

The Gallipolian

The Journal of the Gallipoli Association

No. 145 - Winter 2017



THE GALLIPOLIAN

The Journal of the Gallipoli Association
founded by Major E. H. W. Banner in 1969 on the Campaign of 1915

The Gallipoli Association

Registered Charity No. 1155609

Website: <http://www.gallipoli-association.org>

Mailbox 630, Wey House, 15 Church Street, Weybridge KT13 8NA

[Please Note: Correspondence about membership should be sent to the Membership Secretary at the address shown below - not to the Mailbox address]

PATRON

HRH The Duke of Edinburgh KG KT

PRESIDENT

Captain Christopher T F Fagan MBE DL

PAST PRESIDENTS

The Lord Granville of Eye

Vice-Admiral E. W. Longley-Cook CB CBE DSO

Lt General Sir Reginald Savory KCMG KCIE DSO MC

Brigadier B B Rackham CBE MC

Lt Colonel M E Hancock MC

TRUSTEES

Chairman: Brigadier James R H Stopford CBE

Secretary & General Enquiries: Foster Summerson, 23 Tavnaghan Lane, Cushendall, Ballymena BT44 0SY Tel: 028 217 72996 : secretary@gallipoli-association.org

Treasurer: Vicki Genrich, 78 Foxbourne Road, London SW17 8EW
treasurer@gallipoli-association.org

Webmaster & Historian: Stephen Chambers : webmaster@gallipoli-association.org

Membership Secretary: Peter Luff, 19 Old Exeter Rd, Tavistock, Devon, PL19 0JE
Mobile: 07979 541 256. Home: 01822 612864 : membershipsecretary@gallipoli-association.org

Legal Officer: Ian Philliskirk

Education Officer: Post vacant – see page 26

Other Appointments

Editor: Bryn Dolan : editor@gallipoli-association.org

Material in hard copy for the Editor should be sent to the Secretary for forwarding.

Association Events/Quartermaster: James C Watson Smith, Chelsea Lodge, Coopers Hill Lane, Englefield Green, Surrey TW20 0JX Tel: 01784.479148 : events@gallipoli-association.org

Web Author: Mal Murray 282 Galtymore Road, Drimnagh, Dublin 12, ROI
webauthor@gallipoli-association.org

Historian Panel: Enquiries should be directed to: historian@gallipoli-association.org

Contents

Pages 2-3	Remembrance Commemorations at the Cenotaph
Page 3	Anzac / Gallipoli Day 2018
Page 3	2018 Commemoration at the 29th Division Memorial
Page 4	The 2017 Annual General Meeting
Pages 4-5	'Field Of Remembrance' 2017 – Westminster Abbey
Pages 5-8	Gallipoli Association Conference, Birmingham 2017
Pages 9-13	The Pine Ridge Guns, Anzac, 25 April 1915
Pages 13-14	Collingwood Memorial
Pages 14-15	Memories of Gallipoli – 1915
Pages 15-16	Brothers Meet on Battlefield
Page 16	Private T. Spencer 19519, Loyal North Lancs Regiment
Pages 16-18	HMS <i>Amethyst</i>
Pages 18-24	Diary of Stanley Follot Hook
Page 24	Commemoration in Hawick on 12 July
Page 25	Christmas 'W' Beach 1915
Page 26	Major George Cecil Brooke
Page 26	Gallipoli Battlefield Tour: 6th - 11th May 2018
Page 26	Education Officer Post
Page 27	Subscriptions 2018
Page 27	Articles for <i>The Gallipolitan</i>
Page 28	Quartermaster's Stores
Page 28	Last Post
Pages 29-36	Colour photographs section
Pages 37-54	The Gallipoli Maxims Revisited
Pages 54-56	Book Reviews
Pages 57-63	Herbert Frederick Faux, RAMC
Pages 63-65	New Zealander Prisoner of War in Turkey, 1915-18



See page 16

This edition's cover features the frontispiece from Hargrave, J. *At Suvla Bay: Being The Notes And Sketches Of Scenes, Characters And Adventures Of The Dardanelles Campaign*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917.

John Hargrave, a Quaker, served at Gallipoli with the 32nd Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps.

REMEMBRANCE COMMEMORATIONS AT THE CENOTAPH

11 & 12 November 2017

Foster Summerson



The cenotaph in the 1920s

This year the chairman of the Gallipoli Association was invited by the executive committee of the Western Front Association to attend a service of commemoration at the Cenotaph on 11 November. Brigadier James Stopford was unable to attend due to other commitments that day and Vicki Genrich, our treasurer, represented the association and laid a wreath – see photograph on page 29.

Older readers will recall that Remembrance Day, or Armistice Day as it was sometimes called, was always held on 11 November when almost everyone paused to remember the Fallen – traffic stopped and streets fell silent. After the Second World War the national commemoration at the Cenotaph moved to the nearest Sunday to the 11th – often referred to as ‘Remembrance Sunday’. When this change was implemented, the ceremony at the Cenotaph on the 11th ceased to be held. It was revived in 1994 by the Western Front Association (WFA) and a service has been held annually since then. The WFA is to be commended for keeping this important date alive in the public mind.

On Sunday 12 November, the Gallipoli Association took part in the Cenotaph Service and March Past. The Association contingent comprised nine members and their guests all of whom had family links with the Gallipoli campaign or had family members who served in other theatres. The contingent marched as part of the ‘Civilian Column’ which formed-up in

Whitehall prior to the march-off. Our contingent co-ordinators were David Mason and John Duckworth who formed the left and right markers respectively.

The weather was bright and sunny but very cold with marchers waiting for over an hour prior to 'march-off'. As the contingent passed the Cenotaph, David Mason (who had three uncles who served at Gallipoli) handed the Association's wreath to the Royal British Legion's wreath-taker. The contingent then marched into Parliament Square and Great George Street before turning right into Horse Guards Road and past the saluting dais at the Guards Memorial before wheeling right onto Horse Guards Parade where contingents dispersed. Here they were greeted by James Stopford who had marched with the *Not Forgotten Association* of which he is Chairman - see photograph on page 29.

ANZAC / GALLIPOLI DAY 2018

Anzac / Gallipoli Day will take place on Wednesday 25 April. Although details won't be available for some time, it is expected that they will follow the usual pattern with the Association's wreath-laying ceremony at the Gallipoli memorial in St Paul's Cathedral followed later by the Parade and wreath-laying service at the Cenotaph, and the service at Westminster Abbey, both organised by the High Commissions.

As was the case last year, security arrangements are expected to be tight and details of those wishing to participate will be required. Given that the deadlines imposed on the Association continue to shorten it is proposed to continue the practice adopted in recent years and to ask members to express an interest in attending one or more commemorations / events by completing the form enclosed with this issue of *The Gallipolian*. This will not guarantee a place nor will it be binding on individuals or on the association, but it will allow us to contact those who indicate a wish to attend as soon as the arrangements are known.

Foster Summerson Hon. Secretary

2018 COMMEMORATION AT THE 29TH DIVISION MEMORIAL

The annual commemoration at the 29th Division Memorial, Stretton-on-Dunsmore, Warwickshire will take place at 11.45am for 12.00 noon, Sunday 11 March 2018 when a wreath will be laid on behalf of the Gallipoli Association. Wreaths will also be laid by representatives of other organisations, and by individuals.

The memorial is in the centre of a large roundabout on the A45, at the junction with the B4455, about 5 miles east of Coventry (grid reference SP 415733). Those planning to attend are asked to contact the Hon. Secretary (address inside the front cover) to assist in assessing numbers and to enable further information to be circulated about the event as details are finalised with other groups attending.

Please Note: As mentioned above, the memorial is situated in the centre of a roundabout on the A45. This is a busy road and it will be necessary to cross it to get to the memorial. Anyone that wishes to attend the commemoration will be responsible for his or her own safety and will be solely responsible for any claims or matters that may arise out of any injury, loss or damage suffered by the party or any one in their charge, in connection with their visit, and the Gallipoli Association will not be held responsible for any matter, injury, loss or damage that may arise.

THE 2017 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The Annual General Meeting of the Gallipoli Association was held at the Tally Ho Conference & Banqueting Centre, Pershore Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham, on 4 Nov 2017 at 5.00pm.

The minutes of the meeting will be circulated with the Spring 2018 issue of *The Gallipolian*. However, members will wish to know that the financial statements and the report of the trustees for the period 1 January – 31 December 2016 and the chairman's report (covering the period 1 January 2016 to 30 June 2017) which were circulated to members by e-mail or post on 5 October were presented to the meeting as required by the constitution. The treasurer and chairman (respectively) provided brief overviews on the financial statements and reports. No questions were raised on either document.

Voting took place on the three resolutions circulated with the AGM papers. Resolutions 1 and 2 sought approval to elect Brigadier James Stopford CBE and Mr Stephen Chambers as trustees. The third resolution sought to amend clause 8(6) (g) on the constitution by deleting the words 'and must not be counted in quorum for any part of the meeting'; the purpose of this amendment being to allow those members who vote by post or e-mail and who wish to attend the AGM to be counted in the quorum for the meeting although they would still be precluded from voting at the meeting. The three resolutions were approved. The date of the next meeting will be notified in due course.

Foster Summerson Hon. Secretary

'FIELD OF REMEMBRANCE' 2017 – WESTMINSTER ABBEY

Foster Summerson

The Field of Remembrance at Westminster Abbey was started in 1928 by Major George Howson MC, the founder of the Royal British Legion Poppy Factory. He and a few disabled ex-servicemen from the Factory grouped together around a wooden battlefield cross - familiar to those who had served in Flanders and on the Western Front or elsewhere. Equipped with trays of poppies they invited passers-by to plant a poppy in the vicinity of the cross. The Poppy Factory continues to organise the 'Field' each year so that friends and relatives and fellow servicemen and women can remember those who lost their lives while serving with the armed services. The task of laying out the Field has grown significantly from those far off days and is now a substantial undertaking with well over 200 plots which are set out by volunteers from the RBL.

The Gallipoli Association is a relative newcomer to the Field, our involvement being the idea of David Saunders, the former editor of *The Gallipolian* who, with the agreement of the then committee, obtained permission for the Association to have a plot in the year 2000, our first participation being the following year (see report in the Winter 2001/2002 edition of *The Gallipolian*) with some 54 crosses being laid in the Association plot. The number of crosses laid by, or on behalf of members of the Association has fluctuated only slightly over the past 16 years. This year, 63 crosses or other emblems of remembrance were placed in the plot on behalf of members, the highest number in recent years - only equalled in 2015 when the same number were laid. The task of laying them fell to the Hon. secretary's brother, Clive; this might appear straightforward but the ground around Westminster Abbey can be hard and my brother 'goes equipped' (as they say in police parlance!) with a hammer.

The opening ceremony this year took place on 9 November and was attended by HRH The Prince Harry. Royal Patronage of the ceremony has been almost unbroken since 1928 with HM Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother attending the ceremony and reviewing the plots for over 40 years.

This year, eleven members of the Association were present at the opening ceremony and stood behind the Association plot which was 'fronted' by Vicki Genrich, our treasurer. Sadly, with so many plots to inspect, time caught up with Prince Harry and there was not enough time for him to stop at the Association plot but it is pleasing that he is carrying on the Royal tradition of attending the ceremony. Photographs of the plot and of the opening ceremony can be found on pages 30-31.


GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE, BIRMINGHAM 2017

Foster Summerson

Stephen Chambers, who organised the conference with the assistance of James Watson Smith, welcomed those attending and thanked the four speakers who had given up their time to address the conference. Stephen noted that Major Herbert James who had been awarded the Victoria Cross for the most conspicuous bravery during operations at Gully Ravine on 28 June and 3 July 1915 had been born not far away from the conference venue and had taught at several schools in the Birmingham area before joining the army from which he retired in 1930. Sadly, his death in west London in 1958 went unnoticed and it was not until 2008 that he was commemorated in Kensal Green Cemetery; the project being supported by the Gallipoli Association.

The first speaker was Professor Peter Doyle whose talk *Terrain, Maps & Failure at the Dardanelles* focussed on the part terrain and maps played in the Gallipoli campaign and whether sufficient information was available to General Hamilton and those responsible for planning the landings. Using maps and photographs of the terrain to illustrate his talk, Peter accepted that the navy's failure to force the Dardanelles left Hamilton with limited options but rejected the claims Hamilton advanced later that he had not been provided with sufficient information by the War Office about the geography of the peninsula and that the maps available were inadequate.

Peter pointed out that Hamilton had access to intelligence reports and maps of landing places and defences, together with Ottoman Army Handbooks and other material; and whilst no large scale maps were available to either side at the time of the landings, the British 1908 Map could not be said to have failed. This was based on a French 1:50,000 map produced in 1854,




Professor Peter Doyle

converted to at a scale of 1:63,360 and although the conversion 'smoothed out' some of the detail, this was not material in terms of the Helles landings. In Peter's view, the crucial fact was that the beach areas were organised for defence by the Ottoman forces who made good use of the terrain which became killing grounds.

At Anzac the terrain and geology was unlike that at Helles and posed other problems, but the landings were broadly in the right place and map accuracy was perhaps of less importance with landings in darkness. However, once inland and with the advent of trench warfare at Anzac and Helles the need for new and accurate maps became a priority, many being based on captured maps and on aerial photography. In conclusion, Peter contended that Hamilton had the best available information and that the maps were not responsible for the failure at Gallipoli. It was the terrain and above all the stubborn defence by the Ottoman forces that had lost the campaign for the allies in the first few days.

After a short break for refreshments, Stephen Snelling gave an illustrated talk entitled *Heroes, Scapegoats and Squandering Sacrifice: The truth behind the River Clyde's epic odyssey*. Stephen noted that for many years the *River Clyde* had featured on the cover of *The Gallipolian* which was fitting given the important part the vessel played in the landing at 'V' Beach where 9 VCs were won in 48 hours.



Stephen Snelling

The *River Clyde* was a late addition to the invasion plan; originally the landings were to have been made in open boats but not enough were available. The architect of the plan to use the *River Clyde* was Captain Edwin Unwin who was known for getting things done and who took the lead in converting the vessel for its new role. He also believed in leading from the front and when the lighters that were to form a bridge to the shore broke adrift from the steam hopper towing them, Unwin and Seaman Williams jumped into the water under heavy fire and attempted to get the lighters into position and rescued men who had been wounded. When they became exhausted Midshipmen Drewry and Malleson together with Seaman Samson took over the dangerous task and struggled to secure lines to the lighters. All were awarded the Victoria Cross in August. The bravery of Sub Lieut. Tisdall who carried on after Unwin was not initially recognised and he was to die in May but his case was pressed by his mother and he was awarded a posthumous VC in 1916.


The second day saw VCs awarded to Col. Doughty Wylie and Captain Walford; the former leading the attack on Hill 141 and the latter on Sedd el Bahr; both perished. Cpl. Cosgrove of the Royal Munster Fusiliers also played an important part in the latter action although his award was not gazetted until August and the bravery of many others like Father Finn, Chaplain of the Munsters, went unrecognised.

General Hunter-Weston was seen as the principal scapegoat; he was criticised for insisting

on daylight landings at Helles and for the delay in switching troops to W Beach. Stephen's research also revealed that privately Hunter-Weston did not believe that the landings would go ahead after the navy had failed and did not consider they were feasible. Others criticised were Captain Davidson who commanded HMS *Cornwallis* and was blamed for staying too long at S Beach rather than supporting the landings at V Beach, and Lt. Col Tizard of the 1st Munsters who was seen by Unwin and others as ineffective.

Stephen contended that the principal reason for the sacrifice at V Beach was the failure to recognise that the landings would need to overcome strong defensive positions and the lack of fire-power to subdue the Turkish defences. For this he felt that the blame must rest on Generals Hamilton and Hunter-Weston.

The first speaker after lunch was John Spencer whose talk, *Side-lining the Sideshows: the British High Command's allergic Reaction to Gallipoli* focussed on matters of 'grand strategy'. John explained that the attempts to force the Dardanelles and the land campaign which followed led to a breakdown in the interaction between military leaders and politicians; the failure at Gallipoli permeating British strategy for many years thereafter. Strongly promoted by Winston Churchill, the attempt to force the Dardanelles and the land campaign were seen as means of assisting the Russia and as an alternative to the stalemate on the Western Front. It was opposed by British High Command (notably Haig, French, Robertson) who believed the focus should continue to be on the Western Front; this was essentially a conflict of strategy between the 'Easterners' and the 'Westerners' both of whom had their supporters and detractors in the War Council and elsewhere.




John Spencer

John highlighted the important role played Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the War Council and later Cabinet Secretary. Hankey was among those who reminded Asquith, the then Prime Minister, of an earlier study in 1907 which had drawn attention to the difficulties in attempting to force the Dardanelles by naval action alone and in mounting a combined amphibious attack. Despite this and the strong reservations of the High Command the expedition went ahead. The French were reluctant participants and were later to blame Gallipoli for the failure of the 1915 Artois / Loos offensive. By the later summer the British High Command were convinced that the campaign had failed and became increasingly concerned at Hamilton's demands for more troops. There was also criticism of the planning and conduct of the campaign in the Report of the Dardanelles Commission. The Salonika campaign - seen as another sideshow by the 'Westerners' - went ahead under the dark cloud of Gallipoli largely due to French pressure.

The failure of the Gallipoli campaign strengthened the position of the 'Westerners'. The appointment of Sir William Robertson as CIGS in May 1916 was also significant; he was a strong believer in the primacy of the Western Front and an opponent of 'side-shows', and

supported Haig against pressure from the new Prime Minister, Lloyd George, who wished to divert resources away from the Western Front. The creation of the Supreme (Allied) War Council in November 1917 and the appointment of Sir Henry Wilson as its British representative undermined Robertson's influence over strategic decision-making and he was replaced by Wilson in February 1918 who became the predominant influence on the conduct of the war. Wilson, however, had no wish to see a diversion of resources away from the Western Front. Thus, John contended, the contagion of Gallipoli on strategic thinking remained.



Jon Cooksey

The final talk - *The Vest Pocket Kodak Camera in Gallipoli* - was given by Jon Cooksey who began by outlining the history of cameras and photography in previous conflicts. War photography came into its own during the American Civil War and the Mexican War although at this time equipment was cumbersome and cameras recorded images on glass plates. Technical development led to the development of smaller cameras such as the British made 'Ensignette' - the first roll film camera - in 1907. This had a great influence on the development of what became known as the Vest Pocket Camera (VPC) by Kodak in 1912. The VPC produced images of consistent quality although its cost was such that initially only the affluent could afford to purchase it. Nevertheless, the numbers sold increased dramatically in the years before 1914 and when war came many were taken to the front, mainly by officers but not exclusively so. To illustrate this, Jon showed examples of photographs published in *The War Illustrated* in September 1914.

The use of cameras was initially not restricted by military authorities but when the implications in terms of photographs falling into enemy hands was realised their use was banned in March 1915. Despite this, cameras were still being advertised and British newspapers still sought and published war photographs.

