


The Gallipollian

*The Journal of the
Gallipoli Association*

No. 89
SPRING 1999

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THE GALLIPOLIAN

THE JOURNAL OF THE GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION
FOUNDED BY MAJOR E. H. W. BANNER IN 1969
ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 1915

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MANY HAPPY RETURNS

Members of the Gallipoli Association send their best wishes to Alec Campbell of Hobart Tasmania, youngest of four Gallipoli veterans in Australia, who was 100 on 26 February.

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GALLIPOLI MEMORIAL BURSARY 1999

The Memorial Bursary for 1999 has been awarded to The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and two Cadets will shortly visit the Peninsula. They will make a presentation to Members and guests on 9 June at Sandhurst. Full details and to reserve a place see the enclosed booking form.

AUTUMN LUNCH

The Autumn Lunch and Annual General Meeting will take place on 14 October at The Naval Club, Hill Street, London. Full details in the Autumn *Gallipolian*.

OBITUARIES

JACK BUNTINE MM

Jack Buntine, born in Melbourne in 1895 died there on 14 December, 1998, aged 103. His early life was awful, his mother died when he was nine, his drunken father beat him, then sold his son, aged just ten to some German market gardeners. When his foster mother began to beat him Jack escaped to the bush and lived with Aborigines. One, Percy Pepper, treated him as a son, and Jack subsequently helped in a blacksmith's shop, labelling bottles in a brewery, as a painter, sheep drover and boundary rider.

At the outbreak of war he joined up, later recalling that he did so "for a bit of fun and I heard you could get a square meal. I was a good shot too, and could knock a jam tin off a fence post at 100 yards, so I reckoned I could help out." He sailed for Egypt with the 8th Light Horse, though after a spell on Gallipoli as a sniper was invalided to England with enteric fever. Recovering from this he was assigned as a batman. Frustrated at the lack of action he tipped soup down an officers neck and was promptly banished to the Western Front, here he drove trucks loaded with ammunition to the front, bringing wounded soldiers back. During the great battles of August 1918 Jack Buntine won the Military Medal "for conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty at Morcourt delivering stores and rescuing men under continuous fire."



Returning to Australia he worked as a trapper, shooter and gold miner. After the death of his first wife aged just 31, and with two little girls to care for, he took up regular employment driving maintenance trucks for the Post and Telegraph Department. Subsequently he married Jean Findlay, who survives him after 61 years, together with his six children, 19 grandchildren and 22 great grandchildren.

FRED KELLY

Fred Kelly who landed at Gallipoli in October 1915, died in Sydney, on Boxing Day 1998, a few days short of his 102nd birthday. He was a clerk with a food and milk company when war broke out and joined the 53rd Battalion to look after his brother Jim, who by devious means had managed to enlist aged just 16. Their father, not surprisingly, drew the line when a younger brother Mick, aged 14, tried to join them.

The brothers sailed for Egypt where both were taken ill, Jim with enteric fever, Fred with dysentery which delayed his arrival on the Peninsula until October. Here he operated a machine-gun, later describing his time on the Peninsula as a picnic, this in comparison to those who had fought there during the bitter fighting of the earlier months. Later he served on the Western Front, including the the actions at Fromelles in July 1916 and at Villers-Bretonneux in 1918 where he was wounded, and as a machine gun instructor.



On leaving the Army he opted for the quiet life, vowing never to travel overseas or take a flight, and worked for Nestle in Sydney, eventually as company accountant, until retirement after 40 years. He married Nina Carless and they had seven children, including a son, John, who was shot by the Japanese in New Guinea. His wife died in 1971, while five children, seven grandchildren and eight great-grand children survive him.

Fred Kelly was a private person, a man of few words who, determined to put the war behind him, never marched on Anzac Day, and rarely appeared in public until he was awarded the French Legion of Honour on Bastille Day, 1998, at Sydney's La Perouse, an event he described as "A lovely day."

We are grateful to Mrs Sharp Paul (1266) and James Orton (847) for providing copies of Obituaries published in Australia of the two Veterans. Additional information from *The Last Anzacs* by Tony Stephens, photographs by Steven Siewert, Sydney 1996.

GALLIPOLI CONCERT

The Royal Marines Association (Nottingham Branch) have arranged a Charity Concert by the Band of Her Majesty's Royal Marines – the Walter Parker VC Charity Concert for the evening of Saturday 24 April, at Mansfield Leisure Centre, commencing at 1930. The Charities that will benefit are the Sargent Cancer Fund for Children and the Royal Marines Museum Heritage Appeal.

Tickets £8.50, cheques to RMA (Nottingham) Concert Fund, from Fred Thompson, 15 Northern View, Sutton-in-Ashfield, Nottinghamshire, NG17 2AQ. See also the Gallipoli Day arrangements for Stapleford, page 9 where wreaths will be laid at the grave of Walter Parker VC.

ANZAC BALL

The Management & Staff at *TNT Magazine* cordially invite members to their 11th Annual Anzac Ball which this year will take place at the Savoy Hotel, 24 April. This prestigious event commences with a champagne reception at 1900 followed by a sumptuous dinner after which there is dancing to the small hours with carriages at 0200. Tickets circa £70.00, full details from TNT Events 0171 3733377.

ROSEMARY FOR REMEMBRANCE

Each year an increasing number of those attending at the Cenotaph and other ceremonies wear a sprig of Rosemary.

“There’s rosemary, that’s for remembrance; pray, love, remember:”

Thus, the words of Ophelia to the King and Queen of Denmark and Laertes, son of the Lord Chamberlain, in Hamlet, Act 4, Scene 5:

Will more Members and friends wear Rosemary this year?

EDINBURGH CASTLE FRIDAY 23 APRIL

A wreath will be laid on behalf of the Gallipoli Association at the Service at 1200 on Friday 23 April (**note date**) at the Scottish National War Memorial, Edinburgh Castle. Further information on this impressive ceremony from Deidre Barclay, The Earl Haig Fund Scotland, New Haig House, Logie Green Road, Edinburgh, EH7 4HR. 0131 557 5819.

GALLIPOLI DAY CEREMONIES SUNDAY 25 APRIL, LONDON


BATTERSEA PARK

Members of the Association are invited to attend the Dawn Service and wreath laying at the RAAF Remembrance Stone in Battersea Park at 0500 for 0515. The Memorial is situated just off the North Carriage Drive, not far from the Park Restaurant which will be open for early breakfast. Some 800 people, including hopefully a few early morning Gallipoli Association members, will be in attendance.

ST PAUL’S CATHEDRAL

A short Service and Wreath Laying arranged by the Association will take place at the Gallipoli Memorial in the crypt at 0900 for 0915. This is attended by high ranking officials from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and France. Members are particularly encouraged to join with the increasing number who give their support before moving to the Cenotaph.

Close by the Gallipoli memorial are memorials to General Sir Ian Hamilton, and Lieutenant General The Lord Freyberg VC, while in the Cathedral nave is a memorial to another veteran of the campaign, Field Marshal Lord Slim.



THE CENOTAPH

A wreath will be laid at the Cenotaph on behalf of the Association. Members and guests should assemble at the entrance to King Charles Street, which is just to the south of the Cenotaph, by 1025. Members are encouraged to join with us to march to the Cenotaph, Major Hugh Jenner will act as Marshal. Medals should be worn at the Cenotaph and at the Abbey.

THE ABBEY

Once again we have been invited to join the Anzacs at Westminster Abbey. Please complete the enclosed booking form. Tickets will be handed out by the Secretary at the entrance to King Charles Street before the Cenotaph wreath laying and at the Abbey door prior to the Service. Members should be seated by 1140 for the Service which commences at 1200. Please ensure that on arrival you are directed by the usher to the seats reserved for the Association in the North or South Transept.

GALLIPOLI DAY LUNCH

The Gallipoli Day Lunch, commencing at 1315 for 1345, will be held in the Union Jack Club, Sandell Street, beside Waterloo Station. Anzac biscuits will be available prior to Lunch. A separate booking form with costs is included with *The Gallipolian*. There is no parking at the Club, though being a Sunday, on street parking should be

possible in the side streets to the east and south and near the Old & New Vic Theatres.

Members and guests booked for the Lunch may use the Club facilities throughout the morning, providing means of identity on their arrival.

OTHER GALLIPOLI DAY CEREMONIES

This year we are able to provide details of even more ceremonies on Gallipoli Day. Hopefully Members will make every effort to attend these, not forgetting to wear their Gallipoli tie. Reports and photographs will as always be welcomed by the Editor.

SUNDAY 25 APRIL 1999

BROCKENHURST

The Service at the New Zealand Memorial, St Nicholas's Churchyard will commence at 1500 when Colonel Peter Sweet whose father served with the Australian Forces at Gallipoli will lay a wreath on behalf of the Gallipoli Association. A special feature of the service is the participation of local Youth Organisations who will assemble from 1430. Tea will be available.

BURY

The Gallipoli Sunday Commemoration Service will commence at 1040 when the Parade will form up at the Drill Hall before marching to the Church for the service at 1130. Wreaths will be laid at the War Memorial at 1240 followed by a March Past. There will then be a reception and buffet lunch in the Ballroom of the Castle Armoury.

CAMBRIDGE

A Commemoration Service will take place in the Church of St Andrew the Great, St Andrew's Road, Cambridge at 1430 to which the Cambridge Branch of the British Australia Society extend a warm welcome to members of the Gallipoli Association. The Church contains a memorial to Captain James Cook placed here by his wife, who, together with their two sons, is buried here. Tea is served following the Service. A multi-storey car park is very near the Church through the Lion Yard shopping area.

CANNOCK CHASE

The Anzac Commemoration Service will be held in the British War Cemetery, Brocton, Cannock Chase at 1030 for 1100. This is the largest service outside Australia and New Zealand, regularly attended by up to 3,000 people with about 150 Standards from all over the country being paraded.

CHEPSTOW

In a Service arranged by The Royal Naval Association wreaths will be laid at 1100 on the memorial gun in the centre of Chepstow to Seaman Williams VC who fell at V Beach on 25 April.

CHILWORTH

Members and friends are invited to attend the laying of a wreath at 1600 on the grave of Lieutenant General Lord Freyberg VC, GCMG, KCB, KBE, DSO at St Martha's on the Hill. The Church stands alone on the North Downs above Chilworth near Guildford and is clearly marked on the Ordnance Survey 1:50,000 map. Reg Miles, President of the Guildford Branch of the Royal British Legion, on 01252 715191, will be pleased to provide access details to anyone wishing to attend.

DALLACHY STRIKE WING

A wreath laying ceremony will take place at the Dallachy Strike Wing Memorial, Bognoor, Morayshire. This is situated in Bognoor beside the B9104 running south from Spey Bay to Fochabers. Information from Derek Smith (1112) 01340 820920.

HAREFIELD

A moving ceremony will take place at 1500 at Harefield Parish Church located between Northwood and Uxbridge, immediately north of the M40 and west of the M25 (junction 17). The service leads to a wreath-laying when children will lay posies of flowers at the graves of the Australian servicemen buried here, and concludes with refreshments in the Church Hall.

LEIGHTERTON

The Parade will form up at the School at 1430 and march to the Cemetery for the Service which will commence at 1500. The Parade returns via a saluting base at the Royal Oak public house where the salute will be taken by Colonel D. Lowsley-Williams TD, JP, DL representing the Lord Lieutenant for Gloucestershire. Twenty-five Australian and New Zealand airmen died while training at Leighterton, a village just off the A46 about ten miles south of Stroud, Gloucestershire.

LONG STRATTON

This year the Anzac Day Service arranged by the Norfolk Section of the British Australia Society will take place at 1500 in the Church of St Mary, Long Stratton, a village on the A140 about 10 miles south of Norwich. St Mary's is one of the enchanting round tower flint churches found only in East Norfolk and is famous for its bells. The Service will be followed by tea and Anzac biscuits.

ST ALBANS

The cemetery in Hatfield Road, St Albans contains over 200 war graves. After gathering at the entrance at 1445 there will be a march to the cemetery war memorial

for a short service and wreath laying at 1500. Tea will then be available at the lodge. Parking is usually available near the cemetery.

SHAFTESBURY

The President of the Shaftesbury Branch, Royal British Legion, will hold a short memorial service at the War Memorial Park Walk, Shaftesbury at 1500 when a wreath will be laid on behalf of the Gallipoli Association.

STAPLEFORD

A service organised by the Royal Marines Association will take place at Stapleford Parish Church, Nottingham, commencing at 1130, followed by the laying of wreaths at the grave of Walter Parker VC. See also the note on page 4 concerning a Concert the previous evening.

SUTTON VENY

A Service of Commemoration of Anzac Day will take place at 1500 in the Church of St John the Evangelist, Sutton Veny near Warminster. This Service has been held each year since 1919.

A special service for the children of the village will commence at 1000 when they lay posies of flowers on the graves of the 143 Australian servicemen and nurses who are buried in the churchyard.

WALTON ON THAMES

An Anzac Day Service arranged by the Royal British Legion, Walton and Weybridge Branch will take place in St Mary's Parish Church, Church Street commencing at 1830. A Service has been held here since 1920 to remember some 27,000 wounded soldiers from New Zealand who were treated here at the Mount Felix Hospital.

GALLIPOLI MEMORIAL LECTURE

The 1999 Gallipoli Memorial Lecture will be given in Holy Trinity Church, Southend Crescent, Eltham, SE9 on Wednesday 21 April by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald. He is the first career Naval officer to give a lecture in this series. His theme will be Gallipoli – A View from the Seaward.

The Lecture, which is followed by a short Service with a collection, and a Buffet Supper, is restricted to ticket holders. Requests for tickets, which are free, must be made to Wing Commander J.V.Towey, OBE, 242 Avery Hill Road, Eltham, London, SE9 2JL. 0181 859 2952.

MAJOR-GENERAL'S REVIEW

We have been able to obtain tickets for the Major-General's Review on Saturday 31 May. The Review is a full dress rehearsal for Trooping the Colour and is always well attended. To reserve a place see the enclosed booking form.

COLLINGWOOD DAY

The Annual Service at the Collingwood Memorial on the Downs just east of Pimperne, will take place on Friday 4 June at 1500. Members and friends wishing to attend should meet from noon onwards at the Anvil Hotel, Pimperne, for introductions. Further information from Roy Adam, Camveere House, Portman Road, Pimperne, Blandford, DT11 7DG. 01258 453797.

MANCHESTER REGIMENT GALLIPOLI DINNER

The Manchester Regiment Gallipoli Dinner will take place in the Drill Hall, Ardwick Green, Manchester at 1930 on Saturday 5 June. Further details from the Regimental Secretary, The King's Regiment, Ardwick Green, Manchester, M12 6HD.

