
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THE GALLIPOLIAN

THE JOURNAL OF THE

GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION



VIEW OF "V" BEACH, TAKEN FROM S.S. "RIVER CLYDE"

PRICE TO NON-MEMBERS
55p

No. 49
CHRISTMAS 1985

THE GALLIPOLIAN
The Journal of the Gallipoli Association
(Founded by Major E H W Banner in 1969
on the campaign of 1915)

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NEW MEMBERS

In the original printed journal, this page contains names and full addresses of new members, and also address amendments.

For reasons of data protection and personal privacy, this content has been omitted.

OBITUARY (24th October 1985)

With deep regret the following names are recorded.

A.J. FENTON MM (Bdr. RFA 58 Bde 11 Div.)	57
F.T.K. WOODWORTH (Lt. 7 Manchester R 42 Div.)	72
Lt-Col. G.B. MURRAY (5th R Scots Fus. 52 Div.)	105
G.H. LOCKE (Sgt. 1/5 Suffolk R 54 Div.)	309
A.E. WATTS (Lt. RNVR RND Collingwood Bn.)	446
H.J. FEW (RAMC 53 Div and RE Signals)	466
W.C. BATSON OBE (AB HMS Lord Nelson 1917-1919)	654AM
C.G. DUNNING (Tpr. 3 Co London Y 2 Mtd. Bde. 29 Div.)	735
A.D.B. CASSIDY	787AM
Major J.L. BRYAN MC TD MA (5 Manchester R 42 Div.)	906
W.H. HARRIS (Royal Corps of Signals)	920
S.J. MOYLE (Drake Bn. RND)	922

RESIGNATIONS

Capt J.R. MOTT	795AM
J. GRIFFEY	891AM
J.F. RUSSELL	898AM

An Idea For A Christmas Present.

Why not offer to pay the subscription for a new Associate Member of the Gallipoli Association?

You may know someone, with family or other connections with the Campaign of 1915, who would be interested.

The cost is £6 with effect from 1st January 1986 and the Secretary would be glad to send you particulars.

EDITORIAL

It is unusual for there to be an editorial in **Gallipolian** but the Gallipoli Association is facing unusual times, times pregnant with significant changes and the next Annual General Meeting is going to be critical for the future. As the number of veteran members continues to decline change is inevitable and the precise nature of those changes will have to be decided at the AGM. A number of proposals have been put before your Committee which has decided to defer them to the AGM. **These proposals are:**

(a) That the 1985 Dinner is the last to be held by the Association due to the relatively small numbers attending and the subsequent embarrasment when official guests are faced by so few members, especially veteran members. It has been suggested that either **(i)** more emphasis be placed on the AGM on the 25th April, abandoning the Dinner altogether; or (ii) the AGM is separated from the lunch and is held later in the year, in effect replacing the dinner.

Members views are urgently sought as to whether we adopt either of these proposals or a third idea.

(b) The subject of opening the doors of the Association to lady members will again be discussed at the AGM. The Association needs more members and that is an inescapable fact - those inclined to doubt this are asked to refer to the lengthy obituary list in this edition. The editor has consistently opposed this step on previous occasions on the grounds that we should remain concerned with the Gallipoli campaign rather than degenerate into a social club. If it is at all possible to admit ladies whilst retaining the aims and objectives of the Association then perhaps is is time to reconsider?

(c) The essay competition instituted at this year's AGM and outlined in Gallipolian No. 48 is to be publicly launched in January 1986. The prize money for that year is to come from Association funds but, obviously, we do not want to have to repeat this. The Committee are

currently trying to raise a capital sum of £600 to fund prizes in future years and it is hoped that members will donate to an in-house contribution towards this. Moneys donated for this purpose should be sent to the Treasurer.

(d) A new post is to be created, that of Assistant Secretary, in order to alleviate the load carried by the present Secretary. It is unlikely that more than a few members are aware of the workload born by the Secretary in his efforts to keep the Association together and the Committee have rightly agreed that the new post should be created with effect from 1986. Nominations for the new post are requested for the next AGM so, if you have some thing to offer, don't hold back.

(e) It has been suggested that one way of avoiding the growing financial difficulties facing the Association would be to reduce the frequency of **The Gallipolian** from three to two editions each year. This will certainly save money, especially on postage. After consideration the Committee have decided to continue with three editions in 1986 and then review the situation again. There is enough material to justify three editions, but the problem lies in whether this is financially viable.

Members will note from the Treasurer's statements that the subscriptions for Associate Members will hence-forward be £6 per annum from 1st January 1986. This is a regrettable but necessary step and similarly the price of the journal to non-members will rise to 55 pence.

By the time members receive this edition the 1985 Dinner will have been and gone. Due to the Dinner being held later than usual this year it is not possible to print an account in this edition, but one will appear in Gallipolian No. 50.

The next AGM is going to be decisive for the Association's future. If we do not take decisions now we are going to find the decisions forced onto us by the tight financial situation and then many of the decisions

will be unpalatable. We can no longer afford to muddle through. There has been much talk over the last two years of ensuring that the Association continues when the veterans depart, but if this objective is to be realized then we must lay the foundations now. The Association is approaching a cross-roads and we will have to face the question: "Whither Hercules?" and this will be sooner rather than later. It is no good saying the Associate Members can do what they like once the veterans have vanished, nor will it help for members to say next summer "I do not like the course the Association is following." Your opinion is needed, and needed now. Every effort must be made either to attend the AGM in April, or to make your opinions known either to members of the Committee or to others attending the AGM. The decisions taken affect you; make sure your opinion is heard.

The Committee would like to take this opportunity of wishing all members a very Merry Christmas and a happy and prosperous New Year.

MEO.

SUBSCRIPTIONS 1986

At the AGM on 25th April last the decision was taken to increase the annual rate of subscription to Associate Members to £6 from 1st January 1986; that for Veteran Members to remain at £3. This change was duly confirmed by your Committee. As always donations in excess of the minimum rate will be warmly welcomed and gratefully received.

Whilst this rise is primarily necessary to meet the cost of continuing publication of three issues of the Gallipolian annually, the additional revenue will also provide the initial prize fund for the **EDGAR BANNER MEMORIAL ESSAY COMPETITION**, details of which appeared in issue No. 48 of the journal.

To avoid confusion to the many members who have paid in advance a separate slip is enclosed with this issue setting out the amount due which should be remitted in January to the Treasurer (see page 2).

Will those members who have given Bankers Orders please ensure that revised instructions are given to their bankers.

LETTERS

From Captain E.D. Wolton (418)

With reference to "Matters Arising" in the Gallipolian No. 48 pages 11 & 12 Mr. F.G. Orton states that he has no recollection of a Garland trench mortar gun being used on Gallipoli or elsewhere. I may have been mistaken in the name of the gun, but there definitely was a trench mortar at Hill 60. My authority (such as it is) is the fact that in a letter home dated 5 Sept. 1915 I wrote "There is a nice little trench mortar which fairly throws big bombs into the Turks.....I spent most of my time with the mortar. Whenever we sent a bomb over there came a shower of bullets round us...."