In the second part of the talk Jon showed a selection of photographs taken during the Gallipoli campaign; these included 'Anzac soldiers on the Pyramids at Giza', a photograph taken from the *River Clyde* and 'climbing practice at Anzac' - a re-creation of the taking of Table Top. More controversial was one taken on 25 April showed 'Straggling at Anzac'; this featured wounded but also many seemingly unwounded troops resting on the beach - a photograph which didn't find its way into the Official History! Another showed Turkish prisoners under guard although the former appeared to have uniforms in much better shape than their ragged guards! Jon had researched many the photographers and some of their subjects, which added further interest to this fascinating talk.

The conference was brought to a close by our Chairman, James Stopford, who thanked the speakers for their excellent presentations and also those who had organised the conference or assisted on the day. The conference was followed by the Association AGM and an informal dinner which was much enjoyed by those attending.

THE PINE RIDGE GUNS, ANZAC, 25 APRIL 1915

Ian Gill

It was on the morning of 25 April 1915, following the landing at Anzac around 4.30am, elements of the 9th and 10th Battalions AIF, on gaining the 400 Plateau on Second Ridge, captured three enemy Krupp mountain guns near a position afterwards known as *The Cup*. The fourth gun of the battery escaped back up onto Third Ridge. Turkish records admit to this capture taking place and confirm that the other gun got away. But on nearby Pine Ridge, which stretches from the south eastern inland corner of Lone Pine and down towards Gaba Tepe to the south, it appears that other guns were captured that first day then recaptured by the Turks in the late evening. There appears to be no mention of these guns recorded either in the Turkish order of battle or in any sighted written Ottoman records. And yet, numerous Allied accounts across several battalions, supported by evidence from maps and by the records of an officer of the Indian Mountain Battery, suggest that the Turks did indeed have artillery weapons of a certain type on this ridge and elsewhere on and after 25 April.

It is also worthy of note that Turkish machine guns were encountered at both these sites, despite Turkish records not mentioning any machine guns present at Anzac until Lt Col Mehmed Sefik Aker brought his 27th Regiment's guns up onto Hill 165 on Third Ridge three to four hours after the landing began, and where they remained for most of the first day.¹ I intend to explain what I have discovered regarding this conundrum and to let the reader decide.

Less than two weeks before the landings, an aerial reconnaissance of the Gaba Tepe - Anzac area was undertaken by Major Charles Herbert Villiers Stuart, attached from the Indian Army to the ANZAC Staff Headquarters (Intelligence), as an aerial observer. Following this successful recon, camps, troops encamped, entrenchments, emplacements and numbers of artillery pieces in various locations were spotted and later marked on a map; vital intelligence for the impending operations. In the Lone Pine (400 Plateau) area was duly marked a '7 Gun Battery'. This information is certainly at odds with the four gun battery that was later acknowledged in subsequent official war histories on both sides, although Bean went to considerable lengths to raise the question of 'other' guns on Pine Ridge and to mark a battery there on his maps for his *Official History*. He would later refer to that aerial reconnaissance and the considerable accuracy of its findings regarding troop placements of the various Ottoman units camped around Gaba Tepe and beyond. The 10th Battalion was assigned the task of taking the guns and moving forward onto Third Ridge. (See photographs pages 32 and 33).



Major Villiers-Stuart
56th Punjabi Rifles
(Frontier Force)

The first piece of the puzzle comes from Major E A Drake Brockman, Officer Commanding 'A' Coy 11th Battalion in the first wave of the Landing at Ari Burnu. His recollection to Bean stated:


The time when they landed was 4.20 he thinks. The boats were then 700 to 800 yards out when the flare went up. Almost immediately machine gun fire opened. Something went into the water before they landed - possibly Hotchkiss shells, and threw up a spray - a number of these were falling about. (AWM38 3DRL-227-1).

The two important points in this case are the signal flare and the mention of a Hotchkiss-type

shell hitting the water, obviously different to rifle and machine gun rounds hitting the water. The fact that other lights had been seen higher up the ranges also indicates the Turks were then aware of a landing, possibly using acetylene lamps to warn of an assault taking place and indicating its location. Ari Burnu was certainly in the range fans of Ottoman artillery. While senior Turkish officers believed a landing likely at Gaba Tepe, Sefik Aker of the 27th Regiment believed a landing at Ari Burnu more likely, threatening the nearby heights close behind. He got his men to work digging well-sited trenches and machine gun and artillery emplacements.

In the rush to get inland Captain Sadik's Krupp mountain battery was surprised while limbering up to move and get away. Sadik escaped with one mountain gun but the other three were intercepted by men of the 9th and 10th Battalions and captured. This was before

6.15am, when Major Charles Brand, Brigade Major of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, sent back a message to Colonel Ewen Sinclair MacLagan, commanding the 3rd Brigade, informing him of the capture of three Krupp guns. Some of the enemy were killed, as were animals used for hauling the weapons. An enemy machine gun was also noted strapped to a pack mule with its handler, reins still clasped in hand, shot down near to the guns. This was in the vicinity of Owen's Gully near to the indentation known as The Cup, which cut into the northern lobe of Lone Pine. It was some of these forward elements that later came across some other guns more than 300 yards south south east of this position, leaving recollections of the type of weapon and the weapon pits they stood just outside of. It appears it was men of the 9th Battalion that first came across this other gun position, followed later by men of the 2nd Brigade, chiefly of the 5th and 6th Battalions.



Lieut R M F Hooper's route across the 400 Plateau to the Hotchkiss battery on Pine Ridge.
(Bean, *Official History* Vol 1 p389).

It was between 9 and 10am, with more troops coming up to Second Ridge, that Major A G Salisbury of the 9th Battalion went forward to support the troops who had gone further across Lone Pine, some to the eastern inland end overlooking Legge Valley. Sefik Aker's troops, having arrived from near Maidos, were already pushing forward, driving back the more forward Australian parties who had gone onto Third Ridge as ordered.

In Bean's *Official History* parties of 9th Battalion are stated to have occupied the gun pits at The Cup, but his notebooks also mention, by way of a sketch showing only two guns and text, a different and more southerly course taken by Salisbury, stating:

By about 10.15am when he had crossed Lone Pine plateau to his left. He passed this and went down the far slope. There (to his left) were two guns, one Hotchkiss and one with a shield of steel. Young, Milne and Salisbury were at these guns. Salisbury only got ten men across 400 Plateau. The others dropped down into crevices or hides or were killed. The fire came from Gun Ridge opposite and the right. Salisbury retired onto Lone Pine to a point not far in front of Brown's Dip where the 7th Battalion had

their rest (aid post). (AWM38 3DRL 1772/2).

As it is well known the four Krupp (75mm) mountain guns positioned near The Cup were not Hotchkiss guns, it would appear these men of the 9th Battalion had made it to the other gun pits on northern Pine Ridge as the sketch indicated. Another 3rd Brigade man, thought to be 874 Pte T E Langley of the 10th Battalion, seemed well-informed of what guns the Turks possessed, saying this:

The battery and one Hotchkiss gun which were captured by the Australians on the day of the landing and afterwards retaken by counterattack were in position on the Al Bairak slopes (Pine Ridge). The battery which remained in action in the Olive Grove trees at Kirmizi Sirt was never found. (AWM38 3DRL 1772/2).

As the 2nd Infantry Brigade was pushed into the fighting, two officers who distinguished themselves that first day later gave Charles Bean some compelling information regarding these other guns on northern Pine Ridge. Another 5th Battalion man whom Bean interviewed at 5th Battalion HQ just days after the Landing, but who is not named, related to Bean his first day's experience. Getting up to the 400 Plateau, having started with 50 to 60 men, they were met with severe shrapnel, machine gun and rifle fire as they advanced across Lone Pine towards Third Ridge:

We went down over the crest, the scrub on the plateau was waist high - and as we got down, got into shelter... I made three rushes before we got to their dugout emplacements ... Only three of us got to the emplacements but more came ...

By the finish we had about 15 men in the emplacement and the communication trench and 7 wounded. I started with A Company of the 5th. After dark Lt Levy and Derham came up and one of the officers of the 7th Battalion. We had got there by about 1.30pm. The 3rd Brigade had gone right forward and returned by then. The gun in this emplacement was a Hotchkiss with a drop breech. We tried to work it but I couldn't find the way to open it. There was ammunition - red and yellow shells. We buried 2 boxes of them. The dead within 20 yards of us all had bombs ... Well Derham came up and the others, our line crept forward after dark. We had a circle round the hill. But at 11.30pm we were ordered to retire. We came back carrying our wounded - all we could find. Probably some were left. I took the shell nose down to the beach.

Lieutenant A P Derham, Officer Commanding 10 Platoon, 'C' Company 5th Battalion, fought all over 400 Plateau that day, being twice wounded in the process before making his way south across Lone Pine and down a southern slope, coming onto Weir Ridge later in the day. Here he joined with Lieutenant Levy, also of the 5th Battalion. Bean recorded Derham's story:

They could see their own men moving down the bare forward face of a hill about 200 yards away. They could see it was some sort of position. Made there in a rush. They were under sniping fire but well dug in in some gun pits. When Derham got there he went to sleep (remembering he had already been shot in the thigh and shoulder, authors words) beside Lt Daly (6Bn). Daly was wounded and in a rifle pit behind the gun pits. There was a Turkish machine gun there outside the pits and two guns (at least one). The men were all 5th and 6th. Derham was pretty well done in. Derham asked Daly if he might go to sleep. About 4pm Derham woke... At dusk Daly sent someone back. Immediately afterwards the Turks began to come up. Derham was in command of a small squad behind the pits between Hooper and Levy... There was a Turkish machine gun with ammunition but no one could work it.... Just then

some reinforcements came down the top of the hill - 10 or 20 under a sergeant major". (Believed to be 629 CSM Rupert Charles Williams 6th Bn)

"Sgt Major got the guns going ready to fire near the right hand gun pit..."

Orders came to retire on a formed line in rear. There were just as many wounded as unwounded. Every unwounded man carried a wounded man. They had all the wounded, no one over. Derham and another carried a machine gun. They came upon a man who had a broken leg - carried him in and left the machine gun in a bush. (AWM38 3DRL 606 28A 1).

After completing his mission to Gallipoli in early 1919, and having returned to Australia, Bean caught up with Derham in Melbourne, then practising medicine. In his *Gallipoli Mission* he wrote:

On returning to Australia, however, I interviewed Derham and he made it quite clear that the Hotchkiss gun pits had been at the northern end of the ridge, just down the shoulder from Lone Pine, where Pine Ridge sprang from it ...

Lieutenant R M F Hooper related this to Bean, putting beyond all doubt that this was a different set of gun pits. He had given Bean a plan of the emplacements:

within a few weeks of the Landing, Captain R M F Hooper of the 5th Battalion, a young Victorian afterwards killed at Lone Pine, told me that he had taken part in the capture of the "Turkish Battery"; that the guns were Hotchkiss, and were still in their emplacements, and his party and others held them until late at night." (*Gallipoli Mission* p 148).



Lieut R M F Hooper

The final piece of the jigsaw puzzle comes from an officer of the 21st Kohat Indian Mountain Battery, Major A C Fergusson. In 1916 he penned some words regarding evidence that the Turks were using ten-pounder Hotchkiss shells:

Yet one more yarn about our own shell being fired at us. In the very early days we were often told we were firing on our own troops. Sometimes these allegations were wrong but on investigation proved bodies of our own 10 pounder shell sometimes in places where our guns could have put them, but also in places where they could not possibly have put them. One day Campbell was walking along a trench when an Australian told him to hurry as the Turks were shelling it, and pointed to the body of a shell which had just fallen. Campbell went and looked at it and found a shell with marks to show that it had been made in Cossipore and filled at Rawul Pindi, and the scoop of the shell had shown that it had come from right outside our line.

He phoned down to me and I went and satisfied myself that it could not possibly be ours. I then went and asked Corps to wire and ask if Hellenes had lost any mountain guns. The answer came back 'no' so the matter remained a mystery, but the Australians were still suspicious that we were doing it. Long afterwards the mystery was cleared up. The BGRA New Zealand had long before the war ordered a battery of new mountain guns for New Zealand. England sent our old 10 pounders and BGRA refused to accept delivery. After a lot of correspondence England told him to sell them and credit them with the proceeds. NZ sold them to Turkey and here they were being used against us". (See *The Gallipolian* no. 85, Winter 1997).

In light of all this evidence, which interestingly has been available in the main for decades, and even more easily since being digitised and placed online, it would appear there is much more to the Landing at Anzac than we have been recently told by some writers and historians. This new slant pays no attention to the evidence of these men. One feature of Third Ridge bears the name 'Hotchkiss Tepe'. Why? Other Australian soldiers recorded the Turks firing Hotchkiss-type weapons within days and weeks of the Landing.

Recently published historians assert that Turkish artillery fire began at Anzac some fifteen to twenty minutes after the Landing began, and from Gaba Tepe only in the first instance. Yet a footnote in the recently-translated *Turkish General Staff History*, commenting on the capture of the Krupp guns, says otherwise. It reads:

According to what the artillerymen were reporting, as they were firing at the landing enemy and on the landed forces, this battery was suddenly ambushed. Even though they tried to load the cannons, since the animals and the soldiers were wounded by the close range fire, it was only possible to rescue one of the cannons with difficulty. The troops were very distressed and furious. (*Turkish General Staff History: The Dardanelles (Çanakkale) Front operations April-May 1915, English translation Vol 1* via Macquarie University and Harvey Broadbent p 147).

It just might be that Drake Brockman was right and that some Hotchkiss rounds were fired prior to these guns being lost. This article hopefully serves as a reminder that much of what Charles Bean recorded in those first early days, weeks and months deserves much greater credence and that the recently translated *Turkish General Staff History* and other Ottoman Turk records require a greater level of scrutiny and critique. Dardanelles Fortified Area Command might be one area to start a search to more completely tell the Gallipoli story. It may well prove very interesting.

1. As an example of the presence of 'unacknowledged' machine guns at Anzac before the time that their presence is admitted in Turkish records, the following refers to the Hotchkiss gun pits ('the pits') on Pine Ridge:

An abandoned Turkish machine-gun lay behind the pits. It was exactly what was needed, but no one knew how to work it. ... The enemy were already very close, when down from the summit of Lone Pine came a dozen Australians under a sergeant-major.

It so happened that the sergeant-major understood the mechanism of the Turkish machine-gun, and it was immediately erected near the southernmost pit. Scarcely had it been placed in position than cries of "Allah!" were heard down the hill, and a mass of Turks was seen charging up it. ... The machine-gun opened, and the enemy fell back. (Bean *Official History* Vol 1 p423).

Note: A special thanks to Murray Ewen for providing some of the references from Bean's records.

COLLINGWOOD MEMORIAL

The annual service took place at Collingwood Corner, Pimperne, Blandford, Dorset on Friday 2 June 2017 in glorious summer weather. Angus Campbell, Lord Lieutenant of Dorset laid the first wreath. Some 20 other organisations also laid wreaths, including the Gallipoli Association, to commemorate the casualties suffered by the Royal Naval Division, and in particular by the Collingwood Battalion at the Third Battle of Krithia on 4 June 1915.

A Guard of Honour was formed by members of HMS *Collingwood* and a band played during the ceremony. Gallipoli Association member Martin Willoughby gave the address. Our thanks go to Stuart Adam and Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Brannigan and to the Friends of Collingwood, together with the garrison at Blandford Camp, for their organisation and hospitality.

James Watson Smith

MEMORIES OF GALLIPOLI – 1915

H B Stearman^[2]

This short article on the Gallipoli campaign is written from the point of view of the ordinary soldier instead of the normal historian's records.

Before outlining my recollections, I would like to give the reader some idea of the normal happenings at the turn of the century. I was born in Hove, Sussex in 1897 and my earliest recollections are of my sisters, of whom I had six, taking me to a street party for some celebration. As two of these sisters died in 1901, I can now assume that the celebration was for the Relief of Mafeking. Another treat we boys had was when a horseless carriage rumbled past Goldstone Villas in Hove. We would all run up the road to watch it pass. My father would often remark, "these contraptions, they will never catch on". A horse drawn bus ran from Hove station to Castle Square and the fare was 1 penny to York Road and 2 pence to Castle Square.

I joined the Royal Sussex Regiment in March 1915, a few days after my 18th birthday; I couldn't join before because the lower age limit was 19 but after my 18th birthday, I could honestly say I was 19.

After the sea journey we put in at a Greek island. I have never been able to find out whether it was Mudros or Imbros^[3] However during the late afternoon we transferred to lighters and were taken to Suvla Bay where we landed during the night. By morning we had pushed forward to a place we eventually knew as Burnt Hill and we could see in front of us a flat plain of grass or corn and beyond that hills overlooking the Narrows. Although I knew nothing of military movements I could immediately see that to take these high hills would be impossible.

Eventually, we pushed forward across the flat plain which we called the Great Salt Lake as we found it was filled with brackish water during the winter. From then on it was trench warfare. We occasionally came back to Lala Baba for a rest and on one return to a different part of the line the following incident took place. I was a member of the Machine Gun Section and our guns were about six yards in front of the line (that is why we were called "The Suicide Squad") and at two in the morning, in taking over my turn of duty, I noticed a figure crawling towards our line. I fired a burst; it stopped and I fired another burst. Very soon the whole line was firing and our officer came up to see what it was all about. Eventually, when it was quiet he ordered me to follow him and we crept out to see who it was I had killed. It was a small bush which I had not noticed when I took over. The officer was a Mr Butler who lived in Horsham.

During that summer there were hundreds of casualties through dysentery and malaria and it was in November that we first hear whispers of evacuation. One night it was raining very hard and was very cold and we were ordered to dismantle our dugouts (we were at rest at Lala Baba at the time). We then marched or rather edged our way down to the jetty but after spending the whole night shivering in the rain, we went back. Our dugouts were full of water and the

rain had turned to snow. Within hours a blizzard was blowing and everything was frozen over. Before bending our arms we had to crack the ice on our overcoats and still the temperature dropped. A few yards away from us (my mate Rod Harris and me) a group of four had got hold of some rum and had gone off to sleep. In the morning they were all dead, frozen to death. We kept ourselves alive by wrestling, running where possible, and jumping up and down. It was rumoured that we lost more men in that storm than we had during the whole campaign.

Early in December we went again down to the beach and embarked on lighters which took us out to the waiting ship which I found out was the 'Brighton Belle'^[4]. As we pulled away from the land we could see the fires burning all along the coast where the stores were set on fire. From Mudros we went across to Alexandria.

In Egypt we were transferred to the newly formed Machine Gun Corps and I served with them across Sinai, through Gaza, Beersheba, Hebron, Bethlehem and, after the capture of Jerusalem, we went on to Galilee and Nablus.