MANCHESTER REGIMENT GALLIPOLI PARADE

Seven Battalions of the Manchester Regiment were involved at Gallipoli and on Sunday 6 June there will be a Parade at the 8th Manchesters War Memorial, Ardwick Green, Manchester, commencing at 1200. All are welcome at the Parade and the following social get-together.

DO YOU REQUIRE ASSISTANCE?

Do you have a problem with your Gallipoli studies? Have you come to what seems like a dead-end? Michael Hickey author of *Gallipoli* see page 23, is prepared to assist members with their investigations into the activities of individuals, ships or units during the campaign. Whilst he may be unable to produce comprehensive answers he will endeavour to point the correspondent in the right direction for further investigations. Applications, accompanied by an s.a.e. to Michael Hickey, Pipersmead, Springvale Avenue, Kings Worthy, Winchester, SO23 7LH.

ANZAC BLUFF – PERTH

LEN CHANDLER (1210)

Set high above the Swan River in Kings Park, Perth, is the impressive War Memorial to those from Western Australia who laid down their lives in two world wars. All campaigns are mentioned, particularly Gallipoli 1915. Because of the similar landscape to the location of the landing on 25 April the site has long been known as Anzac Bluff.



A small plaque, in the shape of the famous Australian Imperial Forces cap badge, seen here with the Swan River in the background, contains the words:

ANZAC BLUFF

This Bluff below the State War Memorial is dedicated to the men of Anzac who fought and died in the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915.

It resembles Ari Burnu where Anzacs stormed the beaches, fought upward and shared grievous losses with a valiant foe.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES

A Request: Information on place names, street and road names and similar, for there must be many, hopefully with a photograph, will be welcomed by the Editor for inclusion in future *Gallipolians*.

GALLIPOLI MEMORIALS IN THE UNION JACK CLUB

Members who are attending the Gallipoli Day Lunch at the Union Jack Club may like to spend a few minutes in the reading rooms the Lawrence (after T.E. Lawrence) and the Scott (after Captain Robert Falcon Scott) Rooms situated beyond the bar. On the walls of both rooms are numerous small brass memorial shields which were originally on the bedroom doors of the original Club before its modernisation. After spending many years in store they are now set out here, though on some the inscription is barely legible, the cleaners must have worked really hard.

Among this fascinating array are several with a Gallipoli connection.


In the Lawrence Room:


Anstice, John Spencer Ruscombe. Lieutenant 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers kia 2 May 1915. Mentioned in Despatches. (Redoubt Cemetery.)

Cunliffe, T.H.W. Captain 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers kia 4 June 1915. (Lancashire Landing Cemetery.)

Ferguson-Davie, Herbert George. Second Lieutenant Portsmouth Battalion RMLI kia 1 May 1915. (Commemorated on the Helles Memorial.)

Fowle, Louis Richard. Captain 14th King George's Own Ferozepore Sikhs Mentioned in Despatches. kia 4 June 1915. (Commemorated on the Helles Memorial.)





Leslie, Frank King. Captain 2 Battalion Royal Fusiliers kia 25 April 1915 in the first charge at Gallipoli. (Commemorated on the Helles Memorial.)

Lowe, William Andrew. Lance Sergeant 1/6 Manchester Regiment kia 5 June 1915. (Commemorated on the Helles Memorial.)

Luard, Frank. Colonel Portsmouth Battalion RMLI kia 13 July 1915. (Skew Bridge Cemetery.) The shield also refers to his "friend and servant Pte Percy Rolfe" who fell on the same day. (Commemorated on the Helles Memorial.)

Russell, James Forteath. Lieutenant 10th Gurkha Rifles kia 2 July 1915. (Commemorated on the Helles Memorial.)

Simpson, Henry Gordon. Second Lieutenant 9th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry attached 1st Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers kia "before Achi Baba" 6 June 1915 aged 18. Mentioned in Despatches. (Commemorated on the Helles Memorial.)

Tisdall, Arthur Walderne St Clair VC. Sub-Lieutenant Anson Battalion Royal Naval Division kia 6 May 1915. (Commemorated on the Helles Memorial). This plaque includes his brother killed in France 8 August 1916.

In the Scott Room:


Lockhart, Gerald. Lieutenant 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment kia 10 August 1915. (Commemorated on the Helles Memorial.)

HRH THE DUKE OF YORK VISITS GALLIPOLI


COMMANDER CHARLOTTE MANLEY OBE COMPTROLLER AND ASSISTANT PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE DUKE OF YORK

Last autumn His Royal Highness The Duke of York visited Turkey for the 75th anniversary celebrations of the Turkish Republic. The first day was spent undertaking a number of engagements in Ankara as a guest of the President of Turkey. On the second day, 30 October, His Royal Highness visited Gallipoli.

He laid four wreaths, at the Turkish (Mehmeteik Abidesi), Cape Helles, Chunuk Bair and Lone Pine Memorials, and also walked the beach at Anzac Cove. The British Defence Attache, Brigadier Tony Twiss, was his guide and the party included the British Ambassador, Mr David Logan and John Price of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. His Royal Highness wore the uniform of Colonel in Chief of The Royal Irish Regiment for the visit though the uniforms of two other regiments of which he is Colonel in Chief, The Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's) and The Royal New Zealand Army Logistic Regiment would have been equally apt as forerunners of all three regiments had played their part in the events on the Peninsula in 1915.



*HRH The Duke of York laying his wreath at the memorial at Cape Helles.
Mrs John Price.*



*HRH The Duke of York at the memorial to Mustafa Kemal.
Commander Charlotte Manley OBE.*

HEIRS TO ACHILLES THE POETS OF GALLIPOLI

DAVID CHILDS (1163)

“If I die, think only this of me,
That there’s some corner of a foreign field
That is for ever England...”

Eighty four years ago, on 23 April 1915, Rupert Brooke, the writer of those famous lines, died and was buried on the island of Skyros, two days before the bloody nine month conflict that would leave nearly 50,000 British, Commonwealth and French servicemen for ever beneath the foreign fields of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The horrors of the Western Front were soon to pale the sentiments expressed so sanguinely by Brooke, but his death on the eve of a battle that was to be fought in an area so redolent with legend and history would contribute to the undying belief that Gallipoli was a campaign apart.

On the passage towards Gallipoli Brooke wrote a fragment that appears in few anthologies but sums up the influence on his mind of the classical age towards whose most famous battlefield his ship was carrying him;

‘They say Achilles in the darkness stirred,
And ... Hector, his old enemy
Moved the great shade that were his limbs,
They heard
More than Olympus thunder on the sea
Death and Sleep
Bear many young Sarpedon home.
And Priam and his fifty sons
Wake all amazed, and hear the guns,
And shake for Troy again.’¹

For Rupert Brooke, and many an ex-public school subaltern, the idea of fighting the Turks near the fields of Troy combined legendary romance with Christian crusading chivalry; it was an appeal that poets and generals found heady and irresistible. Brooke wrote in his diary, after he discovered his unit’s destination;

“... it’s too wonderful to believe ... I had not imagined fate could be so kind ... will Hero’s Tower crumble under the 15-inch guns? Will the sea be polyphloisbic and wine dark and unvintageable? shall I loot mosaics from Sancta Sophia, and Turkish delight and carpets? Shall we be a turning Point in History? Oh, God! I’ve never been quite so happy in my

life, I think. Never so pervasively happy; like a stream flowing entirely to one end. I suddenly realise that the ambition of my life has been since I was two to go on a military expedition against Constantinople."²



Statue of Rupert Brooke in Rugby. David Saunders

A graphic example of the poet as philistine. Nevertheless, these were understandable sentiments for a poet steeped in the Iliad and the romantic works of Byron who died on a similar mission against the Turks also before going into action. They were deeply engrained sentiments as well. Even those who, unlike Brooke, were to experience the horror of war drew their inspiration from Homer's tales. Nowell Oxland, killed at Suvla 9 August 1915, wrote of the passage to Gallipoli;

Though the high Gods smite and slay us,
 Though we come not whence we go,
 As the host of Menelaus
 Came there many years ago;
 Yet the self-same wind shall bear us
 From the same departing place
 Out across the Gulf of Saros,
 And the peaks of Samothrace.³

This ability to draw from the classics is unique to this campaign. Ask most people to quote from or name a first world war poet and they speak of Owen and Sassoon men who were fighting in the unromantic cabbage fields of Flanders a land without legend or inspiring landmark. The result is a poetry made all the more depressing in that it can only draw on immediate experience and that the most futile and sordid. Apart from the ironic title '*Dul ce et decorum est, pro patria mori*' there is little of the past in the Western Front. But Gallipoli was different.

And it was not just the poets in the junior ranks who found inspiration from their Classics. General Sir Ian Hamilton, the allied Commander-in-Chief, himself a poet-philosopher, wrote in his diary for 18 March on which day he first cast his eye over the area in which he was to wield his indecisive command;

Passing the mouth of the Dardanelles we got a wonderful view of the stage where on the Great Showman has caused so many of his amusing puppets to strut their tiny hour. For the purpose it stands matchless. No other panorama can touch it. There, Hero trimmed her little lamp; yonder the amorous breath of Leander changed to soft sea form. Far away to the Eastwards, painted in dim and lovely hues, lies Mount Ida. Just so, on the far horizon line she lay fair and still, when Hector fell and smoke from burning Troy blackened the midday sun. Against this enchanted background to deeds done by immortals and mortals as they struggled for ten long years five thousand years ago stands forth formidably the Peninsula. Glowing with bright, springtime colours it sweeps upward from the sea like the glacis of a giant's fortress.⁴

One notes the ominous reference to "ten long years"; perhaps it was the knowledge that Troy eventually fell that provided the source for Hamilton's extraordinary and misguided optimism in the face of frequent reversals as the allies tried in vain to seize that giant's fortress.

A sometime poet on General Hamilton's staff but with no classical illusions was Jack Churchill, who wrote of the difficulties experienced at one particular part of the landing;

"Y Beach, the Scottish Borderers cried,
While toiling up the steep hill side,
To call this thing a beach is stiff,
It's nothing but a bloody cliff:
Y Beach?⁵

One can assume that this comment in a letter home was seen by Jack's brother Winston, whose brain child the expedition was.

Elsewhere, the high command had resorted to a classical ploy to try and disguise and protect the troops that were to be landed beneath the well-defended amphitheatre of cliffs at 'V' Beach. The majority of troops were embarked in a seaborne Trojan Horse, the SS *River Clyde*, which was to be grounded off the beachhead to enable her troops to disgorge through sally ports cut in her side. It was not a success. Unlike Odysseus's cunning plan Hamilton's wooden horse was brought into the enemy camp at daylight below well-warned and prepared defenders. These latter day Greeks were met by a deadly hail of fire.

It is sometimes forgotten that the Gallipoli campaign was conceived originally as a naval operation to force a passage through the Straits and to take Constantinople, thereby forcing Turkey out of the war and opening a supply route to Russia. It was only when the allies, having lost three battleships on a line of previously undetected mines, had failed to penetrate the Narrows and decided not to continue with their attack that the army was forced to land. Hamilton witnessed the naval defeat of 18 March and recorded his feelings in his diary;

The world had gone mad; common sense was only moonshine after all; the elephant and the whale of Bismarckian parable were at it tooth and nail! Shells of all sizes flew hissing through the skies. Before my very eyes, the graves of these old gods whom Christ had risen from the dead to destroy were shaking to the shock of Messrs Armstrong's patent thunderbolts. ... On the deck of that battleship staggering along at a stone's throw was a vindication of war itself. Ten thousand years of peace would fail to produce a spectacle of so great a virtue. Where, in peace, passengers have also shown high constancy, it is because war and martial discipline have lent them its standards. Once in a generation a mysterious wish for war passes through the people. Their instinct tells them. ... There is no other way of progress and of escape from habits that no longer fit them...there is no other way. Only by intense sufferings can the nations grow, just as a snake once a year must with anguish slough off the once beautiful coat which has now become a strait-jacket.⁴

This idea of catharsis was echoed, not only by Hamilton, and in the manner of Brooke's death, but was experienced by those who laid the poet to rest. They felt that they were playing out some ancient Greek myth which somehow made the idea of war pure once more. To many, going to war with a copy of *The Iliad* in their back pocket, Brooke's death recalled not only the death of Byron but also the sacrifice of Iphigeneia by Agammemnon, before the voyage to Troy. Brooke's verse, and the use made of it by Dean Inge at Saint Paul's, was used to illustrate the Christian idea of being woken from sleep to the spiritual life; the unstained young man, the noblest and the best, becoming both priest and victim in a war that cleansed the national guilt. It is almost as if his death was a harbinger of success. Winston Churchill who, as has been stated, had good reason to make acceptable all the news that came out of Gallipoli wrote of Brooke's death;

'Joyous, fearless, versatile, . . . with classic symmetry of mind and body, he was all that one would wish England's noblest sons to be in days when no sacrifice but the most precious is acceptable, and the most precious is that which is most freely proffered.'

However, it did not take long for those who had volunteered to discover what a ghastly, disorganised mess they had freely entered. A P Herbert, who had to walk over the decomposing dead while organising a temporary cease fire found reality almost too much to bear;

'The flies! Oh, God, the flies
That soiled the sacred dead.
To see them swarm from dead men's eyes
And share the soldiers' bread.
Nor think I now forget
The filth and stench of war,
The corpses on the parapet'
The maggots on the floor.'⁶

which is a poem far closer to the disillusioned verse that was starting to be written from the equally horrific trenches of the Western Front. De Sola Pinto who landed at Suvla in 1915 is closer to Owen than the classicists in his poem 'Ginger';

'Strong as a little 'orse,' the sergeant said,
' 'E never got no dysentery,' and now
The sniper's got him, see him lying dead,
Down in the trench, and blood upon his brow.
Dumb-souled, dull-witted, heavy as the sod,
An ignorant farm-labourer; for shame!
Off with your hats, you worldlings, to this clod;
He played the game.

Yet the power of Homer retained a hold on the writers of Gallipoli. Compton Mackenzie, taking shelter from the shells that sounded like “attenuated Aeolian harps” was to write of the Australian troops that he saw;

‘Their splendid appearance really was heroic and should have been celebrated in hexameters, not headlines. As a child I used to pore for hours over the illustrations of Flaxman for Homer and Virgil which simulated the effect of ancient poetry. There was not one of those glorious young men who might not himself have been Ajax or Diomedes, Achilles or Hector.’

