers at Suvla included the small monitors, such as *M.30* which had two 6 inch guns,


one forward and one aft. On 8 August *Manica* was at sea close to Ejelmer Bay and was able to carry out a shoot with *M.30*, which is fully described by John Hanna in *The Gallipolian* No. 132 of Autumn 2013.

By September *Manica's* winch and equipment were deteriorating and her balloon had only a brief life remaining. There were no replacements available, so she was released from her work at Suvla and sailed for Mudros to prepare to return home. With no regrets, she left Gallipoli in her wake on 15 September after five months on the front line.

Back in the UK she underwent a major refit. The two forward holds were joined to create a balloon hold just large enough to shelter an inflated balloon, and she was fitted with a seaplane deck and canvas hangar over her after holds. She served off the coast of East Africa as a seaplane carrier and balloon ship until mid 1917.⁹ Instead of returning to the UK, *Manica* was demilitarised in Egypt, sailing to Bombay in July 1917 to become a tanker for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary as *SS Huntball*. After the war she was sold to Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co as *SS Phorus*. She was scrapped in 1931.

Mackworth had been recalled to the Air Ministry in August, eventually becoming Deputy Director of Balloons. He was commended by the Admiralty for his work with 1 KBS and his name put forward for a DSO. The paperwork for this award appears to have been lost, and the award never made. He was, however, made a CBE for his wartime services. Mackworth, like many observers, could not take a detached view of the slaughter they called down, and was invalided out of the service with the rank of Lieut-Colonel in 1919. He returned to service in June 1936 to help organize the London Balloon Barrage, but the work proved too much and he suffered a mental breakdown. Mackworth took his own life on 5 September 1939.¹⁰

For now *Hector* continued alone, her equipment also showing signs of overwork. She was sent



HMS *Hector*. Note the light anti-aircraft gun on the forecastle. She retains the black hull from her pre-war days, but the white upper works have been painted out in pusser's grey and a white false bow wave added. To identify *Manica* from *Hector*; the latter has a king post immediately in front of the bridge and sheltered passageway along the centre castle is built up at the aft end. (IWM SP111)


to Mudros to be repaired by one of the fleet repair ships based there. Her temporary refit was completed by the beginning of October, a few days before the arrival from the UK of 7 KBS aboard HMS *Canning*. *Canning's* two forward holds had been joined to create a balloon hold approximately 100 feet long and a little over 30 feet wide, just large enough to shelter an inflated kite balloon, a big improvement over *Manica* and *Hector*.

When weather permitted, the two balloon ships continued to work off the Peninsula through October, November and into December. In the latter month, balloon operations were only possible on the 10-12th, strong winds or mist and low cloud making observation impossible.

With the approach of winter evacuation became inevitable, however risky that operation would be. Troops were slowly, and with remarkable secrecy, withdrawn from Suvla and Anzac until on 18 December only a large rear-guard remained. These were to be withdrawn over the next two nights. On the morning of 20 December both Suvla and Anzac were devoid of allied troops. Both *Hector* and *Canning* were part of the covering naval forces for the Suvla and Anzac evacuations, under orders to maintain routine level of support for the ground troops. Only the forces at Cape Helles remained. These too were successfully evacuated over the night of 8/9 January 1916.


Hector returned to the UK in May 1916. No longer required as a balloon ship, she became an ammunition carrier, hauling supplies to Russian ports in the White Sea, and between the UK, Egypt and India. After a final stint as collier and stores carrier, and a brief post war career with Alfred Holt & Co, she was sold for scrap in 1923.

Canning sailed for Salonika, where her continued service is beyond the purview of this article. She returned to the UK for a refit in June 1916. The work fitted her for a new role as Balloon Depot Ship to the Grand Fleet, in which role she served until January 1919, the last balloon ship in service. She was sold for scrapping a year later.



HMS *Canning* with kite balloon aloft on a calm day.
The original caption places this at Salonika in November 1915. (IWM SP515)

At least eight RNAS Kite Balloon Sections also served in France, until taken over by the RFC (belatedly realising their value) after the Battle of Loos in 1915. At the time of the transfer there were 40 officers and 680 men serving with the RNAS KBS in France. The RNAS continued to create their own KBS for service with the Grand Fleet, and for anti-submarine and convoy escort, especially following the adoption of the more stable *Caquot* kite balloon in 1916. On 1 April 1918 there were 500 officers and 3120 men serving in eighteen RNAS Kite Balloon Sections, based in the UK and overseas.¹¹



The armoured cruiser HMS *Edgar*, launched in November 1890 and though obsolete by the time of the Gallipoli campaign, was armed with two 9.2 inch guns. HMS *Hector*'s balloon observed for her off the left flank of Cape Helles during the attacks of August 1915. (*Warships*, Atlas Editions UK).

Endnotes

- 1 Bewsher, Paul, *Green Balls* (Blackwood & Sons 1919), pp.290/1. Chapter omitted from later reprints.
- 2 Mackworth, John D, The First Naval Kite Balloon, *Blackwood's Magazine*, April 1927, pp.464-480 (Reproduced in *The Gallipolitan*, No 80, Spring 1996.). Mackworth referred to himself in the third person, as the 'military officer' or the C.O., throughout his memoir.
- 3 AIR 1/11/15/1/44. *Report on the Operations Carried Out From HMS Manica in the Dardanelles of No 1 Kite Balloon Section*. 15 May 1915.
- 4 Aspinall-Oglander, Brig Gen C F, *Military Operations, Gallipoli, Vol 1* (Heinemann 1935), p. 338.
- 5 Buller, Lt William A H, *To the Dardanelles*, A.A.C. The Journal of the Anti-Aircraft Corps, Vol 1 No 2 (ca. July 1917), pp.35-39.
- 6 A 15 inch naval shrapnel shell contained 13,700 1.75 oz lead-alloy balls. Time to explosion (hence range) was set by adjusting the nose cap fuse. A 6 inch shell held around 450 balls.
- 7 Collins, William Wiehe, *No 1 KBS At The Dardanelles – By one of the Crew*, mss. Leeds University Library, Liddle Collection, Liddle/WW1/GS/0342 - Collins, E. R., H. A., J. A., William Wiehe.
- 8 Collins, op cit.
- 9 For details see Air Vice Marshal Peter Dye, *Royal Naval Air Service: Operations in German East Africa 1914-1918, Part 3* (Cross and Cockade Journal, V38 N1, 2007.)
- 10 ADM 273/2/24. *Record of Service*, J D Mackworth and WO 374/45504. Col J D Mackworth.
- 11 AIR 1/109/15/21. Information regarding Kite Balloons since formation of Kite Balloon Section, RNAS.

Editor's notes

Granville Roland Fortescue was an American ex-army lieutenant who served as a 'special correspondent' of the London *Daily Telegraph* early in the war. He was present on the Turkish side of the line during some of the Gallipoli campaign. On page 228 of his book *Russia, the Balkans and the Dardanelles*, he makes the following observation while staying in Çanakkale:

The daily excitement of the land operations is a duel between an English captive balloon and Turkish aeroplanes. The balloon, which directs the gunfire, is viewed with alarm and chagrin by the Turks. Not only do they aim every available gun at it, but immediately it appears an aviator is launched against the giant yellow sausage. When this danger threatens the balloon returns to earth.



The giant shell of the "Queen Elizabeth" broke into only ten pieces. Outside Fort Kilit Bahr a German Marine in Turkish uniform had collected some of the large bits.

Fortescue spoke with German military and naval personnel - including Admiral Usedom - in Turkey. The photo on the left (from p257) is remarkable not only for its relevance to balloon-directed shelling by HMS *Queen Elizabeth*, but because it indicates that German marines were dressed in Turkish uniform. In the text (page 229) the soldier pictured at left is referred to as 'a German marine sergeant'.

Addendum

In the Winter 2016 edition of *The Gallipolian*, I listed the last Allied officers to die at Gallipoli.

I omitted one officer from the list - Captain Alfred Sanderson Walford (MiD), 2 Bn, Cheshire Regiment, who died in or near the town of Gallipoli on 19 January 1919, and is now buried in Ari Burnu cemetery, Anzac.

Private James William Ewles of the same unit died the same day and is buried beside Captain Walford - *Editor*.

GALLIPOLI REVISITED, 1924

John Howell

Richard Armstrong Crouch was born in 1868 and grew up in Ballarat and Melbourne. He trained as a barrister and solicitor, and was commissioned in the colonial military forces in 1892. At the Federation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 he was elected as an MP and was the youngest member of the new government.

During the pre-war years he rose through military ranks and became a lieutenant-colonel in 1913. Just before the Gallipoli landings he was given command of the 22nd Battalion, and landed on the Peninsula on 5 September 1915.

After three months (and only a week before the Anzac evacuation) he was transferred to become

the Australian base commander in Mudros. Crouch then became so ill with laryngitis that in February, 1916 he was sent to the 1st Australian General Hospital in Heliopolis. In March he was returned to Australia and soon discharged from the A.I.F.

Prime Minister Hughes was being pressured by Britain for more men, and Australia eventually stood alone as the only nation on either side with a volunteer army. Some returned men like Richard Crouch thought it should stay that way. He became the Victorian state president of the 'Returned Soldiers No-Conscription League', and worked during the second half of the war to defeat the Australian conscription referenda of October 1916 and December 1917.

After WWI he joined the Labor Party and was chosen to go to the International Federation of Trade Unions Education Conference that was held in Oxford in 1924. This trip was also his opportunity to return to Gallipoli. Upon his return to Australia he wrote a ten-foolscap-page report. Following are some of his interesting observations:

At Constantinople I met Colonel C. E. Hughes the Australian representative of the Imperial War graves Commission, and he asked me whether I would like to see Anzac again. I certainly would. I suppose that every man who has served at Gallipoli is as anxious as a spiritual medium to see what was on the other side, and how the enemy's actual ground would show whether his opinion of the real Turkish formations and defences opposite him would tally with his daily inspection. I know that for about an hour a day in 1915, my eye had been glued to the end of a telescope, so that the change of almost a blade of grass between ours and the Turkish trenches had seemed familiar to me.

Cyril Hughes went to Gallipoli after the war to head the local Graves Registration Unit. He stayed on for years and became the IWGC Clerk of Works. The Gallipoli cemeteries are to his credit. Before leaving for the Peninsula with Hughes, Richard Crouch visited a Turkish war museum and wrote:

No Australian hats were shown, so my susceptibilities were not offended. Nor were there any captured Australian flags in their War Museum, but there were two Union Jacks prominently displayed. But in the arms stand there were a large number of Australian rifles, bayonets, and war material, which was triumphant evidence to the Turkish Museum's visitors of their country's prowess. I was lucky enough also to get a copy of the Turkish Military Staff's secret report on the Gallipoli campaign. To old Anzac men this is interesting reading, and sets out many surprising facts and theories unknown to us.

For the overnight voyage south he was a first class passenger on the small steamer New Sea and certainly seemed to have a first class attitude:

It took us nearly a day to get there, the boat a government one built in England in 1874, doing only 7 miles an hour. The three meals on board were awful. Everything sour and smelly, with some rancid radishes as an appetising dish in place of olives. There were three first class passengers and our beds were clean and free of vermin. About 40 second class including several Turkish officers and soldiers, and about 60 third class, who fed themselves on strange fare, and slept on hard boards under the hatches.



Richard Armstrong Crouch (AWM DA08943)



Lieutenant Cyril Hughes and Sergeant Arthur Woolley, both former surveyors, marking out graves at one of the Brown's Dip cemeteries in 1919 (AWM G01935).

On the Peninsula, Crouch stayed at the IWGC base at Kilia Liman (just north of Eceabat) and he wrote of his first day:

Early the next morning I was taken to Anzac, and when we got to the precipitous heights of Lone Pine, left the car. On Lone Pine there is erected a memorial worthy of our dead. It is a great obelisk 45 feet high in local white stone and Italian marble on an enormous white platform, approached by noble steps.

The memorial would have only been recently completed, and he commented that:

It will interest the Lone Pine defenders to know that when the Commission was digging for the site of the obelisk, they discovered a Roman Camp, old Roman remains, and coins, and some old skeletons.

Then my interest centred in my own trenches. From the left of Lone Pine to Quinn's Post, passing over Wire Gully and Owen's Gully and Steele's Post. They appeared almost unknown to me, although I had spent here 103 days. True, I had now for the first time seen our lines from the top, then I walked them under the shelter of 14 feet trenches, and a 20 feet firing line parapet.