Notes:

1. This account was first published in the *Sussex Family Historian* in December 1984.
2. Mr Stearman, who served in 1/4th Bn. The Royal Sussex Regiment, applied to be considered for the free place offered to veterans on the 1985 Holts' 70th Anniversary Battlefield Tour in 1985 but was not selected. He appears never to have joined the Association.
3. The Battalion War Diary records that the Battalion entrained for Devonport on 17 July and sailed on the SS *Ulysses* arriving at Mudros Bay, Lemnos on 7 August; it left there for Imbros the following day. The battalion landed at 'C' Beach, Suvla Bay in the early hours of the 9 August where they went into reserve positions near Lala Baba before being ordered forward later that morning to Chocolate Hill where they advanced in support of the 2/4th Queen's attack on Scimitar Hill. Here they came under heavy shell and enfilade fire where the Suffolks suffered 75 casualties.
4. The Battalion War Diary records that the ship was the *El Kahirah*.

BROTHERS MEET ON BATTLEFIELD

A remarkable and pathetic meeting on the battlefield at Gallipoli of two brothers is recorded in a letter written by Private W. Breeze, brother of Mr. J. Breeze, of the Masterton (N.Z.) Post Office staff, to his parents from a hospital in Egypt, where he lies wounded. "It was awful on that hillside on Friday and Saturday. It just rained bullets and shrapnel.

We took two trenches at the point of the bayonet, and at about 1 o'clock on the Saturday we went to support the first lot, and lost a lot of men. We were lying behind the firing line waiting to charge when I got hit. I sat up to have a look where I had been hit when I suddenly saw Paddy (his brother), whom I had not seen since we arrived here, a little way along the trench. He had been wounded. I went over to him, and it was terrible to see him; he had been wounded in both legs. I sat beside him for a time. He was a brave fellow. He sat up and said, "Well, Bill, I'm done for. Tell the boys I died game, and give my love to mother, father, and all at home." I broke up, and tried to carry him, but it was no good. So he said: 'Straighten my legs out and I will take my chance.'

I told him I would send the stretcher bearers for him if I got out. I got to the hospital without getting hit. The stretcher bearers went for him and the other wounded, but never got there. They would not let me go back to them, and put me aboard a ship and sent me to Alexandria."

Word has since been received of the death of Private Paddy Breeze. (Daily Post (Hobart, Tasmania) Thursday 18 November 1915 p2).

6/591 Private George Patrick BREEZE, Canterbury Battalion NZEF, blacksmith and farrier, of Koiterangi, NZ. Killed in action on Chunuk Bair, 7 August 1915, aged 25. No Known Grave.

6/147 William Joseph Breeze, 13th Company, Canterbury Battalion NZEF, was wounded by shrapnel in both legs on 7 August 1915, evacuated aboard the *Tunisian*, and rejoined his unit on 22 September. He was discharged in 1919.

PRIVATE T SPENCER 19519, LOYAL NORTH LANCS REGIMENT

Buried Green Hill Cemetery, Suvla Sector, Gallipoli, aged 35

Tim Chamberlin

I visited the Gallipoli Peninsula many times during the 1980s when visitors were few.

Private Spencer's grave intrigued me because it is unusual to have a home address form part of an epitaph. The 6th Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment formed part of the 13th (Western) Division commanded initially by Major General F C Shaw. The battalion was involved in fierce fighting, particularly on Chunuk Bair.

Green Hill cemetery is beautifully situated; a quiet approach would surprise 'sun bathing' snakes on the paving stones borders!

I had the opportunity to visit Bolton and surprisingly easily identified Meredith Street. I knocked at the door, but there was no reply, nor from any neighbouring properties. The church at the end of the road is in the parish of St Simon & St Jude, but there was no war memorial in the churchyard.

It was an odd sensation to think of Private Spencer walking down this street never to return to his wife, Ada.

I sent all the information to the 'Bolton Evening News' in 1989 but they declined to publish.

It would be interesting to discover if any of Private Spencer's relatives are still in the Bolton area.

I mislaid all this information and was delighted to re-discover it on a recent rummage / clear out!

See photographs on page 36.

HMS *AMETHYST*

CRUISER in ACTION

— Struck by the Enemy. —

What the experience is on a British ship of war when the enemy shells got its range is graphically told by Navigating-Lieut. Morant, of H.M.S. *Amethyst* in a letter to his brother, Mr. Charles Morant, of Renmark.

Writing from Malta, the officer says:— "My ship is a light cruiser, which I joined from the

Harpy (a destroyer) on January 12 last. No doubt you have seen in the papers how events have been going here, and that this ship (H.M.S. *Amethyst*) had a heavy casualty list one night; in fact, we have the heaviest casualty list of any British ship that has been in action and has stayed afloat. At the beginning of these operations at the Dardanelles, or, rather, the active operations, which started in February, this ship used to go up the Dardanelles every night to cover the minesweeping trawlers. We always came under a heavy fire when approaching the main mine field below the 'Narrows.' Sometimes they fired 1,000 shells at us, but as a rule the shooting was poor, fortunately for us! On several occasions we all but hit floating mines, but I just managed to get the ship round in time. (I am the navigator.) However, on the night of March 13 and 14 we were less fortunate. One of the larger forts got our accurate range, and pumped 6-in. shells (100 lb.) into us. The first hit shot away our steering gear, and I was left with the ship helpless (until the handwheel gear was connected up), with four floating mines under our port bow and the ship's head pointing up the straits."



HMS *Amethyst*

— More Shells Get Home. —

"It naturally took some time to turn the ship with her engines alone, and during all this time we were being badly hit. In addition to the guns of the forts, several field batteries on either side of the Straits were bursting shrapnel over our bridge and control positions. It is really very extraordinary that none of the officers on the bridge was struck, for we afterwards discovered that the masts and woods around were full of shrapnel bullets. As it was the hand wheel was connected up in quick time, and I got the ship turned round, and so we were able to get out of range. On the whole, we were really lucky, because if their ammunition had been better, or if they had been using high explosive shells, we would certainly have been sunk. Also, if the officers on the bridge had been 'washed out,' we would have been sunk or gone ashore, as those aft would not have come up in time. It was, as I said, at night (3.50 a.m.), and all we had to fire at were their searchlights (which were blinding us), and the flashes of their guns;

whilst they had us lit up as if it were daylight. A ship of this class has no armour. A projectile gets in at one side, and bursts, and out the other side.”

— Dreadful Injuries.—

“The places where the casualties occurred presented a dreadful sight, and the men’s wounds were appalling. Only one of the many corpses was intact. Several — in fact, most — were mere gruesome pieces of flesh. The seriously wounded were in a dreadful condition, legs having been swept off and bodies laid open. The one mercy is they were all suffering so much from shock that they were semi-dazed. Most of the worst cases afterwards died of shock. The hardest men that have lived I think are those who have lost their eyesight. We got a very fair idea of what the state of both the British and German cruisers that have been sunk must have been like. Their condition must have been 10 times worse than ours. The British lyddite shell has a tremendous effect. One of the 12-in. gun turrets (weighing 400 tons) of a German battle cruiser, which finally escaped, was blown right out of the ship by a 13.5-in. shell from one of our battle cruisers.”

—Mentioned in Despatches.—

“I was lucky over our little show, as I was mentioned in both my captain’s despatches and in those of the senior captain in charge of the minesweeping operations. Since this happened, as you must already know, we have lost some battleships by mines, which are our worst enemy. In a few days combined naval and military operations on a very large scale will be started. They have got to be successful. It will certainly be very interesting. We have Australian and New Zealand troops going to take part in these operations.”

The above letter appeared in the newspaper *Register* (Adelaide, South Australia), on Saturday 24 July 1915. The writer was Lieutenant Ernald Lushington Morant, RN, whose brother lived in Renmark, South Australia.

Lieutenant (promoted Lieutenant-Commander in 1918) Morant was born 20 May 1889, in Hereford. He died in Rhodesia in 1968. He was ‘Commended for service in Action’ between 19th February and 24th April 1915.

DIARY OF STANLEY FOLLOT HOOK

WW1 - Private with 2nd South Western Mounted Brigade 1915 and WW2 - Quartermaster Colour Sergeant with Weston Home Guard 1939-1942

Born in Somerset, Stanley Follot Hook lived in Hopkins Street, Weston with his mother, Agnes, father Follot George, brother Arthur and sisters Ethel and Agnes.

Our grandfather was called up on the day WW1 broke out, 4th August 1914. This day was spent buying horses at Weston’s Recreation Ground. The following day he travelled to Frome with friend Jim Patch to join the 1/2nd South Western Mounted Brigade F.A. and eventually left Liverpool on 25th September 1915 on RMS *Olympic* arriving in Mudros in October and on to Suvla Bay, Gallipoli, Palestine and Egypt.

Stanley kept a daily, detailed diary of events during WW1 from the day he was called up. Dates and events were kept very accurately and all the horrors of this campaign are reported in great detail along with simple facts such as what was eaten for breakfast (if any). This diary

fortunately was preserved by my Grandmother and my father and is now lodged in the Imperial War Museum in London for all to see.

Tuesday Oct 12th

On sanitary squad, shirked & went bathing. Walked to another village "Thermos" 3 miles away. Very hot bathed again.

Plenty of Turkish prisoners about working under guard. Funeral of Egyptian with weird chantings of Hallah Hi. These Gypo's are employed by our Government.

Wed Oct 13th

Packed kit left camp 9 am arrived original landing place.

11 am shipped to 'Waterwitch' at 12 & transhipped in Mudros Harbour to 'Redbreast' under weigh 4 pm. Very rough passage & bitter cold tried to sleep on open deck but impossible arrive Suvla Bay 10 pm. Fell down gangway but no damage.

Packed into lighters like sardines. Landed under shell fire. Waited frozen until midnight. Marched behind 1st Devon Yeomanry to wrong place awful country nothing but stones & boulders, furze & trenches. Abandoned by Yeo about 1.30. Slept on face of cliff. Very bumpy & frozen stiff no grub.

Thurs Oct 14th

6.30 am retraced steps & found RAMC about 1 mile in another direction. Enjoyed fine breakfast - saved my life.

'Beachy Bill' a Turkish Gun livens things up a bit. Spend the day digging dug out. Slept in one at night, warm & comfortable.

Fri Oct 15th

Dug out digging all day. Evening go for rations with stretchers. Beachy Bill again, Artillery duel. 2 British cruisers join in 2 enemies shells fell 10 yards from dug out. Have soon learnt how to drop flat quick. Each man must keep 5 yards from anyone else.

Sun Oct 17th

Carried rations to advanced Dressing station just behind the firing line. Snipers busy. Nothing like a Sunday. Very fierce bombardment of our hill by Turks. Major Greig NDH in our brigade killed. Many casualties, Makes one's blood boil to see the wounded. 1 not 20 yards away who had both legs broken besides an arm clean gone. Talk about the groans of a battlefield.

Monday Oct 18 Nothing important. Went to Chocolate Hill to get sand bags.

Tuesday Oct 19

Had to go to canteen. Plenty of our fellows down with dysentery.



Stanley Follot Hook

Wed Oct 20th

Quiet except Beach Bill of course. Inoculated against Cholera. Digging & improving dug outs

Thurs Oct 21st Dug outs for sergeants Lone Tree Gully with despatches

Fri Oct 22

My birthday am 22 Lone Tree Gully to stay for 2 days. Snipers unpleasant. Despatch to Base & Medical Stores snoozed all the afternoon.

Sat Oct 23rd

Put on stretcher bearing 1st case officer - jaundice. Ordered to take refuge for an hour from the shells in Shrapnel Gully

Sunday Oct 24th

Return to Base with section. Find I have a touch of dysentery decide if not better tomorrow to report sick.

Mon Oct 25

Awful pains in the "tummy" & dyhorrea so report sick. Light duties. Day cold & wet snipers busy.

Tues Oct 26

Am ordered diet - milk rice & cocoa, excused duties.

Wed Oct 27 A lot better today. Artillery active. Turkish aeroplane fired at unsuccessfully.

Thur Oct 28 Am nearly well.

Fri Oct 29 Our brigade goes into the 1st line trenches.

Sat Oct 30

We go to Lone Tree Gully for a week. Shell pitched 6 yards from me going out. Very narrow escape.

Sunday Oct 31

Took 3 cases back to base. Road very dangerous as it can be seen by the enemy who are only about 250 yards away & anyone seen on it by day gets a nice little dose of lead.

Monday Nov 1st

Took fellow back who was shot through the brain. Poor fellow died just as we got there. Maxim gun swept our road & simply wonderful no-one was hit.

Tues Nov 2nd

2 more cases. Maxim still going strong. Gives one a sinking feeling to hear a whole string of bullets whizz past your ear.

Wed Nov 3rd

Maxim still reigns over the road. General attack today, awful row. Australians take 2 lines of trenches.

Thurs Nov 4th Maxim found & smashed.

Fri Nov 5th

Good old Bon-fire Night was celebrated in Grand style & had to take refuge & dodge into our cook-house. Find 2 dozen fellows already there. As there was no roof we had to lie

down & listen to the 'pang' of the lead on the wall. Then started on a good old sing song & had a very merry evening.

Sat Nov 6th

Supposed to be back today but ADMS [Assistant Director Medical Services - Editor] stops us saying that as long as our brigade is in the trenches we have to stay. A Kitchener's unit came to take over but at 10 pm have to pack up again & go back. Poor beggars they were treated like dogs by their officers & NCO's.

Sun Nov 7th Same old routine, getting used to the snipers.

Mon Nov 8th Water cart duty.

Tues Nov 9th Nothing of importance 2 cases.

Wed Nov 10th Go back to base with 10 others, am - huva - er - well, inhabited.

Thur Nov 11

Having got at my kit bag have a bath & a change with a good sprinkling of NCI.

Fri Nov 12

Another bathe & being in hospital have a decent time.

The sea is glorious to bathe in here. It only rises about an inch or so a day. 20 yards from shore it is about 3 feet deep & this depth is maintained for about ½ mile outwards It is a beautiful pale clear blue. Altogether it is an ideal bathing place, that it would be impossible to better.

Sat Nov 13 to Sun Nov 20

This week has been taken up with digging, building, despatches rations etc, with a bathe about twice a day if possible

Mon Nov 20

It blew a gale last night & a destroyer ran aground about 50 yards down the coast near the landing stage. All hands safe. Weather getting colder.

Tues Nov 23 Turks attempt to smash up destroyer fails.

Thur Nov 25th

Went to Lala Baba for Dubbin. This place is simply alive with guns. Wind begins to spring up again hard & cold.

Fri Nov 26

Difficulty in standing up against the wind. A hospital lighter & an ordinary lighter run aground & become wrecks. After 4 days of shelling, the Turks have managed to smash the destroyer. All guns and fittings had been saved before the end, & as only the wreck remained, the Turks have wasted a few shells for nothing. The destroyer was the Prince Louis.

Sat Nov 27th

Last night a dug out fell in & 9 men of the Notts & Derby's were killed outright besides a host of injured. The scene at night beggars description. The wind & the cries of the buried men & the digging in the dark. A light was impossible as we should all have been blown sky high by shell fire. It was a pitiful sight to see the 9 laid out on stretchers, some smashed out of all recognition. Added to the wind the rain had arrived not in drops but in sheets. One of our messengers attempted to scale the hill this evening but was washed back nearly losing

his life. News comes in that the trenches are breast deep in water but the boys are sticking it. It is getting colder still. I have become quite efficient in the art of grave digging.

Sunday Nov 28th

is a day that I shall never forget as long as I live. It was freezing when we were awakened in the early hours & the rain had turned to half snow & half hail. We were told to well wrap up & besides having an extra jersey on I put on 2 tunics a scarf gloves & an overcoat & sleeping helmet & then was icy cold. We were ordered out in parties of 4 to pick up anyone if needed. 100 yards from camp we stumbled on a poor fellow lying on the frozen mud & snow, unconscious. We returned & got a stretcher & brought him into a marquee. Big devils were lit & then the crowd started coming in from the firing line. It was more than heart-rending to see big strong men crying like children, with the cold. None could stand upright, but were frozen absolutely double. I went on slapping the fellow we had brought in unconscious, but it nearly brought tears to my eyes. The moaning & blubbering as they crouched round the fire & their whining for food. They had had nothing to eat for 24 hours (since writing above I learn that 24 hours should read 36) & would eat anything. The fellow we had been working on having died we set out again. It was wise not to go far because it was impossible to see more than 10-15 yards ahead. We brought in 7 more & then found a fellow lying a little way from the road or mud track. He was quite dead.

We had to get picks to pick him out of the hard frozen mud. Just under his side we found a little bird dead, that had evidently tried to get under him for warmth. We took the poor fellow back for burial. Our camp was supposed to hold only 250 patients but there were 796 crammed into it. We could not get them on to the hospital ships as it was too rough so they had to spend the night standing up in the marquees & huts all jammed up together for warmth. None of our own fellows had had any food, as it was given to these poor devils.

Mon Nov 29

Was a lot better & not quite so cold. It had stopped raining & the sun had come out although the wind still held. Still more fellows were coming in. Evening came & we got the whole crowd down to the beach, some in the cars, others on stretchers & the majority walking. Most or them, in fact all were suffering with frost bitten feet. Their boots having been cut off, they tied biscuits on their feet for sandals. 4 of us were detailed off to go on the lighter out to the ship. I was one & Corpl Nancarrow was in charge. After 3 hours hard work loading up the lighter we started at 930 pm. We had 46 cases on stretchers that had to be carried some way & then taken down the slip on the lighter & in darkness too. The walking cases were packed anywhere nearly 500 of them. We reached the hospital boat at 11 pm & then the real work commenced. The lighter made fast alongside & a cradle was let down from the ship, on a crane. 2 of us had to carry the stretcher along the deck & put it in the cradle while the other 2 brought them up from below. We changed over occasionally but it was gruelling hard work & dangerous. We were in semi-darkness & the orderly from the 21st CCS slipped on the iron desks of the lighter & just saved himself from going overboard stretcher & all. There was no hand rail & the decks finished just like a railway platform. We had some blankets sent from the ship to put on the decks & that made it much safer. When the gangway was let down to admit the walkings we had a rough time to stop the rush. I expected every minute to hear a splash of some going overboard. I think the cold & hunger had driven them mad to get to warmth & food. They certainly acted like madmen for a few minutes.

We finished about 2.30 am & slept on lighter, returning to camp 7 next morning.

Tues Nov 30

Being short-handed (some of our fellows had 'gone west' & some evacuated) I was put on as hospital orderly. I fancied myself as a nurse. Still windy & very cold.

Wed Dec 1st

Have to clear up clothing equipment etc left here by the patients & send it to Ordnance people via Indian's garri. I have picked up a decent bit of Hindustani having had so much to do with the Indians.

Thur Dec 2

Weather improving a lot. Despatches to Sula Jig (the other side of Salt Lake) & C Beach.

Fri Dec 3 Despatches 9th A.C. 11th Div.

Sat Dec 4 Weather normal. Despatches as yesterday.

Sun Dec 5

Today there has been the biggest artillery fight since we have been here. Another big ship - Warspite - came into the bay & started using tremendous guns in company with the 2 cruisers that have always been there. This & the artillery makes a fine noise. From our camp we can see where the shells pitch. The big naval ones throw a vivid flash & a pile of earth as broad & high as a church, en bloc.

Mon Dec 6th

English & Turks aeroplanes have a fight which seems to end in a draw. Very exciting.