But there was one vital difference: Homer’s heroes were the leaders of the troops, the heroes of Gallipoli were the junior officers and other ranks who brought to the many disasters conjured up by their superiors proof that for all the misery, the mayhem and betrayal, men could still show that an eternal heroic flame burned inside them. Men like Lieutenant Tubb who, revolver in hand, defied the fierce Turkish counter attack at Lone Pine, supported by troops who caught the enemy’s grenades in their bare hands and threw them back until their hands were blown off or their faces destroyed.

The legend kept hold. In one of the most evocative poems to emerge from the Dardanelles campaign, Patrick Shaw-Stewart, who had commanded the guard of honour at the burial of Rupert Brooke and was to die himself on the Western Front, recalled his reluctance to return from a three day break on Lemnos;

‘O hell of ships and cities,
Hell of men like me,
Fatal second Helen,
Why must I follow thee?
Achilles came to Troyland
And I to Chersonese:
He turned from wrath to battle,
And I from three days’ peace.

Was it so hard Achilles
So very hard to die
Thou knowest, and I know not,
So much the happier I.

I will go back this morning
From Imbros, over the sea;
Stand in the trench, Achilles
Flame-capped, and shout for me.³

Those last two stanzas must be considered as amongst the best war poetry ever written.

Yet bravery was not enough and, of course, the Turks, like the Trojans, were brave and stubborn as well. Many placed the blame for failure squarely upon Hamilton and his generals but to some, such as Masfield, the future Poet Laureate, the Commander-in-Chief epitomised the tragic heroes of old. Masfield considered that the Dardanelles campaign would be regarded as, 'the second grand event of the war; the first was Belgium's answer to the German ultimatum'. He likened the British Division to Charlemagne's army at Roncevaux with Roland, blowing his trumpet to summon reinforcements in vain, a forerunner of Sir Ian who made similar urgent and ungranted requests to the War Office by telegram.

In his poem '*Gallipoli 1915*' Masfield summed up this tragedy of what might have been in a poem that has echoes from both the classical stage and Shakespeare;

'Even so was wisdom proven blind;
So courage failed, so strength was chained.
Even so the gods, whose seeing mind
Is not as ours, ordained.'

The most, perhaps the only, successful part of the Allied campaign was the withdrawal, carried out in total secrecy and without a single life being lost. The final boat drew away shortly before dawn, and just before explosive charges would destroy the stores that had to be abandoned. It was a close run thing because Maude, the Brigadier in charge, mislaid his valise and refused to leave the beach until he found it. A campaign whose poets had echoed classical verse ended with a parody of a more modern poet penned by one of that last boat's crew;

'Come into the lighter, Maude,
For the fuses all are lit,
Come into the lighter, Maude,
and forget your ruddy kit.'⁷

And so they left a world of slaughter behind them and, perhaps a legend to be told and retold that would in future years take its place alongside that recounted by Homer. Maybe, in years to come, men with more prosaic names than Hector and Achilles, men like Tubb V.C. and Simpson (or Kirkpatrick) will become the stuff of legends. At present the one name that assumes a godlike eminence is that of the young poet who was struck down before the battle even began.

Notes:

1. Rupert Brooke '*The Poetical Works*' ed. Geoffrey Keynes 1946, Faber & Faber, ISBN 0 571 047041
2. Letter to Violet Asquith, quoted in '*Rupert Brooke: a Biography*' – Christopher Hassall, Faber & Faber 1964, ISBN 0 571 101968
3. '*The War Poets*', Jarrold 1992, ISBN 0 7117 0398-1

4. '*Gallipoli Diaries*' Sir Ian Hamilton, Arnold, 1920
5. Quoted in '*Gallipoli*', Robert Rhodes James, Pan, 1984, ISBN 0 330 23863-9
6. '*Half hours at Helles*', Blackwell, 1916
7. Quoted in Lieutenant Colonel L H Leeson, memoirs, Imperial War Museum Documents

GALLIPOLI OFFER

Signed copies of Michael Hickey's book *Gallipoli* now out in softback from John Murray Publishers Ltd at £15.99, are available direct from the author at £12 plus £2.00 P&P. Orders, together with a cheque or money order for £14.00 should be sent to Michael Hickey at Pipersmead, Springvale Avenue, Kings Worthy, Winchester, SO23 7LH.

Some critical appraisals of the book: "Excellent" – *Daily Telegraph*, "Solid, soldierly and humane" – *Independent*; "Lucid, vivid and highly readable" – *Royal United Services Institute Journal*.

MILITARY STUDIES AT CHESTER

In a unique partnership the Cheshire Military Museum and University College, Chester, a College of the University of Liverpool, have joined together to offer a Master of Arts Degree in Military Studies. The academic programme will be largely taught at the Military Museum which is housed in a Grade 1 listed building and represents four regiments which have recruited in the old county of Cheshire. The Museum has a fine archive which includes much Gallipoli material. Further information from The Cheshire Military Museum, The Castle, Chester, CH1 2DN. 01224 341088.

IS ANYONE HOLIDAYING IN SPAIN?

A fine book *The Battle Cruisers at the Action of the Falkland Islands* by Commander Rudolf Verner RN of HMS *Inflexible* was published posthumously in 1920 by the author's father. One of the illustrations is of a memorial window to Rudolf Verner, in the English Church, Algeciras, Spain, which includes the words "who fell gloriously 18 March 1915 in the fore-control of HM Battle-cruiser *Infexible* directing the guns in the attack on the Dardanelles."

If anyone is visiting Algeciras the Editor would be pleased to receive a photograph of the window, and any other naval and military memorials in the church.

FISHER AND CHURCHILL

HOW FAR DID THEIR STORMY RELATIONSHIP CONTRIBUTE TO THE FAILURE OF THE ASSAULT ON THE DARDANELLES?

CHERRY PARKER

INTRODUCTION

My history class at Hills Road Sixth Form College, Cambridge, was offered the opportunity to visit the Churchill Archives at Churchill College, Cambridge in February 1997. The visit encouraged me to become more interested in Churchill's life and career while further reading of an article about how the disaster at Gallipoli threatened his career as a politician, led me to decide to investigate his involvement in Gallipoli for my personal study.

My first priority was to get a good over view of the Gallipoli disaster and a basic understanding of Churchill's involvement in it as First Lord of the Admiralty on the War Council. To obtain this, I used the CD ROM Encarta, (1997) and read Chapter 9 of *Churchill: A Major New Assessment of his Life in Peace and War*, edited by Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Lewis (1993). This described his involvement mainly initiating and single-mindedly pushing for the plan to send a naval force to the Dardanelles and therefore stage a surprise attack on the Turkish forces. As a source to provide a general picture of the events that occurred, Encarta proved very useful in giving dates and facts, but it went into very little detail and Churchill's name was only mentioned as one of four who devised the campaign. I therefore had to rely on the biography of Churchill to give more information about his participation. Again it provided a useful and reliable base for further research. From this I decided upon the question: "To what extent was the disaster at Gallipoli due to the instructions of Winston Churchill?"

I read Michael Hickey's *Gallipoli* (1995) as an overall introduction about the politics behind the planning and execution of the moves to take the Gallipoli peninsula. It revealed that although Churchill had ordered and initiated the Gallipoli campaign, he needed the promise from Lord Kitchener of troops to commit a successful land assault so as to allow the ships through. Kitchener would not commit the troops, but Churchill blundered on regardless. This drew my attention to the disagreements between the First Sea Lord, Jacky Fisher and Churchill which resulted in the resignation of Fisher in May of 1915 and then of Churchill soon after. I noted the arguments between them to be quite significant due to Churchill's single-mindedness for the campaign so I altered my research to look into their disagreements.

The library at the Churchill Archives had a large collection of papers of both Fisher and Churchill, as well as a good range of biographies about them. I studied a biography of *Churchill: The Rise to Failure* by Ted Morgan (1982), and one of Fisher: *Fisher's Face* by Jan Morris (1995). Each presented a similar, more detailed picture of the events. The authors, in places, did not treat their subject as objectively as they could have done. As is often the case with biographers, they seem to develop sympathy for their subject so as sources studying an argument, they need to be used with caution. An example of this is their presentation of each man when the arguments were frequent at the end of January 1915, during a War Council meeting. Morris portrays a sympathetic picture of Fisher at the time to be "old, worn out and nervous" justifying his frame of mind, whereas Morgan claims that Churchill did not want to lose Fisher and regarded his presence in the War Council to be indispensable, and "Though he [Churchill] disagreed with him [Fisher] on the Dardanelles, he respected his judgement", which justified Churchill's actions. I decided to concentrate my study on the arguments between Churchill and Fisher over the Gallipoli disaster and it led to the formulation of the question: "Who was more justified in their "argument" regarding the Gallipoli campaign; Churchill or Fisher?"

I decided that to answer the question effectively, I would need to find evidence for the arguments of both Churchill and Fisher. I began by reading a comprehensive biography of Fisher, written by Admiral Bacon, in 1929. It proved very useful in evaluating his role on the War Council during the early part of 1915 and provided some reasons for his actions at the time. It documented Fisher's career very thoroughly making numerous references to primary sources. He thought that one of the reasons for the disagreements was that when Churchill put forward his views at the War Council meetings, he was assumed to be putting forward the opinion of the entire Admiralty when in fact he was merely expressing his own opinion. Bacon, recognised this reason to be exemplified by the fact that Fisher saw himself to be in the War Council in purely advisory capacity rather than to state his objections and so did not contradict Churchill in public at the meetings. Bacon's reasoning was justified as he based it on evidence from the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry. This evidence was supported by Morris' who said that: "Churchill thought of Fisher essentially as a naval constructor, and more and more he began to act as though the disposition of the Royal Navy was his responsibility and his alone." Bacon, writing 15 years after the event did not have full access to all the relevant official papers, but he used considerable evidence from primary sources to back up his arguments so can be seen as a fairly reliable account of Fisher's actions.

The Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry in 1916 ensured members of the War Council and those involved in the decision making behind the operation had to produce reports and statements about their specific involvements. These documents are all stored at the Churchill Archives and I had full access to them. I began by looking at the statements of Churchill and Fisher, both accounting for their actions

and opinions during the planning and execution of the campaign. I mainly used the draft, and actual statements of Churchill as well as the statements of Fisher. The minutes of the War Council meetings from January to February 1915, and the Dardanelles Committee, June to October 1915, were useful in showing what was discussed besides Gallipoli. They helped to put the events in context with the others matters discussed at the meetings such as those in the Balkans. It also showed how Churchill often spoke in place of Fisher when the views of the Admiralty were called upon. These were very useful as they were written by those involved at the time and came straight from the people I was studying, but because the inquiry took place in 1916 need to be treated with some reservations as they had both had the benefit of hindsight to put the events into perspective. Public opinion was unfavourable to both men after their resignations, especially Churchill and so they tried to justify their actions and to sway the public opinion to see then more positively.

Martin Gilbert is renowned for his biography of Churchill, Volume III (1971) is the most relevant, as it covered the years from 1914 to 1916. He is very pro-Churchill although claimed to present a more balanced account of the events surrounding Gallipoli. He had access to an extensive range of sources; mostly documents from public and private archive collections, as well as an impressive bibliography of secondary sources. With this taken into consideration, I found his study very useful for the factual account of events, but his portrayal of Churchill was very biased and justified Churchill's actions rather than Fisher's so I was only presented with one side to the argument.

I went on to read the relevant chapters of Churchill's own history of the First World War *World Crisis* (1923). Again it was similar to his justifications in the Dardanelles Commission. Although it was written quite soon after the end of the war, he based it upon his private archive and upon his own recollections: his documents were incomplete and his memory incomplete, so the source was used with caution. He was unable to make full use of the full official records of the Cabinet Office, Admiralty, War Office and Foreign Office. Without them it is difficult to see how he could have presented a fully, balanced account. He wanted to present the account that justified his actions and would have an effect on the public opinion of him which was quite negative at that time.

I also read other biographies of Churchill and Fisher such as *First Sea Lord* by Richard Hough (1969), *Fisher of Kilverstone* by Rudock Mackay (1973) and *Churchill – The End of Glory* by John Charmley (1983), which only served to increase the depth of my knowledge about the arguments and provide other opinions about the events that occurred. They used the Dardanelles Commission and other primary sources in the same way to draw similar conclusions. I experienced similar problems with those biographies as I had with the ones by Morris and Morgan. An example of this is the opinions of the historians varied so much that it distorted what was fact in some places. An example of this is the reports of what was said at a private, unofficial

meeting between Churchill and Fisher after Fisher's outburst at the War Council meeting on 28 January 1915. Bacon, in his biography about Fisher, describes the conversation as "Churchill's silver tongue was able to persuade Lord Fisher with his appeals to patriotism and good comradeship". In contrast to this both Morgan and Gilbert, both biographers of Churchill, present the conversation as a discussion, the former described it as "heated" and the latter, "turbulent". This shows therefore that the biographers of Churchill presented the argument as a balanced discussion, with both men putting forward their point of view, whereas Bacon portrayed Churchill as manipulative. They were both quite different views of the same incident.

After noting each side to the arguments from each source, it led me to the conclusion that it would be very difficult to find enough evidence to support either argument of who was more justified because the sources provided so many different reasons for the arguments and it was very difficult to judge exactly what was justified.

I decided that whilst I wanted to consider the arguments amongst the War Council, it was very difficult to formulate a question to encompass all my research both about Churchill and Fisher and the Gallipoli disaster itself. The question I finally chose was "How far did the stormy relationship between Fisher and Churchill contribute to the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles?" This allowed me to look in detail at their disagreements between Fisher and Churchill that occurred because of the plan to take the Dardanelles, and its consequent effect on the campaign, such as if Fisher had been able to convince Churchill to continue the naval bombardment in March instead of waiting, then it may not have resulted in disaster.

By this point I thought that I had enough information about Fisher and Churchill and that I needed to focus my inquiries towards finding other reasons that contributed to the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles. For this I began by using *Gallipoli 1915: Frontal assault on Turkey* written by Philip Hawthornthwaite (1991) as part of the Osprey Military Campaign Series. He discussed different issues other than the political background, such as the use of ships deployed in the area as well as the efficiency of the Commanders of both the Navy and the Army. For a basic, overall picture this source was quite useful as it covered the facts and brought new ideas to my attention, but I then went on to look for more detailed sources.