Today we visit the shallow remnants of the trenches and are not surprised to see the degradation caused by a century, but it seems that most of this occurred within the first decade. Crouch was surprised by the area he thought would be most familiar, and said:

Nine years of heavy rains, frost, and severe weather had caused a transformation. Our old earth dump where Padres Bennett, Bladen and Godinach had held their church parades, was covered in beautiful arbutus with red berries like a yew. Figtrees grew where the cooks had had their fires. Small oaks and heather, weeds and thistles, covered the whole ground, whilst the tunnels had fallen in, and trenches once 20 feet high had sunk to a depth of two or three feet. The old regimental office, and signalling station, each side of my own dugout showed but little depression in a bare face of clay; whilst near the adjutant's dug-out there grew a splendid apricot tree. He was always fond of fruit! Of the old position, the only remaining distinctive feature was a sniping post, still protected by a large tree trunk, overlooking Wire Gully.

One of the stated purposes of his visit was to confirm that his 1915 impressions of the Turkish trench system were correct. He soon found that they were not:

The Turkish lines were the surprise. Where my last headquarters plans had shown me three trenches, there were nine, and one old riddle was solved. We had in front of us a place called The Crater, and occasionally lights were reported as visible by night in it. So important was this, as it was about 30 yards from us, that one night an officer and two 22nd Battalion men went out over the parapet to it. They reported no opening at any place into it. Now there is visible a large tunnel from the Turkish lines which evidently escaped their attention in the darkness. And another thing was surprising. My Battalion had to defend the longest line in Gallipoli. Any [Turkish] advance would have to be made up Wire and Owens Gully on our flanks, but what did I find? A broad trench twelve yards wide, leading from a great dip behind the plateau, to which many other trenches led. The actual position would have caused constant anxiety had it been known.

Richard Crouch then spent some time looking over the rest of the Anzac position, which he had been unable to do back in 1915:

The Turkish trenches were much better preserved than ours, and in some of them there was evidence they were not to be held, as they had barbed wire and iron sharp-pointed stakes secured in the bottom. Tunnels were numerous and the communicating trenches curved and very wide. The Olive Grove, so described on our maps, turned out to be of Bologna oaks. The old sap by which thousands passed from Rest Gully to New Zealand Beach to bathe, has fallen, and its track turned by cloudbursts and severe rains into a stony gully. The Sphinx still stands, but the clothing which fluttered during Anzac days, and was said to be the remains of a Turkish sniper, had disappeared. The very safe plateau of Divisional Headquarters in Rest Gully had been washed away. Shrapnel Gully with its weary climb and mule track is now a well-made motor road, and is the site of two beautiful cemeteries. The old embarkation pier still stands, and the two stranded water tank boats have not yet rusted away. Walker's Ridge is serrated with large gullies. Overall, Nature is restoring with a mantle of lovely shrubs, the marks of the ravages of an immortal struggle.

He then went on to Gaba Tepe and Cape Helles. Because he hadn't got to either in 1915 his comments are not as detailed about the changes, but interesting nonetheless. [The spelling of some names varies in the latter pages of his report, but they are left in here as he wrote them. So are his ample number of commas.]

I visited Gaba Tepe, the untaken Turkish fort. It seems harmless now, and by no means impregnable. I came across, in a Turkish trench, the bones of a man, but the Commission will only report it to the Turkish authorities, as it would cause offence to Moslems for a Christian to touch the remains. Later I paid a visit to Helles, a place I had not visited in the War, but whose guns I had frequently heard. The great area gained by the Allies surprised me, over four miles, which seemed enormous after our limited Anzac ground. It was all fairly flat country, honeycombed with trenches, and the village of Kathia- destroyed by bombardment, is still uninhabited, and looks like Pompeii, with its complete streets, walls of houses, and roofless dwellings. At Helles a great monument a 100 feet high has been erected to the soldiers and sailors of England and Australia, and on its outer walls are places left to record the names of the dead whose bodies have not yet found a named grave. From its base, one can see the great places of history: The plains of Troy, which the Germans are excavating; the place where Byron lived for 9 years, the spot where Xerxes sat when his 300,000 Persians crossed.

His interest in the ancient history and archaeology certainly came to the fore towards the end of his story, and he mentions some ancient items that have had brief mentions in earlier issues of *The Gallipolian*:

The whole place teems with history. 200 yards from the Commissions Camp at Kelia, is Leanders

Tower, now used as a Turkish bakery, whilst Leander and Hero's course across the Hellespont is pointed out. Colonel Hughes found two ancient Greek sarcophagi, one at Suvla Bay, whilst the other is used as a horse trough. The French at Helles dug up several beautiful statues and ancient descriptions which are now in the Louvre.

Some of his earlier observations were about the flora of the Peninsula, and he was certainly interested in the plants and trees that the IWGC were nurturing for the cemeteries. The following lines explain the presence of many Australian eucalypts on the Peninsula:

But there is another direction in which Australia will set its mark upon Gallipoli. Mr. Robert Kett the Kew expert, was able to receive from Melbourne and West Australia a large number of Australian seeds, as he thought Australian Flora would be Anzac's most permanent decoration. He planted and successfully raised 75 varieties of eucalyptus, she-oaks, pepper trees, wattles and titree. Of the eucalyptus, three varieties only seem to have a chance and these were blue gum, red gum and lemon gum. The kurrajong, the titree and the wattles failed completely, and their introduction to Anzac is abandoned. He has all the gentleness and modesty of a gardener, and he has propagated from Lone Pine pines 10,000 *pinus maritime*, a number of the seeds which he gave to me.

In Melbourne recently, a pine tree descended from a Lone Pine pine tree died. The timber was salvaged and a guitar was made and later played at Melbourne's Shrine of Remembrance. Does some of the credit for this go all the way back to Robert Kett at Gallipoli, and Richard Crouch who brought back some seeds? Richard Armstrong Crouch then brought his tale to a close, with only a few lines about the end of his time in Turkey. He tacked some of his own poetry on the end, which obviously reveals a lot about his feelings, as one of those who left dead friends and comrades behind during the evacuations at the end of 1915:

And so back to Constantinople by an equally slow Government Turkish boat, with better food, with a German who mines copper on an island (Pargos) one mile long near Smyrna; leaving the Peninsula, with grateful farewells for many kindnesses, Australian men who were there doing great work in comforting our people by their loving and lasting care for our Australian dead. In conclusion I would like to repeat some lines I wrote last year:

They came, they fought, they died
And though with task undone,
And victory still unwon,
They left the bloody shore;
Yet what could man do more?
Their glory is – they tried.

LAST POST

It is with regret that the Association learnt of the death of the following member:

Lady Moyra Brown DBE GCSt.J (Membership No. 1274) died on 4 December 2016; she was a long-standing member of the Association and the second wife of Sir Dennis John Wolco Browne who served at Gallipoli with the 13th Light Horse Regiment. After a few months on the Peninsula he was invalided back to Australia but later returned to service with the RAAMC and was in charge of a field ambulance on the Western Front. Dame Mary Fagan represented the Association at the funeral on 13 December 2016.



Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Birdwood. See pages 2 -3.




Headstone of Sergeant Harry Aiken, 14th Battalion AIF, in Woodgrange Park Cemetery, East London.
Photograph by Foster Summerson. See pages 6 - 10.



Balloon Deck of HMS *Manica* Looking towards Bridge by Herbert Hillier. The kite balloon is protected from the elements by an awning, the bright shaft of sunlight shows the true colour of the balloon fabric. (Art. IWM ART 4375). See pages 10 - 24.




A watercolour by Norman Wilkinson showing *Hecator* with her balloon up (note the stabilising parachutes). The cruiser in the right foreground is probably HMS *Edgar* fitted with mine-sweeping gallows over the bows. (Author's collection, from Norman Wilkinson, *The Dardanelles*, Plate 7, fp.70.). See pages 10 - 24.



Front cover: *World War Stories : Glory at Gallipoli*. (New York : Dell Publishing, 1965).

A rare Gallipoli comic book (Editor's collection).

Permission to reproduce kindly granted by Penguin Random House, New York.



Lieut Nettleton's flask, recovered from his body on Dead Man's Ridge and bought in a Turkish antique store by Haluk Oral (inset). (Photograph by Yetkin İçen). See pages 37 - 46.



Inside cover of Lieutenant Nettleton's notebook, recovered from his body on Dead Man's Ridge.
Note Arabic script from its use as a notebook by Turkish General İzzettin Çalışlar.
(Photograph and below by Yetkin İçsen). See pages 37 - 46.



Yetkin İçsen, Lone Pine memorial. Every officer named in the photo, and all others except Troopers Adelt and Baker, died as the result of the 7 August attack from Pope's Hill (diagram next page). See pages 37 - 46.



Photo taken from far left of Quinn's Post


The assault by 'A' Squadron (green arrow) and 'B' Squadron (red arrow), 1st Light Horse Regiment, on Dead Man's Ridge / The Chessboard, 4.30 am, 7 August 1915. The bodies of Lieutenant B P Nettleton and Major M Reid were recovered and buried by the Turks. See pages 37 - 46; diagram page 38. Photo: B Dolan.



View from Dead Man's Ridge, at approximately the location of the first Turkish trenches assaulted by the 1st Light Horse Regiment on 7 August. View is down Shrapnel Valley. Shoulder of Quinn's Post on left; foot of Pope's Hill on right; Lone Pine memorial centre skyline. See pages 37 - 46. Photo: B Dolan.



General İzzettin Çalıışlar's National Assembly ID Card. See pages 44 -45.
Photograph: Yetkin İçcen.



DEAD MAN'S FLASK

By Yetkin İçsen* and Haluk Oral**

It was about ten years ago, when I stopped at a small town near Çanakkale (Dardanelles) on my way back from a voyage to the Aegean Coast. Just across from the petrol station, I saw a little shop which its narrow window labelled as Antiquarian with crooked letters. I was suddenly intrigued and felt a certain charm about this word and needed to relax a little bit from all the driving, so I went into the shop. There were not many things inside. I bought one of the rum bottles used by British soldiers during the Gallipoli campaign. Then I saw the dusty flask on a shelf. According to the engraved writing it belonged to Lieutenant B P Nettleton of the Australian 1st Light Horse Regiment (photograph page 32). The shop keeper, who realised that I was deeply interested in the case said, 'My chap, it used to belong to an Anzac. I bought it from a local peasant the other day.' With this explanation he encouraged me to buy the flask. In fact, I needed no persuasion.

Now, I confess: I had kept the flask on the shelf of Çanakkale items among my collection cabinet for years and years. During a sleepless night recently I took the flask out. While I was still wondering what it had seen or where on earth it had been to, I started to search for my Anzac man on the Internet: I wrote B. P. Nettleton, Gallipoli, Anzac and searched for him through Google. I was not optimistic that I could find much, though.

On one of the web-sites that appeared was the alphabetic list of the Anzac officers who had died in Gallipoli (www.anzacs.org). When I saw the letter N and these lines below, I could not help staring at the computer screen and could not take my eyes off it for a long time:

Lieutenant Burdett Philip NETTLETON,

1st Light Horse Regiment, AIF. Born Sydney, NSW.

Single; Merchant, of Nara, Turramurra, Sydney, NSW.

Next of kin: Father; Sam Nettleton. Mother; Emily Nettleton, of same address.

Killed in action on Dead Man's Ridge, Anzac, on 7 August 1915, aged 26. No Known Grave.

I felt that I was shivering. The hair on the back of my neck was up. I once more took the flask carrying the traces of bullet and shrapnel. This Anzac officer was just about 26 years old when he died on 7 August, 1915... No Known Grave... What happened that day? What did our soldiers do? Or what about Lieutenant Nettleton?


The attack of the Australians at the Nek to assault Baby 700 was planned in order to back up the attack of the British and New Zealand troops on Chunuk Bair on the 7th August. Other attacks would also be made from Pope's Hill and Quinn's Post. Nettleton and his 1st Light Horse troops were ready at Pope's Hill.

Eventually, the attack was made with 200 soldiers at 4.30 am. The forces under the command of Major Reid were able to reach the Turkish trenches; however, those not killed outright had



Lieutenant B P Nettleton
in the uniform of the NSW Lancers
(pre-war militia).

lost contact with their own trenches. The result seemed dreadful for the Australians: 16 were killed, 98 wounded, 34 missing (mostly killed).



The assault of the 1st Light Horse on the Turkish 27th Regiment trenches, 7 Aug 1915. Note the presence of the Royal Welch Fusiliers and 2nd & 3rd Light Horse Regiments.

(Vernon, P V *The Royal New South Wales Lancers 1885-1985* p95).

See photographs on pages 34 and 35.