Tues Dec 7th

Bombardment by ships of the Pimples. A party of our fellows have a very narrow escape. They were sitting on the side of a rock about 10 feet high when a shell hit the top of the other side. I saw one fellow bowled clean over but it was the force of the explosion. Not one was hit except by bits of rock. If any had been standing up there would have been no hope for them.

Wed Dec 8 Rumours of shifting somewhere.

Sat Dec 11

Packed up left at 7.30 pm leaving lights & fires packed up so that they will burn for some time. Understand they are going to evacuate Suvla, on board Redbreast. 9 pm under weigh. 9.30 slept on decks, arrive Mudros again 7 am on

Sun Dec 12

Back in old familiar Mudros Harbour again. Singularly enough we tranship to the 'Watership', [sic – actually *Waterwitch* – ed] just reverse case from last time. Land 10 am. March full kit & kit bags about 3 miles across island, near our former camp. Put in a rest camp for a rest. Goodness knows we need it, as could be seen by the number that fell out on the march.

Mon Dec 13th Breakfast 7.30. Clean up camp in morning. Village of Porteanos in afternoon.

Tues Dec 14th Messing about camp all day.

Wed Dec 15th

Every other afternoon we have off, & go to the numerous Greek villages otherwise we mess about camp all day, doing nothing & generally wasting time.

Thurs Dec 16th Shift camp to top of hill.

Friday Dec 17th Afternoon Castro. Prices are very high in the villages.

Acknowledgement: The editor is grateful to Ann Baxter and John Hook, grandchildren of Stanley Follot Hook, for supplying this excerpt from their grandfather's diary. Stanley Follot Hook survived the Great War and served in the Second World War as Company Quartermaster Sergeant (CQMS) in the Weston Home Guard. Sadly he was wounded during a Luftwaffe air raid on Weston-super-mare on 30th June 1942, and died of his wounds the following day, aged 48. See the photograph of his headstone in Milton Road cemetery on page 34.

COMMEMORATION IN HAWICK ON 12 JULY

"The most poignant and reflective of events in the Callants' Club's yearly calendar" is how the Club president, Dave Chapman, described the ceremonies at the 1514 Memorial and War Memorial in Wilton Lodge Park honouring the Hawick soldiers of the 1/4th (Borders) Battalion of the Kings Own Scottish Borderers who lost their lives in the attack on the Turkish lines in Gallipoli on 12 July 1915.

In this and in the following months of the Gallipoli campaign, some 132 men from the Hawick area were killed with many more wounded – a disastrous loss of life from such a small part of the country. On 12 July 1916, the Callants' Club marked the first anniversary of what could be described as Hawick's blackest period of its military history. It was not until 1930 that the ceremony took place again but since then the club has paid tribute to the bravery and sacrifice every year since on his date.

This year almost 40 past-presidents, council members and representatives from the KOSB, British Legion and the Ex-Servicemen's Club again gathered at the 1514 Memorial where the president, flanked by Provost Watson McAteer and Callants' Club council member Sandy Laing, laid the wreath on behalf of the club, followed by the recital of the well-known lines from Lawrence Binyon's poem, *For the Fallen*.

The commemoration then moved to the town's War Memorial in Wilton Lodge Park where Club President Chapman addressed the parade on the significance of the ceremony noting that it was not only unique to the Borders but possibly to the whole of Scotland and pays tribute to their bravery and selflessness and that is something that should never be forgotten and this ceremony must be carried on reminding future generations of the sacrifice and loss encountered in these dark days of war. He also noted that the Callants' Club had through this ceremony gained the respect of other associations which commemorated the Gallipoli campaign and were deeply honoured to have been presented with wreaths from these associations to be laid in conjunction with their own.

Following the playing of *Blue Bonnets over the Border* by piper Cammy Renwick, of the Hawick Pipe Band, Mr Chapman laid a wreath on behalf of the Gallipoli Comrades' Association. Club Vice-President Ken McCartney laid the Gallipoli Association's wreath. In the evening sunshine the haunting *Flowers of the Forest* lament echoed throughout the park, as did the symbolic *Last Post* by Stephen Hewson, of the Saxhorn Band. This was followed by the observance of a one-minute silence, broken by *Reveille*. The moving ceremony ended with the parade marching past the museum to the playing of *Scotland the Brave*.

Acknowledgements: This report is based on a much longer article by Jake Coltman published in *The Hawick Paper*; we are most grateful to both for allowing publication in *The Gallipolian*. The photographs on page 34 are reproduced by kind permission of Lesley Fraser of ILF Imaging of Hawick.

CHRISTMAS 'W' BEACH 1915

Bob Pike

It was all over now; it was time to leave.
So many left behind, Constantinople
a faded dream.

Midnight saw us at W Beach just before Christmas.
A time of peace, of brotherly love,
But of necessity, a time to keep low, the head down,
To avoid the sniper's ever-vigilant eye -
We would be departing for good,
Not as thieves in the night, but as soldiers,
Our memories raw, our farewells exhausted.

Christmas Eve, one lifetime ago,
too many beers in 'The Plough,'
Snoring in the midnight pew with Walter,
So long ago even Walter's cheeky grin had faded;
A Turkish delight broke the calm of
the present peaceful day;
Four nonchalant planes scattering gifts from above
On waiting supplicants, leaving festive red upon the sand
Captain Cox, the only officer left from the April landing,
A direct hit, his good fortune ended.

Christmas Day, Johnny Turk was quiet,
perhaps he knew?
But the hostile sea was short on understanding
Few supplies were landed, but there were plum puddings,
Bully beef made tasty rissoles,
and officers joked with other ranks
Not like home, of course, but the dug-outs
exuded good cheer
And ghostly friends watched and approved,
A window of earthly peace and goodwill,
Engraved forever into their candid souls,
With their fallen comrades, never to be forgotten.

From *For Still We Hear Them Singing*: Poems by Association member Robert E ('Bob') Pike.

Publisher: Grosvenor House, Guildford, Surrey, 2015.

MAJOR GEORGE CECIL BROOKE

Margaret Carter

When visiting Hampton Court Palace earlier this year I was interested to see in the *Book of Remembrance* details of the death in Gallipoli of Major George Cecil Brooke, Border Regiment. Son of a Brigadier General, he was educated at Wellington College and later at RMC Sandhurst. He was decorated several times during his extensive overseas service prior to Gallipoli.

According to the war diary he was shot at 1.20pm during the attempted advance towards Krithia on 28th April. He was originally buried at X beach cemetery but then removed to Pink Farm Cemetery. The photograph I took of his grave (see page 35) is to be included in a revised version of the *Book of Remembrance*.

Major Brooke was a resident of Hampton Court Palace and interestingly General Birdwood was a Grace and Favour resident there in his later years. The palace commemorated the centenary of the Gallipoli landings and holds an annual act of Remembrance on 11th November with four wreath-layers, a piper and names read out from the war memorial. The programme for this ceremony concludes with the famous quote from Atatürk.

Editor's Note: Major George Cecil Brooke has featured in a number of previous articles in *The Gallipolian*, notably in issues Nos. 70, 84 and 86. He is also commemorated by an unusual memorial in the form of three altar stair rods in the Royal Memorial Chapel at Sandhurst (issue No. 90). His son, Commander Henry Brooke MBE, DSC, RN was a highly respected member of the Gallipoli Association, which he supported from its early years and represented it at a number of wreath-laying ceremonies. Photographs of Major George Cecil Brooke and his son can be found in the latter's obituary in the Autumn 2003 issue of *The Gallipolian*.

GALLIPOLI BATTLEFIELD TOUR: 6TH - 11TH MAY 2018

Cost: £1,400 (£1,200 non flight option)

This will be our first trip to the shores of the Gallipoli Peninsula in 2018 will take the form of an in-depth study of the entire campaign from the initial landings, through the Suvla campaign and up to the final withdrawal of troops. Gallipoli as a battlefield is quite simply unique, a 'must see' for those with a passion in the subject and a favourite destination for most of our guiding team. This 6 day/5 night tour will be based in Çannakale and will highlight all the incredible history the peninsular has to offer.

For online details please visit <http://www.battle-honours.eu/Gallipoli-Association-Tour>

To enquire or to reserve a space, please email: tours@gallipoli-association.org

Our tours are led by Gallipoli Association and Guild of Battlefield Guide members.

EDUCATION OFFICER POST

The Trustees wish to appoint an Education Officer to fill the vacancy that arose at the 2017 AGM. The person appointed will be the primary point of contact for the Association on all education matters. Details are given in the enclosed Job Specification. Applications should be submitted to the Hon. Secretary by 1 February, preferably by e-mail.

SUBSCRIPTIONS 2018

The annual membership fees for 2018 remain unchanged; namely

Individual Membership (UK) paid by cheque, Direct Debit or Standing Order - **£20.00**.
If paid using PayPal - **£21.50**

Individual Membership (Overseas) paid by cheque, Direct Debit or Standing Order - **£30.00**.
If paid using PayPal - **£31.50**

For other membership categories see page 2 of the Winter 2014 issue (No. 136)

Payment may be paid by any of the following methods:

Cheque: Members who pay their subscriptions by cheque **should use the enclosed form** when their membership renewal is due. Please note that the majority of cheque renewals are due on 5 January, **but not all**. Also, please check to make sure that you do not pay by one of the methods described below:

Standing Order: If you have a Standing Order in place, please check and ensure that the correct amount, as above, is being paid. The Association is unable to amend Standing Orders – *this is the sole responsibility of the individual member*.

Direct Debit: If you wish to pay your subscription by Direct Debit, forms are available for download via the Association's web site, or can be provided on request. These transactions are quite safe and are covered by the Direct Debit Guarantee, but can only be used with a UK bank account.

PayPal: If you pay manually via PayPal, please ensure that you pay the relevant amount when your renewal is due.

Please Note: Any subscription outstanding 3 months after it became due will be treated as lapsed. **You will not receive further copies of The Gallipolian or any of our other publications and your membership details will be removed from our database.**

ARTICLES FOR *THE GALLIPOLIAN*

Articles and items of interest about any aspect of the Gallipoli campaign are always welcome. These should be submitted direct to the editor, preferably as an e-mail attachment, at the email address shown on the inside front cover. Because there is sometimes a significant amount of material awaiting publication, it is not always possible to feature articles in the issue following submission although where there is an element of topicality the editor will try to accommodate them, or refer them to colleagues responsible for the Association website.

For those considering the submission of articles the editor can provide notes for the guidance of contributors on request.

QUARTERMASTER'S STORES

The following items are available from the 'Stores'. All postage costs are shown separately from the cost of the item and the relevant amount indicated should be added when making the order

Silk Ties – silk, non-crease ties in the Gallipoli Association colours - green bands for the land of Gallipoli and blue-grey for the waters of the Dardanelles, with narrow stripes of navy-blue and scarlet for the services - are available at £16.90 plus postage [Cost including postage - UK £17.83. Europe £20.10. World Zone 1 £20.70. World Zone 2 £20.90.]

Standard Ties - in Association colours are available price £7.70 plus postage [Cost including postage - UK £8.63. Europe £10.90. World Zone 1 £11.50 World Zone 2 £11.70]

Blazer Badges – hand embroidered wire and silk blazer badges are available at £7.70 plus postage [Cost including postage - UK £8.63 Europe £10.90. World Zone 1 £11.50. World Zone 2 £11.70.]

Lapel Badges in the Association colours are available, price £6.20 plus postage. [Cost including postage - UK £7.13. Europe £9.40. World Zone 1 £10.00 World Zone 2 £10.20.]

Binders, which hold 6 copies of The Gallipolian are available, finished in attractive simulated leather, coloured maroon, with the title blocked in gold on the spine. Price per Binder is £6.45 plus postage [Cost including postage - UK £8.10. Europe £11.60. World Zone 1 £13.90. World Zone 2 £14.35]

We also feature a new item - an Association Scarf (see photograph on page 35), pure wool, hand-made, in association colours measures approx. 140x 23cms. Price £28.00 plus postage. [Cost including postage - UK £31.70. Europe £32.40. World Zone 1 £33.45. World Zone 2 £33.90.] As this is a new item and only a small stock is held, please check with the Quartermaster regarding availability'

Orders with payment, cheques and postal orders made out to 'The Gallipoli Association', to the Secretary, James Watson Smith Chelsea Lodge, Coopers Hill Lane, Englefield Green, Surrey TW20 0JX. E-Mail: events@gallipoli-association.org

LAST POST

It is with regret that the Association learnt of the death of the following members:

Mr Eric Wilkinson (Membership No. 2069), who died on 26 July 2017.

Eric was one of the 15 members who took part in the centenary commemorations on the Peninsula in 2015.

Mr Mark Perkins TD (Membership No. 2098) died in August 2017

Mr Dick Ascott (Membership No. 2700) who died in August 2017

Dr James Wood (Membership No. 4075) who died in September 2017



Association treasurer Vicki Genrich attending the Western Front Association's commemoration on 11 November. Photograph courtesy of Frances Speakman. See page 2.



The Association contingent on dispersal from the Cenotaph Ceremony and March Past, 12 November. Photograph courtesy of James Stopford. See pages 2-3.




Members (L to R) Patricia Barber, Donna-Marie Kirk Sargeant and partner Ray at the Gallipoli Association plot, 9 November. Photograph courtesy of Frances Speakman. See pages 4-5.



The Gallipoli Association Plot at the Field of Remembrance.
Photograph by Clive Summerson. See pages 4-5.



The Very Rev. John Hall, Dean of Westminster, speaks to Vicki Genrich at the Association plot.
Photograph courtesy of Frances Speakman. See pages 4-5.



Pre-Landing map of Anzac based on reconnaissance reports. See pages 9-13.



Pre-Landing map of Anzac based on reconnaissance reports. Slightly different version to that above. See pages 9-13.



Wreaths at the War Memorial, Wilton Lodge Park (Gallipoli Association wreath on left). See page 24.



Callants' Club President Dave Chapman lays the club wreath at the 1514 Memorial in Hawick. See page 24.



Last Post sounded by Stephen Hewson at Hawick War Memorial. See page 24.



Headstone on the grave of CQMS Stanley Follot Hook. See pages 18-24.



Headstone, grave of Major George Cecil Brooke of the Border Regiment, Pink Farm cemetery, Helles.
Photograph courtesy of Margaret Carter. See page 26.



Gallipoli Association scarf; a new item from the Quartermaster:
See 'Quartermaster's Stores' on page 27 for details.



Headstone on the grave of Private T Spencer, 6th Battalion Loyal North Lancs Regiment, buried Green Hill cemetery, Suvla. Photograph by Tim Chamberlin. See page 16.



28 Meredith Street, Bolton, Lancashire, the address engraved on Private Simpson's headstone. Photograph by Tim Chamberlin. See page 16.

THE GALLIPOLI MAXIMS REVISITED

Murray Ewen

In the Autumn 2014 edition of the *The Gallipolitan* I argued, in my article *The Gallipoli Maxims*, my firm belief that Ottoman machine guns did in fact come into play during both the Anzac and Helles landings on the morning of 25 April 1915. This was a hot topic of debate leading up to the 100th anniversary commemorations for the Gallipoli Landings, and a number of new books were published to capitalise on the renewed public interest generated by these commemorations. Several of those authors claimed that there were no machine guns at the landings due to there being a shortage of these weapons within the Ottoman Army following the Balkan Wars. That there was a shortage is true, and I doubt anyone disputes that fact. The issue in dispute, however, is not whether there was a shortage of these weapons; it is whether they were present on the morning of that fateful day in 1915. To date, as nothing has emerged from the Turkish military archives to confirm their presence, it would appear to some that the 'shortage' explanation should be accepted as sufficient proof that these weapons were not in existence, and that their 'non-mention' should negate all evidence that they were.

As a result we now have two factions that have reached an impasse, with neither side allowing latitude for the others' contention. The danger here is that when a wealth of evidence exists to support the view of one camp, and little or none exists to support the other, then this cannot be regarded as a balanced argument. One side has to concede that it is possible that there were machine guns in play, or a mutually-acceptable explanation has to be put forward, or some actual proof needs to be presented to the jury. Otherwise the gavel will fall and the 'no machine gun' conjecture is perpetuated as fact, if for no other reason that it is 'new.'

My belief in the presence of machine guns, particularly at Anzac, still rests firmly in the first instance with the Intelligence Report mentioned in 2014, in which information obtained from Turkish soldiers revealed that:

The 9th Division [comprising the 25th, 26th and 27th Regiments] formerly at Maidos and Krithia was decimated by 30 April and [that] machine - guns from *Barbarossa* were sent to this division".¹

It is believed this report implies, even if not fully appreciated at the time by intelligence staff, that machine guns from the *Barbarossa* [*Barbaros Hayreddin*] and very likely other Turco-German warships were sent to the 9th Division, and that this occurred *prior to 25 April*.

Another important source is General Liman von Sanders,² who wrote:

The Turco-German Navy took no direct part except that it furnished the Fifth Army two machine gun detachments with about twenty-four machine guns which were of great benefit.

If the ships of the Turco-German Navy did play some role in the defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April 1915, then it was clear that further research into the naval rather than the military establishment would be necessary. But first, let us take time to examine developments which should lay the foundations for the reasoning behind a decision to remove machine guns from what are assumed to have been seaworthy warships and to place these weapons and their crews in harm's way.

In July 1914, as the warning signs of war on the Continent grew daily, Turkey saw Germany

as her only effective ally against foreign designs on her dwindling empire. There was also the threat to Constantinople, which Russia still saw as the true capital of Eastern Orthodox religion.

On 2 August 1914 Turkey signed an alliance with the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The same day the Porte learned that the battleships *Resadiye* and *Sultan Osman-i-Evvel*, then under construction in Britain, had been embargoed under orders from the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. Even if Turkey had not already allied with Germany, it is likely that the order to embargo the two Ottoman warships, later commissioned HMS *Erin* and HMS *Agincourt*, would have forced Turkey's hand and driven her to form closer ties with the Central Powers.

The following day France declared war on Germany, which was closely followed by the British declaration of war on 4 August. At that point, for reasons of her own security, Turkey closed the straits to all warships. "The work of closing the Dardanelles by mines had commenced on 3rd August, the time possibly coinciding with the alliance which Turkey was then secretly concluding with Germany".³

In the meantime, the French and British declarations of war had caught the German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* alone in the Mediterranean to face the prospect of having to go up against what can only be described as overwhelming British naval superiority.

Two options were now open to Admiral Wilhelm Souchon. The first and safer option was to set course for the Dardanelles where he could seek sanctuary from the fury of the Royal Navy. He would then later be able to gain passage through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea to open hostilities against Russia. The second, and less attractive option, was to try his luck against the Royal Navy. So, setting course for the Dardanelles, the two German warships were eventually granted the right of passage to enter the straits and arrived off Constantinople on 11 August 1915.⁴

As a direct consequence of the British embargo of the two Ottoman warships, on 18 August an announcement was made that *Goeben* and *Breslau* had been purchased from Germany and would now operate under the Crescent ensign. It was agreed that these two ships would retain the majority of their German crews. *Goeben* was renamed *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, and *Breslau* the *Midilli*; the tendency, however, has generally been to continue to identify these two ships by their German names. In reality, the ships remained the property of the German people, but the rumour that these ships had been purchased by Turkey was circulated to satisfy interested foreign parties and to console the Turkish population, who had funded the two embargoed ships.