The most perceptive and useful source I found for covering the events leading up to and including the Gallipoli disaster was Michael Hickey's book *Gallipoli* (1995). It was the most recently published source I used and so contained many new, original ideas often expanding on what I had read in Hawthornthwaite, such as the fact that not enough planning had gone into choosing the island bases for the troops to land on so conditions were made even worse for the soldiers because the living conditions on Lemnos were appalling. This was supported by evidence from Robert Rhodes-James' book *Gallipoli* (1965) who also considered the planning and organisation of the troops at the Dardanelles to be a major contributing factor to the failure of the

assault. He also had the theory that poorly trained and equipped troops was also another reason for the failure. This was backed up by Hickey who recognised a multitude of reasons connecting the total lack of organisation of the army and navy by both the War Council and commanding officers who were given very few instructions. Another source; *Gallipoli. The Fading Vision* by John North (1936) agreed with this and believed that "At the outset, the army in Gallipoli was fighting with less than a third of the recognised proportion of artillery".

I decided that I had enough material to start drawing my ideas together and plan the structure of my essay, following objectives of my A-level course which were to be marked as part of my final grade. I chose to concentrate on objectives (a) for knowledge and understanding and (d) for causation as my study involved looking at the causes of the failure of the assault on Gallipoli. Taking into account the nature of the question, my essay will begin by looking at the origins of the campaign with the reasons for staging an assault there, along with its aims and intentions. I want to begin by discussing how far the arguments between Churchill and Fisher did affect the Gallipoli campaign, and possibly who was more justified in their argument so that I can incorporate some of my earlier research. This will incorporate many different factors: The differences in personality between Churchill and Fisher and the positions of the two within the War Council. The disagreements between them over whether or not to send troops to the Dardanelles. The fact that Churchill ignored Fisher's warnings that the plan would lead to disaster if the naval attack was not supported by a land assault. Fisher's preoccupation with events in the Baltic and the North Sea.

The second part of my essay will look at how far the arguments of Fisher and Churchill did not lead to the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles, and so what other factors were involved. I will consider how the involvement of the War Council and its inadequate planning and preparation of the offensive led to its failure, such as the lack of co-ordination between the Army and the Navy. I will also consider how the living standards and lack of artillery and supplies for the troops also led to its failure. Finally I want to study the Turkish military operations and how the efficiency and order of the Turkish troops could also have led to the failure of the campaign. I will then draw conclusions as to the importance of each of the reasons within the essay as part of my overall conclusion in which I will analyse just how far the arguments between Fisher and Churchill led to the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles.

Carrying out this study has proved to be both interesting and informative. The Churchill Archives provided me with a huge range of different source material, both primary and secondary, that I found immensely interesting and there is much more that I would like to read and study. I would like to thank the archivists who were very patient and exceedingly helpful in showing me the relevant archival material and books that I needed.

THE STUDY

The disaster at Gallipoli can best be described as one of the tremendous “ifs” of history. There has been great criticism of those involved at all levels, but had the venture succeeded, its effect on the course of the war would have been immense. As Kitchener said to Hamilton “If the fleet gets through, Constantinople will fall of itself, and you will have won, not a battle, but the war” Hickey (1995).

The origins of a move to undertake an offensive against Turkey date from before the outbreak of war. The original plan was for the expedition to be undertaken by Greece, at that time in sympathy with the Allied Powers. King Constantine of Greece’s relation by marriage to the German Kaiser Wilhelm III meant that he had become increasingly pro-German and the Allied Powers no longer trusted him. The plan was resurrected by the War Council after a plea from Russia for help in distracting Turkish resources. A military success in Constantinople would have resulted in the severance of Turkey’s links with the Central Powers and consequent exit from the war. A seaway would have been opened through the Bosphorus enabling essential military supplies to reach the Russian armies, while wheat and oil from the Ukraine and Caucasus, could have been exported to the West. It was also thought that a decisive victory over Turkey and the occupation of Constantinople would prevent any likely Balkan alliances against the Allied Powers.


Churchill initially came up with the idea for an attack on the Dardanelles when the War Council held its first meeting on 25 November 1914. He argued that the best way to defend Egypt would be to threaten Turkey in a “decisive area” Rhodes James (1965). By December, all the members of the War Council were in agreement that the best way forward for the Allies would be to have war in France, but with the Central Powers occupied elsewhere so that the Allies would have the advantage. Maurice Hankey, who was the War Council’s secretary, proposed an attack on Turkey in his famously well-argued paper known as the “Boxing Day Memorandum.” This proposal was pushed by Churchill who requested Vice-Admiral Carden of the Naval War Office to draw up plans for the “forcing of the Dardanelles by ships alone” *Churchill Companion* (1972).

Carden produced a plan by 11 January 1915, to force the Dardanelles a month later.

- A Total reduction of defences at the entrance
- B Clear defences inside of Straits up to and including Kephez Point battery No. 8.
- C Reduction of defences at the Narrows Chanak.
- D Clear a passage through mine field advancing through Narrows reducing forts above narrows and final advance to Marmara. *Churchill Companion* (1972).

He gave the Navy the spotlight and satisfied Churchill’s longing to be on the offensive. A memorandum prepared by Prime Minister Asquith following a meeting of the War Council concluded that they “should prepare for a naval expedition in

February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective" Gilbert (1971).



Happier Days – Winston Churchill and Admiral Fisher leaving a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Press Association.

The arguments between Fisher and Churchill arose from these initial stages of planning. It is important to understand that the arguments become more complex as Fisher frequently changed his opinion as to whether or not he thought the attack would be a success. As was the case in many instances, he disagreed in principle, but thrived on the thrill of planning a naval attack. Their personalities played a major part in the disagreements. Fisher was an old Admiral by this time, who was noted by Captain Richmond as “old, worn-out and nervous” Morgan (1982) and also quite paranoid about the prospect of forcing the Dardanelles at the expense of other projects. Churchill on the other hand, was only forty, and very enthusiastic about the Dardanelles. He “was no longer the grateful pupil, but the overbearing boss” Morris (1995) of Fisher, which added to the difficulties. Churchill’s enthusiasm seemed very extreme, as he practically forced the War Council to adopt his proposals, although he knew that he had neither Fisher’s nor Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Arthur Wilson’s approval. It is generally believed by the public at large that had it not been for Churchill, the campaign would not have taken place at all, so this meant that when the campaign failed, public opinion turned decisively against him.

Throughout the planning and implementation stages of the whole campaign it was assumed by the War Council that Churchill spoke the opinion of the entire Admiralty. Fisher and Wilson were on the War Council to represent the Admiralty, but they both felt that they were there in a complete advisory capacity, to answer

technical questions and not to argue with the First Lord over policy in front of others. In many cases their silence was mistaken for their agreement of the proposals then under discussion. Churchill's dominant personality only served to worsen the problems for Fisher as he felt more and more isolated. "Mr Churchill had the whole naval operation at the Admiralty as well as at the Dardanelles with him, I was the only rebel" *Dardanelles Commission Report*.

An example of this can be seen at the War Council meeting of 28 January. Churchill and Fisher attended a private meeting with Asquith acting as arbitrator in order to settle the disagreements between the two. Asquith engineered a trade off: that Churchill would drop any further plans for the North Sea, specifically Zeebrugge, and that the Dardanelles campaign would go forward. This was immediately followed by a War Council meeting. Fisher had understood the question of the Dardanelles would not be raised, but Asquith brought up the subject, saying that "it could not well be left in abeyance" *Churchill Companion* (1972). Fisher rose to leave the meeting intending to resign from the Admiralty because he felt more and more betrayed, but Kitchener pointed out that he was the "only dissident" and that the Dardanelles operation had been decided on by the Prime Minister *Churchill Companion* (1972). Aside from Asquith, Churchill and Kitchener, none of the other members of the Council realised what had happened because Fisher's opposition had not been made public. The assault on the Dardanelles may not have gone ahead or would certainly have been given more thoughtful and careful planning if, at the War Council meetings in January, Fisher had stated his objections and not waited to be asked his opinion, therefore putting his views clearly on record.

One of the most important problems concerning the disagreements between Fisher and Churchill was over whether or not to send troops to the Dardanelles. At the beginning of January 1915, Fisher actually supported the plan and went as far to recommend that the Navy's newest superdreadnought the *Queen Elizabeth* should take part in the offensive, but by about 17 January he began to have "dark thoughts" Morgan (1982) about the campaign and disagreed with the proposals. He went on to insist that victory would only come about due to a combined operation between the army and navy, with at least 200,000 men supporting the navy on land, made up from using the troops of the Allies nearest the spot. Before Churchill took on the idea for an assault on the Dardanelles, "The policy of a joint naval and military attack upon the Dardanelles was under discussion during the later months of 1914, and was abandoned because the men for the military attack were not available", (Dardanelles Commission) which may have influenced Fisher's opinions. Richard Hough in *First Sea Lord* (1969) believes that "Churchill ignored Fisher's premise that the bombardment should be supported on land," because he was concerned with sending the Navy. Churchill believed by making it a purely naval operation would improve its reputation after the disaster of the *Audacious* sinking in October and other naval incidents during the early parts of the War. Churchill wanted to send his own special Royal Naval Division to the Dardanelles which he believed would hold the key to the success of the assault.

During the latter part of January and early February, Fisher began to have some influence over the various disputes and agreements made about whether or not troops were needed in Gallipoli. He also had the backing of influential men like Maurice Hankey, while at the Admiralty Captain Richmond and Sir Henry Jackson also thought that a land assault was essential. Churchill and Kitchener realised that there was sense in backing up a naval expedition with troops after the first offensive failed at the end of February. According to Ted Morgan, Churchill, in order to win Fisher over, promised to urge Kitchener to commit troops to the Dardanelles. By all means Churchill planned to ask Kitchener, but saw a greater need for troops to rescue Serbia and to occupy Salonika. Martin Gilbert contradicts this as he believed that Churchill did not choose the operation at the Dardanelles as a purely naval attack, and that he argued repeatedly that troops must assist the Navy. At the War Council meeting of 9 February, Kitchener finally gave the assurance that "if the Navy requires the assistance of the land forces at a later stage, that assistance will be forthcoming" Morgan (1982).

At this point the Dardanelles expedition changed dramatically from a purely naval action to one where the Army would land to follow up on the gains made by the Navy. Churchill consequently saw the advantage of sending troops, but also the advantage of agreeing with Fisher so as to prevent further arguments and have Fisher on side. This is also shown in the minutes of the War Council meeting of 19 February, which suggest that Churchill "did not ask for troops actually to be sent to the Dardanelles but only that they should be within hail" *Dardanelles Commission Report*. Whilst the arguments of Fisher and Churchill served to slow the planning down, this was in effect worsened by the inefficiency and unwillingness of Kitchener to commit his troops to the Dardanelles. Fisher's hopes of success rose and fell with Kitchener's fluctuating intentions to send troops, which helps explain his constant changes of heart. Churchill and Kitchener fought quite strongly over numbers of troops available. It was decided that the prestigious 29th Division would be sent to the Dardanelles under the command of General Sir Ian Hamilton, along with 30,000 Australian and New Zealand troops under the command of Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood.


Fisher was very concerned with mounting an attack in the Baltic and the North Sea, which may have meant that he did not give the operations at Gallipoli his full attention or as many resources as could have been possible if his mind was not occupied. He had always wanted to mount a diversionary attack in the Baltic where the effect on Germany would have been much more direct, and where it would also have the advantage of being within range of the Grand Fleet's massive support if anything went wrong. "The Baltic was my real purpose at the Admiralty, Mr. Churchill dropped it for the Dardanelles" *Dardanelles Commission Report*. According to Richard Hough (1969), "Fisher did not base his opposition strongly enough on the folly of bombarding forts from the sea for which he considered there were numerous precedents of failure, but on wishing to attack the Baltic rather than the

Dardanelles." He believes that instead of clinging to his Baltic plans, Fisher should have proposed his scheme widely and therefore it would have stood a better chance of being seriously considered.

Churchill was so preoccupied with the Dardanelles plan that he can also be criticised for not listening to ideas other than his own that he deemed worthy. It was also thought that the Dardanelles blinded the War Council, and especially Churchill, to opportunities of diversionary activities elsewhere. Great numbers of the special craft Fisher had built at record speed for his Baltic project were diverted by Churchill to the Mediterranean. As the attempts to take the Peninsula were failing, more aircraft, monitors, repair and auxiliary ships, destroyers, cruisers and battleships were demanded. Fisher's reluctance to deprive the Grand Fleet, whose margin of superiority over the High Seas Fleet was dangerously narrow, was met by the accusation that he was prepared to leave the Army in the lurch at the time of its greatest need. It was thought that the War Council finally came around to the idea that the operation could not succeed without a large force to land and take the forts.

On 28 March, Fisher heard from intelligence sources that Holland might shortly be invaded by Germany. This re-awoke his dreams of operations along the North Sea Coast. It also increased his concern for the Grand Fleet's ability to overwhelm the High Sea Fleet if the Germans were to attack Holland. After this, Fisher made it clear to Churchill that no more warships would be sent out to the Dardanelles as he wanted, not only the large dreadnoughts, but the host of escorts, light cruisers, destroyers and minesweepers for possible action in the North Sea: "A failure or check in the Dardanelles would be nothing – a failure in the North Sea would be RUIN" *Churchill Companion* (1972). The removal of the vital warships contributed to the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles as it left behind only the older, weaker ships making the offensive impossible. Fisher was also worried, for good reasons, about the threat of German and Austrian submarines that were positively identified in the eastern Mediterranean. The final crisis that developed between Churchill and Fisher began on 12 May, when the Navy still proving itself incapable of knocking out the Turkish guns and forcing the straits on its own suffered disaster when the battleship *Goliath* was sunk by torpedoes, with the loss of 570 lives. Fisher was concerned that the *Queen Elizabeth*, the Navy's newest, most powerful dreadnought, was in danger, and rather than risk her falling victim he ordered her home, therefore decreasing the Naval ability at the Dardanelles. Fisher reluctantly allowed it to be replaced by two older battleships also intended for the Baltic project.

The resignations of Fisher and then Churchill from their roles in the War Council, also may have contributed to the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles. The final catalyst for Fisher's resignation was the suggestion that the fleet could make another attempt at forcing the Narrows, using the more effective minesweeping equipment available. After removing the *Queen Elizabeth*, Fisher was reluctant and very against providing any more resources to the Dardanelles, he thought that it was "fraught



HMS Queen Elizabeth leaving Mudros. From Diary of HMS Queen Elizabeth 1919.

with possibilities of disaster utterly incommensurate to any advantage that could be obtained” *Churchill Companion* (1972). Churchill, and especially Fisher were vital to the War Council in instructing Naval measures as they knew the area well and plans thoroughly. By the time they resigned, the assault on the Dardanelles had already failed, but their knowledge and initiative was vital to the earlier plans. Fisher saw that “the great projects in the Northern Waters [ie his Baltic Project] which he had in view were no longer to be considered. Only the Dardanelles was to count. All the vast fleet for the invasion of Germany was to be dispatched on Churchill’s pet which became a monster” Morgan (1982).