Information indicated on the web-site *NSW Cavalry* says that: All of the officers of B Squadron were casualties. The bodies of Major Reid and Lieutenant Nettleton could not be found.

In his book *Gallipoli Chunuk Bair Battles* the author Cemil Çonk had written these lines below indicating General Oglander as a reference: First Light Horse led by Major T W Glasgow attacked over Quinn's, Pope's and Chessboard zones (Turkish 27th Regiment trenches). Even though, initially they managed to capture three lines of trenches, since they were not supported adequately they lost 154 privates and officers out of 200. Thus, they had to retreat to their former trenches. (p42).

The Australian Light Horse attacked the trenches of the 27th Regiment. Lt Col. Şefik (Aker) was the commander of this regiment. His memoirs were published in a Military Periodical under the heading of *Gallipoli - Ariburnu Battles and the 27th Regiment* (1935, Volume 99). Şefik Aker had written the following for the progression of the same events:

The enemies failed to be victorious. The Australians could only penetrate into a small trench labelled as the 21st - because the soldiers defending this trench were all wounded or martyrs. This trench was a part of 27th Regiment which I was in command of and in order to point out that they captured the trench, the Anzacs had hoisted their flag. However, as a consequence of their counter-attack, the Australians had made a slight advance, this way we were able to recover almost all of their dead, trenches and flags. These bodies were buried in a private courtyard.

What is more, Şefik Aker added that there were two officers among these dead bodies. Two officers! The Australian references declared that Major Reid had reached the Turkish trenches.

The bodies of two officers from B Squadron, who were Reid and Nettleton, could not be found. Most probably, Reid and Nettleton were among the bodies that Şefik Aker had buried in a private courtyard.

On 7th August, half of Chunuk Bair and on 8th August the entirety of Chunuk Bair was seized by the Allies. On the day Nettleton died, the Anafartalar Group was established and immediately thereafter, Col. Mustafa Kemal was assigned as the commander of this group. On 10th August the allied forces were defeated and thrown off Chunuk Bair.

And this is where our story ends.

Nettleton remains only as a name engraved in the cold marble at Lone Pine.

I would like to end this article with a message from Mustafa Kemal calling out from 1934.

Those heroes who shed their blood and lost their lives! You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore, rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehments to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours. You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries! Wipe away your tears. Your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well.

I wrote the above article three years ago. When a devoted researcher, Mr. Yetkin Işcen, called me, I mentioned this story to him. In as short a time span as two minutes, the name of this young officer had already excited two people and already in thirty minutes the same name had forced Mr. Işcen to my residence. Amongst the information Mr. Işcen had brought me I was finally able to see Lieutenant Nettleton's picture, about whom I had been reading all available documents at the Australian Archives website.

Is the world really as small as we think it is?



Major James Moffatt Reid,
1st Light Horse Regiment.
He and Lieut Nettleton were
buried by the Turks.

Who is Şefik Aker?

Colonel Şefik was born in 1877; his father was Selim Bey. After graduating from military school, he joined the 3rd Army in Istanbul as a lieutenant and in 1897 served as a platoon commander in the Greco-Ottoman War. In 1900 he was promoted directly to captain, jumping the rank of 1st lieutenant. He was in Yemen as a volunteer for two years. His last task there was the post of deputy staff commander of the 14th Division. After Yemen, Mehmet Şefik served in Ezine and Edremit. He also fought in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12, and in the Balkan War of 1912-13. When the Gallipoli campaign started, he was the commander of the 27th Regiment of the 9th Division.

On 25th April the first Anzac troops landing at Ariburnu faced the men of this regiment. Three-and-a-half hours after the landing had begun, Şefik attacked the enemy with a machine gun and two infantry companies. Three hours later, Lt. Col. Mustafa Kemal, on his own initiative, came to his aid with the 57th Regiment. Fifteen thousand enemy soldiers were stopped that day and in a way it was clear that the trench war which was to last for eight months had begun.

In 1916 he became a colonel; Mehmet Şefik, and fought in Galicia and Aleppo; one of the very first commanders who realised early on that Turks would have to fight a War of Independence after the conclusion of the Great War. On 23 May 1919, he pointed out the obligation of establishing a national force in a report he sent to the Ministry of War. Cevat Pasha (Cobanlı), who had become the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army a day before the Greeks invaded Izmir (Smyrna) on 14 May 1919, was supportive of this idea and delegated the choice of this path to Mehmet Şefik.

Şefik Bey put his thoughts into practice by organizing the local militia. When the city of Aydin was liberated from the Greek invasion on 19 June 1919 he was in the midst of this fierce and bloody battle. When Izmir was invaded again by the Turks, he was the commander of the 57th Division. He worked together with Gokcen Efe and Yoruk Efe, and he was also in charge of the force with Demirci Mehmet Efe which moved to Konya to suppress the uprising in that city.

Şefik Aker retired in 1931 at his own request. He died in Istanbul on 6 February 1964. Information regarding his service can be found in the book *Commanders Who are Taught About in The Turkish War Classes* (Published by the Harp Akademileri Komutanligi Yayinlari, 1983).

- Haluk Oral



27th Regiment officers at Gallipoli.

Seated L-R: Major Halis Ataksor, Lieut Col Şefik Aker (CO), Major Cemil Bey

Standing L-R: Captain Mustafa Efendi, Cevdet Efendi (ADC), Captain Faik, Captain Hamdi Efendi

It was a few months before the 75th anniversary of the enemy forces landing in Gallipoli, that is a few months before 25 April 1990. I was at the office of a friend. While we were talking about business, I could not help but notice a Medal of Independence hanging on the bulletin

board behind my friend's desk. 'Whose medal is this?' I asked İzzettin. His reply was short: 'My Grandfather's ...'

That's when it dawned on me. My friend's name was İzzettin Çalışlar, yet I had never given it a thought, because his last name is a rather common name. When I asked what his grandfather's name was, I got the answer I thought I would get: General İzzettin Çalışlar.

It was that famous commander at The Battle of Çalışlar during the Independence War, Col. Mustafa Kemal's chief of staff in Gallipoli and then his later to be close friend; General İzzettin Çalışlar

I recall asking İzzettin: Are there any surviving diaries or notes of any kind at all to this day from your grandfather? His reply was of the usual kind, a simple answer with very few words: 'Oh well, there is a suitcase full of them.'

Anyway, İzzettin brought that suitcase in the next day, and we buried ourselves in the faded and aged notes and diaries. I know how to read only the numbers in old Turkish writing, thus it was easy for me to find the daily notes for 1915, yet we needed someone who could read these since we could not. I found that someone very quickly and we had all of the notes from 1915 translated into modern-day writings (all of the notes in this suitcase were eventually completely translated into modern-day Turkish in the span of few short years and were published in book form by the Yapi ve Kredi Publishing House first as *2,5 Years with Atatürk* and subsequently as *Diaries of The 10 Years War*. But these books were published with many errors due to a lack of attention to detail during the pre-publishing stage. This was a cause for sadness for me).

While the young Mr Çalışlar and I were going over many of these old notes, something rather unusual attracted our attention. This was a name and address written in the Latin alphabet on the inside of the back cover of these notes, which were entirely written in old Turkish using the Arabic alphabet.

Lieut. B. P. Nettleton, B SQN, No.1 L.H. Reg. (A.I.F.) Turramurra, N.S.W. Australia

There was also an annotated list of thirty-five soldiers' names.

Additionally we noticed another name which was scribbled on the top corner of the same page: 'Pope's Hill' (photograph page 33).

These notes in the Latin alphabet had aroused my curiosity. For days I tried to give this name an explanation or some kind of meaning, yet somehow my every theory remained incomplete. The translation of the 1915 diaries came to the rescue; I found the following note amongst the daily notes for 22 August 1915: 'An officer and 20 soldiers were captured as prisoners. The officer absolutely refused to give any information.'

Apparently, this captured officer and his men were brought to Major İzzettin, the Chief of Staff of the Anafartalar Group. We assumed that when it came to recording the names of these men, he must have handed the pen to the Aussie officer and likely said: 'You write them,' because he could not record their names using the Latin alphabet.

If the actual event happened this way, this officer - Nettleton - and his men should have been sent to a POW camp. This would also be highly likely to mean that they had returned to their country alive.

Based on this assumption I undertook the following: I was going to have brochures made containing the picture of these pages from the notes, and some important additional notes I

had selected again from these documents, and I was going to distribute these during the Anzac Day ceremonies taking place on 25 April 1990. In my brochure I had referred to Nettleton as 'the captured officer.' Maybe there would be someone amongst the visitors who would somehow remember or recognize this name. There were 3,000 copies printed of this brochure, and all of them were gone in a short time during the day of remembrance on the Gallipoli Peninsula. But there was no response from anyone who had received this brochure, nor did we receive any replies in the ensuing days.

Ten years passed. Now the internet had become a part of our lives. One evening, in my study at home I was going through different search engines and I was using the words, Gallipoli, Dardanelles and Anzac, and I found a web site called www.anzacs.org.

Two Australian researchers, Bryn Dolan and John Meyers, had set up this site. These young men were collecting information on about 500 Anzac officers who died in Gallipoli and they were making this data available for public use. Suddenly I remembered Nettleton, and I looked his name up in the index of officers. And what did I see?

The records were indicating that Lieutenant Nettleton was killed in action during the raid on 7 August 1915 and that his body had not been found, thus he did not have a known grave and his name was inscribed on the stone wall of the Lone Pine memorial.

I quickly wrote a letter to web site official Bryn Dolan and told him about the findings. I explained to him: If this officer had been killed in action on August 7, Major İzzettin could not have written that they had held an officer and twenty soldiers as prisoners, and the names of all these men could not have been recorded in his notes. This tells me that Nettleton did not actually die during this fight; he merely became a prisoner of war. Therefore I wish to encourage you to review your research.

I received a very detailed response from Mr Dolan. These documents showed clearly how well organised and detailed the record-keeping was even in those years in the Australian armed forces; these would extend all the way from the eyewitness sources who saw Lieutenant Nettleton killed in action, to his death certificates which was sent to his immediate family. This response from Mr. Dolan also included a small portrait of Lieutenant Nettleton as well as the exact path he had followed with the men under his command to climb Dead Man's Ridge [See page 34]. These pieces of evidence were accurate to the point where one could almost see where Lieut Nettleton had been shot and killed. Dolan had also made another important point: There were no known Australian officers, captured at Gallipoli, who had died in any POW camp in Turkey.

It was exactly at this point that I received some news from my friend İzzettin. One of the experts conducting the translation had found another notation made in the diary. This note was handwritten by Major İzzettin and actually solved the entire mystery right there:

'27 October 1916. I am recording my memoirs for this year inside a note book taken from the British in Ariburnu.'

This meant that Major İzzettin had used this note book, taken from an enemy soldier during the fighting in Gallipoli, to write his daily notes between 27 October 1916 and 28 February 1917.

What had misled us was our impression that these two books were in sequence since we could not read the old Turkish writing. We had related the book used during 1916 and 1917 to the days of Gallipoli, because there was the name and address of Anzac Lieutenant Nettleton and

the list of his men under his command. Unfortunately, we had failed to notice the tiny note on one corner of this book, again because we could not read the old Turkish.

We promptly reported these findings to Mr Dolan with a letter of apology and we verified his accuracy and the findings in his reporting. Nettleton had received orders to attack Dead Man's Ridge from Pope's Hill that day; he had recorded 'Pope's Hill' in his note book, but as he fought in the Turkish trenches on top of the ridge he had lost his life. We had ultimately not unveiled a secret(!) which had remained hidden, but had got to know an expert such as Mr Dolan as the result of this communication.

Another 3 or 4 years passed after these events. During a conversation with one of my friends about Gallipoli, I discovered that he knew a man named Haluk Oral, a professor at a university in Istanbul, very interested in Gallipoli. I called him at his home a few days later. At one point in our phone conversation Professor Oral mentioned that he had written an article in a magazine about the flask belonging to an Anzac lieutenant.

Casually I asked him who this lieutenant was. But I remember very vividly that I almost jumped up from my seat, when he answered, 'B P Nettleton.'

It was a mere half hour later after I had asked his address that I was already in front of the entrance to his house ringing his door bell. Just seconds later I was standing in front of the glass cabinet which contained the flask. Here was the most vivid object standing before me, which belonged to the enemy soldier who had been occupying a part of my brain for the past fifteen years. The number of the unit he was a member of and the name of Lieutenant B P Nettleton could be seen on this flat-shaped flask.