Admiral Souchon also took up his new position as director and commander-in-chief of the Turco-German Navy. It was not long before criticism was directed at successive British Naval Missions due to the appalling state of readiness of the Ottoman Navy.⁵ The truth is, the sole purpose of these missions had been to advise the Porte on all matters naval, while representing British interests.

The Mitchell Report has this to say concerning the state of Turkish dockyards;

The arsenal at the Golden Horn and the dockyard at Stenia, [Istinye] remained under the control of the Turks throughout the war. The German staff in the dockyard departments consisted of two or three constructors and 150 workmen, who fitted up and used their own shops in the yards. The workshops at Stenia were in a very disorganised state when the German officers arrived, as they had previously been run by a French company, which, of course, ceased control when war was declared. There was a very great scarcity

of materials of all kinds suitable for repairs throughout the war and altogether the question of repairs was a very difficult one. A very small quantity of material came with the German Staff on the first arrival and towards the end of the campaign small quantities were brought through Germany, but the amount on hand was never sufficient to meet requirements. The workmen were also slow and inefficient in their work, and for these reasons repair work was very unsatisfactory.⁶

Without delay the Germans got to work to reorganise the Ottoman Navy, which at that time could only be described as sitting somewhere between obsolete and basket-case. The only ship in the Ottoman fleet considered to be in some state of battle-readiness was the protected cruiser *Hamidiye*.

“Sultan Abdul Hamid II who was deposed in 1909 must shoulder most of the responsibility for the Ottoman defence erosion. He ruled for more than thirty years, the longest of any sultan in the period. His suspicion of his armed forces, especially the navy, had a tremendous detrimental effect and naval armament was precisely the area [he] most hindered”.⁷

A general overview of the state of the Ottoman fleet was listed as gun sights removed from guns and in some cases breeches so badly corroded they had to be opened using hammers. Ammunition was fitted with practice fuses and a search had to be conducted of the naval depot to locate live fuses. It was stated that whilst the ships generally looked, by outward appearance, to be well maintained, from a marine engineer’s perspective they were a nightmare.⁸ Watertight doors and hatches had been removed, coal-fired boilers were in a deplorable and filthy state, piping and condensers leaked, routine engine and machinery maintenance had been non-existent and ships’ hulls were found to be rusted through and leaking seawater.⁹

As a result crew members from both *Goeben* and *Breslau* were transferred to Ottoman ships as instructors, and in exchange Turkish crews were sent to the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to receive professional training and instruction. Additionally, “Out of practical necessity a German commanding officer was assigned to each major Ottoman warship and led combat operations, while the respective Ottoman commanders maintained order aboard the ships and oversaw operations while in port. German engineers were also assigned to each ship as breakdowns were frequent among a wide variety of machinery on the various warships”.¹⁰

The interviewer of German prisoner Petty Officer Paul Kubrille recorded that:

Turkish Naval Officers, and Petty Officers as well as ratings had their instructional courses on board. This prisoner [who] had been on the *Torgut Reis* [said it], is commanded by a Turkish Captain with the help of two Germans, Kapitän Rosentreter, and Leutnant Fett, [and] one Engineer Officer.¹¹

The state of readiness of the Ottoman Navy was considered to be so dire that with some urgency German Naval Command was contacted and a request was made for more personnel. This request was approved and 27 officers and 521 specialist technical staff were selected under the command of Admiral Guido von Usedom, the Mission being assigned the heady title of Sonderkommando der Kaiserliche Marine in der Türkei.¹²

As September 1914 drew to a close, the Turkish pro-German Minister of War and Chief of General Staff, Enver Pasha, ordered the closure of the Dardanelles to all foreign ships. The entrance to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus had been laid with the first lines of underwater mines earlier the previous month, but on 30 September Admiral Usedom ordered further mines be laid.¹²

Turkish pro-German tendencies and the closure of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus now created a problem for Britain and her ally France. If Russian armies were expected to keep pressure on the Central Powers fighting on the Eastern Front, then they desperately needed to be supplied with modern arms and war materiel. Conversely, Britain relied on Russia for wheat shipments from the Ukraine, the food bowl of the Russian Empire. Another important factor often overlooked is the fact that the only year-round warm water seaports available to the Russians were all located in the Black Sea.

Whilst German motives to act as big brother to Ottoman Turkey may at first glance appear honourable, in reality, German aid to and influence upon the Porte was largely self-serving and would ultimately tie up Allied warships and troops in peripheral engagements played out with Ottoman armies on several fronts. It would also prevent British and French aid to Russia and sap resources away from the Western Front.

On 24 October permission was secretly granted for Admiral Souchon to commence simultaneous operations against Russian Black Sea ports.¹³ Enver Pasha had been trying to delay this action as long as possible, but German patience was wearing thin and the prospect of Germany withdrawing support at all levels was hinted. Five days later, on the morning of 29 October 1914, the first shots were fired on Odessa from the Ottoman Navy destroyers *Muavenbet-i-Millîye* and *Gayret-i-Vataniye*. *Goeben* and the destroyers *Samsun* and *Tasoz* bombarded Sevastopol, whilst the protected cruiser *Hamidiye* attacked Fedosia, and the torpedo cruiser *Berk-i-Satvet* as well as *Breslau* shelled Novorossiysk. The extended honeymoon period between Germany and Turkey was over.

On 1 November 1914, "A conference was held at Istanbul [Constantinople] to review the operations carried out against Sebastopol [Sevastopol], Fedosia and Odessa. None of the operations had been a success, and Russian losses - two warships and six merchant vessels - were slight. The German officers were particularly critical of the operations, and voiced a low opinion of the Ottoman Navy in general, although they praised the Ottoman seamen for their bravery and hard work during the action, especially as the crews had little sea training."¹⁴

The following day Russia declared war on Ottoman Turkey and three days later Britain and France followed suit. It is interesting to note that Winston Churchill had sanctioned a pre-emptive bombardment of the outer forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles, ostensibly to test the range of the main armaments on the older British pre-dreadnought battleships. This strike was executed by British and French warships on 3 November, two days before the British and French government's official declarations of war. Perhaps we will never know, but in Churchill's mind it may have been a retaliatory strike for the Turco-German operations in the Black Sea. "Immediately following the first [British] Naval attack in November, 1914, the minefield batteries were increased by the removal of Q.F. (quick firing) guns from ships, and by mobile field and siege guns."¹⁵

The Mitchell Report goes further into the removal of armaments from Turkish warships to bolster coastal defences:

The policy of removing some of the guns from ships in order to form shore batteries had actually been decided on previous to the November bombardment, and two 15cm, and other some smaller guns from the *Messudieh* [*Mesudiye*] were already mounted on shore when the bombardment took place. The work was accelerated after the bombardment, light Q. F. guns from *Toorgood Reis*, [*Torgut Reis*]; *Barbarossa* [*Barbaros Hayreddin*], and *Berc-i-Satvet*, [*Berk-i-Satvet*] all being removed and mounted; principally at Suandere

and Messudieh, (Asia) before the bombardment of 18 March.¹⁶

With the opening of hostilities, restrictions were placed on Ottoman naval vessels considered to be unseaworthy or incapable of holding their own against the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The pre-dreadnought battleships *Barbaros Hayreddin* and *Torgut Reis* were lacking in speed, whilst some vessels like the *Demirhisar* class torpedo boats had insufficient range to cope with Black Sea operations. Other ships were still in need of attention, or put simply, were either obsolete or beyond being of any further use. The cruisers *Hamidiye* and *Mecidiye* and destroyers *Samsun* and *Muavenet* were also of limited use, which only left the *Goeben* and *Breslau* capable of inflicting any serious damage on the Russians.

This resulted in a situation whereby: "During most of the war the Ottoman war effort at sea was restricted almost exclusively to the Black Sea and the Straits region. In both areas of operations of the German-Ottoman fleet were essentially defensive in character".¹⁷

Seeing as the Black Sea was to be the main theatre of naval operations it is easy to see how many of the ships in the Ottoman fleet remained laid up, or were restricted to operating within the confines of the Sea of Marmara or Dardanelles.

Admiral von Usedom expressed his true feelings about the Turkish fleet in a letter to the Kaiser;

I think that in the Turkish fleet only the two German ships *Goeben* and *Breslau* have any appreciable fighting value, while the others are dummies."

He went on to say;

Things are not much better as regards the gun-boats, torpedo boats and mine carriers of the harbour flotillas. Half of the vessels are always being repaired and after the excessively prolonged time in dock almost always come back in such a condition as to necessitate further repairs elsewhere, because the opportunity is not taken to overhaul the whole vessel and machinery thoroughly.¹⁸

Obsolete unseaworthy ships, poorly equipped and manned dock facilities, and a shortage of parts and material to effect repairs were all major issues. However, the real Achilles heel for Turkey was the shortage of coal. The need to supply the coal-fired boilers of the Turco-German warships and her limited merchant marine fleet, as well as power stations, railways and domestic requirements, all stretched demand far beyond Turkey's capacity to supply.

Even then the issue was not so much the shortage of coal *per se*, but the infrastructure required to transport it from Turkish ports in the Black Sea. Much of Turkey's coal resources were located in the region of North Anatolia around the ports of Eregli, Zonguldak and Kozlu from which places it was shipped the 150 nautical miles to Constantinople. Coal from Zonguldak in particular was noted for being of a very poor quality. What followed over the next three years was a continuous effort by the Russian Black Sea Fleet to loosely blockade these coal ports by regular raids. With respect to convoy protection only *Goeben*, *Breslau*, *Hamidiye* and *Mecidiye* were capable of opposing the nine new Russian *Bespokoiny* class destroyers which had entered service in 1914-15.¹⁹

That completes the first section of this article which should promote a greater understanding of the state of readiness of the Ottoman Navy in 1914-15. On reflection it is probably fair to say that the Ottoman Navy inflicted more harm on Allied sea and land forces at Gallipoli with the ships' guns removed for coastal defences inside the Straits, with underwater mines and machine guns, than it did with actual ships. A ship or submarine, like an aircraft, is a

weapons platform. Its purpose is to transport these assets wherever required to be deployed against an enemy. By removing the larger- and middle-calibre armaments from these ships and effectively leaving them as steel carcasses, there could be no sensible reason why machine guns would be required to remain in their armouries when they could be put to good use elsewhere.

To make a strong case for removing machine guns from the ships of the Turco-German fleet, numbers first have to be examined to determine whether they match expectations. It has therefore been necessary to investigate the various types and numbers of vessels equipped with small-calibre machine guns. To present a realistic figure, any ships which were known to have been destroyed or sunk due to enemy action prior to 25 April 1915 were exempted, as were ships with weapons deemed too old to be of any value in a battlefield situation. In certain cases where a ship was known to have been equipped with 'machine guns', this could mean a 25.4mm Nordenfelt or 37mm Pom Pom. Although still classified as machine guns these larger-calibre weapons were ideally operated from fixed naval-type mountings. The final numbers should be considered as being conservative estimates. References used for this data were *Jane's Fighting Ships* 1914 and 1919 editions, the F A Rayfield Papers²⁰ courtesy of the IWM, and *The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828 - 1923* by Bernd Langensiepen and Ahmet Gülerüy. British arms expert and author John Walter contributed by way of much-welcomed comment and advice. Whilst John and I did our utmost to investigate every twist and turn along the road before any final decision was made, we both accept that finding detailed information concerning Ottoman naval small arms is extremely difficult.

Examining now the ships in question, the two most modern ships in the rejuvenated Turco-German Navy were the German battle-cruiser *Goeben* and the light cruiser *Breslau*. Each of these ships carried *at least* four Maxim machine guns. These weapons were as much at home mounted on fixed naval mounts as they were mounted on a tripod when used by marine landing parties. It is unlikely these machine guns were older model Maxims but almost certainly MGo8's firing the 8 x 57mm S-Patrone cartridge. This ammunition was adopted in 1905 and fired the pointed Spitzer bullet, hence the 'S' designation. At least one MGo8 is recorded as being captured during the Second Battle of Krithia in early May 1915.²¹ Photographs clearly show identification markings on the gun's top cover indicating it was an '8mm Masch-Gew 1908'. This particular Maxim was manufactured by Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken (DWM) at Berlin in 1910 indicating that, although it was a model MGo8, the actual year of manufacture was two years after its model number indicated. It is thought that this gun was from either the *Goeben* or *Breslau* and considering the date of capture was probably deployed by German marines attached to Lieutenant Boltz's detachment in early May 1915.

In second position were the two geriatric Brandenburg Class pre-dreadnought battleships; the Ottoman Navy's Flagship *Barbaros Hayreddin* (formerly the *Kufurst Friedrich Wilhelm*) and *Torgut Reis* (formerly the *Weissenberg*), both ships having been purchased from Germany in 1910. These ships were each equipped with twelve Maxim machine guns, thought to have been older models. John Walter offered the opinion that,

It is fair to claim that these [ships] would have been supplied 'ready armed', but whether this would have included small arms is not recorded anywhere I could find. I am tempted to suspect that the Germans would have taken the chance to rid themselves of a few old pre-1903 Maxims that were deemed unsuitable for conversion to the S-Patrone cartridge.²²

These machine guns would have been chambered for the German 7.92 x 57mm Patrone cartridge which was not in use by Turkish military or naval forces.

If this was indeed the case it rings true with the statement²³ by British official historian Brigadier-General Cecil Aspinall-Oglander, which I quoted in my 2014 article;

The southern, or Sedd el Bahr sector comprised the toe of the peninsula from Gully Beach (exclusive) to Sedd el Bahr (inclusive), and was held by the 3rd/26th Regiment, with one company of engineers attached for work on the defences. This battalion had one company guarding W Beach; one company with four old pattern Maxim guns (according to British reports there were also two Maxims at W Beach), at Sedd el Bahr and above V Beach; and the remaining two companies in reserve on the low ground north-west of Morto Bay.

As part of the purchase deal from Germany of the two - by 1910 standards outdated - pre-dreadnought battleships, four large *S138* Class torpedo boat destroyers were included. These ships were the *Muavenet-i-Millye* (formerly *S165*), the *Yadigar-i-Millet* (formerly *S166*), the *Numune-i-Hamiyet* (formerly *S167*) and the *Gayret-i-Vantaniye* (formerly *S168*). These destroyers each carried two Maxim machine guns which were also likely older (pre-1903) model Maxims.

Next are the gunboats *Taskopru* and *Malatya*, each being equipped with two French-manufactured 7.65 x 53mm Hotchkiss machine guns. And finally the remaining seven *Aydin Reis* and *Isa Reis* Class gunboats, being *Aydin Reis*, *Preveze*, *Sakiz*, *Burak Reis* and the *Isa Reis*, *Durak Reis*, and *Hizir Reis*. Each of these gunboats also carried two Hotchkiss machine guns in an unspecified 7.6mm calibre, but which is also thought to have been 7.65 x 53mm for the simple reason that all these gunboats had also been constructed in France.

There were also several other vessels which could be considered as possible sources of weapons - motorboats and river gunboats mainly - but it was thought preferable not to include these boats due to insufficient information concerning them, even though they are also listed as carrying machine guns.

In summary, to make a statement concerning the calibre of all these machine guns would only be conjecture without further detailed information. However a little further on will appear the interrogation statement by a German marine who was taken prisoner and claimed that, 'Turkish machine gun ammunition is not good'. Turkey had adopted the S-Patrone 7.65 x 53mm cartridge in 1910 for the Ottoman Army's Gew 98-M1903 rifles, MG09 export model Maxims and Hotchkiss machine guns, including the Ottoman Navy's Hotchkiss guns on the French-built gunboats delivered between 1911 and 1912. However, in the case of the older model Maxims, taking into account the statement made by the captured marine and John Walter's opinion that these were probably older pre-1903 model Maxims, unable to be converted to the new S-Spitzer round, there is reason to believe these weapons may have been re-barrelled and chambered from the German 7.92 x 57mm to the 7.65 x 53mm Turkish cartridge, in this case for the older M88/8 round-nosed Patrone cartridge which Turkey was still using in several second-rank Mausers.²⁴

Therefore by deduction it is reasoned that this German marine was referring to 7.65 x 53mm Turkish-manufactured M88/8 Patrone ammunition and that he was in some way involved with the older model Maxims off the *Torgut Reis*, *Barbaros Hayreddin* or one of the four *S138*-class torpedo boat destroyers. This now brings the final *conservative* figure to 40 Maxim and 18 Hotchkiss machine guns and a greater understanding of the origins, variety and calibres of Turkish weapons used in the defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April 1915.

The next phase of this story will include new information discovered through searches of the

Bundisarchiv at Freiberg in Germany. It should be understood that the evidence produced from the *Bundisarchiv* has been translated from German into English and so there may be occasions where the need has arisen to make changes to some words. But it should be quite clear that as was the case above with the number-count of machine guns on the Turco-German warships every effort has been made to remain impartial and present this evidence as accurately as is possible.

The following excerpts from files were retrieved from the *Bundisarchiv*;

Dardanelles - 30 April 1915 ²⁵

[The] Delivery of two machine guns of *Barbaros* [*Hayreddin*] to the army is requested. Could additional machine guns be sent, [The] army has an unbelievable lack of machine guns.

Dardanelles - 1 May 1915 ²⁶

Barbaros; Sent confirmation to A.O.K. V. (*Army OberKommando* - Army Headquarters Staff - V Army) that 6 machine guns could be sent.

Constantinople - 1 May 1915 ²⁷

To the Fleet; *Barbaros* should send machine guns to the V Army by own arrangements. *Goeben* and *Breslau* machine guns have been sent.

Dardanelles - 2 May 1915 ²⁸

2.5 Telegraph Abteilung (detachment) of [the] III A. K. (III Armeekorps)

Barbaros; Send machine guns and personnel this evening to Kilia [Liman]. It would be better if personnel are dressed in khaki.

Constantinople - 4 May 1915 ²⁹

Telegram to General Liman von Sanders; Oberleutnant zur See Boltz with eight machine guns and German soldiers and additionally two machine guns with Turkish soldiers have been sent.

To the Admiral Staff of the Navy Telegram 6 May 1915 ³⁰

Detachment / of / Mediterranean Sea / Division / consist / 10 / machine guns / with / German soldiers / officer / Oberleutnant zur See / Boltz / given / to / Army / Liman / Peninsula / Gallipoli / stop.

Signed - Humann

The use of the word 'soldiers' from the *Goeben* and *Breslau* is misleading seeing as this was a German naval detachment. Another prisoner interrogation, this one of 24-year-old German naval wireless telegrapher's mate Richard Zoen, (no date given) also tells us that; "Most of the German soldiers on the Turkish front are marines." ³¹ [Members may recall the photo of a German marine sergeant in Ottoman army uniform at Gallipoli on page 24 of the Spring 2017 edition of *The Gallipolian* - editor].