The disorganisation of the War Council was a vital factor in the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles. It was established at the outbreak of the war as the government’s executive board for the prosecution of the war against Germany and her allies. From the start it displayed a fatal weakness, in that, despite the various members with political and administrative talents, it lacked firm guidance in the prosecution of war. No organisation of the Government in war-time had been thought out beforehand: no training of Prime Ministers or other high officials in matters concerning war had been suggested before. The Admirals and Generals on the War Council had been trained from their youth up, whereas the politicians had had no previous training to be capable “of conducting a world-wide struggle of supreme importance to the Empire” Bacon (1929). There were no central defence staff in Whitehall with executive power over the combined services. No information about the campaign on

vital matters was asked for from the Naval War Staff and the Headquarter Staff at the War Office, and no joint conferences took place between the two staffs. The views of the two staffs should have been laid before the Council by their technical heads rather than by Churchill and Kitchener. Therefore, the direction of the war effort lay in the hands of a diverse committee who fought for what they saw as their own service or political interests.

Churchill took it upon himself to formulate the Gallipoli campaign, which would unite several political and strategic aims. Apart from political and strategic considerations, during the early months of 1915, the War Office had not even started to equip itself for the conduct of a World War, "the men at the head of affairs are ignorant of all technique. They think they have only to say 'Do it' – and it is done wrong" North (1936). This comment from Hankey, sufficiently explains why things such as the ships conveying the troops to the Dardanelles should have been "packed anyhow", showing the detachment the War Council had from what was actually happening.

The disorganisation had a knock-on effect to the organisation of the offensive plans. The Dardanelles forts were ineffectually bombarded on the 19 February. This is due to the old predreadnoughts having guns with a relatively high velocity and flat trajectory which could damage a fortified target, but did not destroy the enemy guns, so the Allied Naval forces were still at risk. Naval gunnery was not the answer, but it was not realised early enough by the men that could have made a difference. By the end of the month it was realised that the only way to put the forts out of action was by landing troops. The arguments amongst the War Council delayed this.

The Allied army that assembled at the island of Lemnos under General Sir Ian Hamilton was fighting with less than a third of the recognised proportion of artillery and without adequate reinforcements. This was definitely a contributory, if not essential factor, to the failure of the assault on Gallipoli, because every time the troops were needed to make that final push, none were available. The artillery levels laid down by the War Office bore no relation to what Hamilton had at his disposal. An example of this is that, in theory, the British should have had 304 guns when they only received 118, and ammunition supplies were minimal. The troops were sent no engineers apart from the divisional field companies, no headquarters signal company, no trench stores and no materials for construction of piers and jetties.

It is clear that Kitchener only had a vague idea of what was entailed in sending troops to Gallipoli. He sent Hamilton out to Gallipoli with the hope that he would pick up the loose ends and come up with a workable plan. Hamilton was therefore given a hopeless briefing on the forces available for the expedition in general terms, when he should have had a clear plan of operations. He was also given no hint as to the relationship between himself and the naval commander in the eastern Mediterranean with whom he needed to work. There was therefore no supreme

commander, as the military and naval forces remained under independent leadership. He was also deprived of the staffs who should have been planning the system of casualty evacuation and hospitalisation, and the provision of the immense quantities of ammunition, rations and clothing. Hamilton also did not know Mudros Bay was totally unsuited for forward bases, the large natural harbour had little capacity for disembarking troops and supplies so many troops were dispersed over other Aegean islands, or they remained aboard troopships. The island could not easily sustain a force without hospitals, safe and abundant water supplies, ammunitions depots and an adequate road system. Communications was of prime importance and yet the General Headquarters arrived without its own signals company because it was held back in England due to an outbreak of measles. This meant that a make-shift GHQ was created from Anzac resources and was proved less reliable. There was also a lack of sound intelligence on the Turkish positions, especially on the location of their gun batteries and concealed machine-gun nests. This would have been vital in assaults such as that on Kirithia.

There were also problems with operational inefficiency. The standards of military proficiency varied; something which contributed to the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles. The professionals of the 29th Division were enthusiastic, but generally unfit and ill-trained. The Anzacs were men of superb physical form, but they were militarily raw and inexperienced. Most officers at the Dardanelles were young and courageous, but generally inexperienced which did not benefit the Allies. There were no standard staff and training doctrines to hold the forces together which served to worsen the problems.

The Turks were given ample time to prepare for the next offensive from the Allies when the Naval forces bombardment on the forts at Gallipoli in February 1915. This gap in the assault had detrimental effects and was partly caused by the arguments of Fisher and Churchill as they held up the process of deploying the troops. After the first naval attack the defences of the Turks were strained to the limit. Had the Allies renewed the offensive immediately it is likely that they would have succeeded. Robert Rhodes James (1965) quoting from the Turkish official account reports that "Up to the 25th February, it would have been possible to effect a landing successfully at any point on the Peninsula, and capture of the straits by land troops would have been comparatively easy." The Turks ammunition was in short supply and there was very low morale amongst the troops. A force of 80,000 Turkish troops from the Fifth Army, began defending the Peninsula from March 1915. They were commanded by the head of the German Military Mission to Turkey, General Otto Liman von Sanders. He made great improvements to the Turkish Army, which contributed to the failure of the eventual assault. His introduction of German officers into positions of responsibility was greatly beneficial, as was his intensive training of the troops. They were also commanded with nationalistic commands such as: "I do not expect you to attack. I order you to die" Hickey (1965) from Mustafa Kemal.

In conclusion therefore, it can be seen that the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles was due to the contribution of the arguments of Churchill and Fisher, but it involved other factors that the War Council had no control over. The involvements of Fisher and Churchill were key to the failure, but this was of equal importance to the whole disorganisation of the War Council as they did not help to make matters run more smoothly. If Fisher was younger and had had the energy and strength to follow his convictions that the plan to take the Dardanelles would fail, then may be there would have been stricter controls and checks over Churchill's workings and the feasibility of the attempt. The failure on the part of the Allies ultimately relied on the direct influence of the War Council because it had ultimate control of the war and in turn the War Council was influenced by Churchill's unquestionable power as an orator. This confirms that the failure of the assault on the Dardanelles was due to a number of complex factors that were all connected, but ultimately dependent on the War Council and the directions of Fisher and Churchill.

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CD ROMS:

- Encarta 1997 Encyclopedia Microsoft

CORPORAL HORACE CHASNEY DCM

ROY CHASNEY (1429)

My father was born on 26 July 1891 at the Plough Inn, East Hendred near Wantage, Berkshire where my grandparents were licensees. He was the eldest son of seven brothers and three sisters, five of the brothers served in the First World War and remarkably all returned safely.

He joined the 1/1st Berkshire Yeomanry (Territorial Force) in 1909 and was in the Wantage Squadron – D Squadron. Although they embarked for Egypt in 1915 with their horses these had to be left behind when they went to Gallipoli where they landed at Suvla on 18 August. Their first action was three days later during the attempt to capture the surrounding hills. The Official Historian summing up the events of 21 August reported.

The British troops had fought with distinguished bravery, but their task had proved impracticable. With numbers little greater than those of the defenders an attempt had been made to capture by frontal attack a position of great natural strength, manned by a determined and victorious enemy. The Turks were amply provided with artillery, and their now formidable trenches were well protected by flanking machine-gun fire.

In the words of Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis 1915*:

The British losses, particularly of the Yeomanry and the 29th Division who assaulted with the utmost determination, were heavy and fruitless. On this dark battlefield of fog and flame Brigadier-General Lord Longford, Brigadier-General Kenna VC, Colonel Sir John Milbanke VC, and other paladins fell. This was the largest action fought upon the Peninsula, and it was destined to be the last.

The Berkshires had gone into action that day with nine officers and 314 men, by nightfall only four officers and 150 men remained. For his actions on Scimitar Hill, during which he was wounded, my father was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal, the citation reading:

Corporal H. Chasney 1st (1st) Berkshire Yeomanry showed consistent gallantry when leading a section into attack. He also did good work rallying men who had scattered in the darkness.

Major Wigan of the Berkshire Yeomanry kindly wrote to my father from Ingatestone Court, Essex on 22 September 1915:



Corporal Chasney DCM, standing right, with his four brothers.

I saw your Squadron Leader Captain Wroughton¹ on Monday afternoon, and was pleased to hear from him of your gallant conduct during retirement on 21st August, upon which I offer you my heart congratulations. I trust your wounds are going on well.

I hope to be fit to return to the regiment within about a fortnight.

You will indeed be sorry to hear that Major Gooch² passed away yesterday afternoon.

In addition to the Distinguished Conduct Medal my father was also Mentioned in Despatches. Recovering from his wounds he was promoted to Sergeant and returned to Woolwich and from there to the Army School of Remounts where he remained for the rest of the War.

After the War he returned to East Hendred and started a coal and haulage business but following the death of my grandfather helped my grandmother at *The Plough* before taking the licence of *The Tandem Inn*, Kennington, Oxford, where he remained for 35 years, following which I took the licence for a further 25 years. He died, aged 71 in July 1962.



The War of 1914-1918.

*Berkshire Yeomanry (I.F.)
1416 Cpl. H. Chasney?*

*was mentioned in a Despatch from
General Sir Charles Monro K.C.B.
dated 6th March 1916*

*for gallant and distinguished services in the Field.
I have it in command from the King to record His Majesty's
high appreciation of the services rendered.*

Ernest Austen

Secretary of State for War

*War Office
Whitehall, L.W.
7th March 1916.*

¹ Captain Philip Wroughton of the 1st/1st Berkshire Yeomanry died on 19 April 1917 and is buried in the Gaza War Cemetery.

² Major Edward Sinclair Gooch of the Berkshire Yeomanry, formerly 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars had died of his wounds, aged 36, on 21 September. He is buried in Fort William (St Andrew) Episcopalian Churchyard.

HMS ARK ROYAL – GALLIPOLI AND AFTER

JOHN WELCH (1548)

The presence of HMS *Ark Royal* at Gallipoli is recorded in many accounts of the campaign. What is never mentioned is that she survived for thirty five years after Gallipoli, seeing active service against Dervishes in East Africa and the Luftwaffe in the North Atlantic.


She was originally laid down as a collier by the Blyth Shipbuilding Company in 1913. The Admiralty however, purchased "Steamer no. 9727" long before her launch on 5th April 1914. This resulted in her virtually being built as a seaplane carrier, and not as a converted collier. Her designer, J.H. Narbeth, moved the engines aft to give a hanger 150' x 45 x 15', accessed by a hatch 40' x 30'. Large workshops were provided, far better than the facilities available in later converted carriers, and a warming up shelter made for aircraft under the bridge. Below, safe storage was provided for petrol, bombs and torpedos.

The rest of the year following her launch was spent fitting out, until she was commissioned as HMS *Ark Royal* on 9 December 1914. The ship was only the second to have this name in the Royal Navy. The first *Ark Royal* was a 55 gun galleon, built for Sir Walter Raleigh at Deptford in 1587. She was initially called the *Ark Raleigh* until sold to the state. The following year she led the English Fleet against the Spanish Armada, and survived to be broken up in the Medway during the late 1630's.

The new *Ark Royal* displaced 7,080 tons, had a length of 366 feet, a beam of 51 feet and a draught of 17½ feet. She was equipped with 2 shaft triple expansion reciprocating engines, developing 3,000 horse power. These drove a single propeller, giving a maximum speed of 11 knots. The low speed was later to cause serious operational difficulties, though reflected her design as an experimental ship, rather than one which was to operate with a fleet. The ship's company numbered 140, a figure which fluctuated from 149 in 1920, to 100 in 1941.

Ten aircraft could be carried, though only half this number would be operated at any one time. Take off and landing were made on the sea, two 3 ton commercial steam cranes being fitted to lower and recover aircraft. Much thought had gone into giving *Ark Royal* the ability to launch wheeled aircraft. Trolley mounted machines could be launched from a platform 130 feet long. A tank in the bows could be flooded, so as to give the platform a downward slope and help the takeoff speed of an aircraft. A small sail fitted aft helped to keep her head into wind during launching operations – surely a unique fixture in any kind of aircraft carrier. Little, if any, use however was

made of this facility. The requirement to recover from the water aircraft, and at times pilots, meant that she was well equipped with boats. Two 12' dinghies, a 27' whaler, two 30' cutters and a 32' motor cutter made up the compliment.



HMS Ark Royal, Mediterranean 1915. Maritime Photo Library.


Defensive armament consisted of four 12pdr guns. This gun required a crew of six, had a range of 8,000 feet, and fired a three inch calibre shell capable of penetrating nearly four inches of armour at 1,000 yards. They gave good protection against torpedo boats and surfaced submarines. Two .303 Maxim machine guns were carried, which were excellent for dealing with boarding parties, as were 300 grenades. The latter though, were primarily for use by aircraft.

Early in January 1915 the decision had been taken by the Allies to attack the Dardanelles. The *Ark Royal* arrived there the following month, having called at Egypt en route to collect her aircraft. Whilst operating against Turkish forces she was known to have carried Short Admiralty Type 135 and Type 166 Seaplanes, Wright Pusher Seaplanes, and Sopwith Tabloids and Schneiders. The power of the engines ranged from as little as 80hp up to 200hp, though even the biggest did not enable an aircraft to reach a really useful height. Maximum range for radio transmitters was in the order of fifty miles.

Her aircraft were soon busy on reconnaissance flights, carrying out photographic surveys and spotting for naval guns. The more aggressive duties of shooting up Turkish targets, was left to the land based aircraft of No 3 Wing RNAS. *Ark Royal's* armourers were credited with enabling small bombs to be carried aloft. Mortar bombs were fitted with flights, and an eye screw was inserted through which a wire was threaded. A pilot or observer could then release bombs fitted to their aircraft with a sharp pull on the wire.

A good example of a the work of the *Ark Royal's* aircraft was a flight by Sub-Lieutenant Bromet on 25th April 1915. He took off as soon as it was light for Ejeimer Bay, in order to "spot" for the *Majestic*, should any enemy batteries be located. He found the area clear so flew south to Gaba Tepe, where the bush covered landscape made it impossible to identify targets. Whilst in this area he came under fire from guns at a village called Kojadere. Five other aircraft were launched but all reported the same difficulty in finding targets amongst the scrub. Aircrew from the *Ark Royal*, like their land based colleagues at Tenedos, soon realised that something had gone terribly wrong. The beaches which they had reported as being well protected, were the ones selected for the landing places.