I think Hill 60 came under the Anzac command and perhaps that is why Mr Orton, who was at Sulva Bay, did not know of this mortar. As the Turkish trenches were only 20 to 30 yards from ours, the mortar was certainly practical. After all these years I cannot remember it, perhaps because the thought was ousted from my mind by the erratic, exacting, and almost useless catapult gun, which was liable to hurl the bomb into our own front line and support trenches. Officers and men did not look to the front but, fearful for their own safety, looked towards the catapult gun. They laughed to see the bomb going straight towards other sectors, but when one came in their direction they felt very differently about it! Once experienced never forgotten. The catapult gun team came under the Brigade. They would come, fire their bombs and then depart, leaving us to experience the Turks' retaliation by being bombarded by their seventy-fives. The catapult gun team were not popular!

Mr Orton states that the trajectory of our shells was too flat to be of use against trenches. We did have howitzers which had a very steep trajectory. In a letter home dated 26 Sept. 1915 I wrote "I saw a very interesting sight. I actually saw about 30 shells going through the air and most interesting it was!" It was a cloudless day and the shells could be seen going up, flattening out and then dropping almost perpendicularly.

E.D. WOLTON.

Extract from a letter from N. Anthony (796AM) who laid a wreath on behalf of the Association at the Helles Memorial:

Knowing of the chaos around the Memorial on the 25th, the party that I led (it included Miss Rose Coombs and many other experts from the Imperial War Museum) decided to lay our wreaths on the 24th. In a very moving, simple ceremony the wreaths were laid.

After the ceremony we were very pleased to be congratulated by a party of Turkish veterans who had witnessed the ceremony.

Some photos were taken and if anybody is interested I will bring them to the annual dinner.

N. ANTHONY.

The Transition

During the course of the past year I have received a number of requests from youngsters boys and girls, who are taking O and A level examinations in history and who have selected as their subject Gallipoli. Many of them ask for literature, pamphlets or information sheets and some if they had their way, would have me do the work for them. Of course we have nothing to hand out but I give what help I can and direct them to sources or answer their queries but I always begin my reply to them by stating "We are a veteran's organisation....." There is a twofold

reason, firstly we have no records other than my own library, secondly to cut down my own involvement because at times I have more correspondence than I can possibly deal with and follow my occupation. One young man sent me his completed essay to permit me to see the results and I thought it good enough to pass to Dr Occleshaw for the new Essay Competition he has introduced. In addition to these youngers I also receive quite a number of letters from people trying to trace details of relatives who were at Gallipoli and so it would seem that instead of directing enquiries to Archives the first choice is this association. Of course I realise that many people have no idea what Archives exist.

There is a change coming about in the activities of this association and not just from the approaches I have mentioned where we are not seen as a veterans organisation, and time itself is bringing about changes and I ask the veteran members to bear with me. Change for the sake of change is never a good thing and should be avoided, but changes must take place in the Gallipoli Association in the lifetime of veteran members if it is to be a smoooth change. To explain this let any veteran member tell me how one stages a reunion with non veterans, or fills a journal three times a year without the experiences of veterans that currently fill the pages. The latter is not so important but the gatherings are if we are to continue and provide interest for our members, and I am thinking of those who may join 10 years from now. We have to change.

In Gallipolian 46 I gave my views hoping to provoke comment and ideas for the Committee to consider while we still have veteran committee members. Alas nothing was forthcoming and we continue with a falling membership to produce three journals, a lunch and formal dinner for which now we are beginning to see the first signs of rising costs, reflected in your subscription. May I then as your Secretary, upon whom most of the work of this association falls, and who has real interest in keeping an organisation which functions, provides interest and yet is easy to manage, and is cost effective, suggest that in

1986 we bring about some real changes to cope with the future and all the changes time will bring. If you agree or disagree please write to me and say so.

I suggest that we make more of the lunch on the 25th April each year. As an act of remembrance we continue to parade at the Cenotaph and attend Westminster Abbey with the Anzacs, be we then go on to a lunch and not an Annual General Meeting. A lunch at which the Associate members meet in a spirit of comradeship based on a common interest taking their example from the veterans who previously filled the meetings with the spirit of comradeship formed on the battlefield.

Secondly we wind up the formal dinner at which attendances are falling because of time and age, the costs of travel and staying over in London, and replace it with the A.G.M. at lunch time, at the Duke of Yorks, where we can have a friendly informal lunch and conduct the business of the Association for those who wish to attend.

Finally, in order to stimulate additional interest at the lunch on the 25th April we invite a speaker from among our own members to speak for 15 minutes (20 at the outside) on any topic related to Gallipoli. The speaker to be selected from those attending who are willing to submit brief details of their chosen subject. One of our Committee members has suggested to me that he can provide a serving officer to address the meeting but my own opinion is that people speaking with hindsight who further dissect the corpse of Gallipoli are unlikely to provide much interest to an audience already familiar with the campaign to some extent, even if only from reading. To this end I submit the following headings as subjects and ask for volunteers to select or come up with something of their own.

Suggested Subjects. GALLIPOLI ONLY

The origin and role of the Zion Mule Coprs (and Indian Army Mule Corps.?)

Medical Services

Communications

Intelligence

Landing Craft - Beetles

Tekke Tepe, Suvla

Norfolk Regiment - Sandringham Coy.

Kirkpatrick (Simpson & Donkey)

The Turkish soldier

Lt. Co. W.G. Malone C.O. Wellington Rgt.

Minesweepers and Minesweeping

Royal Naval Air Service

Labour units or Pioneers

Humour

The Press

Old soldiers who would like to add information to assist the speaker on these or any other subject will be welcome to do so via the Secretary.

Keith Tranmer
Hon Secretary.

BOOKS

Since many members saw service on the Western front after Gallipoli it should be of interest that the Official History, Military Operations France and Belgium is being reprinted by SHEARER PUBLICATIONS of Woking, Surrey. The first volume. August-October 1914, is now available price £13.95 + packing and postage from:

ZEUGHAUS,
11 Hythe House,
Swan Road,
Rotherhithe,
London,
SE16 4LG

John Laffin's DAMN THE DARDANELLES! is now available in paperback in Australia and New Zealand. It is published by Macmillan under their Sun Papermac imprint and retails at A$7.95.

To What End Did They Die?
Officers Died at Gallipoli
By R W Walker

Having over many years acquired numerous books concerning Gallipoli I have reached a time when I am more than discriminating about adding any new book to my library. Few writers today can add much to what is already published and few are motivated to write because they have the subject bottled up inside them and the desire to communicate their feelings to others. Publishers turn away anything that will not make money and if a writer sincerely has something to say this can be extremely frustrating and may well result in ending any further desire to write on their part.