The flask seemed to me as more of a personal item from Nettleton, than the book where he had recorded his name and address. This was not a standard issue item as part of an officer's equipment. Perhaps it was a gift from a girlfriend or maybe his younger brother Donald had given him this flask as he was about to board ship in Sydney. Who knew?

I could see his elongated face with a rather large chin. I saw him raising this flask to his lips drinking the warm water on that hot August day on a bushy hill at Gallipoli, all too foreign to him, a land he had never seen before, while bullets were whizzing by and the bombs were exploding around him. Had he actually had a chance to swallow that small bit of water? Or had the mortar shell exploded next to him while water was still in his mouth? Who had taken this flask from his dead body? Were the flask and his book taken by the same person or by different people?

Haluk Oral had told me that he had purchased this flask from an antique dealer. This pretty much told me that the flask wasn't taken that day by Major İzzettin. If he had taken the flask, it would still be in the hands of his family.

The clues which Mr. Oral had traced pointed to his burial by the Turks after he was killed. The fact that he had no known grave in the Australian records further verified this. The documents sent to me by Bryn Dolan had shown me that he was killed together with his colleague Major Reid at the same moment when a shrapnel shell had exploded next to them. It would therefore seem logical that those who found him had buried him somewhere over there after his personal items, such as weapons, issued equipment and his flask, were taken. It would seem rather logical too, that those who had found him would have given his notebook to Major İzzettin to scrutinise. Later he had used this book to keep his own notes. This could also be deduced based on Major İzzettin's note: 'A notebook taken from an English Officer

in Ariburnu...' He had not even known that the owner of this note book was not English.

The 26-year-old Lieutenant Nettleton was the elder son of a family who had migrated from England to Australia two generations before. His father was a well-known Sydney merchant. He had a younger brother. He had previously served as a trooper, and was promoted 2nd lieutenant in the Australian militia in 1913. In the early days of 1915 he was promoted to lieutenant. Based on the written records about him and also based on eyewitness accounts of the events on 7th August, Nettleton had fought hard and shown bravery during the battle. It was reported that he had fallen in a captured Turkish trench and that his body was left there. The trench in which he died was later recaptured by Turkish soldiers and these soldiers then had indicated that the two officers were buried in a location removed from this particular area. One of these two officers was surely Lieutenant Nettleton.

The crowd that attended the memorial service at Turramurra was so large that some people had to remain outside the church because it was overflowing. His father was shaken badly by the news of his son's death and only lived only two more years, dying at the age of 59. As is customary, Nettleton's name was engraved on his father's tombstone.

Even though his name is engraved on two different marble stones, he does not have a marked grave; yet the flask from which he drank and the notebook in which he wrote his name and address managed to keep his memory alive, even 92 years after his death.

Who is İzzettin Çalışlar?

Maj. İzzettin (General Çalışlar); see photograph page 35.

İzzettin Çalışlar was born as the youngest of the six children in Yannina in 1882. His parents were Ataullah Bey and Esma Hanim. He came to Istanbul to be educated in military school (Mhendishane-i Berr-i Hmayun), and graduated in 1903. That year he was accepted into the Military Academy. In 1906 he graduated second in his artillery class and joined the army as a staff officer with the rank of captain, and commanded various units during the Balkan Wars of 1912 - 13. While he served during this war as a staff officer in the Fatih Reserve Division and 14th Recrute Division, in 1917 he was elevated to senior captain and was assigned to serve at Fort Edirne and also to Branch 3 of the Armed Forces HQ.

Soon after WWI broke out Lieut-Colonel Mustafa Kemal was assigned to the Gallipoli front as commander of the 19th Division and he asked Maj. İzzettin to serve as his staff officer. At that time İzzettin Bey had just become a major. He was later to continue in his position as the chief of staff for Colonel Mustafa Kemal in the Anafartalar Group. Following the Gallipoli campaign he became the commanding officer and chief of staff of the 16th Corps and was promoted to lieutenant-colonel, subsequently acting as the 2nd Army's chief staff officer and commander of staff officers at General HQ. In 1920, when he was ordered to serve in the Ottoman Army HQ Personnel Bureau, he decided instead to join the War of Independence movement which had begun a year before; and thus he went to Anatolia.

After joining the War of Independence as a lieutenant-colonel, İzzettin Bey first served as the vice-commander of the 20th Army Corps; he was later assigned to the command of the 23rd and 61st Divisions and fought at Kutahya and Inonu. He fought as a colonel on the Sakarya Battlefield, leading the 1st Group. Lastly during the war years he led the 1st Army Corps. Atatürk gave him the last name Çalışlar, because he led the continuing battles during the Great Charge, which started in the village of Çalışlar in Afyon, all the way to Izmir.

When the Turkish Army entered Izmir he acted as the military governor of the city, and during that time was promoted to brigadier-general. He served as a member of the Izmir courts and represented the city of Aydin in the Turkish parliament between 1923 and 1924. After resigning this post he chose the military as a full-time position. While in command of the 3rd Army he was promoted to full general in 1930. Later he was the commander of the 2nd Army for 6 years and in 1939 he retired from the military at his own request.

As a civilian he moved on to politics. He served in the Turkish parliament as the representative of the city of Aydin in 1939 and served 6th and 7th terms in 1940 as a representative from Mugla. Again in 1947 he was elected for an 8th term as the representative of Balikesir.

Throughout his professional career he earned various medals for service and distinction from the Ottoman empire, as well as from the German and Austrian-Hungarian empires. He was awarded the Medal of Independence and the Turkish Republic's Certificate of Appreciation from the Grand Turkish Parliamentary Assembly. He and his wife had four children, and when he died, on 20 August 1951, he was laid to rest in the government cemetery in Ankara.

- *Yetkin Işcen*

*** Yetkin Işcen (1953) is a freelance journalist, Gallipoli War researcher / historian and owner of the web site www.gallipoli1915.org

*** Prof. Haluk Oral (1957) is the head of the Department of Mathematics of Bogazici University. He publishes on the history of Turkish literature and Gallipoli besides Mathematics.

BURDETT PHILIP NETTLETON



Bryn Dolan

Lieutenant Burdett Philip Nettleton, 1st Light Horse Regiment, AIF, was born in Great Buckingham Street in Redfern, an inner-city suburb in the south of Sydney, on 15 March 1889, the son of Emily Ambler Nettleton (nee Laycock), originally of Bradford, Yorkshire and Sam Nettleton, originally of Clayton, Yorkshire.

He was educated at Sydney Church of England Grammar School, where he rowed in the school crew, and later at the Wagga Experiment Farm. Before the war he was a partner in his father's company of Nettleton, Son & Co., and gave his address as that of his parents; 'Nara,' Turramurra, a northern suburb of Sydney. (I believe that 'Nara' was in Gilda Avenue, in what is now the suburb of Warrawee).


He had previous military service as a trooper in 'A' Squadron, 7th Light Horse Regiment (NSW Lancers), enlisting in May 1910. He was appointed 2nd lieutenant on 28 February 1913.

When he attested into the AIF on 27 August 1914, he was 5ft 11in. (180.3 cm) in height, and weighed 168 lb. (76.2 kg). He gave his religion as Church of England.

He embarked with B Sqn., 1st Light Horse Regiment, landing at Anzac on 12 May. On the 18th the 1st Light Horse Brigade (1st, 2nd and 3rd regiments) took over the post known as Pope's Hill. Here Lieutenant Nettleton served as adjutant to the brigade.

He was killed in action on Dead Man's Ridge on Saturday, 7 August 1915, aged 26. A witness stated, 'His body was left behind in the trenches and was buried by the Turks.' Having no

known grave, he is commemorated on the Lone Pine memorial.



After holding out for three hours to the enemy lines, Major Glasgow looked round upon the few survivors and then gave the order to retire. Major Moffat Reid lay dead among his fallen. Nettleton also was dead. Wallace Cox was shattered. Tinson was helpless. The big form of Trooper Oakes, a B.A. of Sydney University, and guard to the bomb-throwers on this fatal occasion, lay upon the right of the Turkish parapet, where he fell at his post. (Extract from the diary of Chaplain E N Merrington).

The notebook that was recovered from Lieut Nettleton's body contained a list of, and information about, the men in his squadron. It was later reported that 'great difficulty was experienced in promoting N.C.O.s ... as far as 'B' Squadron was concerned, the nominal rolls had gone with the killed and missing on August 7.'

In 1918 Lieutenant Nettleton's brother, Donald, married Alice Purser. At the reception the bride's table was decorated with pale blue and white, the colours of Lieut. Nettleton's 1st Light Horse Regiment. Donald Nettleton named his first-born son Burdett, after his brother. Burdett Nettleton served as an engineer sub-lieutenant in the Royal Australian Navy during the Second World War.

A LETTER FROM SUB-LIEUT TWYMAN, H.M. SUBMARINE E7

Introduction

I am grateful to Lieutenant Commander Arthur Coxon (retd.) for bringing the following letter to the Editor's attention. It was sent by Sub-Lieutenant Twyman DSC to his parents (see end note and acknowledgements) shortly after returning from the Sea of Marmara in submarine E7. The submarine's next trip ended in disaster on 4 September 1915 as one of its propellers became hopelessly entangled in the anti-submarine nets off Point Nagara, just beyond Çanakkale in the Dardanelles. The crew was forced to scuttle the submarine and were all taken prisoner. Irvine Twyman and Lieut-Cdr Coxon's father, Captain Cedric Coxon (5th Battalion Norfolks), captured, ended up in the same POW camp in Turkey. Irvine Twyman became one of Arthur Coxon's godfathers.

My Dear Mother & Father,

We returned safely yesterday after 24 days up the Dardanelles in the sea of Marmara. It is hopeless to try and give you a detailed account in a letter but you can take it from me it was a fine show. We broke all previous records. The tale of our doings is the sort of thing one reads of in the old days. We went around the sea of Marmara leaving a trail of sunk and burning ships. We fairly shook things to the core. We are the first submarine in history to bombard a place on shore under fire. I think we were under fire about three times a day on an average. We penetrated into all sorts of places and destroyed shipping. We even shelled a railway and

destroyed two troop trains.

We shelled the embankment and blocked the line and then caught the trains as they came along. It was the funniest thing you can imagine to see the trains trying to hide behind trees, but we caught her and smashed her all to blazes. Three ammunition wagons blew up with a terrific explosion. The soldiers of course got out and took cover and fired tons of ammunition at us but we were out of range.

Altogether we sunk one gunboat, five steamers, one of 3000 tons, and 17 large sailing ships, two trains, one railway embankment, and a few villages who fired on us and got it in the neck for doing so.

We also dived up to Constantinople and fired a torpedo at the wharf at the arsenal where there were a lot of ammunition lighters and there was a most terrific explosion which shook the boat although we were 1 mile away. What happened I don't know but something must have got it in the neck judging by the bang. We had a small duel with a small gun boat one day on the surface, and drove her off although she fired about 200 rounds from her 2 guns.

After that we were left alone, and everything ran like blazes when we appeared anywhere. The only drawback was that we all had dysentery; two men nearly died and Hallifax the second officer & a seaman got badly burnt setting fire to a steamer, and so Cochrane and I had to keep watch all the time and by the time the 24 days were up we were absolutely done up. What Hallifax went through down below for three weeks suffering agonies with his burnt feet, I don't know, it must have been hell, poor fellow.

We had no trouble diving up but when we came down we had an awful time as the Turks had rigged all sorts of nets and things to catch us and we got mixed up in them, and also got foul of mines three times. It was awful I can tell you, but we got back safely after all. The reception we got when we steamed into the harbour where the French and English fleets and the troop ships lie was great. I was so affected that I nearly shed tears. The whole fleets and everything manned the rails and cheered us madly. I have never heard anything so fine. Just imagine it, us all dirty and unshaven, and the flag with bullet holes all over it and the conning tower all dents from bullets and rusty, steaming through the lines and thousands of men cheering like mad. Battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, and transports and everybody along the rail with the Captains leading the cheers. Oh! it was great. I have heard cheers before but this was the real thing. Poor old Cochrane's eyes were full of tears as he saluted in reply. And wild howls of are we downhearted and well done E7. It was wonderful.

Well, I always said that if we only got a chance we would do something, and we did.

I am afraid this is somewhat of a mixed jumble but I shall have to settle down a bit before I can write a coherent letter. I kept a record of all our doings in a book day by day and I hope you'll be able to see it some day. I cant describe it all in a letter, but I have told you our main exploits, but I can only describe things properly with my tongue, a pen is so futile. I got a fine mail when I got back, 7 from you, 5 from Vera, 2 from Gwen and 1 from New Zealand, so everything was fine. I am so sorry I should have been adrift about your silver wedding but we have not had much chance of remembering things of that sort. I had my birthday in the sea of Marmara. Thanks very much for the £5. in the War Loan. I feel as though I really am doing something at last. What!