The ship's maximum speed was felt to be insufficient, to enable her to avoid torpedo attacks by submerged submarines. She was withdrawn in June, and replaced by HMS *Ben-my-Chree*. Never the less the battle honour "Dardanelles 1915" had now been earned, the first since "Cadiz 1596".



Sopwith Schneider in hangar, 1915. Maritime Photo Library.

The *Ark Royal* now withdrew to a protected anchorage at Mudros, where she acted as a support ship for anti-submarine patrols. Her roll was not entirely static though, for late in 1915 she was at Salonika operating Short 166 Seaplanes. The rest of the war was spent in the eastern Mediterranean supporting antisubmarine patrols. After the collapse of the Turkish Empire she moved into the Black Sea in support of Russian intervention forces. However, far away on the edge of the Indian Ocean, events were unfolding which would send the *Ark Royal* beyond the extremities of the old Turkish Empire.

A Dervish leader known as the Mad Mullah, more correctly Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, had been a thorn in the side of the British administration in the Somaliland Protectorate since the beginning of the century. The *Ark Royal* left the Mediterranean early in December 1919 to take part in what would be the fifth and final operation against him. She arrived at Berbera, capital of British Somaliland, at the end of the month. The only other naval units present were the Cadmus Class sloops, *Clio* and *Odin*. Ground forces included the Somaliland Camel Corps, 1st/101st Grenadiers and two battalions of the King's African Rifles.

The *Ark Royal's* role was as an aircraft transport, rather than a seaplane carrier. She carried twelve DH 9's under the command of Group Captain Robert Gordon, entitled "Z Force". The senior medical officer for the campaign was Wing Commander W. Tyrell, who had arranged for one of the aircraft to be converted into an air ambulance. The modifications carried out at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, enabled it to carry one sitting and one prone casualty. The air ambulance proved its worth, being used to evacuate eight casualties during the campaign.

The DH 9's opened operations with an attack on a fort at Medishe, which nearly killed the Mullah. They supported the ground forces in harrying him and his followers, until he crossed into Abyssinian territory. Operations ceased on 11 February 1920, and he died of influenza some nine months later. The Africa General Service Medal with bar "Somaliland 1920", was issued to 144 officers and ratings on the *Ark Royal*. There was not to be another bar issued for this medal, until "Kenya" in 1955 for the Mau Mau Rebellion.

Three years later she was operating off Constantinople and Chanak in the last days of the British presence in the Straits. The *Ark Royal* returned to Chatham via Malta in September 1923, to pay off for reserve. She was soon back in service however, training pilots who would fly seaplanes off catapults on cruisers and battleships. She also undertook trials with the Hein Mat, a system to recover seaplanes whilst the parent ship was still under way.

The *Ark Royal* was renamed HMS *Pegasus* in December 1934, so as to release the name for a new aircraft carrier. Those who were to serve on her with this new name, inevitably called her "Peggy". This was curiously a repetition of the first ship's history,

for she had been renamed *Anne Royal* in 1603, whilst still in naval service. The First World War *Pegasus* a small cruiser, had been sunk off Zanzibar, but her namesake in World War Two was to survive several dangerous encounters with the enemy.

The Second World War was six weeks old, when on the night of 13/14 October 1939, *Pegasus* was anchored in Scapa Flow, some two miles from the battleship *Royal Oak*. The German submarine U47 entered Scapa Flow in search of targets, which were relatively few on this night. Nevertheless the *Royal Oak* was attacked, and sunk with the loss of over 800 of her company. Some reports state that the German commander located *Pegasus*, but identified her as a much larger warship. This has been disputed, given the unique silhouette of *Pegasus* amongst Royal Navy ships.

Some survivors managed to swim to her, where upon two whalers were sent to search for more. Eventually 400 survivors were on *Pegasus*, which stretched her resources to the limit, as she was not a depot ship. The injured were transferred to the hospital ship *Saint Abba* as quickly as possible. The lot of the *Pegasus* was to make a signal, "Regret *Royal Oak* has sunk" to the battleship *Iron Duke*.

With the fall of France in 1940, the Germans were able to send long range reconnaissance aircraft, Focke Wolf Condors, out into the Atlantic to locate and attack Allied convoys. Few escorts included an aircraft carrier, and the RAF could not provide fighter cover very far from land. An answer was for a merchant ship to carry a fighter which could be launched by catapult and shoot down the Condor. Thereafter the pilot would bale out over the convoy, or try and reach land. The mother ships would be known as Catapult Aircraft Merchant (CAM).

Pegasus was the only ship available to try this idea out, and although by now her engines could only make nine knots, she was suitably re-equipped in November 1940. Within a few days she escorted convoy OG47 to Gibraltar. *Pegasus* catapulted a fighter operationally for the first time on 11 January 1941, whilst escorting a West Africa convoy SL60. The Condor was driven away, and the pilot managed to land in Ireland after a flight of over 250 miles. This was one of only three operational launches of fighters by *Pegasus*.

Pegasus normally operated three Fairy Fulmar fighters as catapult ship. One would be mounted ready for take off, whilst the other two would be available as re-loads. Her defensive armament at this stage consisted of two 4" anti-aircraft guns mounted forward, with light anti-aircraft guns aft.

Pegasus returned to being a seaplane pilot trainer on 26 July 1941. She usually carried six Walrus amphibious aircraft in this role, but would occasionally test other aircraft in seaplane mode. However, with increasing numbers of aircraft carriers in the Royal Navy, seaplanes were phased out on cruisers and battleships. Thus by 1944 she had become an accommodation and depot ship.

The end of her Royal Navy service came in October 1946, when she was sold, renamed *Anita 1* and registered in Panama. She was sold to a Dutch company, Boomse Sheepas Boujen, in 1949, and finally in April 1950 to BI&S, who had her broken up at Grays in Essex.

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Black Saturday, Alexander McKee, Hamlyn, Feltham, 1978. Thorough account of the *Royal Oak* tragedy.

Scourge of the Atlantic, Kenneth Poolman, Macdonald and Jane's, London, 1978. Good account of CAM ships v FW Condors.

APRICOT AGAIN!

Apricot jam was another infliction – that and a detestable mixture known as Deakin's marmalade. "Apricot again!" Why on earth there was not more variety no one knows. One explanation given was that in the clear liquid it was impossible for drowned flies to masquerade as blackcurrants. This is quite the line of reasoning that would appeal to the type of mind responsible for the selection of the supplies sent to Gallipoli, and is therefore quite likely correct.

The crowning atrocity, however as far as food was concerned, was bully beef of the Fray Bentos variety. If General Birdwood was the soul of Anzac, then bully-beef was its "flesh and body." Bully was always in evidence. It came ashore at the first landing, and remained even after the evacuation. On the beach the A.S.C. made palatial residences of it; in the front line whole boxes were used for parapet building. It was salt, stringy and unpalatable. The only recommendation it had was that some kinds were not as bad as others, and that sometimes the less bad kinds were served out.

From *The Auckland Regiment* by O.E. Burton MM, Medaille d'Honneur published by Whitcomb & Toombs, 1922.

LOG OF MIDSHIPMAN RONALD DENT

EDITED BY R.L. MARTIN

What follows is edited from part of the daily log kept by the late Commander Dent, whilst serving as Midshipman on board the destroyer *HMS Chelmer*, supporting the landing of the Anzac's at Gallipoli in 1915. It has been previously published by the Shiplovers Society of Victoria Australia, in "The Dog Watch" No 54, a collection of sea stories.

Commander Dent was born in Devon in 1896. At the age of 15 he became a cadet with the British India Steam Navigation Company. During the First World War he served as Midshipman, Sub Lieutenant, and Lieutenant RNR. He subsequently went on to become a Commander RNR, and Suez Canal Pilot from 1929 until his retirement in 1950. The complete original log has been donated by his family, to the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich, where it is retained amongst its archives.



Saturday 24/4/15 In the morning about 1030 we weighed anchor and went alongside the transport *Suffolk* and to take about eight hundred troops from her to the *London*. Having embarked the troops by 1130 we proceeded to the *London* and by noon had completed embarkation. After this we anchored, but not for long, for at 1400 we were ordered to weigh anchor and take up station astern of *Colne* as one of seven destroyers in line ahead, lead by the *Beagle*. Arriving outside the Murdros harbour we were instructed to carry out our previous orders: 'Accompany the transport *Suffolk* to Imbros'. At 0830 we anchored off the island of Imbros in company of several more destroyers and transports. The programme was that at 2300 all destroyers detailed for landing troops, should embark the troops from their respective transports and proceed at seven knots to a rendezvous midway between Imbros and the coast of Xeros Bay and there meet the fleet and await orders. We embarked approximately three hundred troops (Australians) by 2330 and then steamed in line abreast with the other seven destroyers, similarly laden, on an ENE course.

Sunday 25/4/15 We meet the fleet at 0230 and stopped to await further orders. At 0300 the signal was made to proceed in execution of previous orders: 'Steam slowly towards the coast of Xeros Bay and with the least noise possible land all troops'. We had three large lifeboats on either side of us ready for the troops to get [into] when close enough to shore. At 0330 we arrived about a quarter to half a mile off the appointed landing place. The troops commenced to get into their boats. They were as merry as anything and one would think they were going to a picnic instead of a tough scrap. Everything had to be performed as quietly as possible and by the time they had all got into their boats it was well past 0400 and commencing to get light. Directly they commenced to be towed towards the shore (by a picket boat), the enemy opened a rapid fire with maxims and for the next half an hour there was nothing short of a perpetual rain of bullets and I am afraid several of the poor beggars who were landing must have been knocked out.

For my part I don't think I ever felt in such an uncomfortable position. I was standing aft the foremost funnel talking to a group of tommies with my hair on end as bullets were simply whipping over us. One soldier who I was standing next to fell beside me, shot through the head. By this time I was feeling more than uncomfortable and found a more sheltered spot under cover of a stokehold ventilator. I hadn't been there more than a few minutes before a bullet came clean through it, passing just clear of my posterior, so I again shifted my billet. By this time several of the soldiers remaining on board had been hit. I made myself useful by going into the forecastle to assist with bathing and bandaging of wounds. At this time there were about six wounded in the forecastle, with one killed, shot through the heart. The majority of wounds were serious, one shot through the shoulder blade, another the left temple, one through the stomach and various other parts of the anatomy. I washed their wounds with borax, roughly bandaging them up and giving them brandy which was about all that one could do at the time. The poor beggars didn't seem to care a bit about their wounds, in fact one chap who had the whole of his


cheek ripped open wanted to go ashore and find the Turk who had done it. All this time we were under heavy fire and although it was bad enough on board, it must have been simply murder pulling ashore in open boats.

Anyway these Australian troops didn't care a jot for it, one crowd of them singing 'A Long Way to Tipperary' as they were going ashore and only just waiting to have a go at the enemy. One soldier, whom we had particularly noticed as being a fine specimen, on arrival on the beach was attacked by two Turks; the first one he bashed over the head with the butt of his rifle and the second one he bayoneted and threw over his head. I expect the Turks wondered what they had struck. That we lost a lot in the first landing must have been fairly certain for the enemy was heavily entrenched all around the surrounding hills. We went back to the transport *Clan McGilvay* and got another lot. Arriving inshore this time the maxim fire had abated somewhat, but what was worse they had commenced firing shrapnel, which did a considerable amount of damage. This trip we had four or five more soldiers wounded, including our telegraphist who happened to be standing outside the wireless room when a shrapnel shell burst over us. He was unlucky enough to get a piece in the lower part of the abdomen. He was brought to the forecastle and bandaged up. The poor beggar must have been suffering badly, for although he was given plenty of brandy it did not seem to relieve him very much. On our return to the transport, for another lot of troops, we put all the wounded aboard. We were employed thus for the remainder of the day, during which our troops must have had heavy losses, for the enemy had a great advantage, not only in numbers but in their positions, as they were heavily entrenched in the surrounding hills. Throughout the whole day there was nothing but one continual roar of guns and maxims. Somewhere about eight battleships were lined up on the coast, and were simply pouring salvos on the enemy trenches and although damage must have been considerable it by no means silenced them.

Rather a fine sight was to see our troops with fixed bayonets charge up the hill at about 0900. I think it must have put the fear of God into the Turks. Later we received news that one of our leading seaman, who had been coxswain of one of the boats, had been shot and died instantly. The remainder of the night and morning we were engaged in landing troops.

Towards evening the firing eased somewhat, but every now and again you would see dozens of rifles flashing for a few minutes and occasionally a shrapnel bursting. In the afternoon, Chanak Forts from across the peninsula commenced firing at our transports, but thankfully they were such bad shots as to be hopelessly astray and did no damage whatsoever.

Friday 30/4/15 and Saturday 1/5/15 At 0700 we weighed anchor, and steamed up the eastern coast of the Gulf of Xeros in search of aeroplanes and also to reconnoitre. At 0930 we turned about and returned. At noon we entered Suvla Bay, as we had



A drawing found amongst Commander Dent's papers.

observed something which looked very much like an observation station. We opened fire and also destroyed two others we discovered later, firing altogether somewhere about fifty rounds.

After this we returned to our base in Xeros Bay, and anchored off the flagship. The fighting ashore was progressing just the same. In the direction of Chanak an enormous cloud of smoke was coming, which was I think the result of the *Triumph's* firing throughout the day. Our ships were firing shrapnel into the enemy trenches.

We went alongside the collier *Lydie* to recoal ship at 1700 and then moved to a position about half a mile from the fighting line in order to keep our searchlight on the beach, and fire on the enemy if they attempted to cross. Throughout the night they were occasionally sniping at us, and in the morning as it was just getting light, the enemy commenced firing shrapnel into our trenches and some of the shrapnel found a goal in us, but luckily did not do any damage. At daylight we switched off our searchlight and closed the flagship *Queen* for orders, afterwards anchoring. Just as we had let go anchor, Flag Commander Lamburton came aboard ordering us to

take him up the eastern coast of the Gulf of Xeros, in order to carry out reconnaissance.

At 0700 we entered Sulva Bay and commenced to search along the coast for any possible observation stations. Shortly afterwards we landed an armed crew consisting of the Flag Commander, Lieut. Harris, myself and about eight seamen. The first thing we came across were some trenches, which were beautifully made. Next we observed a wooden hut and after approaching it within two hundred yards, we took cover for a few minutes until the flag commander gave the order 'Charge', and this we did, being a noble force of ten men. Luckily for us the hut was unoccupied otherwise we wouldn't have seen the *Chelmer* again. We cautiously entered the hut, finding it entirely empty without any trace of it ever having been used as an observation station. I picked up an empty cardboard bullet box with German and Turkish writing on it, which I gave to the flag commander.