This is an unusual book and falls into the category of books that are unlikely to be a profitable publication or if accepted for publication may be held back if something thought to be more interesting comes to hand. The title does not help because the question can only be answered by reading other authors who have written about Gallipoli, but "Officers Died at Gallipoli" is the real title and the subject matter of the book for within the well bound covers are over 200 pp listing in alphabetical order and in detail the names of every officer killed in the campaign including those who died of wounds attributed to their Gallipoli sevice.

By coincidence the book arrived within days of me receiving two letters concerning relatives killed at Gallipoli and by way of a check both were looked up and both were recorded. Numerous other names have been checked since and at no time could one fault the accuracy and detail in the information provided. Obviously some names attract more attention than others, names like Baldwin, Bridges, Brooke, Doughty-Wylie, Longford, Malone, Overton, Quinn, are described in considerable detail having played a significant role, and there are many others some well known, many not so, but when put together there is a continuous link of senior and junior ranks on

different fronts and different dates, British, Australian, New Zealander and Indian, of both Army and Navy, which brings home to the reader who is perhaps tired of reading of the blunders and misfortune of Gallipoli, that the field officers and men were not defeated. Not by the enemy, nor the appalling conditions and impossible terrain; not even by the promise of certain death or mutilation. Scanning the pages where their efforts and ultimate fate are recorded there is scope to consider the question in the title "To What End Did They Die"? I certainly value the immense amount of research that has gone into this book and it is a fitting tribute to those known and lesser/known officers who gave their lives. It is in fact a tribute also to Rob Walker for undertaking such a task knowing that the entire cost of publication of his excellent record would fall entirely upon himself, a task he has not stinted for the book is well produced in clear type with supporting chapters dealing with Regimental titles, Units present, Ships engaged, and a Diary of events. There are 10 sketch maps and photographs of some of these whose names are recorded. This is an excellent reference work invaluable to those who collect medals but above all a splendid record with much detail for relatives of the men recorded and students of Gallipoli.

Keith Tranmer.

Format 6¼ x 9½ inches 252 pp illustrated, hard bound.

Members who wish to order this book should write to R.W. Walker Publishing, London House, 14 Old Street, Upton upon Severn, Worcester WR8 OHA.

The price is £15 including postage and packing.

A WAR GRAVES PILGRIMAGE TO GALLIPOLI

This is an account of the Royal British Legion War Graves Pilgrimage to Gallipoli, on the occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Landings at Cape Helles and Anzac on 25th April 1915, as arranged by Major and Mrs Holt's Battlefield Tours.

It all started at Heathrow on Saturday 20th April, when my elder son, Mike, and I met the other members of the RBL Group, under the direction of Major Piers Storie-Pugh (Executive Officer, RBL War Graves Pilgrimages).

The flight to Istanbul, by Turkish Airlines, was uneventful, and we arrived on a cool overcast evening and got settled into an excellent hotel, Etap Istanbul, where we were to spend the next two nights.

The following morning found us in the Hippodrome, from where we entered the beautiful Blue Mosque, with its six minarets. From here we went to the nearby Aya Sophya Mosque which is now a museum. It was fascinating to compare the 9th, 10th and 12th century Christian mosaics with the later inscriptions from the Koran that adorn the pillars, the original cathedral having become a mosque after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453.

After seeing the treasures of the Topkapi Palace Museum, which were spellbinding, we lunched at the Topkapi Restaurant overlooking the Bosporus, where it enters the Sea of Marmara, and scarcely a minute seemed to pass without a ship being observed proceeding to or from the Black Sea. In the afternoon we attended a Band concert in the hall of the Military Museum and then toured this well laid out museum.

In the evening HBM Consul General and Mrs James Paterson gave a Reception for the Pilgrimage Party at the Consulate General (the former British Embassy).

The next morning our coach drove us across the splendid Suspension Bridge that spans the Bosporus and links European with Asian Istanbul. Our tour of Istanbul ended with a visit to the Grand Covered Market.

After lunch we proceeded westwards out of the city, along the shore road by the Sea of Marmara, and it was interesting to note the large numbers of ships at anchor waiting to berth at Istanbul. After a stop at Tegirdig,

we arrived at Eceabat for the car ferry, across The Narrows, to Çanakelle, where we stayed at The Bakir Hotel for bed and breakfast but had our evening meal at the nearby Anafarta Hotel.

On Tuesday morning, 23rd April, when the weather had, at last, become warm and clear, we returned to the Gallipoli Peninsula and first visited Lone Pine Cemetery, where so many Australians are buried. We then obtained a magnificent view from Chunuk Bair, to the south, of Gaba Tepe and scrambled down Shrapnel Gully to Hell Spit, where in the little Anzac Beach Cemetery, "Simpson" ('The Good Samaritan' with the donkey) is buried.

Proceeding further up the Sari Bair Ridge, we visited Quinn's Post and The Nek cemeteries. From near the summit (910 feet) a grand panoramic view of the beach to the north of Anzac leading to Suvla Bay and the Salt Lake can be seen, stretching eastwards past Chocolate Hill and Scimitar Hill to the Tekke Tepe Ridge. We had a splendid Turkish Guide called Tosun (Bengisu), assigned to our coach, and I have a photo of him and Mike in one of the several Turkish trenches that have been preserved on the Sari Bair Ridge which had been Colonel Mustapha Kemel Pasha's Divisional Headquarters in 1915. My lasting impression was "how on earth could anyone have expected our troops in 1915 to have captured the tortuous heights of the Sari Bair Ridge?".

After lunch, while the rest of the Party made a closer inspection of the Suvla Bay area, Mike and I and a few others were taken by car to visit cemeteries near Helles. After a brief stop at Twelve Tree Copse Cemetery, we came to Pink Farm Cemetery where, to our great satisfaction, we found my father's grave, at which we laid a Poppy Spray and planted a little wooden cross of Remembrance. It was all very peaceful and quiet and all that could be heard was the hum of cuckoo bees amongst the Pink Blossom, with lovely Swallowtail butterflies flying around. Mike and I had achieved our object, and we could not have asked for more. We then proceeded a little further south to the large Lancashire Landing Cemetery in the vicinity of Cape Helles.

I cannot give too high praise to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission for all they have done, and are doing, at these cemeteries, and I should particularly like to mention the U.K. Resident Supervisor at Gallipoli, Mr Ken Harris, and his loyal and devoted staff of Turkish gardeners.

On our way back we stopped about 1½ miles SW of Krithia, where Mike and I reckoned we were within a few hundred yards of where my father had been killed, while Second in Command of his Battalion, during the First Battle of Krithia. On passing through Krithia, we looked in at the local War Museum in the main street of the village. Then back to Eceabat for the ferry passing a Turkish frigate, the NUSRET, at anchor off Çanakelle, dressed overall for Turkish National Children's Day.