Sub-Lieut Twyman.
Photograph courtesy Kate Twyman.


Well! At present I am resting hard and basking in the light of popular favour. It is very nice to be a hero among ones own cloth you know, because you know they really mean it and they really understand the worth and difficulty of ones achievement. Whether the papers will make a song about it I don't know or care much, it makes no difference to ones own feelings on the matter.

I am sending Gwen a safety pin from the head of a torpedo that sank a steamer. This pin is only taken out at the last thing before firing. When it is in the torpedo will not explode, but when it is taken out, stand by! It would make a brooch quite well I think. Hoping you are all well, as I am, I remain, Your affectionate son Irvine.

Notes and Acknowledgements

Irvine Twyman married Vera (Vera Emily Coles, nee Finch), mentioned in the letter, and they had four children; George Irvine, June Helen, April Brenda and Richard Finch. Richard will be 86 this year. I would like to thank Richard and his granddaughter, Mrs Sally King (April's daughter), for permission to reproduce Sub-Lieut Twyman's letter.

Irvine Twyman had six grandchildren, all of whom are still living. One of them, Kate Finch Twyman, gave permission for use of the portrait of Sub-Lieutenant Twyman on page 47.



POW Camp, Turkey. Sub-Lieut Twyman, in beard with pipe, became Arthur Coxon's godfather. Capt A C M (Cedric) Coxon, 5 Bn Norfolks, captured at Suvla - Arthur Coxon's father - is behind Twyman's left shoulder and Capt Alfred Douglas Pass, Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry (with knee near dog's head), captured on Scimitar Hill, became Arthur Coxon's other godfather in 1927.

Death is the Conqueror's Welcome Home

Epitaph on the headstone of Private William Henry Nield, Lancashire Fusiliers.
Died 8 September 1915, aged 19. Azmak cemetery, Suvla.

FURTHER TO THE MYTH OF THE GALLIPOLI CURRENT

John Howell

The article in *The Gallipolitan* 142 (Winter 2016) explained that for a century it had been an accepted fact that a mysterious current pushed the Anzac forces some miles north of where they intended to land in April 1915. The details of Major-General Bridges' Operational Order No. 1 were ignored by many including Aspinall-Oglander in his British official war history of 1929. The power of his *Military Operations, Gallipoli* even caused Charles Bean to revise what he had earlier written and thought.

Point 1 of Bridges' order of April 18 had finished without being specific, and had simply said: 'The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps will land north of KABA TEPE the landing will probably be opposed.'

It was Point 2 that added more definition to the intended location in stating: 'The Division will land between KABA TEPE and FISHERMANS HUT. Its first objective will be the occupation of the ridge extending from Sq 212(i) to point 971 in Sq 238(m).'

Colonel Henry MacLaurin commanded the 1st Brigade in the 25 April landing at Z Beach, but he was unfortunately killed by a Turkish sniper only two days later. Part of his personal map that he carried ashore is now in the collection of the Australian War Memorial, and is shown on page 36. Reference to it simplifies all this talk of map squares and co-ordinates. His copy of the map would have been the latest version that it was possible to print in time for the landing. Every new and important piece of information that had come in from aerial reconnaissance would have been added (see map page 36).



H N MacLaurin

The ridge that was nominated in Point 2 of the official order that running from Map References 212(i) to 238(m) - is of course the high ground that starts near Gaba Tepe and rises up to include Lone Pine, The Nek, and Chunuk Bair. This crazy piece of crumbly coast with its ridges and gullies was never a place arrived at by accident. It was the location expressly listed in the Anzac orders as the first objective.

Aspinall-Oglander, of course, didn't wait until 1929 to make up details of an ocean current; it was more that his official war history wasn't easily questioned. Such talk of currents had simmered for years, and even a disbeliever like Sir Ian Hamilton had conceded four years earlier in his introduction to *Gallipoli Today* that it was already the generally accepted view that it was a current which landed the Anzacs a mile further to the north.

It seems in fact that such talk was around in Australian minds not years afterward, but only a matter of days after the landings of April 25. On 7 May, only a fortnight after the landings, the Anzac Command produced: *Report on the Operations of the First Australian Division*.

The second page of the report states that:

The position at which the landing was effected lies in Square 224 (g) and (l), and was about 13/4 miles north of the intended landing place.

The map references are certainly true for Anzac Cove and North Beach, but the rest of the

sentence flies in the face of their own Operational Order No.1. The landing in accordance with the issued orders was now apparently north of the intended landing place, and it seems too that the peninsula scuttlebutt was already justifying the cause of the error by talking of a current.

Was the Z Beach landing already being seen as a possible failure? Was this 7 May report already setting the tone for on-going justification of the very limited progress of the landing? Map reference 224 (g) and (l) is precisely what we now call Anzac Cove or Ari Burnu, but 1³/₄ miles to the south is Gaba Tepe. Those aboard HMS *Queen* had ruled this out as a landing point back on 14 April. Even without the later aerial reports they could see it was a deadly place to land.

The negativity of the report certainly continues with the next lines:

While in the tows and during the landing the troops were under machine gun fire and musketry fire and enfilade shrapnel fire from KABA TEPE. An accurate statement of the losses incurred during disembarkation cannot be obtained; it is feared that there were many casualties.

Such negativity and uncertainty produced the fertile ground in which the existence of a mysterious current could germinate and flourish. It soon thrived and became a part of the Gallipoli landscape as we have grown up to know it.

Notes

- MacLaurin's map can be found in the Australian War Memorial Collections by searching for item RCo2689
- *Report on the Operations of the First Division* can be found on-line in the AWM Collection reference RCDIG1009148

GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION TOUR 7 - 12 MAY 2017

Only 4 places remain on this year's Gallipoli tour, led by Steve Chambers and Clive Harris, so we urge anyone wishing to go to contact tours@gallipoli-association.org as soon as possible.

Spring is a beautiful time to explore this dramatic and evocative battlefield. Our study of the campaign (walking and/or non walking) will include the main historic areas of Helles, Anzac, Krithia, Gully Ravine, North Anzac, Suvla and the Dardanelles. For those of you who have been to Gallipoli before, we will be exploring some 'hidden' parts of the old battlefield seldom visited and recounting new stories of heroism and endurance. All are welcome.

Price per person: £1,350.00 (£120.00 single supplement)

Deposit £300.00 (Flight cost, ATOL approved)

Non-flight price: (Meet the group in Istanbul) £1,150.00

Hotel accommodation: (Half board basis in Çanakkale)

They Shine As The Stars For Ever

Epitaph on the headstone of Lieutenant Alan Macfarlane Turner, 1/5th Highland Light Infantry.
Died of wounds 19th December 1915, aged 20. Pink Farm cemetery, Helles.

His elder brother, 2nd Lieutenant David Fotheringham Turner, 8th East Yorkshires,
was killed in action at Loos on September 25.

2ND LIEUT GORDON HERBERT WACE, ROYAL MUNSTER FUSILIERS

From the Association Archives

Foster Summerson

Introduction:

I came across the letter below in the Association Archives and thought it would be of interest to readers. It came from a former member, Mr Patrick Shaw, who was given it by a friend, Mr Robert Blandy, who discovered the letter while sorting through his late wife's papers and gave permission for its publication. Mrs Blandy was the cousin of Captain Dunlop referred to in the letter.

There is no indication of who sent the letter, or the recipient, but both appear to have lived and had business in Ceylon before the First World War. They clearly knew Herbert Gordon Wace (known as Gordon in the family) and his father Herbert Wace CMG, (1851 – 1906), the Government Agent of the Central Province of Ceylon and Acting Colonial Secretary.

The account in the letter is second-hand and was told some years after the events that took place when memories had faded, and parts of the story have become confused in the telling. Certainly, readers will spot a number of inaccuracies. Indeed, research by the Editor indicates that Wace was sent for officer training in Egypt on 5 April 1915^[1] – probably soon after the Ceylon Tea Planters Rifles contingent arrived there – and was gazetted into the Royal Munster Fusiliers from the General List on 19 April 1915.^[2] It is unlikely therefore that Wace was with the Munsters at the time of the landing at V Beach! The writer, or the person (Colonel Whigham) who relayed the information to him, was clearly thinking of someone else.

It is thus a reminder not to take everything one finds in archive material as entirely accurate!

Sadly, Herbert Gordon Wace was to die on 21 August 1915, possibly during the attack on Scimitar Hill. He is commemorated on the Helles Memorial. The family were to suffer a further loss the following year; another son, Captain Percival Beckwith Wace, 5th Bn. Royal Berkshire Regiment, a Master at Marlborough College, was killed on the Somme on 3 July 1916.

11th January 1924

My Dear [?]

The death of Dean Wace^[3] brings to my mind an incident of the war, which, since it came to my knowledge, I have often meant to relate to you, but whenever we happened to meet there have been so many other more immediate things to talk about that I do not think I ever did. At least, I think so. If not, and I have already told you the story, please forgive me. It is a moving little tale, it I can relate it well.

You will recollect some two or three years before the war you asked me to take young Herbert Wace as S.D.^[4] at 'Kandanewara'^[5] after he had been for a time, rather unsuccessfully, trying to learn some law as Secretary to the Chief Justice – Hutchinson – I think. That must have been in 1911. He stayed on a K.N. for about 2 years or 2½ years, and then we tried how he would do in a more independent position at Galgawatte.^[6]

Though quiet steady and willing, he never seemed to have his heart in planting any more

than in the law, and a certain rather waffling indifference was, I recollect, causing me a good deal of uneasiness, not to say vexation with him.

The only thing he seemed to have any interest in was the occasional camps or drills of the Ceylon Rifle Corps. There was not much scope in that in 1913!

Then came the War, and his eagerness – like a dog's when it sees you take down a gun – to be allowed to join the contingent, was pitiful to behold. You will remember how the shopkeepers, to whom he owed some small bills, interfered, and we fixed matters so that he could go.

The next step was the sailing of the contingent. I went to see them off and was standing on the deck of the troopship speaking to the regular Adjutant and some others, when something was wanted and the Adjutant blew his whistle for the corporal of the guard. Who should come doubling up as smart as a pin and alert as a terrier, with stripes on his arm, but my old rather heavy and sheepish young friend, Wace, and there were some uncommon smart lads on board in that contingent too.

When he had saluted and gone bustling off in pursuit of the order, I turned to the Adjutant in some surprise and asked how Wace came to be in that position. "One of the best we have" says he, "always ready, always keen, always smiling". "Isn't he rather thick-headed and forgetful?" says I. "Why no", says he, "or he would not have got his stripe, you may bet on that".

They sailed, and we heard little more of them until after the Gallipoli campaign which opened in 1915.

Later on, in 1917, I was in West Africa, and on the boat home, there was a certain Colonel Whigham who had been in or attached to the Dublin Fusiliers at the time of the Gallipoli landing, which, as you may remember, was led by that regiment out of the SS River Clyde. I also met a Colonel Moorhouse who was the senior transport officer in command of the landing arrangements of the ship.

Among the officers of the Dublins was a certain Capt. George Dunlop, a cousin of my wife's, who had paid us a visit from India in 1912 or 1913, on leave from India.

Describing the landing, Whigham told me that Dunlop was Captain of the Machine Gun Company and that it was the machine gunners that had to get out of the ship first and run up the beach and get their guns into action to keep down the Turkish rifle fire from the trenches above the beach, and Dunlop led them.

You may recollect that the ship was run ashore and that large port-hole doors had been cut in her bows and sides to allow troops to get quickly out of her and so to storm the beach. Getting the pontoons out, of course took some little time, during which the doorways were kept down with the troops, carefully arranged in order by Moorhouse, drawn up behind them.

As soon as the pontoons were, more or less, in place the door was raised and out ran Dunlop, followed by his company and carrying their machine gun. The pontoons did not quite reach the shore, and they had to wade a few steps. Most of the men were shot down before the shore was reached, and by the time the gun was got onto dry land, just above the water, they were all down except Dunlop himself. His supports in the ship, seeing what it was like, not unnaturally hung back for a moment, and he was seen trying to lift and carry forward the gun, which, with its tripod and ammunition, is too heavy for a single hand.

At this juncture, a single unknown figure from the back of the ship pushed his way through

to the doorway and, jumping onto the pontoon, ran to Dunlop's assistance, and seizing the other handle, the two of them rushed the gun up into dead ground under the hill, and even, it was believed, got it into action. They were, however, both shot to ribbons in the doing of it.