And in the case of the two Hotchkiss machine guns and personnel, these men are also thought to have been Turkish naval personnel, the reasoning for which is directly related to the presence of Hotchkiss machine guns on some Ottoman Navy gunboats. However, assuming what might appear to be the obvious can sometimes be fraught with danger. Very little is known about the Dardanelles Fortified Command, due it seems to the reluctance by Turkish Military Archives to release the war diaries for this command. So there is a possibility that this command provided troops who played some role on the morning of 25 April, even if only as pack mule

handlers to support the machine gun detachments with the transportation of their machine guns and ammunition.

What we can gather from the preceding communiques is that, on 30 April 1915 a request was made to the Ottoman battleship *Barbaros Hayreddin* for two machine guns and personnel. As a result of this request a reply came back that *Barbaros* could dispatch six machine guns. This offer was accepted, and then it was further requested that personnel coming ashore be dressed in khaki.



“GOEBEN” MEN LEAVE FOR THE DARDANELLES FRONT.

From Kopp, G. *Two Lone Ships: Goeben & Breslau*, London, Hutchinson, 1931 (translation), facing p208.

This raises the question that if the *Barbaros Hayreddin* was able to dispatch six machine guns out of her complement of twelve, after 30 April, then is there a possibility that six machine guns had already been dispatched prior to 30 April; or more specifically, before the Allied landings on 25 April?

Further, a telegraph was sent to Admiral Souchon, advising him that eight machine guns from *Goeben* and *Breslau* had been sent. This detachment comprised Oberleutnant Boltz, Officer Cadet von Rabenau, six NCOs and 37 naval ratings, making a total of 45 men. It was also stated that an additional two machine guns had been accompanied by Turkish personnel.

German prisoner, Petty Officer Paul Kubrille, formerly off the Depot ship *Corcavado*, then *Goeben*, also mentions the Boltz detachment and Hotchkiss machine guns;

The German machine gun section has eight machine guns and two Hotchkiss guns.

It is completely ‘independent’ and is provisioned direct from Constantinople.³²

The fact that this detachment is described as being ‘independent’ requires further investigation,

as also does the fact that Admiral Souchon had been notified when the machine guns were dispatched to Kilia Liman. This may have some bearing on the organisation, formation and dispatch of these naval landing party detachments to the Gallipoli fronts. It appears that initially these detachments could have even been outside the restraints and knowledge of local regimental commands, and I believe this to be the case particularly in the early stages of the campaign. However, the translation of an order from the Officer Commanding the Ottoman 127th Regiment, located at the rear of Hill 143, dated 18 June states; "Immediately after the capture of the trenches the German machine guns will follow the companies where they are needed",³³ thus giving the impression that local Turkish commands were astutely aware of the support they were receiving from the German marines and their machine guns. It is apparent though that Army Headquarters Staff - Fifth Army and Third Armeekorps Headquarters were advised and judging by the telegraph traffic it is reasoned that General Liman von Sanders, as General Officer Commanding Fifth Army, was also kept informed, as the quote from his book might suggest.

Also connected with the term 'independent' is the request that these naval personnel be dressed in khaki. Given the short notice, it is not unreasonable to assume that these uniforms were a hodgepodge of German and Ottoman uniforms intended to make these German marines appear to look more like their Ottoman Army counterparts. Such a state of uniform would explain why these men were later apprehended;

Soon after my arrival Naval Lieutenant Bolz [Boltz] reported with a landing party, a most heartily welcomed support. The Turks naturally took the German sailors for English, and a terrible catastrophe was only just prevented by the lucky arrival and intervention of Major Muhlmann. The original Turkish escort had all gone.³⁴

Another prisoner, Naval Reservist Emille Skora,³⁵ had arrived in Turkey in August 1914 and was employed on the German Headquarters ship *General*³⁶ and was later attached to a machine gun section. Skora stated that;

An independent section of German machine guns has 40 to 45 men including 6 NCO's and 2 officers. The two officers Lieutenant Boltz and Cadet von Rabenau were seriously wounded. The machine gun section on 3 May was [located], at Domuz Dere,³⁷ where eight were killed, several were wounded and two machine guns were lost. The section is composed of two French machine guns (Hotchkiss) without water jackets and five German machine guns. The two machine guns on the left of the section fouled, and were unfit for action when taken by the English. The two on the right were saved. The Turks have one French machine gun posted 500 metres to the left of the place where he was."

The fact that we now have one archival reference and two independent sources claiming there were two Hotchkiss machine guns,³⁸ specifically stating these weapons were manned by Turkish personnel, raises the ante. From previous information we will recall that the seven *Aydin Reis* and *Isa Reis* gunboats plus the *Malatya* and *Taskopru* were each equipped with two Hotchkiss machine guns.

In addition, a report dated 4 May tells us that; "Our southern detachment (28 battalions and 16 machine guns) made a night attack."³⁹ This number of machine guns accounts for the eight from *Goeben* and *Breslau*, the two Turkish Hotchkiss guns and six Maxims from the *Barbaros Hayreddin*.

This machine gun detachment had half its number casualties and most of its guns put out of action. "Subsequently the original detachment of eight machine guns was increased to 12

machine guns.”⁴⁰

Dirk Rottgardt confirms this information by elaborating thus;

On 19 May, the detachment practically annihilated, had to be raised again, and for the third time on 27 July.

Rottgardt tells us there were three officers and 150 men.⁴¹

It seems odd, then, that it is only the eight machine guns from *Goeben* and *Breslau* that are ever ‘admitted’ and continue to be regarded as a point of fact by the ‘no machine gun’ advocates. Yet we now know that these were not the only German marines who made a contribution towards the defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The six Maxims from *Barbaros Hayreddin* and two Ottoman Navy Hotchkiss guns have never rated a mention, indicating that previous research on this subject is flawed and incomplete. First-hand British and Australian accounts of machine guns coming into action early on 25 April and accounts by German marines from machine gun detachments being taken prisoner in August 1915 leave little doubt as to the true situation.

With respect to the actual numbers of machine guns, some consideration should also be allowed for captured British and French weapons. From reports of the Fifth Army we learn that; “Since yesterday, [5 May] we have captured 17 machine guns from the enemy.”⁴²

But with the capture of enemy machine guns is the inherited problem of ammunition supply. So provided there is enough ammunition to keep these captured machine guns in operation it is believed we could be looking at higher numbers of these weapons at the front than first thought.

An intelligence report on the subject of captured weapons says that,

All English cartridges found in the captured trenches will be collected and will at once be sent to H.Q. in order that they may be used in the captured machine guns.

The captured Turkish document was signed by the Officer Commanding the Ottoman 9th Division, Colonel Halil Sami.⁴³

There is also no reason to doubt that captured weapons or ammunition would not have been transferred between the Helles and Anzac sectors as required. That would make captured British and French machine guns highly sought-after items especially if they came with a plentiful supply of ammunition. And whilst on the subject of ammunition as mentioned previously, one captured German marine⁴⁴ is quoted as saying; ‘Turkish machine gun ammunition was not good’ which would certainly support the argument in favour of German marines manning Turkish machine guns.

If there was such a shortage of these weapons in the Ottoman Army, how is it that a German marine came to be firing a Turkish machine gun? Would that not indicate that this weapon had been sourced from an Ottoman warship, seeing as German Maxim machine guns were chambered for the 8 x 57mm S-Patrone cartridge? This was not a calibre of ammunition in use by either the Ottoman Navy or Army.

The numbers of machine guns being discussed also indicates a reasonably high attrition rate for these weapons. In terms of actual detachments it is believed that it can now safely be said that firstly, there were the Anzac and Helles detachments covering the 25 April landings. Then three detachments to the southern area of Krithia and Kereveş Dere, one in early May, the

second in mid-May and the third at the end of July; then again at Anzac, at least up to and including the August offensive as described below.

This would then explain why there was a continual flow of German naval personnel, not only from the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, but also from other German ships to enable Turkish and German sourced and captured machine guns to be manned. Some might question the numbers of these weapons involved as being outside the brief of *Goeben's* and *Breslau's* inventory of eight machine guns, but when;

Three Germans of a machine gun detachment captured at Anzac on 7th August were further examined at Mudros, they stated that they formed part of the German detachment of 30 machine guns and 150 men mostly drawn from the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. A group of 16 machine guns had been deployed against Anzac, and the prisoners belonged to a section of four guns under Ober Leutnant Pohl which was enfiladed by our naval guns on 6th August, and two of the guns knocked out. One of the prisoners stated the remainder of the *Emden's* crew which reached C'ple overland had been turned over to the *Breslau*.⁴⁵

These crewmen are believed to have still been in possession of their four early model Maxim machine guns, which undoubtedly would have also been put to good use.

If we now take a look at all this information from another angle, it might reveal something not previously considered. It is known that German naval personnel from the *General* and *Corcavado* were attached to a detachment in early May,⁴⁶ and [that] these personnel were being (and this is the key word) 'channelled' through and grouped under the 'banner' of crewmen from the *Goeben* and *Breslau* and then dispatched to the front.

Why then wouldn't machine guns and Turkish personnel, from unseaworthy Ottoman warships, not also have been covered by this arrangement? In this scenario we should recall those Turkish personnel who accompanied Boltz's detachment in early May with their two Hotchkiss machine guns. We know through intelligence reports that seventy⁴⁷ German marines served on each of the Ottoman battleships, *Barbaros Hayreddin* and *Torgut Reis*, as they did on a number of other Ottoman naval vessels. By utilising this resource a continuous supply of German and Turkish personnel and machine guns could be brought into play which would of course be supplemented by any captured British or French weapons. The fact that German marines received small arms training is no secret, and generally all German warships' armouries carried an array of weapons such as pistols, Gew-98 Mausers and Maxim machine guns in sufficient numbers to arm all the ships' officers and crew and, if required, landing detachment parties.

It now appears evident that a continual flow of marine personnel and machine guns were being sourced from the warships of the Turco-German fleet and were being channelled into the Turkish front lines by way of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, and that these personnel were acting independently of the Ottoman Army, and quite possibly on occasions even local regimental commands, and were being fed and otherwise supplied from Constantinople.

From the Turkish perspective the evidence which has proven to be the most elusive continues to be in respect of the battleship *Torgut Reis*. This ship, like the *Barbaros Hayreddin*, had a complement of twelve Maxim machine guns, but to date no mention of machine guns being removed from this ship has been found. One possibility as to why this is so is provided by Bernd Langensiepen and Ahmet Gülerüyüz in their book, *The Ottoman Steam Navy* p.33:

The two battleships [*Barbaros Hayreddin* and *Torgut Reis*] alternated on station, with one returning to Istanbul to bunker, store and load ammunition for the Fifth Army every five days. During the return passage a stop was often made at Gelibolu to unload deck cargo. There was usually an overlap of two days in which both battleships were on station together.”

Based on this information it is feasible that *Torgut Reis* could have taken the opportunity to transfer a portion or all of her twelve Maxim machine guns and ships’ complement of German marines to the *Goeben* and *Breslau* whilst taking on coal and stores at Constantinople. Bad storms leading up to 25 April, which ultimately delayed the Allied landings by several days, appear to have put a damper on British intelligence gathering. It would come as no surprise, therefore, to learn that the Turks and their German allies had taken full advantage of this situation to prepare defences against an amphibious landing on the Gallipoli littoral which by then they realised was inevitable and just a matter of days away.

Now our final area of focus is the Anzac sector and recent information opens up a new corridor for research. One account provides proof of the existence of a machine gun located on MacLagan’s Ridge sometime before 5am which involved the 10th Battalion’s scouts’ officer, Lieutenant Eric Wilkes Talbot-Smith and one of his men, Private (later Corporal) Joseph Weatherill. The Australian official historian, Charles Bean, interviewed Weatherill (Talbot-Smith was mortally wounded on 25 April 1915, ironically while manning a machine gun, and died five days afterwards) and scribed the following transcript of the interview in a notebook;⁴⁸

Touched [shore] just south of Ari Burnu. The 10th Battalion arrived pretty much together and ran across the beach. They started about 3 minutes after landing. The order was fix bayonets, load 5 cartridges, cut offs closed, safety catches out, nothing in chambers; packs off. Talbot Smith had told his scouts to leave their packs in the boats. They went straight up the hill without opposition. Two Turks were in a trench on top. Couldn’t see far to left or right. Had seen flash of machine gun on the left as we climbed. When they were about 30 yards away it ceased fire. It was over the sheer part of the cliff looking towards the sphinx. They pulled the machine gun off its tripod and threw it over the cliff. [It] was about 20 feet [deep]. It was in the corner of the trench. Talbot smith was wounded by the machine gun. He had done some fine shooting with his revolver.

In July 1972 Mr Peter Liddle, representing the Sunderland Polytechnic History Division and with the help of the Turkish Veteran’s Union, interviewed a number of Turkish Gallipolians, which included Second Lieutenant - later Captain - A Ozgen, in Istanbul. Ozgen stated that he was with the machine guns at Anzac, and was also Mustafa Kemal’s aide, and had surveyed the Australian positions during the ‘Armistice’ of 24 May 1915.

In my 2014 article I refrained from detailing the Liddle-Ozgen interview because at the time I felt there was insufficient evidence to support its inclusion. The interview was recorded on tape and later transcribed. The questions were presented to Captain Ozgen⁴⁹ through a translator, also a Turkish veteran.

A segment of that interview, concerning one particular machine gun at Anzac on the morning of 25 April, follows:

Peter Liddle: Was he on the peninsula ready for the landings of the Australians?

Capt. Ozgen: Yes.

Peter Liddle: He was there before the first Australians landed?

Capt. Ozgen: Yes.

Peter Liddle: The question I would like him to tell me what rank he was and what weapons he was using?

Capt. Ozgen: He was a Second Lieutenant and in the machine guns.

Peter Liddle: Where was his position in relation to the landing at Anzac Cove?

Capt. Ozgen: He was in front of what the allies called MacLagan's Ridge.

Peter Liddle: Were the Australians easy targets?

Capt. Ozgen: They were not easy targets. They were in a very difficult position because our position was well placed. We had a little forest in which we had our gun[s].

Peter Liddle: I would like to know why at V and W beaches at Cape Helles the poor men landing came under withering fire, and very serious fire in the landing boats, but this was not so at Anzac. I would like to know why.

Capt. Ozgen: He says that is not true because the Anzacs had very heavy casualties at that time. The reality is that the Anzacs had a lot of casualties. The chief reason was our position. We saw them but they couldn't see us. Our position was very well hidden.

It is suggested that Second Lieutenant Ozgen was placed in charge, possibly at short notice, of an undisclosed number of Ottoman Army soldiers, possibly connected to Dardanelles Fortified Command, assisting with the deployment and operation of this Hotchkiss machine gun. The fact that Ozgen mentions guns and not gun is interesting and may be explained away as error created during the course of the interview between Ozgen's translated reply or to the transcription of the recorded interview. But more on this subject follows.

Testimony was also given to Charles Bean by Lieutenant Clarence Rumball⁵⁰ of 'D' Company, 10th Battalion AIF, who had come ashore with his platoon from the destroyer HMS *Scourge* between 4:20 and 5:50am and had made his way up onto Plugge's Plateau. For those familiar with the Anzac terrain you would realise the relevance of Plugge's Plateau to MacLagan's Ridge. The evidence Rumball gave to Charles Bean was;

Talbot Smith had shot an officer there. He was a German and was searched repeatedly by his [Rumball's] men.

Bean made a comment in his notebook that this information [could be] inaccurate, because it seems that Rumball believed they had landed north of Fisherman's Hut when in fact they had landed north of Ari Burnu.

If Rumball's evidence is correct, and there is no reason to believe it is not, then this German, possibly with others, had been manning this Hotchkiss machine gun, or possibly even the machine gun located at Ari Burnu Knoll, as described in my 2014 article. Although I had assumed this particular machine gun was a Maxim, now that new information has surfaced, on reflection there is every chance this machine gun could also have been a Hotchkiss machine gun. This could be what Ozgen was referring to when he said 'our guns'. Being a lighter weapon than the Maxim it would make perfect sense to locate Hotchkiss guns closer to the coast as a first line of defence with the heavier Maxim guns further inland as a second line of defence. The reason for this would be simply that the Maxim is water-cooled and therefore heavier than the air-cooled Hotchkiss. It would take longer to dismount and load a Maxim with its gun, tripod, condenser and ammunition onto pack animals and pull the weapon back

to avoid capture by the enemy.

In another of Charles Bean's interviews, Major Drake-Brockman⁵¹ of the 11th Battalion AIF adds some weight to the capture of a machine gun on MacLagan's Ridge. Although not considered a first-hand report, the recollection does bear an uncanny resemblance to the account of the capture of an enemy machine gun by Lieutenant Talbot Smith and Private Joseph Weatherill.

The time they landed was about 4.20, he thinks. The boats were then 700 - 800 yards out when the [Turkish] flare went up. Almost immediately machine gun fire opened. They got rifle and machine gun fire, also while in the boats. (A Hotchkiss gun was taken by 10th Battalion, D Brockman thinks, on MacLagan's Ridge.) This probably did the shooting. They could not see the flashes or where the shooting was coming from - did not notice it anyway.

It is also necessary to mention that both Lieutenant Talbot Smith and Private Joseph Weatherill were recommended for and received awards for their actions on that morning. Our next account comes from Major Walter Edmund Cass,⁵² Brigade Major to the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade.

As an instance of bravery which I think has not met with due reward the following appears to be an excellent example. On Sunday 25 April a portion of the 6th Battalion was being knocked about by a machine gun at short range but could not be located in the scrub. Two men, one a scout, decided to silence it if possible. They crawled forward from their firing line down a gully in the direction of the sound. Fifty or sixty yards down they saw two Turks who were promptly shot. The shooting attracted the German working the machine gun, who momentarily ceased fire and raised himself to see what happened. The movement gave him away as he was close to the men. He met a bullet and our men then dashed forward to the now located gun. Two Turks were there to assist in working it and as they turned to clear out both were killed. Then the men carried the gun back to our own lines.

From the *Bundisarchiv* in Freiberg, Germany, comes the following;

25 April 1915 - Kaba Tepe, Ari Burnu, Sedd el Bahr⁵³

To support the weak attacked Turkish Army, the fleet sent all *entbehrlichen* (dispensable) machine guns with German troops of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Dardanelles to serve the V Army. This was an essential reinforcement for the Turkish troops. It made severe damage to the enemy which different English reports show.

The fact that this file specifically states 25 April [at] Kaba Tepe, Ari Burnu and Sedd el Bahr, cannot possibly be refuted by claiming that what is meant is a date or location other than those specifically stated. To my knowledge this is the only reference ever discovered which actually confirms that machine guns, manned by German marines, were present at Anzac and Helles during the time of the 25 April Landings.

Post Mortem

The intent of this article was to provide sufficient evidence to either prove the existence of machine guns at Anzac and Helles on the morning of 25 April 1915 or at the very least, encourage others to seriously question why there is no mention of these weapons in the only available translated document approximating a Turkish official history.