At 0930 hours we entered Agelmar Bay and proceeded to search it as we did the previous one. After getting to the innermost part of it, we stopped about three cables offshore, as we had sighted a place that looked suspiciously like an observation station. We fully intended to land the same party as we did in the previous bay, but very luckily for us, before our intentions were carried out, the enemy opened a hot rifle fire on us, at which we cleared out of it at full speed, firing at them with shell as we steamed away. Heaps of their bullets hit the ship, but in some marvellous way, no one aboard was injured. After this we proceeded to return to the flagship and report our discovery to the rear admiral. We then anchored. At 1800 we weighed anchor and closed on *HMS Agamemnon* to pick up a new wireless rating. On completion we returned to Xeros Bay and anchored for the remainder of the night. The fighting ashore continued, and although we lay close to shore, it was hard to tell the position of our troops, they had undoubtedly got a considerable distance up the hill.

Saturday 2/5/15 At 0600 we weighed anchor and proceeded to close the flagship *Queen* for orders, which were to take the mail to the *Queen Elizabeth* and transport *Arcadian*. Afterwards we came back and anchored in our previous billet. At noon, General Carruthers and Colonel Knox came aboard, and ordered us to take them round to all the Australian transports, in order to find out exactly how many men were in each, and to order a certain number in each transport to land at once. This survey took all afternoon. We must have gone alongside at least twenty transports. By 1830 after collecting about four hundred Australian troops, we proceeded to shore to land them, on the way stopping alongside *Queen* to disembark General Carruthers. About four cables off the beach we stopped and anchored and waited a considerable time before we could obtain boats to land the troops. Fortunately this time, very few bullets were knocking about, although later a few stray ones came aboard, slightly wounding two men.

Monday 3/5/15 At 0830 a high ranking officer came on board and we took him to

the transport *Arcadian* and anchored. At 1100 from the direction of Chanak, firing commenced and several large shells came whiffing over us, landing very close to a collier where the light cruiser *HMS Amethyst* was coaling. As they were getting uncomfortably close we weighed anchor with all speed and proceeded 'to get out of it'. Just as we succeeded in getting underway, a shell hit the collier from which the *Amethyst* had been coaling. This shell (which must have been somewhere around a ten inch) hit the collier aft, went clean through her decks to the hold, finishing up amongst the coal. After this, the collier commenced to steam out of it, and at the same time we closed her, in case she required assistance. After steaming well out of enemy fire, we stopped and secured alongside the collier to aid the wounded. At the same time a surgeon from *HMS Amethyst* came on board and attended to our two wounded men. One had the lower part of his left forearm badly shattered and a few minor injuries, the other was more or less all right, only being slightly injured in one of his extremities.

Tuesday 4/5/15 At 0415 we switched off our searchlight and proceeded to a position a quarter of a mile to the south of Cape Gaba Tepe. I did not mention previously that it was intended to land about 120 men on Cape Gaba Tepe at daybreak on this morning, and whilst they were landing, the destroyers *HMS Colne*, *Usk*, *Ribble* and ourselves were to keep up heavy fire on the vicinity. We opened fire when the first boat containing troops shoved off from the *Colne* and received a signal from *Colne* ordering us to close her. On landing, our troops met with a lot of resistance, as some five machine guns opened fire. However they succeeded in taking cover behind a low cliff above the beach losing a few men in doing so. Calculating that we only had 120 men, that the enemy were heavily entrenched in the surrounding hills with about five machine guns and that the whole of Cape Gaba Tepe consisted of nothing but one network of wire entanglements, it was decided to take them off. After the word had been given, the boats went in for them again, at the same time we opened up a heavy fire on the enemy and kept it up until all were safely back to the *Colne*.

After the *Colne* had left we discovered two more of our men taking cover under a cliff, which in haste had been left behind. The *Usk* and ourselves steamed as close to the beach as we could. The *Usk* then lowered her dinghy, with a volunteer crew in it. Immediately the *Usk's* dinghy started for the shore we all opened fire on the enemy trenches. The dinghy succeeded in getting to the beach, rescuing the two remaining soldiers and notwithstanding a hot fire from the enemy they all returned safely to the *Usk*. About an hour later, when lying off Cape Gaba Tepe with the light cruiser *Dartmouth* we discovered another wounded man lying face down on the sand, and now and again moving his leg. He was a considerable distance to the right of where the others had been rescued which is why they did not previously notice him. It was decided not to risk a boat's crew to rescue him, for he was practically dead. It would scarcely be worth while risking the sacrifice of two or three men to recover a man who would probably not live. We lay off the beach all the forenoon and about every ten minutes you could see the man move his leg. At noon the

Dartmouth made a signal, saying that she intended to land a volunteer crew in her steam cutter to rescue the man and if we could obtain a volunteer crew for our dinghy she would take it in tow. We soon succeeded in getting a volunteer crew, which consisted of a signalman, seaman, and two stokers. Both the *Dartmouth's* steam cutter and our dinghy were to fly the Red Cross flag. Whilst they were away, we were in all readiness to open fire on the enemy trenches should they not respect the Red Cross flag, although we did not have our guns trained or show any hostile intentions. Whether the Turks had cleared out of the vicinity, or whether they respected the flag, I do not know but it is sufficient to say that they did not fire a single shot. The wounded man was brought back safely to the *Dartmouth* where after he was temporarily bandaged up he was sent on board the hospital ship *Gaskin Castle*. The poor beggar was very badly wounded, having half his scalp torn away, and his left eye badly damaged, he was undoubtedly unconscious.

The log continues and goes on to describe the campaign up until 12 November 1915.

QUARTERMASTER'S STORES TIES, BADGES GALLIPOLIAN BINDERS

The **Association Tie** which comprises wide green bands for the land of Gallipoli and blue-grey for the waters of the Dardanelles, with narrow stripes of navy-blue and scarlet for the services is available price £5.00 including post.

A **Lapel Badge** in the same colours is available price £5.50 including post.

Binders, which hold 12 copies of *The Gallipolian* are available finished in an attractive simulated leather, coloured maroon, with the title blocked-in gold on the spine. Price per Binder is £5.25 including post in the United Kingdom and £6.25 including post for overseas.

Orders with payment, cheques and postal orders made out to The Gallipoli Association, to the Secretary, James Watson-Smith, Earleydene Orchard, Earleydene, Ascot, Berkshire, SL5 9JY.

RECENT SALES

The Dix, Noonan and Webb Sale of 18 September included a rare group to the Tormey family, James Tormey and his brother Joseph, being killed during the Anglo-Irish War. James, who had served with the 5th Battalion Connaught Rangers in Gallipoli, was killed on 2 February 1921 while leading an ambush in revenge for the death of his brother, shot by a sentry barely three weeks previously. The family group of medals sold for £680, estimate £400-500.

A scarce First World War DSC group of five to Surgeon Commander A.G.V. Elder RNVR sold for £1,250, estimate £700-900. He was awarded the DSC "in recognition of his services in connection with Naval ambulance trains and sea hospital transport throughout the war. Acting Staff Surgeon Elder was frequently under fire at the Gallipoli beaches."

Also in the sale was a rare C.M.G. group of seven to Brigadier-General H.L.N. Beynon Royal Artillery whose wide service included Gallipoli from 25 April to 9 January. These sold for £470, estimate £400-500.

The Dix Noonan Webb sale of 25 February included a Military Cross to Captain Edgar Banfield, Royal Irish Fusiliers who served at Gallipoli, August and September 1915. Sold for £220, estimate £200-250.

Described as "an interesting group of six" was that to the Reverend A.R. Fuller a Chaplain attached to the Royal North Devon Yeomanry. With the supporting papers was the Chaplain's Gallipoli journal. Reverend Fuller subsequently was invited to serve as Domestic Chaplain to King George V at Sandringham and West Newton 1926, where he remained until 1943. Sold for £820, estimate £600-800.

A First World War trio to Private H. Bradley of the Manchester Regiment, who was buried at sea 19 August 1915 after being wounded at Gallipoli was sold for £120, estimate £60-80. The same group to Major H.G.F. Dawson who served at Gallipoli with the Royal Army Medical Corps reached £110, estimate £50-70, while that to Private C.F.W. Turner, 21 Battalion, AIF who was on board the *Southland* when she was torpedoed, 2 September 1915 sold for £100, estimate £50-70.

Finally a Gallipoli DCM group of four to Corporal F. White, Manchester Regiment. "For conspicuous gallantry on 7 August 1915 at Krithia Nullah. After all the Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers had fallen, Corporal White took command and rallied the men who were wavering under a close and withering fire. His bravery and resource were most marked." This sold for £520, estimate £300-400.

The Editor will always be pleased to receive information relating to sales of Gallipoli material.

VETERAN AT REMEMBRANCE EXHIBITION

Members of the Western Front Association Suffolk Branch organised an exhibition to mark the 80th anniversary of the ending of the First World War. This took place at Woolpit, near Bury St Edmunds on Sunday 8 November.

The highlight of the day was undoubtedly the arrival, complete with piper and Gurkha guard of honour, of Gallipoli Association member, Corporal Richard Barron who served with the 2nd London Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance at Gallipoli. Also present was Private Denis Finbow of the East Surrey Regiment who celebrated his 99th birthday that same day.



We are grateful to Bill Fulton (1464) for providing information on this splendid event and the photograph.

STOP PRESS: As we were going to press we sadly heard of the death of Richard Barron. Full Obituary in the next issue.

CROSSING TO IMBROS

DR LEONARD CONSTABLE (1242)

All visitors to Gallipoli will be familiar with the sight of the islands to the north and west, Samothrace and Imbros, though probably few venture to them. Actually it is quite straight forward to make a short day visit to Imbros, 11 miles offshore, by catching the ferry which runs from Gaba Tepe on the west side of the Peninsula. I did this with the Galina Battlefield Tour in 1998 and thought members of the Association might like to learn of the opportunity, and hopefully make their own visits.

Ferry timings, departure at 1130, return at 1500, are such that it is impossible to spend much time on the island without an overnight stay, though this would clearly be possible as there is at least one hotel and rented holiday accommodation. The ferry cost is modest, with tickets being available at the terminal.



The crossing from Gaba Tepe takes about an hour and a half, while another, and much longer journey, can be made several days a week from Canakkale. Taxis and a bus are available at Kuzu Limani, the ferry terminal on the north-east coast close to which the monitors *Raglan* and M28 were sunk on 20 January 1918 by the *Goeben* and *Breslau* during their first and last sortie from the Dardanelles. It is said that timber salvaged from the two vessels was used in house construction on the island. The main town is Panaia, while General Sir Ian Hamilton's headquarters was at Kefelos, some 17 kilometres from the ferry.



Imbros, 17 miles by five miles, is sparsely populated, the roads are not good and there is now little sign of the activities of 1915. Perhaps the most notable feature of the crossing is the view from the seaward of the Gallipoli Peninsula, especially the ridges of Anzac with their many memorials and cemeteries distributed along their length.

Dr Leonard Constable, 17 Roseworth Avenue, Gosforth, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE3 1NB.

GENERAL PALIT MILITARY TRUST

In 1989, the General Palit Military Studies Trust was established in India by Major General D.K. Palit for the purpose of promoting the study of Military History and Military Science. In 1990 a parallel UK Trust was approved. Scholarships are awarded to applicants approved by the Trustees who wish to study the history of the Indian Armed Forces.

Further information from The Secretary, General Palit Military Studies Trust, 17 Charterhouse Street, London, EC1N 6RA.

GALLIPOLI ARCHIVES

LIDDLE COLLECTION – LEEDS UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

The remarkable archive of First World War material brought together by Peter Liddle (426), first at the Sunderland Polytechnic, and now housed in the Brotherton Library, University of Leeds, contains a great many original papers, diaries, photographs, and other archive material of the Gallipoli campaign. No one interested in the campaign should miss an opportunity to make good use of the Collection.

The Liddle Collection consists of approximately 5,500 collections of personal papers. These have been grouped by geographical area in which a man or women served, or by the nature of his or her military service. Summary guides, those for Gallipoli are reproduced below, together with examples of the abbreviated results and individual records available, assist those visiting the archive. These are now also available on the Internet.

www.leeds.ac.uk/library/spcoll/liddle/sumguide.htm

In addition, one can support the archive by becoming a Friend of the Liddle Collection. The subscription, £10.00 per annum is due on 25 April for which Friends receive the journal *The Poppy and the Owl* three times a year. Subscriptions should be sent to The Secretary, The Liddle Collection, Brotherton Library, Leeds University Library, Leeds, LS2 9JT.

Liddle Collection Summary Guide

GALLIPOLI [Access to the Catalogue](#)

Reference GALL

Extent 86 boxes

Content The Gallipoli section holds collections of the personal papers of men who served during the Gallipoli campaign, 1915.

Dates Covered c 1915

Arrangement The material is arranged in files alphabetically by name, and also in sub-groups by category of material: maps, miscellaneous, photographs, recollections.

Finding Aids Gallipoli catalogue (hard copy).

Related Material

GALLIPOLI ROYAL NAVY [Access to the Catalogue](#)

Reference GALL (RN)

Extent 11 boxes

Content The Gallipoli (Royal Navy) section holds collections of personal papers of men who served in the navy during the Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns, 1915.

Dates Covered c 1915

Arrangement The material is arranged in files alphabetically by name, and also in a sub-group by category of material: photographs.

Finding Aids Gallipoli catalogue (hard copy).

Related Material

Examples of abbreviated results

1. GALL 001 Addams-Williams, Donald Arthur (1896-1915). 2nd Lieutenant, 1/4th South Wales Borderers, 13th Division. Son of Mrs Grace Addams-Williams, nee Lysaght, and father Herbert Addams-Williams, Rector of Llangibby, Monmouthshire. Educated at Winchester and Marlborough, enlisted 1914, joining the Public Schools' Brigade at Epsom and then received a Commission in October into the 4th Battalion, South Wales Borderers. Embarked for Dardanelles on 29 Jun 1915 and landed at Suvla 12 Jul 1915. Was leading No1 A Company when killed at Chocolate Hill 11 Aug 1915 (See Gall 1/63), (given as 13 Aug 1915 in "The Cross of Sacrifice"). Commemorated 7th Field Ambulance Cemetery, Anzac.
2. GALL 002 Aitcheson, Albert B S (1886-?). Royal Munster Fusiliers. Enlisted 4/9/14, in Dublin 23/1/15. Landed at Gallipoli 30/7/15 from SS Newmarket, returned to Britain, 14/12/15, suffering from dysentery.
3. ANZAC (NZ) RECOLLECTIONS Aitken, F W (1894-?). Sergeant, Divisional Signals Company, New Zealand Engineers, NZEF (New Zealand Expeditionary Force). Father was a station master. Served as a Volunteer before the outbreak of war. Military service at Samoa, Gallipoli, Western Front. Also served in the Second World War.
4. ANZAC (AUST) RECOLLECTIONS Alexander, A. Major. Served as Lieutenant with the 10th Battalion, AIF (Australian Imperial Force). Served at Gallipoli.
5. ANZAC (NZ) Alexander, A E. Major. Served as Lieutenant, Divisional Signals Company, New Zealand Engineers. Served at Gallipoli and on the Western Front, 1915-1918.
6. GALL 003 Alexander, C. Corporal, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 52nd Division. Bomb instructor with Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; landed Helles 3 Aug 1915, wounded 27 Dec 1915 and returned to England Feb 1916.