However, the situation was saved. The regiment poured out of the ship and worked the gun. "Who was the unknown", I enquired. "Oh" says Whigham, "he was one of your little lot from Ceylon. He had no business there but he did well. I never hear his name till afterwards, though I went to have a look at him – tallish chap with very fair hair and light-coloured eyes".

"What was his name?" I asked. "It was Wace".

Notes:

1. Information from Wace's Medal Index Card.
2. *The London Gazette*.
3. The Revd. Henry Wace (1836 – 1924) was Dean of Canterbury from 1903 – 1924. He was the elder brother of Herbert Wace CMG and therefore Gordon's uncle.
- 4 & 5. There is no explanation of the abbreviation 'SD' but George Wace was assistant manager at Kandanevura (more commonly spelt Kandenewera) – a tea estate - in 1912.
6. Galgawatte was the location of Ceylon's first tea growing estate.

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA TO THE DARDANELLES OPERATIONS

Professor Dmitry V. Likharev

Russian sources relating to the Dardanelles Operations may be divided into two large groups. The first group embraces documents concerning strategy and diplomacy of the Russian Empire in the question of the Black Sea Straits. Most diplomatic documents are contained in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire in Moscow. The most interesting of these diplomatic papers were published in the 1920 - 30s in two documental series - 'Constantinople and the Straits' edited by E. A. Adamov (2 vols., 1925 - 1926)¹ and 'International Relations in the Epoch of Imperialism. 1978 - 1917,' edited by M N Pokrovsky and V M Khovostov (13 vols. 1930 - 1940).² Strategic plans are contained in the fund 418 'General Naval Staff of the Russian Naval Archive' (St. Petersburg) and are still unpublished.

The second group includes documents relating to the purely naval operations of the Russian Black Sea Fleet against Turkish forts on the coasts of the Bosphorus and the participation of the Russian cruiser *Askold* in the operations of the Allied naval forces against the Dardanelles. These documents are kept in the funds 609 'Staff of the C.-in-C. Black Sea Fleet' and 716 'Operations in Ocean Communications' of the Russian Naval Archive and they also remain unpublished. Of course, these documents were used in several monographs which will be mentioned below.

It would be natural to begin our survey with the problems of strategy and diplomacy. The seizure of the entrance to the Mediterranean was one of the principal Russian war aims of the First World War. Ambitious naval building programmes were adopted in Russia soon after the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Their fulfilment was supervised by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and were planned to be completed by 1917. Accordingly by this time the Russian Navy would outdistance the Italian, Austrian and Japanese navies and would become equal to the French Navy.

As early as 1913 - 1914 the General Naval Staff worked out a strategic plan for conquering the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits. This plan envisaged capturing the Straits by simultaneous naval and amphibious operations from the Bosphorus side and from the Dardanelles side at the very beginning of the Great European War. The authors of this plan, seemed, did not believe that such a war would begin before 1917. Russian naval leaders selected that moment for such an operation because they believed that the two main powers which might effectively interfere were Germany and their ally, Great Britain.

The introduction to this strategic paper runs: 'Britain will not actively interfere in our Balkan politics and block by force our intention to obtain Constantinople and the Straits until Germany will be defeated, or at least her navy will be defeated. As soon as the defeat of the German Navy will become *fait accompli*, she will certainly do it.'³ The necessary condition for the success of such an operation was indisputable supremacy of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea and of the Franco-Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea. According to the strategic plan the main forces of the Russian Baltic Fleet should be transferred to the Mediterranean on the eve of the Great European War.

Neither this plan, however, nor the naval building programmes, had anything in common with reality and were far beyond the capacity of Russian finance and industry.

August 1914 buried completely these ambitious plans and programmes for creating a navy capable of accomplishing the desired strategic tasks. Only four dreadnought battleships of *Petropavlovsk* class in the Baltic and three in the Black Sea together with several destroyers of the *Novik* class were commissioned into the navy during 1914 - 1915. Construction of the *Izmail* class battle-cruisers (see p32) and the *Svetlana* class light cruisers had to be concealed.⁴

From the very beginning of the war Russia badly needed her ally - Great Britain - as the strongest naval power. But the question of the Straits, or to be more precise, who would possess the Dardanelles, Bosphorus and Constantinople after the War, constantly embittered the relations between Russia and her Western Allies,⁵ especially during the Dardanelles operations.

Russian diplomatic documents and correspondence between Minister for Foreign Affairs B D Sazonov and the General Staff contain curious facts which reveal the diversity of attitudes to the problem of the Straits and the Dardanelles operations in the highest diplomatic and military circles of the Russian Empire.

After Turkey entered the War, Russia had to deal with one more front in the Caucasus, about 1000 kilometres in length, as well as with many problems in the Black Sea created by the presence of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. In December 1914, Russian Supreme Commander Grand-Duke Nikolai appealed to the British Government and British High Command with a request to undertake a naval or military demonstration against Turkey in order to ease the pressure exerted by the Turks on Russian armies on the Caucasian front. He did not mention the Straits or Constantinople by name in his telegram, but only for a naval or military demonstration in 'the most vulnerable and susceptible places' of Turkey.⁶

However, despite any Russian problems, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill was eager to initiate offensive moves on the European periphery just as soon as feasible. Thus this Russian request should be treated only as a pretext to launch a serious war effort of strategic meaning.

On 20 January 1915 British Ambassador to Petrograd George Buchanan handed to Sazonov

a memorandum which indicated that the request of the Russian Supreme Command '... had been subjected to deep and careful consideration in the Admiralty. They have now come to the conclusion that in addition to the minor demonstration of which Lord Kitchener has telegraphed to Your Imperial Highness, the common interest of the allied cause requires that some more serious effort should be made to crush Turkish opposition. The Admiralty has accordingly determined to attempt, by naval operations, to force the passage of the Dardanelles. It is thought that these operations which will, the Admiralty hopes, resemble the methods by which the Germans destroyed one after another the outer rings of forts at Antwerp, will take 3 or 4 weeks to complete'.⁶

Further, this memorandum indicated that the Admiralty were going to use a fleet composed of 12 battleships (2 of the dreadnought type), 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, 4 submarines, 1 seaplane ship, a large number of minesweepers and other auxiliaries. The attack was planned to begin soon after the middle of February, when the concentration of this fleet was completed. 'A sufficient margin of casualties and for the destruction of the Turko - German fleet if and when the attacking fleet reaches the Sea of Marmara been allowed in the force available for this operation'.⁷

In conclusion, the Admiralty were expressing the hope that the Russian Government would, by naval operations undertaken at a proper moment at the mouth of the Bosphorus, and by holding troops in readiness to seize any advantage that may be gained, cooperate powerfully in the proposed attack.

In fact, Churchill saw the 'Dardanelles Scheme' as comprising two phases: first, forcing the Dardanelles by old battleships; success in this breakthrough would enable a small military force to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula, thus securing the rear and supply for the battleships in the Sea of Marmara. These ships would advance to Constantinople and cut the link between Asiatic and European Turkey; the menace of their guns would bring down the already tottering regime in Constantinople and force Turkey out of the War, and thus the all-important connection with Russia would be renewed. In the second phase, which would wholly depend on the first, Churchill hoped to establish a wide Balkan front supported by Anglo-French forces.

The news from London about the forthcoming Dardanelles operations produced something like a shock in Russian diplomatic circles and caused Sazonov great anxiety. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was the most inflexible advocate of seizing Constantinople and the Straits. He raised the question of the 'most important result of the war' for the first time on 21 December 1914, in his letter to Grand Duke Nikolai's Chief of Staff General Yanushkevich. He pointed out

- 1) the importance of obtaining the Straits 'from the point of view of national interests and Russia's great sacrifices in that war.'
- 2) the impossibility of gaining that aim by defeating Germany and Austria-Hungary, because 'it is evident that the Turks will not agree to abandon Constantinople by free will; they will not be driven from there unless by force'.⁸

This letter clearly reveals Sazonov's fears about the prospects of Russia possessing Constantinople and the Straits by diplomatic means after the end of the war, in spite of all the promises which Grey and Buchanan had made him on 1 November 1914. Later Duke Kudashev related to General Danilov Sazonov's opinion that 'we shall possess firmly only that soil which will be taken by our own force and blood'.⁹

On December 29 Sazonov spoke in favour of an 'independent' operation to seize Constantinople and the Straits by force through the Russian Black Sea fleet and expeditionary corps. He emphasised that such an operation would be highly desirable from a political point of view, though he admitted the possible intervention of the Bulgarian or even Romanian army.¹⁰

Discussion of this problem revealed that the Supreme Command held quite the opposite position. Grand Duke Nikolai considered that the Russian army should stick to the 'initial war plan,' and he viewed the situations on both the Russo-German and Russo-Austrian fronts rather pessimistically. He firmly believed that 'independent' operations against the Dardanelles and Bosphorus were impossible. Accordingly General Yanushkevich wrote to Sazonov that it was useless discussing independent operations against the Straits at the present moment.

Only in the case 'that we cannot secure Constantinople and the Straits after the final defeat of the Central Powers, should the question of special military operations be raised.'¹¹

But this answer from the Supreme Command did not discourage Sazonov. He again tried to approach the problem from another angle. He wrote one more letter to the General Staff, in which he pointed out that, 'the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should know if it is necessary to prepare the passing of the Straits for our advancing armies across the territories of Romania and Bulgaria, or maybe it would be desirable to ask permission for the landing of our troops in Varna or Burgas.'¹² He completely ignored Yanushkevich's previous answer, in which the latter had written of the necessity of waiting till the final defeat of Germany. 'If the condition of our fleet,' continued Sazonov, 'permits amphibious operations without any help from neighbouring states, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs will not start negotiations on this problem.'

This time Grand Duke Nikolai himself answered Sazonov. He flatly declared, 'we are in no way able to seize the Straits.'

He was sure that in order for Russia to achieve this aim it would need not only the cooperation of the 'second rate' Balkan states, but 'all the military power of Great Britain and France.' Thus, 'at the present moment there is no need for political explanations to our Allies on that subject; we should be satisfied with the already-given promise by Britain and France to take into account our interests when solving the problem of Constantinople and the Straits.'¹³

This exchange of opinions between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Command in November - December 1914 will help to understand Russian reactions to the Dardanelles operations.

On receiving the news that the British were going to force the Straits and seize Constantinople, Sazonov immediately passed the above-mentioned British memorandum to the General Staff and attached to it his own 'strictly confidential' letter. He insisted that before answering Lord Kitchener, 'we should carefully think over whether we are able to give the British powerful support in such an operation at the present moment, and play a proper part in seizing the Straits.' Sazonov was so anxious of the political consequences of British success in the Straits area that he offered 'to ask our Allies to postpone the forcing of the Dardanelles, because the position of our armies on the Caucasian front has turned for the better.'¹⁴ He conjectured as to whether Russia ought to give a negative answer to allied requests for cooperation.

Sazonov's fears did not make an impression on the Supreme Command. On the day after receiving Sazonov's letter Kudashev handed Grand Duke Nikolai's memorandum to General Williams, which was 'supplemented and expanded by verbal explanation.' The essence of his answer to Lord Kitchener may be reduced to two main items:

- 1) Russian Supreme Command, in spite of their desire, could not promise any support to the Allies of 'either military or naval forces.'
- 2) 'From a military point of view, any blow delivered to Turkey would be to the advantage of Russia,' because it would ease the pressure on our armies not only in the Caucasus, but also on the European fronts and might 'bring Balkan states to our side.'

It was clear that the haste with which the Russian Supreme Command had answered the British spared no time for considered thought. In spite of the indisputable political importance of this problem, it was addressed solely by military considerations.

On 25 January Sazonov received the General Staff's explanation of its position. General Danilov pointed out that in spite of Russian victories at Ardagan and Sarikamish (3 and 4 January respectively), the position of the Russian army on the Caucasian front continued to be precarious, 'which is why we should welcome any serious operation against Turkey undertaken by our Allies.' He stressed that even in the case of success of the Allied operations against the Dardanelles, 'our amphibious operation against the Bosphorus would be impossible.' At the same time Danilov said that he himself 'absolutely' did not believe that the 'British undertaking' would be successful. 'Even if the British fleet forces the Straits and bombards Constantinople, the Allies would not be able to seize the city. An expeditionary force of two infantry corps would not be enough to achieve such a task; the Turks would throw them into the sea.' 'It is not worth speaking about an expeditionary force less than 4 army corps,' concluded Danilov.¹⁴

However, Danilov considered that the attempt by the British to force the Straits, even if unsuccessful, would be to the advantage of Russia. Accordingly Danilov asked Sazonov 'not to discourage the British.' Kudashev in his letter to Sazonov added that it would be useless asking the British to postpone the operation: General Wilson had hinted to him that, 'according to his personal information and reading between the lines of Kitchener's telegram it was clear that the British Admiralty had taken this decision once and for all.'¹⁵

The news about the Dardanelles operation sharpened the divergence of opinions between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Command of Russia. Russian generals were inclined to think in narrow military categories. Certainly, they knew better the real situation on the various fronts and they understood that the Russian army and the Black Sea fleet had no reserves or capacity to undertake such complicated amphibious operation as seizing Constantinople and the Straits. General Danilov, for example, believed that Russia would be ready for such an attempt only after the final victory over Germany, and he was afraid that it would demand 'another war.'