Some insight as to why this might be so is provided by Peter Liddle who after his visit to Turkey in 1972 to interview Turkish Veterans wrote in his report,

I also had an interview with the recently appointed Turkish Military Historian of the Campaign, Colonel M. Saral, though this was of limited value as he was both unwilling to allow me to see any official Turkish documents and failed to appreciate that anything could be gained by contact with either Turkish or British veterans.

The Colonel Muhterem Saral mentioned by Peter Liddle in the above recollection eventually had a hand in the writing of what I will refer to as the Turkish official history (that is not its official title, which is, in any case, in Turkish, but will suffice for this discussion). This was completed and published (in Turkish) in 1978, and was recently translated into English. It is suggested that if attitudes such as that of Colonel Saral existed before, and still exist today in Turkey, then there is little hope of ever extracting any more information than has already been surrendered by way of this 'official history', which continues to be questioned for its obvious omissions. If every aspect of the Turkish version of events for the 25 April landings and beyond is to remain unchallenged on the basis that it either is, or *is not*, mentioned in this 'official history', then what are the implications in terms of historical accuracy further on, be it the morning in question, later that day, or the next? And how can sensible and accurate historical balance be achieved, if one side denies and refuses even to consider what is known to be fact by the other?

Taking into consideration all the facts as presented, I feel it is fair to say that it was the Germans who were responsible for overseeing the control and organisation of machine guns and detachments, 'channelling' these weapons and personnel through the conduit of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* and beginning some time just prior to 25 April 1915. There might also be some validity in the belief that it was actually Admiral Wilhelm Souchon who was the driving force behind these machine gun detachments and that he is the man upon whom we should now focus our attention. Given the less-than-amicable relations of the Turco-German partnership during the Gallipoli Campaign, it appears that any connection between Ottoman victories and German assistance or intervention has been whitewashed from Turkish history. If Turkish methodology is to present only a populist patriotic history aimed at the Turkish masses then the only way of ever getting closer to the truth is to bypass the bureaucracy of the Turkish Military Archives system with continued research into what German documents may have survived.

Admiral Guido von Usedom, who possibly foresaw a future in which German influence on the Campaign was written out of Turkish history - as it has eventuated with some accuracy - warned:

The absolute incapacity for real criticism, and especially self-criticism, is an outstanding trait of the Turks. It was necessary therefore to keep within bounds the presumption of some of them, and it will be necessary in all encounters to insist formally on the view that without German help neither the Straits nor Turkey herself could have held out in this war, if ever Turkish national pride strives to controvert this relationship.⁵⁴

Acknowledgements: Finally, a Mention in Despatches to the following people who have assisted me in different ways over the long and short term. Firstly, special thanks to Nick Fear and John Walter. In Germany to professional researcher Benjamin Haas for his many hours of research on my behalf. Additionally to Ian Gill, Wes Olson, Anthony Staunton and Michael Robson. Also to those who believe there were 'no machine guns' present at the 25 April landings, which belief has helped tremendously to keep the fire stoked.

Endnotes

1. Intelligence, General Staff Headquarters MEF - AWM4/1/5/2 part 1 18 May 1915 p.32
2. Sanders, General Liman von *Five Years in Turkey* The Battery Press, Nashville Tennessee, 2000 p.69
3. Mitchell Report AWM51 39 part 1, Chapter 3 para 1.
4. Noppen, Ryan *Ottoman Navy Warships 1914 - 18*, p.18, Osprey Publishing 2015
5. Langensiepen Bernd & Güleriyüz Ahmet - *The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828 - 1923*, p.28, Conway Maritime Press UK 1995
6. Mitchell Report AWM51 39 part 1 – Dockyards, Chapter 12 para 27
7. Grant, Jonathan ‘The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports 1854 - 1914’ - *The Journal of Military History* Vol 66 No.1 (Jan. 2002)
8. Noppen, Ryan *op cit*, p.18 - 19.
9. *ibid* p.19
10. Hamilton Files - Kings College London - Intelligence Bulletin, 14 August 1915. File 7/6/70
11. Noppen, Ryan *op cit* p.19.
12. Langensiepen, Bernd & Güleriyüz, Ahmet *op cit* p.30.
13. Noppen, Ryan - *op cit*, p.19.
14. Langensiepen, Bernd & Güleriyüz, Ahmet *op cit*, p.45
15. Mitchell Report AWM51 39 part 1, Chapter 2 para 22.
16. *ibid* Chapter 2 para 53.
17. Trumpener, Ulrich *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914 – 1918*, p.66, Caravan Books NY 1968
18. Despatches by Admiral von Usedom. CAB45/215 p.13 - 14, National Archives Kew,
19. Noppen, Ryan *op cit* p.22 - 23
20. Ray, F A Rayfield Papers Catalogue number 14111, Imperial War Museum London
21. German Colonial Uniforms website.
22. John Walter by way of email correspondence with the author.
23. Aspinall-Oglander Vol 1 p.159
24. Walter, John *Central Powers Small Arms of world War One* p.145 Crowood Press 1999
25. Bundisarchiv Freiberg RM40/778 - Title: *War Diary of the Task Force of the Imperial Navy in Turkey, 24 Feb - 12 Oct 1915*. p.99
26. *ibid* p.101
27. *ibid* p.101
28. *ibid* p.104 – Also from ANZAC Intelligence Headquarters AWM4/1/27 Part 2 May 1915 A French aeroplane report dated 20 May 1915 it was stated that at Kilia Liman there was a landing place and encampment and that a narrow gauge railway ran inland.
29. *ibid* p.107
30. Bundisarchiv Freiberg RM2/ 1156 *Mediterranean Division - Details of Imperial Navy in Turkey Jan - Jun 1915*
31. ADM/137/3896 National Archives Kew
32. Hamilton Files Kings College London Intelligence Bulletin 14 August 1915. 7/6/70
33. AWM252 GHQ Intelligence Dardanelles – Translation of Turkish Documents. See also AWM4/1/27/5 part 2 July p.34.
34. Kannengiesser, Hans *The Campaign in Gallipoli* Hutchison & Co London (n.d.) p.133
35. Hamilton Files Kings College London Intelligence Bulletin 14 August 1915. 7/6/70
36. The two large trans-Atlantic transports, *Corcavado* and *General* were moored opposite each other in the Golden Horn. *Corcavado* was used as a depot ship and *General* operated as a shell factory.
37. Domuz Dere was a Turkish staging area used by the troops for forming up prior to moving up into the front lines. Information compliments of Michael Robson. Lt - Col Edward Erickson *Gallipoli - The Ottoman Campaign* Pen & Sword Military 2010 p.133
38. Langensiepen, Bernd & Ahmet, Güleriyüz *op cit* p.166
39. Bundisarchiv Freiberg RM40/74 Reports of the V Army, p.5
40. A German Staff Officer [Sodenstern] on the Dardanelles Expedition, Extract from the *Journal of the United Services Institution*. CAB45/235. National Archives Kew
41. Rottgardt, Dirk - *German Naval Infantry in World War I*, The Nafziger Collection 2010, p.67
42. Bundisarchiv Freiberg RM40/74, p.6

43. Intelligence, General Staff Headquarters MEF - AWM4/1/27/5 part 1 July 1915
44. Hamilton Files - Kings College London - Intelligence Bulletin, 14 August 1915. File 7/6/70
45. *ibid*, also refer see 37. Intelligence, General Staff Headquarters MEF, AWM4 1/5/5 for 13/8/15
46. *ibid*, Prisoner of War Report dated 14 August 1915 File 7/6/70
47. ADM 137/4068 Naval Operations against Turkey: reports received in N.I.D., including press cuttings PRO, Kew
48. AWM38 3DRL 1722 Item 2
49. Peter Liddle Special Collection 1914 - 1918 Gallipoli - Brotherton University Leeds UK
50. AWM38 3DRL/606/5/1 April - May 1915
51. AWM38 3DRL 606/22/1
52. Bean Collection Series 5 AWM38 3DRL/8042/6 Cass Notes p.10
53. Bundesarchiv Freiberg RM40/440 *History of the Landing Troops until the Withdrawal of the Enemy from Gallipoli*.
54. Admiral Guido von Usedom - Dispatches to the Kaiser. National Archives Kew. CAB45/215

BOOK REVIEWS

The Major

The life of a Gallipoli & Western Front Survivor H W H Seager MC

Author/Compiler: Michael Seager. Publisher: privately published 2015. Softback. 466 pages with numerous B/W photographs. Price: A\$35 (plus postage). ISBN 978-0-646-93538-6. Available from the author. E-mail: middlethorpepark@iprimus.com.au

The book is a record of the life of the author's father, Major Harold (Hal) William Hastings Seager MC (1893-1976) who served with the 10th Bn., Australian Infantry at Gallipoli and later with the 50th Bn. on the Western Front.

The first half of the book deals with his early life when he worked in a bank and also served, on a part-time basis, in the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia. Then enlistment in August 1914, voyage to Egypt and five months on Gallipoli from April until September when Captain Seager was evacuated to Mudros suffering from dysentery and severe influenza. This took him first to Malta and then, despite his strong protestations, to England. Following recovery he 'kicked his heels' in England for several months, fretting that he was not allowed to return to the fighting. He eventually got back to Mudros in December but with the evacuation well advanced, he never returned to Gallipoli, being posted once again to Egypt and then to England. He went to the Western Front in January 1917 where he was promoted to major and was awarded the MC; his service there forms the second half of the book.

The story is told using Seager's letters, notebooks and other documents including orders which he transcribed into his notebooks, or otherwise retained. Although few of the orders can be regarded as significant in historical terms they recount the day to day tasks and routines which a company commander needed to ensure were carried out. The letters to family members, relations, friends and a former employer will be of interest to those, like me, who enjoy reading personal accounts of this kind. I would, however, have welcomed a more detailed commentary on the actions in which he was involved on the peninsula; most Gallipoli Association members will, of course, be aware of these but I assume the book is published for a wider audience.

Foster Summerson

Duty Nobly Done

The South Wales Borderers at Gallipoli 1915

Author: Rodney Ashwood, Publisher: Helion and Company 2017. Hardback. 336 pages, 38 photographs, 20 maps, £29.95

After some twenty-nine years service with the Welch Regiment the author retired in 1993 to become curator of the regimental museum in Brecon where he developed his interest in military history further. Now retired and a member of the Gallipoli Association this is his second book, the first being the Zulu War Diary of Lieutenant Wilfred Heaton the 24th Regiment of Foot.

The foreword is provided by Major General L A H Napier CB OstJ, OBE, MC, DL whose grandfather Major Sir William Lennox Napier was killed by a sniper at Suvla on 13 August 1915, his son Joseph at his side. Five generations of the family have served in the regiment.

The 2nd Battalion of the South Wales Borderers arrived in Egypt on 29 March and was the only Welsh battalion to take part in the landings on 25 April, their transport the battleship HMS Cornwallis, their destination S Beach in Morto Bay. The band of the Cornwallis played the regimental march 'Men of Harlech' as with the early morning mist clearing the boats and trawlers made for the shore. One of those who fell as the assault parties scrambled up the two hundred high cliffs was Major E C Margesson whose son became a lieutenant-colonel in the regiment while two grandsons were also commissioned into the Royal Regiment of Wales.

The author rightly draws attention to the fact that the landings at S Beach, despite achieving their objectives, indeed this one of the few successes that dreadful day, are often overlooked. Much is focussed on what was happening just round the corner at V Beach and beyond at W Beach. As the battalion's war diary records 'Our casualties were not heavy considering the position we attacked. Had it been held by resolute men we should never have been able to capture it without severe loss.'

One remarkable source about the whole campaign was the account by Sergeant Sidney Bean who on the 8 May found he had a narrow escape. One bullet tore through his cap, and another through his left breast pocket, his note book, cardigan and shirt, and finished in his trouser leg without even causing a bruise. Another was embedded in his lifebuoy soap while three more completed their journeys in his mess tin. With all the officers in C and D Companies killed or wounded Sergeant Bean took charge, bringing the men back to safety. For his actions he was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

Another survivor was Lieutenant Ernest Kirkland Laman, Quartermaster of the 2nd Battalion, whose detailed diaries, now in the Regimental Museum, provide an invaluable account of life at Gallipoli and of his subsequent war service. He was evacuated on 8 January 1916 and how he enjoyed his whisky and soda when finally aboard the Prince Abbas and en route to Egypt.

The author has skilfully woven together such extraordinary personal day-by-day accounts, both of those who survived and others who did not, together with memoirs and official records. The result is a fine and vivid portrayal of the regiment and a fitting tribute to all who served at Gallipoli.

David Saunders

Churchill and Fisher Titans at the Admiralty

Author: Barry Gough. Publisher: Seaforth Publishing 2017. Hardback. 600 pages, 35 illustrations, 2 maps, £35.00.

A massive book in every respect, a dual biography offering a vivid study in the politics and stresses of high command, of two titans, one young, one old locked together in perilous destiny at the Admiralty.

For Gallipoli Association members, Part 4 headed with the epic words used by Jacky Fisher 'Damn the Dardanelles They will be our grave' when writing to Winston Churchill on 5 April 1915 will be of special interest. Indeed the author recommends that the reader ought to keep a photo of the Admiral to hand, and observe in his heavy laden eyes the wisdom as well as the warning, while his turned-down lips seem about to open with yet another cautionary tale or censorious utterance.

Over a century later there can be few parts of the Churchill story more dramatic, more extraordinary, more debated than that which took place during the early months of 1915, months which concluded in mid-May with Fisher resigning in a most unusual manner. In his letter to Churchill he wrote how 'I find it increasingly difficult to adjust myself to adjust myself to the increasingly daily requirements of the Dardanelles to meet your views' he concluded 'I am off to Scotland at once to avoid all questionings.' Only Fisher could have chosen such a way.

A further eight days and Churchill himself was forced out of office, his head demanded by the Conservative party as their price for supporting the Asquith government. Years later when describing his departure from the Admiralty he recalled being 'Like a sea-beast fished up from the depths, or a diver too suddenly hoisted, my veins threatened to burst from the fall in pressure. I had great anxiety and no means of relieving it; I had to watch the unhappy casting-away of great opportunities, and the feeble execution of plans which I had launched and in which I heartily believed.'

This is an extraordinary story brilliantly told of two equally extraordinary men and the epic parts they played, parts that have and indeed still divide opinion. One thing is certain that without them, faults and all, Great Britain would have been far less ready for war when it commenced in August 1914. While without the schisms, the disagreements over the Gallipoli campaign might this after all had succeeded?

As James Masterton-Smith, a private secretary to Churchill when First Lord of the Admiralty writing to Fisher long after the war said the '15th of May 1915, was the best day the Germans had in the War. The breach between yourself and Winston was the tragedy – in my judgement the outstanding tragedy of the War. Together you were invincible and would have gone from triumph to triumph. But the high gods willed otherwise, and from the first foredoomed the Dardanelles to failure.'

David Saunders

Disclaimer

Readers are reminded that the observations and opinions expressed in items published in *The Gallipolian* are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editor, or those of the Association.

HERBERT FREDERICK FAUX, RAMC

Christine Peach

This is an account written by my father and discovered by me among records in the care of my nephew Nicholas Faux in 2017. I have seen this for the first time in my life, having been born in 1932, the third child of loving parents – of whom more later.

Dad seldom spoke of his army service and probably we did not listen to stories of the olden days – which is the normal reaction of the young. Today's generation being little different where our parents are concerned.

My father was Herbert Frederick Faux, born January 10th 1890, died February 12th 1972, youngest son of Francis and Hannah Faux, and one of five children. He was an educated man and stayed at school until age 16 – which is apparent from his writing, which I recognised instantly, and his command of English.

He married my mother Eva Maggie Purling (one of 12 children) in 1921. They had three children – Sheila born 1922, David born 1925 and myself Christine, the after-thought in 1932. Sadly I am now the last of the family of my generation although as children we had an abundance of aunts, uncles, cousins, great aunts and great uncles – known to we children as 'Mother's Secret Service' since any public misdemeanour did not go long unreported!



Herbert, David, Sheila, Christine and Eva Faux, approximately 1935.

It was a happy, loving family with a background of strict Methodism and Sunday chapel, Sunday school and no playing out. The Radio Relay acquired in the mid 1930s was restricted to the Home Service on a Sunday – no Light programme for us.

As the youngest I was my father's pet, known as 'my little maid' and I believed he could solve every problem and was omnipotent. However, apart from knowing he could make a bed which remained secure however restless the occupant, I had no idea of his army experience.

This is the account I found in a small notebook in his familiar, immaculate handwriting and, as his spelling could be relied upon, I have copied it as written. I do not know whether the account is contemporary or written later. From the detail I imagine it was written as a diary as it happened, the times and dates being meticulously recorded.

The Dardanelles

Herewith I relate as accurate account as possible of my doings as private 1982 of the 1/2nd East Anglian Field Amb.

After 11 months training we were passed as fit to take our place in the field of Active Service and on 27th July 1915 we left St. Albans en route for Devonport. After spending one day in helping to load the ship we were ready and on July 29 we left Old England's shore in the SS *Manitou*.

We had no fixed idea as to our destination but most of us had come to the conclusion that we were bound for Egypt. Needless to say there were crowds of people thronging the quays cheering us and in as tangent a manner as possible, wishing us God's speed.

We left at 1.30 in the afternoon and soon passed Eddystone Lighthouse.

On August Sunday (Aug.1) we had the privilege of listening to two very nice sermons by the Rev. Sullings (who you will remember died from Enteric fever contracted in Gallipoli).

On August Bank holiday we were in sight of land. We saw Spain on our left and Northern Africa (Tangiers) on our right.

In the early morning of Aug 3 we entered the Straits of Gibraltar. Here we had a chance of witnessing the activeness of the British Navy, for no sooner had we entered the Straits then we were challenged by a torpedo destroyer who wanted to know who we were, who were on board and to where we were bound. Having given satisfactory answers we were allowed to proceed on our journey.

While in the Mediterranean Sea the weather became much calmer and I might have mentioned that the weather was simply glorious the whole of the journey and the sea was as calm as a millpond. Needless to say a journey of this description became monotonous and so to relieve things a bit we had sing songs at night.

On Thursday August 5th we sighted the islands of Galita and also passed Algiers. Here we saw the first signs of cultivation since we left England, which as you can imagine was a welcoming change. On the following morning early, we came in sight of the islands of Gozo and Camno and at 10 am we arrived at Malta. This island as you know was visited by St. Paul in the early days of Christianity. No sooner had we dropped anchor than about fifty small boats drew up alongside and the occupants began crying their wares, such as Chocolate, Cigarettes, Apples, Picture Postcards, Shirts and even Canaries. The noise that went on for several hours I shall always remember. It was perfect bedlam. We laid in Malta harbour until 6.30 pm.

From the outside Malta looks like a vast island of stone of cream colour. It is a strongly fortified island and from where we laid we could clearly see Fort Ricasoli. Not being an officer nor even a Warrant officer but a common private I hadn't the pleasure of a trip round Malta so can give no description.