Example of a full reference

Reference: AIR 047
Name: BREMNER, F D
Background: Bremner, F D. Flight Sub-Lieutenant, RNAS (Royal Naval Air Service). He served at **Gallipoli**, Egypt and the Mediterranean.
Level of Collection Level
Description:
Extent of 1 file
Collection:
Dates 1915-1916; 1974

Created:

Content: 4 letters of introduction (Dec 1915); Photocopied Pilot's Flying Log Book and diary (Dec 1915-May 1916); Typed extract of a letter from Bremner (Jan 1916); Photocopied typed extract from letters (Jan-Apr 1916); Typed transcript of an interview recorded with Peter Liddle (1974); Letter from Imperial War Museum, London to Peter Liddle (1974); 18 copied photographs, some with captions, taken at Gallipoli (c 1916); Emergency medical kit in leather and canvas pouches.

Dates 1915-1916

Covered:

Finding Aids: Air catalogue

Copies: Microfilmed

Related Tape 210: interview recorded with Peter Liddle in Mar 1974

Material: (Reel-to-Reel 651).

Record 10/12/97

Created:

Record 000000850

Number:

INFORMATION PLEASE

We are always pleased to include requests for information concerning the Gallipoli campaign.

The fate of the Turkish ferry *Halic 14*: My information is taken from the war log of the MMD Turkish Coast Defence, Soko Turkei. On 19 June 1915 the ferry *Halic 14* with three barges in tow left Constantinople for the Dardanelles. On 20 June off Silivri the submarine E14, Lieutenant Boyle, surfaced near the convoy. The ferry left the tow, with two barges sunk according to the Turkish war log, but all three according to Boyle. *Halic 14* then disappeared for two days, the Turks believed her lost until on the afternoon of 22 June she was observed running west near the coast by the battery at Kephez. After checking with the CIC in Chanak the battery opened fire but by then *Halic 14* was out of range and reported stopped by British destroyers. I can find nothing more about this incident, and although a number of vessels were returned to Turkey in 1920 *Halic 14* was not among them.

Information would be warmly welcomed by Bernd Lanensiepen, Krickentenweg 26, D 21147, Hamburg.

The Great Scout of Anzac: While browsing in the National Army Museum library during an all too infrequent visit to London, I came across the following paragraph, on page 61 of *The Auckland Regiment* by O.E. Burton MM, Medaille d' Honneur published by Whitcombe & Tombs, 1922.

“When Private Richard Warden was buried, the stillness of the night was broken by the cries of the stricken in their agony. Carrying parties and stretcher-bearers toiled up and down with their heavy loads, the scrub breaking and crackling beneath their feet. The bursts from the Turkish machine-guns whizzed venomously overhead. Bullets fell everywhere, with the sound of heavy slow drops before a thunderstorm. The night was full of noise, yet within a small space it was very still and quiet. Here in a shallow grave they placed the body of the great scout of Anzac. Two or three of those who loved him for his great valour stood round while the heroic priest recited the words of Eternal Hope. The short service was over, the mourners turned once more to the fighting front.”

Is more information available regarding Richard Warden and his deeds which resulted in him being called “the great scout of Anzac”? The Editor would like to hear from members who can throw further light on this.

ASC Presence at Gallipoli John Freeman (1422), of Hunter’s View, 9 Pix Mead Gardens, Shaftesbury, Dorset, SP7 8BZ seeks further information relating to the history of the supply column of the ASC. His uncle, Staff Sergeant Major George Henry Freeman, a reservist who had served in the Boer War, worked first as a school teacher, later as a Police Constable, before being called to the Colours at Manchester. He served at Helles with 249 Depot Unit of Supply, 29th Division and is buried in Lancashire Landing Cemetery. The War Memorials at Stalybridge, Cheshire, and at Hallow Parish Church, Worcester, his home town bear his name.

Former Naval Person – Old Soldier: Ray Dockery, 25 Duckhouse Road, Wednesfield, Wolverhampton, WV11 3AE would like any leads for a friend who recalls when stationed at Edinburgh in 1941 an interesting character transferred from the Manchesters. He was a Private, with a collection of Good Conduct chevrons “up to his elbow”. His medal ribbons must have been unique. First, the DSC awarded for his service on B11 under Lieutenant Holbrook VC at the Dardanelles, December 1914. Then a Great War trio, GSM bar “Iraq” IGSM bar, “Burma 1930-32” and the Army LSGC.

“He was a dour old chap, who when you could get him talking revealed that on leaving the Navy in 1919 he enlisted in the Manchesters, where after rising to Sergeant, then losing his stripes had transferred to the RAP as a Private. He usually appeared in his brass-buttoned SD tunic, with Service chevrons blanched white and medal ribbons immaculate. I volunteered into the Royal Engineers shortly afterwards, so never heard what became of him, nor can I now recall his name, even when prompted by the sight of the B11 crew-list.” Can a member help?

BOOK REVIEWS

ADIM ADIM CANAKKALE SAVAS ANILARI

EKREM BOZ

Olay Gazetesi. 5th Edition 1998. 80 pages, numerous illustrations, maps. \$5.00

One of our members, M Kemal Yilmaz (1157), has kindly sent this guide book to the Gallipoli Battlefield. After briefly reviewing the events of 1915 it provides a fine photographic record of the many Turkish memorials and other sites of interest on both sides of the Dardanelles. Some will be well known to Gallipolians, but others may be little visited. With this in hand none need now be missed. The book, which is available in the bookshops and museums at Canakkale, concludes with a poem for young martyrs by M. Kemal Yilmaz.

AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR

EDITED BY HUGH CECIL & PETER H LIDDLE

Leo Cooper 1998. 412 pages, 140 illustrations. ISBN 0 85052644-2. Paperback £19.99.

Peter Liddle (0426), a very long standing member of the Association, whose numerous other works include *Men of Gallipoli* and *Gallipoli 1915: Pens, Pencils and Cameras at War* has combined with University of Leeds colleague, Hugh Cecil, to bring together from a galaxy of international authors, these "Reflections, Hopes and Anxieties at the Closing of the Great War, 1918." Amidst all the relief, the great loss of so many lives had cut a swathe across the nations. Few families had not been marked by the conflict in some all the young men had been lost. Even in the final moments before the guns fell silent men were dying, "my cousin died on the eleventh of November at eleven o'clock. On the Baasrode bridge" recalls one Belgian. A book, whose object to capture a moment in history, the hopes and fears at the end of the most catastrophic period in history, is dedicated "to the welfare of all archives, libraries and museums specialising in the acquisition, conservation and public access to materials relating to twentieth century history – against whatever adversity." Gallipolians will say Amen to this.

RECIPIENTS OF THE VICTORIA CROSS IN THE CARE OF THE COMMONWEALTH WAR GRAVES COMMISSION

Commonwealth War Graves Commission 1997. 108 pages. £8.00 including post from the Commission, 2 Marlow Road, Maidenhead, SL6 7DX.

This A4 book provides details on each of the 374 holders of the Victoria Cross in the care of the Commission, 262 who died during the First World War, 112 during the Second and one non-war casualty. Details are alphabetically by country and cemetery commencing with Bedford House in Belgium and concluding with Maala Cemetery in the Yemen. A variable amount of information is provided on each, the 12 holders of the VC remembered on the Gallipoli Peninsula take two and a half pages.

JAMES NEVILLE MARSHALL VC MC & BAR

ARTHUR GRAHAM

Published by the author 1998. 57 pages, 25 illustrations, map. See footnote regarding cost.

The author, in his introduction, tells how he started to take an interest in the names on the Harlow War Memorial. He quickly agreed to research the life of James Marshall, killed on the Sambre-Oise Canal on 4 November 1918, "a bold, brash extrovert who set an example and inspired his men. He died as he had lived, out in front, larger than life but not quite all that he claimed to be, he will never be forgotten."

The book, is available from the Regimental Headquarters, Irish Guards, Wellington Barracks, Birdcage Walk, London, SW1E 2HQ, in return for a donation to Regimental Funds to cover costs and postage. Hopefully members will generously support this initiative, for many will recall the warm welcome provided by the Irish Guards when they so kindly provided, for a number of years, the facilities for our Gallipoli Day Lunch at Chelsea Barracks.

SEA WARFARE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 20TH CENTURY CONFLICT

PAUL KEMP

Arms & Armour 1998. 320 pages, numerous illustrations. ISBN 1-85409-221-9. £35.00.

After a brief introduction the book is divided into three sections, a chronology of events that have shaped sea warfare this century, an A-Z of warships, weapons, battles and the like, and then naval personalities. A useful guide which would have been greatly improved if references or lists for further reading had been included.

GALLIPOLI

ROBERT RHODES JAMES

Pimlico 1999. 384 pages, 34 illustrationsw 23 maps. ISBN 9-780712 665377. £12.50.

If the first edition of *Gallipoli*, published by Batsford in 1965, is not on your shelves do not despair. The author in his preface writes "What is remarkable is that although the formidable Gallipoli historiography has increased considerably since 1965 it has not seriously superseded anything written before then, and I have seen no reason to amend the original 1965 edition of my book, which now appears in full replica for the first time."

Indeed, even if you are fortunate to have the first edition on your shelves, it is worth purchasing the present one for the Preface alone. A masterly review in eight pages telling of how he came to write *Gallipoli* together with a brief comment on some of the more recent books about the campaign. Few would dispute the statement by Field Marshal Viscount Slim when reviewing the first edition when he said "It is the best book on Gallipoli I have yet read."

GALLIPOLI

NIGEL STEEL

Leo Cooper 1999. 224 pages, numerous illustrations, maps. ISBN 0 85052 669 8. £10.95.

A worthy addition to the publisher's fine Battleground Europe series, this, a revised and updated version of the author's earlier book *The Battlefields of Gallipoli – Then and Now*. Much of the contemporary material has been drawn from the archive collections of the Imperial War Museum. Nigel Steel (1037), a member of the Gallipoli Association, dedicates his book "to three late friends who told me how it felt to be at Gallipoli" – Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm Hancock MC, Ivor Powell and William Wright. No visitor to Gallipoli should be without a copy in their knapsack, if only for the splendid series of photographs then and now.

VETERANS

THE LAST SURVIVORS OF THE GREAT WAR

RICHARD VAN EMDEN & STEVE HUMPHRIES

Leo Cooper 1998. 208 pages, numerous illustrations. ISBN 0-85052-640-X. £16.95.

The authors, the first a member of the Gallipoli Association, have brought together the stories of the last survivors to accompany the BBC documentary shown in November last. Epic stories of four years of war, some only revealed for the first time by the participants, who include at least one who served at Gallipoli, Richard Barron (see also page 55) who sailed for the Middle East on board the *Aragon* in September 1914. Brief biographies of the survivors would have enhanced the book, indeed sadly there is not even a summary list of them, and where is the index?

WE WILL REMEMBER THEM

ALFRED WAKELING

Scribe Publishing 1998. 20 pages. ISBN 0 9503 1834 5. £2.31 including postage in Great Britain from 9 Queen Street, Brightlingsea, Essex, CO7 0PH.

Little books like this, not forgetting their authors, need all our support. This lists all those remembered on the War Memorial in Brightlingsea, Essex who fell in the First World War. One hundred and nine names strong, from Thomas Adams, KIA 31 July 1917 to Walter Yell killed on a boom defence vessel while lifting a 30cwt weight on board. Four were casualties at Gallipoli – H. Brown died on HM Fleet Messenger *Waterwitch* on 9 October 1915, Boy 1st Class Leonard Ellis died on board HMS *Albion* 1 February, Harry French killed in action 28 June and Henry Gant who died on 9 November.

WHO SAID THIS?

In the Autumn *Gallipolitan* we asked who said:

One by one they died on Chunuk, until after a few hours desperate struggle against overwhelming forces the only New Zealanders left alive were a dozen severely wounded. But not for a long time did the first Turk dare show his head. Then into the trench several crept with their bayonets to kill the wounded. Fortunately a Turkish sergeant arrived and saved the lives of the wounded, who were carried off to the German dressing stations E behind Hill Q. In all the history of the Gallipoli Campaign there is no finer story of fortitude, no finer exhibition of heroism and self-sacrifice, than was shown in this forward trench of Chunuk on that desperate August morning. Here died some of the noblest characters in the New Zealand Army. August 8 was a day of tragedy for New Zealand, but no day in our calendar shines with greater glory.

The answer, Fred Waite DSO in *The New Zealanders at Gallipoli* published by Whitcombe & Tombs, 1921.

Now another WHO SAID THIS?

"Still," our enemies say, "you did not win the Peninsula." We did not; and some day, when truth will walk clear-eyed, it will be known why we did not. Until then, let our enemies say this: "They did not win, but they came across three thousand miles of sea, a little army without reserves and short of munitions, a band of brothers, not half of them half-trained, and nearly all of them new to war. They came to what we said was an impregnable fort, on which our veterans of war and massacre had laboured for two months, and by sheer naked manhood they beat us, and drove us out of it. Then rallying, but without reserves, they beat us again, and drove us farther. Then rallying once more, but still without reserves, they beat us again, this time to our knees. Then, had they had reserves, they would have conquered, but by God's pity they had none. Then, after a lapse of time, when we were men again, they had reserves, and they hit us a staggering blow, which needed but a push to end us, but God again had pity. After that our God was indeed pitiful, for England made no further thrust, and they went away."

GALLIPOLI CEMETERIES – PLUGGE’S PLATEAU

Plugge’s Plateau (pronounced “Pluggie’s”) is the steep hill above Ari Burnu named after Colonel A. Plugge, CMG, VD who commanded the Auckland Battalion and placed his HQ here. He died in 1934. The cemetery covers just 133 square metres and contains 21 graves, eleven being of those killed on 25 April, while three are of artillerymen who fell at their guns sited here. From the Plateau one has a marvellous view of Ocean Beach and on north to Suvla.