The next day was spent in Asia Manor visiting Troy. The recent T.V. serial and subsequent book "In search of the Trojan War" by Michael Wood tells the story of Troys I-IX so well, and all I will do here is to mention the fine panoramic view looking north from the ramparts towards the Dardanelles, with the Gallipoli Peninsula beyond, across dark brown fields and green pastures. In the foreground, there was a shepherd leading his flock, as has always been the custom in Eastern Mediterranean countries, and it is interesting to recall this point being specifically mentioned in the 23rd Psalm and in the 10th Chapter of St John's Gospel.

Before lunch at the excellent Tusan Motel, we visited one of the shore batteries, now on a wooded hill, where two 6 inch guns (which had been manufactured in Britain) were mounted. Later we saw some Krupp guns at the Meysuf Battery on the south shore of, and overlooking, the Dardanelles.

On return to Çanakelle we toured the Military Museum and Mine Depot and were intrigued to be shown over a life size model of the (1915) Minelayer NUSRET which had laid the twenty 'extra' mines, in the vicinity of the southern shore of the Dardanelles, that were largely responsible

for the destruction of about one third of the Allied Heavy ships during the great naval battle of 18th March 1915 which was the last attempt by the Allies to force The Narrows by ships alone. This evening Mike and I had the privilege of calling on Captain Clarence Bennett (713) in his hotel room.

This came the great occasion of the 70th Anniversary on 25th April. We first attended a ceremony in front of the newly completed Turkish Military Museum above Gaba Tepe, where a Turkish Guard and Band was paraded, and speeches made by Turkish, Australian and New Zealand representatives before flags of those three countries were unfurled. It was here that Captain Bennett (713) and a Turkish veteran greeted each other most warmly, to the delight of all those present.

We next went to attend the unveiling of the Turkish Memorial, with its most touching inscription, to all those who fell at Anzac. The memorial, situated on the shore, had a bronze head of Ataturk on its top left hand corner. Anzac Cove was then officially named as such by the Turkish authorities, and it was here that I had the pleasure of meeting N. Anthony (796 AM). Then on to Lone Pine where a short ceremony was held, and the Last Post and Reveille sounded by our Drummer from The Kings Own Royal Border Regiment and the RBL Standard paraded by the Deputy National Standard Bearer. A similar ceremony was repeated at the Chunuk Bair New Zealand Memorial.

And so to the culminating ceremony at the great Cape Helles Memorial, where among those present were HBM Ambassador in Ankara (Sir Mark Russell) and the Chairman of the RBL National Executive Council (Mr Windsor Spinks) who has sadly died before this article was printed. Once again our Drummer and Standard Bearer took part in the ceremony, at the end of which I had the privilege of laying a Poppy Spray in memory of the uncle of Lt. Colonel R.K. May (725 AM).

During the lunch break arrangements were made for Mike and me to visit the nearby Skew Bridge Cemetery, to

lay a Poppy Spray at the grave of an uncle of another special friend and, before returning to Helles, we paid a second brief visit to Pink Farm Cemetery.

In the afternoon we listened to a description of the Landing from the RIVER CLYDE at 'V' Beach, looking down on the location from the cliffs above, by Lt. Colonel Mike Martin, a former recent Commanding Officer of The Royal Hampshire Regiment, and the Holts' excellent representative in our coach. It was fitting that a party of two officers and eight Other Ranks from the Royal Hampshire Regiment was present.

Mike and I then went for a short walk a little inland from the Helles Memorial, from where the minaret of the mosque at Krithia village could be clearly seen some five miles to the north east, with the slopes of Achi Baba in the right background, and I just cannot understand how that village was never captured. Subsequently, we visited the grave of Colonel Doughty-Wylie VC a little inland from the cliffs at 'V' Beach. The day ended with a visit to the enormous Turkish Memorial above Morto Bay.

On 26th April we returned to Istanbul, making stops at Gelibolu and the Hisar Restaurant. It was particularly interesting to be able to study the country round the Bulair Isthmus, through which the main road passes.

And so back to Heathrow on the following morning after a most memorable week.

H.J.A. Brooke.
(588 AM).



The War Graves Pilgrimage at the Cape Helles Memorial Ceremony 25th April 1985



Captain C.A. Bennett with Turkish Veteran.

A LONE GRAVE

By David Saunders (928 AM)

Nearly 30 years ago while on a cycling tour with my wife to be in east Suffolk I happened to pass through the tiny village of Thebberton. Just inside the gateway to the thatched church, and forming a striking frontispiece to the war memorial was a German machine gun, erected there in memory of one of the village sons, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Doughty-Wylie VC Royal Welch Fusiliers who had fallen at Gallipoli. In 1975 the ravages of time on the gun were plain, whilst six years late I was shocked to find it had completely disappeared. Enquiries nearby elicited the information that to escape destruction during World War II scrap metal campaigns the gun had been buried, this however had led to its deterioration with no steps taken to prevent its ultimate decay.

That chance discovery of the Doughty-Wylie memorial on a late summers day in 1957 has been entirely reponsible for my subsequent interest in the Gallipoli campaign. This year I was most fortunate in being able to visit the Peninsula, and made as my first objective Hill 141, subsequently renamed Fort Doughty-Wylie. On 23rd April I walked the short distance up the hill from the tiny village of Sedd-el-Bahr, the sounds of singing and dancing, for it was Childrens Day, receding in the distance. Doughty-Wylie lies where he fell, a lone grave with two sentinel cedars marking its position from many miles away. Two days later, the 70th anniversary of the landings, I returned and with particular pleasure saw the wreath of poppies laid on behalf of the 1st Bt Royal Welch Fusiliers and the RWF Old Comrades Association. The attached card with a Welsh translation of Laurence Binyon's immortal lines.

Charles Doughty, the name Wylie being added after his marriage, was born, the son of Henry and Elizabeth Doughty, at Thebberton Hall the family home, on 23rd July 1868. He won a scholarship to Winchester, passed high into Sandhurst, and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the

Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 21st September 1889. Two years later he was severely wounded in the knee during a campaign among the preciptous ridges of the Black Mountain to the west of Indus. Service as a transport officer on the staff of General Gatacre during the Chitral campaign of 1893 was followed by spells in Malta and Crete. During the Nile expedition he was presented at both the battles of Omdurman and El Gedd. Whilst in command of a battalion of mounted infantry he was severly wounded at the affair of Vredfort during the South African war. On recovery he rejoined his Regiment at Tien-stin before taking responsibilities as a Special Service Officer in Somaliland 1903-04.