We left Malta at 6.30 pm and nothing more of interest happened till we reached Alexandria on Monday August 9/15. Here we had the privilege of a ramble on shore and took the opportunity of a rapid trip round the town. We passed through the native quarter which was in a filthy state (but this I can explain later). I might mention that while we were there the people were celebrating Xmas.

On Thursday August 12 at 7pm we left Alexandria and on the Saturday we were in the Grecian archipelago. These are mostly masses of sheer rock with little or no signs of cultivation. Our third Sunday at sea found us at Lemnos - the base for the Dardanelles. Here we learnt the sad news of the fate of the Royal Edward and it made that Sunday a day of gloom and sadness.

We left Lemnos at 7.30pm, taking all precautions by having lifebelts handy in case of emergency and arrived at the scene of operations at 3 am on Monday August 16.

Now we come to a very interesting but nevertheless the most trying experience in the life of any man who took part in the Gallipoli operations. Let me explain at the outset that necessarily the narrative of an R.A.M.C. man will be different to that of an infantryman.

We awoke in the early morning to hear the booming of distant artillery fire and saw shells bursting over distant hills. These hills appeared to us to be absolutely void of life and to our surprise when we arrived there we found [they] swarmed with troops and transport. We were taken off the transport ship and landed at Suvla Bay in small rowing boats. We had not been there more than half an hour before we had our baptism of shellfire and we had to move under the shelter of the hillside. Here we pitched our hospital and at night some of our fellows had to go to the trenches to collect the wounded. So you see they were not long before they put us into harness.

Every morning while we were at Suvla Bay the Turks had what we termed their "Mornings Hate" in the form of shrapnel shells coming over one after the other in quick succession. The safest plan of course then was to keep in our own dugouts.

In the evenings of Tuesday and Wednesday August 17 and 18 I had my first experience of collecting wounded from the trenches. We used to start from our Hospital about 6.30pm and we would be out till sometimes 7.30am the next morning. The distance to the trenches would be about 4 miles. About half a mile from the trenches we would form a temporary dressing station for receiving the wounded as they came from the trenches. The job we had of carrying these poor wounded fellows is nearly beyond description.

The fighting was taking place in a kind of valley and so you see the wounded had to be carried up the side of a steep hill (so steep that it took at times 8 men to carry a stretcher up the hill). After this weary toil we had to carry the wounded back to our hospital which as I said before was a distance of about 4 miles.

As we made our way to the trenches the search light of a torpedo boat (which was shining on the Turkish trenches) would occasionally flash across our path and we were instantly greeted with a shower of bullets, one of our fellows being wounded by a sniper while attending to a wounded comrade.

On Tuesday August 17 we had our first experience of bombs dropping. A German Taube came over and tried to drop bombs on our warships which laid in Suvla Bay but happily she missed them every time.

On the 18th of August we lost our first man. This man was carrying a patient to the clearing station a quarter of a mile distant. When nearly there the Turks opened fire on the A.S.C. stores and one of the shells hit the poor fellow killing him almost immediately. We gave him as decent a funeral as possible and as you can imagine a gloom seemed to hang about the camp that day. We erected a rough cross on which was written: "In loving memory of a Fallen Comrade."

The A.S.C. stores, which I have just mentioned in the preceding incident, was certainly a very good target for the Turks. They used to shell it every morning as we went to draw stores. I remember going for stores one morning and had reached the A.S.C. and was sitting with a Sergeant on a box of currants. I was then given my portion of stores to carry back and had only left the box about a minute when a high explosive shell came hurtling through the air. I had only just time to get under cover and when I came out again I found that the shell had hit the box I had been sitting on smashing it to atoms.

Truly a providential escape.

On Saturday August 21 I witnessed a sight I shall ever remember. This was the battle of the Salt Lake. The artillery commenced to open fire at 3pm in the afternoon and kept up a bombardment till the early hours of Sunday morning. Several places were set on fire and it was in this battle that the village Anfarta Plain was destroyed. No doubt you are aware of the result of the battle. Needless to say hundreds of poor fellows, both Turks and British, perished.

On Wednesday August 25 while the Turks were shelling they managed to hit one of the warships that laid in Suvla Bay but did very little damage. On Friday I went with the advance party to a new camp on the other side of Lala Baba and on Saturday night I came back to guide the main body. Those two tramps across the Salt Lake I shall never forget. The Salt Lake was dried up when we arrived on the Peninsula so you can imagine what a journey across this lake would be like. In parts it was quite 12 inches deep in mud. The journey was about 4 miles. We started at 7pm and arrived at our new camp at 11pm. So I leave it to you to guess what the journey was like.

When we arrived at our new home the thought occurred to us that we might get things a bit more quiet here, but not so. Mr. Turk was bent on giving us as rough a time as possible. On the Sunday morning we had a visit from a German Taube. On the same beach as we were was another field ambulance about 100 yards away from us. We watched the flight of this Taube from our dugouts and much to our horror we heard a bomb rushing from it to the earth and I regret to say it landed right in the other ambulance, wounding 8 men. We had several visits from this demon of the air but after this incident no more bits of lead were dropped on us.

On the Tuesday we witnessed an exhibition of Turkish Artillery Fire. A British Aeroplane landed on Anfarta Plain in full view of the enemy, who were situated on the hills about three miles away. Their object was to smash up the aeroplane. They fired 167 shrapnel shells and not one of them actually hit the machine. Only some of the shrapnel bullets penetrated the wings and engine

As you know in warfare a soldier has no abiding city and so on Wednesday September 1 we sought pastures new. We arrived at our new quarters on Thursday morning and found ourselves in the centre of 48 Artillery guns.

In the afternoon we had the experience of being shelled for ½ hour continually. The shells (shrapnel) were bursting within 100 yds of our camp.

On Thursday night I went with some more to form an advanced dressing station at a place called Dixon's Gulley. This place was about ½ mile from the firing line. The remainder of the unit finding their new home a bit too hot, moved back again where, for several weeks, they carried on a Rest Camp for the sick of the 54th division.

I was up at the advanced dressing station for 5 weeks in all, having a week at the rest camp in between. The dressing station is a place where the wounded are brought from the trenches by the Regimental Stretcher bearers. They receive attention here and our duty was to carry them from here to the Hospital.

Just below our dressing station was an A.S.C. store and the Turks were very fond of trying to do damage to it. While carrying men to hospital we had to pass the A.S.C. and often while we were on the way they would commence shelling it and even, to use a vulgar phrase, had a rough house. When we left Dixon's Gulley we had to cross an open space of about 500 yds in full view of the enemy and then into another gulley.

Well, it was crossing this open plain that we used to get it. I remember taking a patient to hospital one day and there had been no shelling for a long while that day. We had just got half way across the open space when the Turks opened fire. I could hear the shell coming and, there being no cover and also having a wounded man with us, there was nothing to do but to trust to Providence to bring us safely through. The shell burst just over our heads and curious as it may seem the bullets all fell on the far side of the stretcher, hurting no one. This I think you will admit was another wonderful escape.

Beside carrying wounded to hospital we had to fetch water for our own use. For this we had to go over the same ground into another gulley, a distance of about 1¼ miles. The well unfortunately could be seen by the enemy. If two men were at the well we were left in peace and quietness because they thought it was not worthwhile wasting a shell over two men. But if a crowd was there getting water, then the band began to play. Shell after shell would come whizzing over and you had to hop it. I have seen several men hit there. In fact this particular gulley was a perfect death trap and so instead of going in the daytime we mostly went at night.

Well this sort of business was our routine while we were at the dressing station. One or two incidents happened. One sad night I saw the death of a soldier. He was only a lad, just turned 17, and he had been struck just below the heart by a shrapnel bullet. He was in awful agony when he was brought in. He was given an injection of morphia to ease his pain. He was quite beyond human aid and all we could do was to sit by and watch him die. This was the sort of thing that brought home the horrors of warfare.

On Sunday September 12 we were given a change by the Turks. Running by our camp about 20 yds away was a pathway and Mr. Turk obliged us by dropping four High Explosive shells in quick succession right on this pathway. As you can imagine we made ourselves pretty scarce.

On the following Saturday afternoon the Turks made an attack, and being within half a mile of the Turkish trenches, we got a full supply of stray bullets and once more we had to seek refuge in our dugouts.

I also remember one afternoon we had cleared out all the patients and six of us were sitting by the cookhouse having a chat when, without warning, a shell came over and dropped not more than a yard behind us. Fortunately for us it burst in the ground and completely covered us with earth. Had it burst a second before we should all have been killed. The shell was a shrapnel six inches across the base and one foot high. The time fuse was dug out of the ground at a depth of three feet.

You can imagine what a slaughter one of the shells could make when I tell you that in the smallest of them there are over 300 bullets about the size of a marble.

On Friday night, October 8, we had a weird experience. We were lying in our dugouts, the night was calm and still. Suddenly without a second's warning a terrific wind blew carrying everything before it. Tops were blown off our dugouts. Cookhouse fires we thought were not fanned into flame. Stacks of bully beef were blown about like paper. Tents on the beach were blown down. The sea came up to the doors of the tents and then, to make matters worse, it simply poured with rain. And believe me I have never in all my life seen rain in such torrents before. This started about 9pm and lasted till 2am. These are the sort of things Tommy has to endure but the good people of the homeland see by the Daily Pictorials that Tommy loves this sort of life!

Sunday October 10 saw my last day at the advanced dressing station. From here I went to the base and found work here was harder than at the dressing station. Our work here as stretcher bearers consisted of fetching water a distance of one and a half miles, carrying patients two miles along the beach to the clearing station and any fatigue jobs that might come along – which were too many to note.

I might mention that when we had to carry patients along the beach we had to pass two batteries of Artillery and more often than not when we went past our mutual friend Mr Turk would be having a shot at them. So you can see it was a bit warm at times.



Herbert Frederick Faux in later life.

On October 21 the Turks favoured us with an exhibition of Artillery fire but did no damage. I expect they were celebrating Trafalgar Day. On October 28th we once again moved our quarters. This time taking over the place of the 1st East Anglian R.A.M.C. at the Casualty Clearing Station. Our duty here was carrying patients from the Clearing Station to the pier ready for transfer to the Hospital Ship. Though this work was very hard, it was much better carrying patients over hard ground than carrying them along the beach.

During the night of October 31 a tug was washed ashore and on the next day the Turks amused themselves by shelling it.

Up to this time I had enjoyed fairly good health but the strain began to tell and on Friday November 5th I was admitted to hospital with a temperature of 105 degrees.

Two nights in succession while I laid in hospital we were shelled by 9in. high Explosives from Chanak (a distance of eight miles away). Unfortunately for us we were just at the tail end of the range and the shells were dropping all round us.

Those of us who were in hospital had to be carried to a place of safety.

Getting no better, on November 9th I was taken to the Hospital ship and I am not ashamed to own that I was jolly glad when I saw the Gallipoli Peninsula fading in the distance.

This is the end of my account of my three months on the Peninsula.

PRISONER OF WAR IN TURKEY, 1915-18

Digger's Unpublished Ms.

(By "Quivis.")

Stories of the Great War, after a fairly long eclipse, seem, now to be viewed in a more favourable light. It may be that the threat of war in the near future turns the memory back a little to war in the past. If so, there is possibly a chance for the publication of the story of the experiences of a New Zealander as a prisoner of war for more than three years in Turkey. So far as I know, apart from official histories and recollections which appeared in "Quick March" and other periodicals of the time, there is no book giving a "Digger's" own story of the war as he saw it, either in the form of fiction or as a personal record. I was surprised therefore, to receive, not from the author, but from somebody who knew somebody who knew the author, a foolscap typescript of 150 odd folios embodying a "Digger's" account of his sufferings as a prisoner of war in Turkey from 1915 to 1918, from the Suvla Bay landing to the Armistice. It is a long story as typewritten, and, if printed, would make a book of ordinary size. I do not know whether it has ever been offered to publishers, but the MS. looks as if it had been the rounds and it might have been as a last resort that it was submitted for my perusal and opinion. I should say at once, after a careful reading, that there is not much of the "Road to En-Dor" about it or "The Secrets of a Kuttite," which cover similar experiences; but it has the merits of a plain, straightforward tale and certainly deserves a more permanent record than a mere MS. Some day such records will become very precious for their historical value, and the growing interest taken in New Zealand history might very well find a niche for this picture of a phase of war of which we have no chronicler. Something should be done to preserve such a record.

Survivors Captured

The "Digger" — who is anonymous — was one of a handful of survivors of a party left to hold a trench on Chunuk Bair, Gallipoli, to cover a retirement in the Suvla Bay operations of August, 1915. The author considers, as a private soldier, this retirement unnecessary and is very bitter about it. In the last stand, he was twice wounded in the head and believes he would have been bayoneted by the Turks in their counter-attack but for a very gallant comrade, "Davie." As prisoners of war the survivors were marched away to their fate and this is the picture the author gives: —

We appeared indifferent and dignified, if the term could apply to a dozen worn, bandaged, and bleeding prisoners surrounded by a scraggly, whiskered, ill-clad, down-at-heel, half-dozen sentries.

Eventually the prisoners were taken to Constantinople or Stamboul, where they suffered greatly from neglect in hospitals in which the wounded were crowded. In one they are

visited by Enver Pasha, who came, as “Digger” naively puts it, “attended by his aide de champs (sic) and colleagues.” Complaints are made of treatment and Enver replies that the Turkish prisoners were also brutally treated in Egypt and orders more severe treatment for the British as a form of retaliation. The prisoners, though still suffering from wounds, are glad to get out of hospital and are transported to Angora in the heart of Asiatic Turkey. The journey is by train and “Digger” thus describes it: —

We had no idea where we were going, and little we cared; we were seeing strange lands and strange people, with strange customs and filthy habits. It was all education to us and we looked on the bright side of everything ...

Monotonous doesn't describe it at all. With not a railway time-table to read, the journey nearly drove us mad.

From Angora in the middle of November, 1915, they are marched over 100 miles to Changeri — “one of our hardest trials in Turkey.” They spend a wretched Christmas at Changeri; and then in January, 1916, march back through deep snow to Angora, ill-clad and ill-fed, many sick, pricked on by the point of the bayonet. They camp at night in a wretched hovel, and “Digger” says:

I struck a match and looked around at the faces of my mates. They looked calm, though haggard and worn, and still wore that contemptible (sic) smile which made them British ...

They had fought like heroes and fell like lambs; now they were enduring their lot like lions.

In The Taurus Tunnels

At the end of January, 1916, the prisoners were shifted from Angora to the break in the Bagdad railway in the Taurus mountains at the entrance to the Bozanti tunnels, then under construction. Here for over six months they had a comparatively good time working in the tunnels, receiving pay from 2s to 3s a day and being well fed. It was here that there were several attempts to escape. One party tried under the leadership of a New Zealander, George McAvery, with two Australians, Lushington and Ashton — the names are given. They got as far as the Mediterranean coast at Mersina, but were captured on the beach by gendarmes and confined in a dungeon in Tarsus.

They suffered terribly, but recovered under kind treatment in the American hospital in this city, famous as the birthplace of St. Paul. In July and August malaria, the curse of Cilicia, attacked the prisoners, and finally they had to be evacuated from that fever-stricken region. In the meantime they see the arrival of prisoners from Kut in a shocking condition from their brutal treatment by the Turkish guards on their long march. “Digger” quotes some pathetic verses by a British prisoner, who died shortly afterwards.

In December, 1916, the prisoners were moved to Afium Kara Hissar, half-way back to Stamboul, and here they had six months of suffering under a frightfully brutal camp commandant. Many died. Russian prisoners were bastinadoed without mercy. It is a terrible story, and no one reading it will wonder at “Digger's” hatred of the Turks, beside whom he finds the Germans “white men.” In June, 1917, “Digger's” party is shifted to Ada Bazar, not far from Ismidt, and conditions improve. So 1917 passes and 1918 comes in. They move to San Stefano, on the Sea of Marmora, seeing en-route the wreck of Haidar Pasha station,

the terminus of the Bagdad railway, bombed to bits by British aircraft. The station was full of munitions and petrol loaded on trains for the relief of Bagdad and for the Palestine front. Bombs from the air exploded the whole lot, "one of the most daring and serviceable deeds of the war," says "Digger." Passing by the island of Prinkipo, on the way across to the European shore, the prisoners think bitterly of General Townsend, "the hero of Kut," living in luxurious captivity, but careless of what happened to his men. More months pass, and then the Armistice and freedom and the last of Gallipoli, and "Digger" ends his story on a fine note:

As the hilltops grew indistinct, I left my place and walked the deck trying to blot out from my mind the trials and horrors of those last four dark, weary years, and endeavouring to realise that my comrades and myself were once again free men, and bound for a place we never could forget — Home.

While as a book this simple, honest story of a New Zealand prisoner of war in Turkey could never be a "bestseller," intrinsically on its worth to the community it has far more genuine claims to print than much that passes as literature.

'Prisoner Of War', *Evening Post* (Wellington NZ), 24 October 1936 p28.


Editor's note:

Some of the author's comments are perceptive: 'Some day such records will become very precious for their historical value ... Something should be done to preserve such a record.'

I believe that, unfortunately, this account by a New Zealander prisoner of the Turks was not preserved and is probably now lost to history.

Two of the soldiers whose names are mentioned in this account were captured at Anzac on 25th April 1915. Bugler Fred Ashton, 11th Battalion, and Private Reg Lushington, 16th Battalion, were two of only four Australians who, as Charles Bean records, 'remained prisoners in Turkish hands at the Landing.' Both men survived the war. Reg Lushington wrote an account of his imprisonment in Turkey - *A Prisoner With The Turks 1915 - 1918*, which was published in 1923, and which tells the story of the escape.

The 'George McAvery' mentioned in the text was actually Sergeant George James McAneny of the Wellington Battalion, NZEF, captured on Chunuk Bair on 8th August 1915. He too survived the war and went on to serve in World War II, retiring as a captain.



From *At Suvla Bay* by John Hargrave p86.



OBJECTIVES

To advance education for the public benefit by raising public awareness of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915 and by encouraging and facilitating the study in the legacy and lessons of that campaign. To keep alive the memory of the campaign and to ensure that all who fought or served in it, and those who gave their lives, are not forgotten by applying such means as the Trustees deem fit.



The River Clyde at V Beach, 25 April 1915 by Charles Dixon

Reproduced by kind permission of The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment (Queen's and Royal Hampshires)

The Gallipoli Campaign is characterised by countless deeds of heroism and endurance. It took place in an area smaller than Southampton amid appalling conditions - heat, flies, lack of water, equipment and proper sanitation. Later on rain and a freak spell of sub-zero temperatures had to be endured, to say nothing of the desperate close-quarter fighting throughout the campaign. Some 559,000 Allied personnel were committed, of whom 420,000 were British and Empire troops, including 50,000 Australians and 9,000 New Zealanders, and 80,000 French. The cost in human terms was terrible. The Allies had 250,000 casualties, of whom approximately 58,000 were killed, with only 11,000 having known graves. Ottoman forces, with some Germans, numbered between 300,000 and 400,000 and of these some 87,000 were killed. The evacuations in December 1915 and early January 1916 were masterly operations - one of the great feats of military history.