Sazonov, on the other hand, thought in terms of grand strategy and politics. He again appealed to the Supreme Command with a request to avert the Allied operation on account of its 'extreme riskiness,' because 'in case of an unsuccessful result, the role and the meaning of the Allied fleet in the Mediterranean would be seriously undermined.' This straw broke the camel's back. The Supreme Command decided to be rid of Sazonov's advice once and for all. On 1 February Kudashev informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that 'according

to a decision of His Imperial Majesty the matter of obtaining the Straits was transferred wholly to the province of the supreme Command.' Nikolai II had solved the problem influenced solely by military opinion. The representative of the General Staff declared 'in a most imposing manner' that 'conquering of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles will need another war,' and they doubted whether Russia would have either the ability or the will to wage such a war.

However, the Russian Supreme Command soon changed its opinion.

On 20 February the Russian Ambassador to France, A P Izvolsky, informed Sazonov that the Allies were discussing future operations against the Dardanelles. It had been decided to land considerable expeditionary forces on Lemnos in order to begin combined land operations on both sides of the Dardanelles. Izvolsky related to Sazonov his talk with Delcasse in which the latter had expressed hope '... that our Black Sea fleet ... will undertake simultaneous operations against the Bosphorus, and in case of success the two fleets - Russia and Anglo-French - would appear before Constantinople at the same time, which would be very important from a military, but especially political, viewpoint.'¹⁶

The information from Paris alarmed Sazonov and he appealed to the emperor over the heads of the Supreme Command. On 1 March he sent a note to Nikolai II in which he drew attention to the fact that '... the breakthrough of the British and French forces' - to Constantinople - 'may take place sooner than we expected.' 'The French and British Ambassadors,' wrote Sazonov, 'insist that our naval and military forces must take part in the capture of Constantinople. The Allies are going to send to Turkey landing forces of 80 - 85,000 men. They are going to storm the Bosphorus forts from the rear in order to ease our passing through the Straits, but they consider it undesirable that the expulsion of Turks from Tsargrad takes place without our participation. Supposing that the Supreme Commander will not consider it possible to send the necessary number of troops to Constantinople, that is, equal in numbers to the forces of our Allies, I dare to intercede before Your Imperial Majesty for immediate despatch to Odessa of the expeditionary forces destined for Serbia ... The delay in sending these troops, as requested by Serbia, may be explained by pointing out that the seizing of Constantinople is a common cause for the Allies.'¹⁷

At the same time Sazonov made a scene with the French Ambassador in connection with the fate of the Straits. There exists an interesting document called 'The Daily Record of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.' The 'Record' dated 5 March contains curious information about the conversation between Sazonov and Paleologue. An extract from this 'Record' deserves quotation here.

The Telegrams received from Izvolsky reveal that the French Government has erroneously supposed that we shall be satisfied with the opening for us of free passage through the Straits on the basis of some international-legal combinations such as neutralisation, internationalisation and similar artificial situations ... S. D. Sazonov decided at once to put a question point-blank and to-day - March 5 - flatly declared to the French Ambassador that if France puts obstacles to our intentions concerning Constantinople and the Straits, he will resign immediately and as a consequence will be replaced by another minister from those who remain supporters of the *Dreikaisersbund*, for there are still enough such persons in Russia.'¹⁸

The 'Record' records that Sazonov's tirade made a profound impression on the French Ambassador.

Sazonov's threats partly resulted in a secret agreement dated 18/20 March, according to which: 'Added to Russian territory: the city of Constantinople, western coast of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles, South Frakia to the line Anos-Midia, the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the coast of Sikaria, a station in Izmid Bay which will be determined later, islands in the Sea of Marmara and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos.' The private rights of British and French citizens on those territories would be guaranteed.

Though this agreement was secret, its terms soon became known in general, and, as Soviet military historian A Kolenkovsky considered, they served as weighty arguments for Bulgaria and Greece not to enter the war on the side of the Entente.¹⁹

By 1 March it was at last decided to send an army corps from the Caucasian front to the Dardanelles by sea. The 5th Caucasian Corps (37,000 soldiers and 60 field guns) began concentrating in Odessa. The Black Sea fleet gathered a flotilla of transports of more than a hundred vessels.²⁰ At the same time the cruiser *Askold* received orders to join Admiral Carden's squadron and to participate in forcing the Dardanelles. *Askold* also had to serve as liaison ship with the Russian Black Sea fleet.

However, the unsuccessful attempt by the Allied fleet to force the Dardanelles on 18 March caused Russian Naval and Military Command to postpone the planned operations, though demonstrative preparations in Odessa and Sevastopol continued.

The Russian Black Sea fleet undertook its first bombardment of the Turkish forts at the mouth of the Bosphorus on 28 March, ten days after the unsuccessful attempt of the Allied fleet to force the Strait. The following ships took part in the bombardment: pre-dreadnought battleships *Eustafii*, *Zlatoust*, *Panteleimon*, *Tri Svyatitelya*, and *Rostislav*; cruisers *Almaz*, *Pamyat Merkuria* and *Kagul*; seaplane carrier *Nikolai I* (5 seaplanes); nine destroyers and six trawlers.

On 27 March this squadron left Sevastopol and at dawn the next day appeared near the entrance to the Bosphorus. At 6.00am the ships which were to bombard the Turkish forts (battleships *Tri Svyatitelya* and *Rostislav*, cruiser *Almaz* and seaplane carrier *Nikolai I*) separated from the main forces and moved into bombardment range. The other ships were to cover the bombardment at a distance of 12 - 15 miles from the entrance to the Bosphorus.²¹

Tri Svyatitelya, *Rostislav* and *Almaz* bombarded the Turkish batteries on the Asiatic coast near Anatoli-Fener from 10.30 to 11.00am, then shifted their fire to the forts on the opposite coast near Panas-Burnu and bombarded them from 11.00am till 12.30pm. The enemy guns did not answer as the range was too great for them. The bombardment caused fires and several explosions in Turkish batteries.

An enemy steamer which accidentally appeared nearby was hit several times and was beached by her crew. She burned to the waterline. Ship's salvoes were corrected from the seaplanes. The bombardment was considered to be successful and Admiral Ebergard was going to repeat it the next day, 29 March, but this did not take place on account of thick fog.

The squadron then had to return to Sevastopol.

The opinions of Soviet naval historians regarding this operation differ. Kolenkovsky considered that it was very difficult to estimate the results of this bombardment of the Bosphorus by the Black Sea fleet. He pointed out that this operation had been undertaken

without any coordination with the operations of the Allied fleet and was practically of no significance from the point of view of strategy.²² The two-volume *Official Soviet History of Naval Operations in the First World War* (1964) written by Admirals N G Pavlovich and V A Belli agreed with and repeated this estimation.²³

At the end of the 1980s, however, there appeared a tendency to revise this traditional point of view. The book *Russian Navy in the Black Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean* (1988), written by the Director of the Institute of Military History, General V A Zolotarev and his co-author I A Kozlov, may serve as an example. These authors asserted that the operation of the Russian Black Sea fleet against the coast of the Bosphorus on 28 March, 1915, had proved itself and had been rather successful. Addressing the absence of coordination with the Allied efforts to open the Straits - that is, the fact that the operations of the Russian Black Sea fleet had taken place ten days after the attempt of the Allied fleet to force the Dardanelles on 18 March - they considered rather a debatable explanation: the British, fearing that the Russian army and navy would appear before Constantinople sooner than the Allied fleet could break through the Dardanelles, deliberately had not informed Russian naval command of the precise date of their operation.²⁴ That assertion, however, is certainly not confirmed by any documents.

The author of this article, however, is inclined to think that the problem may have a simpler explanation. On 11 March the C-in-C Black Sea fleet, Vice-Admiral Ebergard, informed Mr Churchill of his intentions through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 'The first stage of the operation: during the actions of the Allied fleet in the Dardanelles the Black Sea fleet will undertake a demonstration against the Bosphorus by naval forces only. The Second Stage: When the Allied fleet reach the Prince islands, the Black Sea fleet will begin resolute actions against the Bosphorus forts. The Supreme Command considers that without the assistance of the Allied fleet the Black Sea fleet will not be able to break through to Constantinople. The third stage: After annihilation of the Turkish navy and joining of the Black Sea fleet with the Allied fleet they will begin amphibious operations according to the plan.'²⁵

This document shows clearly that Russian naval and military command did not believe in the ability of the Black Sea fleet to force the Bosphorus independently. The unsuccessful Allied attempt to force the Dardanelles on 18 March by means of purely naval forces made them also doubt the ability of the Anglo-French fleet. As is known, the planned second and third stages of the operations planned by Vice-Admiral Ebergard never eventuated. The Ambassador of Greece to Petrograd informed his Minister for Foreign Affairs that 'the bombardment of the Bosphorus bore the character of demonstration and adventure.'²⁶ It would be more precise to characterise it as a kind of formality fulfilled by the Russian Black Sea fleet to satisfy the Allies.

The bombardment of the Bosphorus coasts by the Black Sea fleet was repeated twice, on 25 April and 3 May, with the same complement of ships and the same results. However, there exists evidence that the British naval command considered the 'demonstrations' by the Black Sea fleet to have been rather useful for the Allied operations in the Dardanelles. On 18 April (7 days before the landing of Hamilton's army) Admiral De Robeck sent, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, his request that Vice-Admiral Ebergard begin embarkation of the 5th Caucasian Corps on transports and spread rumours that it was going to the Bosphorus in order to prevent the transfer of Turkish reinforcements from Constantinople to the Gallipoli Peninsula.²⁷

At the very beginning of May the general German advance began on the Eastern front. Mackensen's army broke through at Dunaets and threw Russian troops back to the river San. In consequence of this German breakthrough the Russian army had to clear northern Hungary by 9 May. On 24 May Russian armies began to retreat from Galicia. Przemyśl fell on 3 June, Lvov on 22 June.

In the middle of May the 5th Caucasian Corps, which had been practicing embarkation and disembarkation at Odessa with a view to cooperation with the Allied Dardanelles Expedition, was hurried off to the river San. The Chief of General Staff at Petrograd tried to reassure the British Military Attaché, Alfred Knox, that this corps would be replaced immediately by another, but the latter reported to London: 'It should be clearly understood that no help from Russia is likely to be forthcoming in the forcing of the passage to the Black Sea. The corps which is said to be forming at Odessa will be drawn into the fighting-line on the western frontier long before the Russians decide to embark it for the Bosphorus... The Grand Duke has still a task on the western frontier that will require every man till things take a decided change in the Western Theatre.'²⁸ This was indeed an accurate appraisal of the situation.

The rumour of the forthcoming despatch of the 5th Caucasian Corps to the western frontier reached Sazonov by 13 May and he immediately raised the alarm. The same day he wrote to Duke Kudashev: 'Will you be so kind as to check whether the possible sending to the Western front of the expeditionary corps destined for Constantinople is a fact. If this rumour does not lack foundation, I call the attention of the Chief of the General Staff to the extreme undesirability, from a political point of view, of turning the above mentioned unit from its main task. Acting on instructions from the Supreme Commander I informed Lord Kitchener of this force, on which our Allies are relying for an attack from the Bosphorus side of Constantinople ...'²⁹

The next day Sazonov received an answer from Duke Kudashev that the 5th Caucasian Corps had been already sent to the western frontier, but that it would be replaced by other units in Odessa. When on 15 May Sazonov wished to know if the above-mentioned units consisted of 'first-rate troops,' he received the unpleasant news that the new expeditionary forces comprised of 113 brigades of reservists, several units of sailors, 2 battalions of marines, 1 regiment of Cossacks and 1 Caucasian division; 40,000 men in all.³⁰ Thus, the 'first-rate' 5th Caucasian Corps was replaced by ill-assorted units of doubtful fighting quality.