In 1904 Doughty married Lilian, widow of Lieutenant Adams, Indian Medical Service, and daughter of John Wylie of Hampshire. Shortly afterwards his career took a change of course when he was appointed Military Consul for the Kania province of Turkey During a revival of the Armenian pogroms he took command of Adana on his own initiative. Despite having his right arm broken by a rifle bullet he brought together loyal troops and dispersed the mobs so preventing further massacres. H.W. Nevinson The Dardanelles Campaign refers to the recollections of a young American girl trapped with others in a Church being set on fire by the Turks. Doughty-Wylie arrived, forced his way through, and calling 'Come my "children", led them to safety, 'like frightened sheep we were, but he calmed us'. With his wife he arranged relief for over 20,000 refugees, his work being recognised by the award of the CMG.

The year 1909 found Doughty-Wylie as British Consul in Addis Abbaba, but concern at events in south-east Europe during the Balkan War of 1912 brought him back to Turkey where he became Director in Chief of Red Cross Units. A grateful Sultan bestowed awards on both Doughty-Wylie and his wife. In the aftermath of the conflict he became British representative and Chairman of the International Commission delineating the southern boundary of Albania. His services were again noted and on 22nd June 1914 it was announced he had been made a

Companion of the Bath. He returned to his diplomatic post at Addis Abbaba, rising to become Charge d' Affaires before recall to active service.

In February 1915 Doughty-Wylie was attached with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to the staff of Gerneral Sir Ian Hamilton for the Gallipoli campaign. One of the last photographs shows him in deep conversation with the General on the rails of the Arcadian at Mudros in Mid-April. With the great landings imminent Doughty-Wylie transferred to the River Clyde and so travelled to V beach where his presence was to prove so crucial. During the desperate hours after the landing on 25th April he was everywhere on board as other senior officers were killed or wounded. After dark he went ashore with Lieutenant-Colonel W.de L. Williams and Captain G. N. Walford to rally the survivors crouching against the low bank which backed the narrow and now blood stained beach. Sir Ian Hamilton recorded that 'many of the troops were badly shaken and it was a rare quality for an unknown officer to pull them together'.

Captain Guy Nightingale of the 1st Munster Fusiliers has provided an excellent account in Ward, C.H. Regimental Records of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers Vol. 4., of the searing hours from dawn on the 26th. The Castle, bastion of the Sedd-el-Bahr position overlooking V beach, was occupied after a bayonet charge led by Doughty-Wylie. It was now that Captain Walford died as a burst of machine gun fire raked one of the Castle exits. He was post-humously awarded the Victoria Cross. Doughty-Wylie had a narrow escape when a bullet knocked his staff cap to the ground. With complete disregard for his personal safety and protection he walked amongst the men carrying no more than a cane as he encouraged them to greater efforts.

All morning desperate hand to hand fighting took place as the Turkish defenders were driven, house by shattered house, from the village. Whenever a party of men faltered at their task, whenever a house needed to be searched, Doughty-Wylie seemed on hand to rally and inspire confidence. In the face of enormous difficulties

Sedd-el-Bahr was eventually captured from the enemy.

There remained but one last objective, Hill 141, a low ridge overlooking the village upon which the Turks were firmly entrenched. Doughty-Wylie arranged for HMS Albion to bombard the hill, for those on board it was a day never to be forgotten, they witnessed first the tribulation and then the triumph of those on shore. As the barrage lifted, with barely an order the men of the Hampshires, the Munsters and the Dublins rushed forward cheering as they went towards the summit.

The final Turkish position was rushed with Doughty-Wylie in the lead. Here 'in the last stage of his priceless success he was shot in the head, dying almost immediately'. That evening his watch and few personal posssessions were removed and the Lords Prayer said as the men of the Munsters, who had shared the victory, bade good bye and buried him where he had fallen.

The citation for the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross refers to the initiative, skill and great gallantry of both Doughty-Wylie and Walford being mainly responsible for the attack being a complete success. Would the day have been carried but for them?

When in 1919 the work commenced of bringing the remains of the fallen from my scattered points to the 31 cemeteries on Gallipoli, Doughty-Wylie was left undisturbed. The lone grave is now set upon a raised surround, a rosemary bush growing snugly by the headstone. A hoopoe called from the distant orchard and brought a pastoral tranquility to this warrior's grave on a windy hilltop as I made my third visit during this 70th anniversay year.

Most who pass this way, to V Beach and Lancashire Landing Cemeteries, or to the great memorial at Cape Helles, probably do not realise that hidden within a few yards of where the narrow road tops the hill above Sedd-el-Bahr lies Doughty-Wylie. Hamilton described him as having no hatred for the enemy, but with 'the overflowing

enthusiasm and contempt for death which alone can give troops the volition to attack when they have been crouching so long under a pitiless fire'.

THE ROYAL NAVY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN OF 1915 (Contd.) BY CPO A.L. BURGIN (AM 873)

The Carden Plan

Churchill's restlessness could not be harnessed and, on 3rd January 1915, he telegraphed Admiral Carden, asking for his views on the possiblity of forcing the Dardanelles by ships alone. 'It is assumed older battle-ships fitted with mine-bumpers would be used, preceded by colliers or other merchant craft as mine-bumpers and sweepers. Importance of results would justify severe loss. Let me know your views'. This telegram was highly signif-icant. It was, on Churchill's own admission, deliberately phrased to provide a favourable response.[11] But Carden, who had little knowledge of the Dardanelles defences, was being invited to give his views on a matter of decisive policy. Moreover, the First Sea Lord had not only not seen this telegram prior to its despatch, but had not asked to be shown it. (Fisher's account is that he agreed in principle to Carden's views being ascertained. 'Churchill talked to me about it', he has stated; 'I was quite conversant with it'). Carden found himself in the unenviable position of being asked to give an opinion on the very wide question of weather the Dardandelles could be forced by ships alone. His cautious reply of 5th January is understandable. 'I do not consider Dardanelles can be rushed. They might be forced by extended operations with large number of ships'. Although Carden was later to tell the Dardanelles Commission 'I did not mean directly that they could be forced. I thought it might be done', his reply gave an eager Churchill the lead he required. On 5th January, he replied to Carden, 'Your view is agreed by high authorities here. Please telegraph in detail what you think could be done by extended operations, what force would be needed, and how you consider it should be used'. (The 'high authorities' actually turned out to be Admiral

Oliver and Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, the Third Sea Lord, with whom Churchill had discussed the matter briefly. Oliver was extremely cautious - he has recorded that his opinion was that 'we should push on slowly until we over come the enemy's defence, or till the enemy's defence brought us to a standstill'. Jackson's views were even more guarded. Neither Fisher nor the War Staff Group at the Admiralty were consulted. Carden was entitled to believe that 'high authorities' meant something a good deal more than this. This beginning was to characterize the relationships between Churchill and his Service advisers throughout the inception of the Dardanelles Campaign, and must be viewed as skilfully playing off one side against the other.

Carden's plans were received at the Admiralty on 11th January. They had been prepared by his staff and the gunnery experts in HMS Inflexible, and consisted of a four stage attack involving direct and indirect (firing over the peninsula from off Gaba Tepe) bombardment of the forts, the clearing of the minefields, and the eventual advance into the Marmara. Carden insisted on the essential requirement of aerial reconnaissance, that ammunition expenditure would be heavy, that it was impossible to estimate the time required to complete the operation, and that the weather -notoriously unreliable at that time of year in the Aegean - was a crucial factor. Carden asked for a fleet of 12 battleships, 3 battlecruisers, 16 destroyers, 7 submarines, 4 seaplanes, 12 minesweepers, and other miscellaneous craft.

Churchill was greatly impressed, but the reaction of Fisher and his colleagues to the Carden proposals was one of surprise. The comments of Admiral Jackson, far from 'embracing' and 'approving'[13] the plans, were critical and even sceptical. When he attempted to discuss the subject with Churchill, his viewpoint 'was not welcomed and had no effect'. Admiral Sir Percy Scott, the Navy's foremost gunnery expert, considered it 'an impossible task'. The Naval Air Staff did not meet formally to discuss the proposals at all. Fisher repeatedly declared that he found it impossible to controvert Churchill's arguments

when the two met. 'He always out-argues me'. But, when he reflected on the matter, his doubts and apprehensions returned. 'I made it a rule that I would not at the War Council kick Winston Churchill's shins', he told the Dardanelles Commission. 'He was my chief, and it was silence or resignation'.

Churchill produced Carden's plans at the end of a long and trying meeting of the War Council on 13th January.[14] The forts, he said, would be systematically reduced 'within a few weeks. Once the forts were reduced, the minefields could be cleared and the Fleet would proceed up to Constantinople and destroy the Geoben.[15] They would have nothing to fear from field guns or rifles, which would be merely inconvenience'. Kitchener again stated that no troops would be available for some months; although he did not on this account oppose a naval operation at the Dardanelles. Members of the War Council were attracted by Churchill's rhetoric, the immense possibilities which might follow successful entry into the Marmara, and the fact that, if necessary, the operation could be broken off. The ensuing resolution was that 'the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople at its objective'. This exemplifies the lack of cohesion in the War Council, for a purely naval expedition could 'take' neither the peninsula nor Constantinople. Without a military occupation and the expulsion of the Turkish forces, the Turks could continue to hold both sides of the Straits, thereby preventing supplies from reaching the fleet. Asquith thought he had sanctioned merely the 'preparation' of an expedition. Churchill, perhaps not surprisingly, took the view that the Council had approved of a 'principle', with 'general knowledge' of the method involved. Fisher and Admiral Wilson had left the Council room before the resolution was read out. Commodore de Bartolomé, Churchill's naval secretary, subsequently said, that the naval members 'only agreed to a purely naval operation on the understanding that we could always draw back - that there should be no question of what is known as forcing the Dardanelles'. It is difficult to dispute that Churchill, in informing

Carden that his plan had been approved, and in ordering a closer study of the proposed attack on the assumption that the principle had been accepted, exceeded his authority. Moreover, on 19th January, Churchill was telling the Russian Grand Duke that 'it has been determined to attempt to force the Dardanelles by naval force. It is our intention to press the matter to a conclusion'.

The War Council met again on 28th January. Kitchener stated that the naval attack was of vital importance, and that its success would be equivalent to a successful campaign by the new armies. Churchill repeated his intention of using ships to force the Dardanelles, and that preparations were well advanced. Fisher was by now greatly disturbed about such an operation - he had, with Admiral Jackson, been pressing vigorously for the possibility of using troops - and rose to tender his resignation. Kitchener quickly intervened and told Fisher that he ought (out of a sense of loyalty) to abide by Asquith's decision to endorse the Dardanelles operation. Fisher eventually relented but maintained what Asquith has described as 'an obstinate and ominous silence'. Fisher's position was exceedingly difficult. Although enthusiastically in favour of a joint operation, he was strongly opposed to a purely naval attack.[16] But on 28th January, albeit with many misgivings, he had definitely agreed to the naval operation. 'To forbid, before it had been tried, an experiment on which rested so many sanguine hopes, would have been an impracticable step', he later declared.

SHIPS AGAINST FORTS

The naval attack began with bombardment of the outer forts on 19th February, four days late owing to bad weather. From a military point of view it was not a success. The warships kept moving as they fired, and caused little or no damage. But the resulting Admiralty communiqué created great excitement. Constantinople was tense and expectant, and anxiously awaited the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire. Carden renewed the bombardment of the Outer Defences on 25th February, with more success. The long-range guns were silenced and the Turks

withdrew. (Fisher had agreed that the newly completed HMS Queen Elizabeth should carry out her gunnery trials by firing at the Turkish forts. Although this was a great psychological advantage to Carden, he was told on 5th February that great care was to be taken with the guns of the most powerful battleship afloat, and that salvoes should not be fired by her except in an emergency. Under no circumstances was she to be allowed to sail in waters unswept of mines. 'It is not expected nor desired that the operations should be hurried to the extent of taking large risks and courting heavy losses', he was instructed. This was a subtle, but significant, change of emphasis in his orders. (Having been told that the operation was so important as to justify heavy losses, he was now being urged to be cautious).

On 26th February, bombardment of the Inner Defences was opened from inside the Straits by three warships, and for the first time resistance was encountered from concealed mobile howitzer batteries.[17] Meanwhile, parties of Marines had been landed at the tip of the peninsula and, without hindrance, destroyed the guns in the abandoned outer forts. (At this exact spot two months later, thousands of British soldiers fell dead or wounded).

The Dardanelles defences were by now a different proposition than in November. Under German direction,[18] the defensive system had improved dramatically. The mines had been laid with forethought and were the principal defence; the primary role of the guns was to protect the minefields. (This fact was not readily appreciated by the Allies at the time. The fortresses and gun batteries were considered to be the key factor of the defences). The problem for the ships was acute. The Narrows could not be approached until the mines had been swept, and the improvised minesweepers (North Sea trawlers) were unable to clear a path until the shore batteries had been eliminated. Furthermore, dummy batteries -emitting black smoke - had been positioned to draw the war-ships' fire. The fleet bombarded the Inner Defences on three other occasions but with little effect. On 2nd March, Carden reported to the Admiralty that he hoped to be in the Marmara in about a

fortnight. (This was supreme optimism and typifies the conduct prevalent in many of the leading military commanders throughout the campaign. But such optimism was to have disastrous consequences, particularly concerning the strategy of Sir Ian Hamilton).