Since General Hamilton's expeditionary forces after their landing on 25 April had been drawn into trench warfare, the Russian Supreme Command, it seems, had completely given up any belief in the final success of the Dardanelles operations. Kudashev declared that the situation on the western frontier did not allow the holding back of the first-rate units at Odessa destined for future landings on the Bosphorus coasts. However, on 17 May the General Staff suggested sending to the Dardanelles a unit of 6,000 men from ... Vladivostok! It was planned that this unit would participate 'symbolically' in actions on the Gallipoli Peninsula and then would take part in a final victory parade in Constantinople.

After receiving this news Kitchener finally lost his temper and asked General Williams to inform Duke Kudashev that 'sending 4,500 men with horses and artillery will bring to the British nothing except troubles.' On 7 July General Danilov informed Sazonov that the embarkation from Vladivostok, of the expeditionary unit destined for the Dardanelles, was called off on account of 'technical difficulties.'³⁴ After that the Russian Supreme Command

completely lost interest in the Dardanelles operations.

These documents reveal that the attitudes to the Dardanelles operations in the highest military and diplomatic circles of Imperial Russia differed greatly. The Russian Supreme Command demonstrated striking narrow-mindedness. They viewed the Dardanelles operations only in categories of military tactics and strategy; i.e. how it could help to ease pressure on the Russian armies on the Caucasian front or Western frontier. At the same time Russian Naval and Military Command did not believe in the final success of the Allies and were not going to help them. They were quite right only on one point: Russia was not able to undertake an operation to open the Straits in the unfavourable circumstances of the general German advance on the Eastern front and the Turkish pressure on the Caucasian front.

The Head of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs viewed this problem from quite a different angle. He never forgot that Constantinople and the Straits were the main war aim of Russia and he constantly felt anxiety about what would be their fate after the war. That was why Sazonov indefatigably urged the Supreme Command to initiate participation of Russian military and naval forces in the Dardanelles operations, though of 'symbolic' character.

The most regrettable fact was that neither Russian Supreme Command nor Sazonov understood the importance of opening the Straits to allow supply of Russia's 'under-armed' army. Real coordination of war efforts in the Straits area would have brought not only a different outcome to the Dardanelles operations, but would also have altered the results of World War I.

Editor's notes

This article came to the Association some time in the year 2000. All we know is that Professor Likharev is, or was, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Dept. of Historical Education, Far Eastern Federal University, Ussuriysk, north of Vladivostok, Russia. References for footnotes (in Russian) are available on request to the Editor.

INFORMATION PLEASE

Foster Summerson writes:

When I was Editor of *The Gallipolian*, I was often sent snippets relating to Gallipoli from Peter Butt who lives in Essex. Peter has recently been trawling through issues of *The Great Eastern Railway Magazine* for 1915 and I hope, with the Editor's agreement, to include these in a future article. Peter has raised a question with me that I cannot answer and I wondered if readers might be able to assist.

In Volume 5, No 54, June 1915, of the magazine – in a column entitled 'From the Tea Room Window' – Peter came across a letter from Mr Atkins 'serving in the Dardanelles', who wrote 'one of the comforts most appreciated here is the body-belt, which has been aptly styled 'the dado round the dining room...'. Commenting on the letter, the magazine's editor wrote, 'Soldiers and sailors generally manage to hit on descriptive names. H.M.S *Bellerophon* for instance, was known as the 'Bully Ruff'on,' and now we learn that a certain Turkish warship in the Dardanelles which fired heavy guns at our fleet between 6.0 and 7.0 a.m. daily has become known as the 'Christians Awake!'

Does anyone know the name of the Turkish warship?

LAST OF THE SIX?

Carnoustie V.C. Dead

George Samson's Life of Adventure

George McKenzie Sampson, V.C., has died of double pneumonia at the Bermudas. He was the last survivor of the six naval men who won the Victoria Cross at the landing at Gallipoli.

The news was received by his parents in the course of a letter from the agent of the shipping company with whom Samson was employed.

On 7th February, 1922, Samson sailed from Dundee in the new magazine ship, S.S. *Dosina*, and has been away and ever since. In the course of his last letter, received about a month ago, Samson said they were in the Gulf of Mexico. He had had one or two attacks of malaria, and complained of feeling unwell. In the event of his boat encountering a vessel belonging to their company he was to be transferred to it and sent home. The cable to the company's Dundee agent merely states that Samson was transferred to the *Strombust*, bound for Bermuda, and died of double pneumonia on 23rd February. He was to be buried on 24 February.



George McKenzie Sampson, VC

Triple Honours

The V.C. was only 34 years of age. In the early days of the war C.P.O. George McKenzie Samson - then only a seaman - gained triple honours in the Dardanelles, for he was the first man to land at Gallipoli, the first V.C. of the war, and the first sailor of the lower deck to win the V.C. since the Japanese war.

Samson was the second son of Mr and Mrs David Samson, 63 Dundee Street, Carnoustie. His whole career was a story of adventure and daring.

Educated at Carnoustie Public School, he was in the same class as the seaside town's other V.C., Corporal Charles Alfred Jarvis, R.E. As soon as he left school Samson started a roving life, and there were a few countries which he had not seen.

His first venture was to Buenos Ayres, where he was sent by ex-Bailie Taylor, Dundee, with a consignment of prize cattle. He stayed out there, and was employed on a big cattle ranch in the Argentine, remaining almost two years. The life of a cowboy suited him, and he had more than his share of adventure when for days on end he was lost on the vast prairie.

On returning home he sought excitement in the army, and for twelve months he was in the King's Own Scottish Borderers. But that palled on this lover of free life, and he sought new interests by going to sea. While a sailor he visited every part of the world, even to the icy north, where he was engaged in whaling.

Working at Smyrna

He next joined the Royal Naval Reserve. Two years before the war he had settled down, his new home being Smyrna, in Turkey, where he was employed at the gasworks and the railway, both under the same company.

When war was declared he volunteered at Port Said, but had to go to Malta before he was accepted. There he was put on board HMS *Hussar*.

His deeds at the landing at Sedd-ul-Bahr won him the Victoria Cross. Samson was not on the *River Clyde*, but preceded it in a small hopper which ran ahead. The first task was to haul up several lighters to make a pier for the landing of the troops. Well this was going on Midshipman Drewry was shot above the left eye and fell into the water. Everyone thought him lost, but an hour later he reappeared at the siege with his head bandaged, and for hours afterwards held his post held his post.

The fierce attack continued all Sunday and right throughout the night. Then came the 26th, which saw the Turks on the run. In Samson's words, 'We had sustained a terrible loss. It was not fighting - it was murder!' Just as the enemy fled Samson was hit on the shoulder and left side. He was wounded in no fewer than seventeen places.

For 33 hours he had been at work without a stop. He carried over twenty wounded men back to the hopper. When he was carrying a midshipman belonging to the Cornwallis the lad was shot and killed outright while in Samson's arms.

Epic of Heroism

The official story given when Samson was awarded his V.C. has been called by one writer 'An epic of heroism, but an epic not half told.' After being wounded Samson was taken aboard the hospital ship, and was afterwards removed to Port Said hospital, where he remained for three months. On leaving Port Said he came to Britain, and after a brief stay in hospital at Portsmouth was sent home to Carnoustie. To the last Samson carried in his body several pieces of shrapnel.

A Great Welcome

Memorable scenes were witnessed in Carnoustie when he arrived home there on 17th of August, 1915. He was met at the station by Provost Carnegie, members of the Council, and his minister, Canon J. B. Jobberns, then of Carnoustie Holy Rood Church.

On 29th of October, Carnoustie Y.M.C.A. Hall was packed when the town honoured Samson and Jarvis. Mr James Falconer, the county M.P., presented them with tokens of public recognition. In replying, Samson referred to the time when he met Jarvis in London at Trafalgar Square. 'On that occasion,' said the sailor, 'the people came very near to taking down Nelson and putting us up instead!'

The news caused deep regret in the burgh yesterday. The parish Church bell was tolled, and hundreds of messages of condolence were received by the bereaved parents.

Editor's notes

The article above is from *The Courier*, published in Dundee, 1 Mar 1923. Some of the claims made do not stand up to scrutiny. For example, George Samson was certainly not 'the last survivor of the six naval men who won the Victoria Cross at the landing at Gallipoli.' He was not 'the first V.C. of the war'; this was, in fact, the other VC recipient mentioned - Corporal Jarvis. Neither is it confirmed, as far as I know, that Samson was 'the first man to land at Gallipoli.'

The article makes no mention of the fact that he left a widow and children. Further, this article and others mention that only his parents were informed of his death, implying that his employer (who sent the letter) was unaware that he was married. He married Charlotte Glass in the Huntly Arms Hotel, Aboyne, Aberdeenshire, on 31 December 1915, and had two sons, the first

born 3 June 1917 and the second 12 November 1918. Newspaper articles indicate that, after his death, his widow had to fight for a year with the assistance of many powerful supporters before she was granted a pension.

'It was a coincidence that there should be present at St George's [Bermuda] four men from the H.M.S. *Calcutta*, who were with Samson at Gallipoli the day he won his V.C. These men, P.O. L. J. Bennet, P.O. A. F. Merrill, S.P.O. Gus Palmer, and L.S. G. A. Pitt, assisted by Privates Raymond Hayward and Herbert Davil, B.V.R.C., acted as pall-bearers.' (*Dundee Courier* 30 March 1923 p6).

BOOK REVIEW

The Glorious Madness Tales of the Irish and the Great War

Author: Turtle Bunbury. Publisher: Gill & Macmillan 2014. Hardback. 327 pages with numerous photographs and illustrations. Price: Euro 29.99. ISBN 978- 07171 6234-5.

The author, although not well-known in the UK, is one of Ireland's most prolific modern historians, being well-known for his books on Irish history and related topics, and for a number of programmes for Irish Television. *The Glorious Madness* focuses on the Irish men and women who went to war in 1914 and examines what they thought, felt and believed, and how the war changed the lives of those who survived. They were certainly a mixed bunch – as the book flyer amusingly notes, 'from tragic generals to nuns of the run' – the latter being Benedictine nuns who found their religious life interrupted by the German bombardment of Ypres, being assisted in their escape by two Irish soldiers – a catholic from County Kerry and a protestant from Belfast. Others featured include Home Rule politicians who died for the Empire, and Anglo-Irish aristocrats and working class Dubliners who fell side by side.

Just under a third of the book deals with the Dardanelles and Gallipoli. Among those in positions of high command were Admiral Jack de Robeck, who commanded the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet, and General Godley, commander of the New Zealand and Australian Division who, although born and educated in England, had strong family links with Ireland and always regarded himself as Irish. Others to distinguish themselves at Gallipoli were Lt Col. Rooth, Captain Geddes and Cpl. Cosgrove of the Royal Munster Fusiliers, and Dr Burrows Kelly (RAMC). Those who served in the 1st Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers at Helles and the 7th Bn. at Suvla are not forgotten. Among those who became famous in later life was Pte. Brian Hurst who was wounded while serving with 6th Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers at Chunuk Bair; in later life he was to become Ireland's most prolific film director whose work is still recognised internationally.

Whilst *The Glorious Madness* will be of interest to those with Irish connections, there is much in the book which I am sure all readers of this journal will enjoy.

- Foster Summerson

Disclaimer

Readers are reminded that the observations and opinions expressed in items published in *The Gallipolitan* are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editor, or those of the Association.



OBJECTIVES

To advance education for the public benefit by raising public awareness of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915 and by encouraging and facilitating the study in the legacy and lessons of that campaign. To keep alive the memory of the campaign and to ensure that all who fought or served in it, and those who gave their lives, are not forgotten by applying such means as the Trustees deem fit.



The River Clyde at V Beach, 25 April, 1915 by Charles Dixon

Reproduced by kind permission of The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment (Queen's and Royal Hampshires)

The Gallipoli Campaign is characterised by countless deeds of heroism and endurance. It took place in an area smaller than Southampton amid appalling conditions - heat, flies, lack of water, equipment and proper sanitation. Later on rain and a freak spell of sub-zero temperatures had to be endured, to say nothing of the desperate close-quarter fighting throughout the campaign. Some 559,000 Allied personnel were committed, of whom 420,000 were British and Empire troops, including 50,000 Australians and 9,000 New Zealanders, and 80,000 French. The cost in human terms was terrible. The Allies had 250,000 casualties, of whom approximately 58,000 were killed, with only 11,000 having known graves. Ottoman forces, with some Germans, numbered between 300,000 and 400,000 and of these some 87,000 were killed. The evacuations in December 1915 and early January 1916 were masterly operations – one of the great feats of military history.