HMS Queen Elizabeth opened up an indirect assault on the Narrows' forts on 5th March at a range of some 14,000 yards. Her 15 inch shells, hurled across the Gallipoli Peninsula, in this totally unexpected attack, flung the Turks into considerable confusion. The protection of their batteries had been designed specifically on the basis of attack from the Straits. But the absence of reliable reconnaissance aircraft (refused by Kitchener), ensured that Carden was unaware of the extent to which the indirect fire had disconcerted the Turks. When the ship arrived off Gaba Tepe the following morning to repeat the operation, she was herself shelled by a Turkish battery which had been rushed there overnight. The ship was forced further out to sea, with a seriously adverse effect on her gunnery. (For some unexplained reason indirect fire techniques were not generally used at Gallipoli. On 3rd May, Commander Dewar of HMS Prince of Wales presented a report on methods of indirect firing. No action was taken and a writer in the Naval Review of October 1957 suggests that the proposals were not forwarded 'perhaps because they might be interpreted as questioning the infallability of the admiral'. Captain Dent of HMS Edgar used indirect firing methods on 15th November with great effect in assisting a British attack at Helles. He had officers ashore as spotters, and at night used illuminated aiming marks on land. With the same technique, the Edgar fired 1,000 rounds of 6 inch shell into the Turkish trenches at Helles on 7th January to support the evacuation).

By 11th March the fleet had made no progress and, while the morale of the Turkish and German[19] gunners was rising daily, the minesweepers' civilian crews were demoralised. Theirs was a desperately difficult task, and the dangers they faced have not always been fully appreciated. With a strong opposing current, the trawlers were continually exposed by fierce sunlight during the day and

by searchlight at night. They were under fire from the shore batteries at extremely close range. The naval officer sent out from England to command them had had no previous experience of minesweeping duties. When their nerve finally broke, Carden's Chief of Staff, Commodore Roger Keyes, took personal command of the minesweepers, called for naval volunteers and offered the civilian crews handsome financial inducements to continue. On the night of 13th March, Keyes sent six of the trawlers, together with the cruiser HMS Amethyst as escort, to sweep the Kephez Bay minefield. Within minutes four trawlers were badly damaged by gunfire, while Amethyst was also hit and for a time lay out of control. The minefield had hardly been touched. (The civilian crews were subsequently blamed very severely - particularly by Keyes - for their failure. But the folly lay in their presence at the Dardanelles at all in this impossible role).

As a result of this setback Carden reversed his strategy, and decided that the guns of the ships must precede - rather than follow - the minesweeping operation. Under increasing pressure and failing health, he replied to an anxious Churchill that he would launch his major attack on 17th March. (Fisher, who 'had a sort of feeling that the thing was rather too much for Carden', even offered to take personal command at the Dardanelles but Churchill persuaded him to remain in Whitehall).

While not yet amounting to an actual reverse, the delays incurred by the fleet since 4th March had important political consequences, not the least being the downfall of the Greek Venizelos Government on 6th March, and the resulting change in Greek attitude towards the Dardanelles Campaign. Admiral von Tirpitz noted on 12th March, 'It is a dangerous situation. The capsizing of one little State may affect fatally the whole course of the war'. On 21st March he wrote, 'The forcing of the Dardanelles would be a severe blow'.

18th MARCH 1915

Carden collapsed from the accumulation of strain and worry on 17th March, and was replaced by his second-in-

Vice Admiral John de Robeck.[20] On 18th March, having assured Churchill that he wholeheartedly supported both the operation and Carden's plan he ordered the Allied fleet to attack the fortifications at the Narrows. In a tremendous spectacle of naval might, 18 battleships, surrounded by an armada of cruisers and destroyers, swept majestically into the Straits.[21]

The famous naval attack of 18th March has often been described. It opened favourably for the Allies but shortly before 1400, the French battleship Bouvet sank with almost all her entire company of over 600.[22] (The loss of Bouvet has often been inadequately explained. When this writer visited the Commander at the Dardanelles - Rear Admiral Erhan Gurcan - in August 1982, it was confirmed that she was first hit by a shell and, almost simultaneously, struck one of the 20 mines which had been laid parrallel to the Asiatic shore by the Turkish Commander Mine Group at Chanak after observing the movements of the Allied warships, and particularly the manner in which they broke off an attack and returned to the Aegean. He was able to see that the arc to starboard was always the same, and that the ships passed close to the Asiatic side of the Straits. 14 of the mines were of Russian origin, brought to the Dardanelles from the Black Sea. A small number were French and had been recovered from a ship that had sunk in Izmit Bay near Constantinople. This writer also confirmed that this row of mines was laid on the night of 16th March, and not, as suggested by Mr. Alan Moorehead in his book 'Gallipoli', on the night of 8th March.[23] This may help to explain a little better why this particular row of mines was not discovered before the naval attack of 18th March.

The minesweepers, advancing slowly and with difficulty, again made little impression. At 1611, HMS Inflexible reported that she had struck a mine, and was seen to be listing badly. Three minutes later, HMS Irresistible was listing, and was flying a green flag at her starboard yardarm, indicating that she thought she had

been torpedoed on her starboard side. She had in fact struck another of the elusive 20 mines.

At 1700, de Robeck ordered a general retirement. The battleship Ocean then struck a further mine. She and Irresistible eventually sank, and although Inflexible and the French battleship Gaulois - badly damaged by gunfire - reached safety, de Robeck was faced with the sombre fact that, out of nine battleships engaged in the attack, six had been sunk or crippled. At first there was no thought, either in Whitehall or at the Dardanelles, of not continuing the attack, although Keyes admitted that the action could not be renewed until the minesweepers had been completely reorganised. He anticipated that this would take about two weeks. 'There was never any question', he has written, 'of taking battleships through unswept minefields'. (Following the general withdrawal, Keyes had returned to the Narrows to ascertain the condition of the stricken ships. He has related that, 'Except for the searchlights there seemed to be no sign of life, and I had a most indelible impression that we were in the presence of a beaten foe. I thought he as beaten at 2pm. I knew he was beaten at 4pm - and at midnight I knew with still greater clarity that he was absolutely beaten. Churchill would say later that, 'If the Navy had tried again they would have found that the door was open. The battle of 18th March could have been resumed a month later in overwhelmingly favourable conditions'. It is difficult, with hindsight, to argue with Keyes' assessment of the situation on the night of 18th March. The Turks had expended most of their heavy calibre ammunition, and it is probable that a further attack on 19th March would have been decisive. But Churchill's view is open to much challenge. The only chance of success a month later would have been the employment of the new sweeping force of destroyers proposed by Keyes. But he did not anticipate that they would be ready before 10th April. When the fleet did not immediately renew the attack of 18th March, Liman von Sanders, the German commander at Gallipoli, was certain of an Allied landing on the peninsula, and made preparations accordingly. 'It was equally clear to me that they (the Allies) would

not relinquish such a high prize without further effort. Hence a large landing had to be counted upon! Despite the driving enthusiasm and optimism of Keyes, de Robeck had been badly shaken by the events of 18th March. On 22nd March, he and General Sir Ian Hamilton - appointed by Kitchener on 12th March to command the land forces - conferred onboard the flagship, Queen Elizabeth. It was agreed that a joint attack was now essential. (Accounts of this conference vary. Hamilton says that 'the moment we sat down de Roebeck told us he as now quite clear he could not get through without the help of all my troops'. De Robeck's version is that he had been prepared to continue with the naval attack until Hamilton told him that he regarded a joint attack as 'a sound operation of war'. But it is clear that Hamilton now appeared to be eager to take the initiative away from the Navy). Churchill was dismayed at this news and drafted a telegram ordering de Robeck to resume the naval attack as soon as possible. But the Admiralty War Staff Group now showed resolve, and was adamant that the decision could only be made by the commanders on the spot, 'for the first time since the war began'. Churchill was written, 'high words were used around the octagonal table'. With deep reluctance, he had to accept their judgement. (Churchill in fact had realised that a major Admiralty crisis was imminent unless the telegram was significantly amended which, in effect, left the decision to de Robeck).

The events of 18th March had been a severe check to the British, and it marked the end of the attempt to force the Dardanelles by the Royal Navy. The scene was now set for the landings of 25th April, and the agony of the Gallipoli Campaign.

To Be Continued)

APOLOGY

The Editor wrongly attributed the article entitled My Gallipoli Story in Gallipolian No. 48 to Major T. Verschoyle MC, instead of Major G.B. HORRIDGE TD. The Editor takes full responsibility for this error and wishes to apologise unreservedly to both Major Horridge and Major Verschoyle for the avoidable confusion.

MY GALLIPOLI STORY (Contd.) - Major G.B. Horridge 1/5 Lancashire Fusiliers (129)

The day wore on, no more attacks were made and eventually at dusk we were ordered to fall in in "Mass"!! I shouldn't think any battalion before or since has fallen -in in mass formation in the front line'. Perhaps the enemy couldn't see us in the dusk but a machine gun could have wrought terrible havoc. So we fell in. To my astonishment my men began to appear from various places and I found they weren't all dead. In fact there were 6 casualties. Out of my 61 I had lost 3 killed (Collinson Searle and I think Walling) and 3 wounded. The casualties of the battalion were about 180, that is about 18% which is a lot, but alas we hadn't reached the shoulder of Achi Baba. We hadn't even taken a trench and we had't seen a live unwounded Turk. We were relieved by the K.O.S.B. 29th Division and made our way back towards the beaches.

Few things are more depressing than the evening after a battle, when the full total of the casualties are realised. Everybody has lost friends both killed and wounded and the recital of various phases of the battle and the accounts of the casualties, people killed others badly wounded and again others (probably a friend or two among them) missing; no one knows what has happened to them, is a very mournful and depressing business. My friend with whom I had explored Cairo namely Humphrey Hoyle, was the Scout Officer and was the first Officer (and may well be the first man in the battalion) to be killed. Being a Scout he was leading the advance and was shot through the head early on in the day somewhere just in front of the trench I have just mentioned.

After May 7th for a month we were in what we called the "white line" because of its chalky appearance. This line was in support and not near enough to the enemy to be under direct fire. Stray bullets came occasionally and there were a few casualties. The Turks had a habit of firing a lot at night and consequently our men slept in the bottom of the trench to protect them against stray bullets.

Sentries on the trench were posted at night, Officers had a two hour watch to do each night and everyone had to "Stand to Arms" at break of dawn for an hour. I trust that my readers know very little about bad or vulgar language. If it ever happens to be their duty to patrol trenches and visit sentry posts at night when the trench is full of men sleeping in the bottom of it, they will almost assuredly learn a lot more about it. Soldiers who get their face trodden on when asleep are apt to wake up and say things which are quite "low" in tone (tho' said in a loud voice) and generally verging on the vulgar. It was my experience to hear a good deal of this every night. A lot of new words and not all four letter words can be learned in this way. I slept in a rectangular hole in the ground which I shared with a corporal of my platoon Cecil Clarke. After the war I was Best Man at his wedding, godfather to his daughter and one of his grand-daughters. There were working parties every day and the duties already described at night and consequently we were tired for lack of sleep. However, we were well and hungry. No flies had arrived yet and the rations were not generous enough to stop the hunger. The working parties went out every day. Trenches had to be dug; deep mule trenches were made so that the animals could carry ammunition and stores to near the front trenches and stores etc. had to be unloaded from ships. Our rations consisted of 3 dog biscuits made by Pratts (there was no bread for our first month on the Peninsular) a day, a little bacon, a tin of bully beef, about 8 men to a pot of jam, a little cheese and butter. Also tea. This was hardly enough to keep body and soul together if one was young and healthy. One day I was ordered to take a working party to the beach to unload stores. Sidney Milnes

said to me "if your entrenching tool happens to drop and break open a case of food, bring me some of the contents". Well it did happen to fall on a case. I made sure it was hard enough to open it. The excitment was terrific; I peered inside. Pickles!!!

The weather all the time I was on the Peninsular which was from May 5th to June 4th wounded and away until July 12th, July 12th to August 2nd (about) went to Lemnos Hospital with illness brought on by the flies until August 16th, August 16th to September 15th when I was evacuated to have an operation for fistula, was hot, and cool at night time.

We had ordinary khaki uniform, not drill which we generally wore without jackets as it was too hot. Going into action on May 7th we were warned by some of the 29th Division not to wear our pith helmets as they were too conspicuous and were a good aiming mark for the enemy. So we threw them away into a ravine and wore our woollen cap comforters. Later these helmets were collected and we wore them later in the trenches. Discipline was generally pretty good. Occasionally a man would be "had up" for self inflicted wounds and sometimes a man would go to sleep on sentry duty. Both these were very serious crimes. As officers we couldn't do anything about the self inflicted wounds and if proved it was a case of court martial. We could do something about being asleep because we realised how tired the men were. So if when on duty we thought a sentry was asleep we would walk past him and either knock his rifle down or knock his leg from under him. When we went up to speak to him he was awake.

I had an old soldier in my platoon, Private J. Dawber who was a character. He had a medal for the Sudanese campaign under Lord Kitchener about 1898. He was fat and slow and knew most of the tricks of the trade. He was heard one day in the trenches where he had stationed himself at the end of the trench where it ran out into the gully saying "come and stick your leg out here, the bullets are coming low here." However, he didn't get

wounded with me but was eventually pushed off to join the Indian Transport. He had an old army song he used to sing, of which the chorus went

Side by side like a crimson tide
In the days of long ago
One we dashed as our sabres flashed
and we conquered every foe
One by one 'til the day was done
I saw my comrades fall
'Til I was the only one left
To answer the last roll call

I never heard this song any other time.

To continue the story. We were in the white line for almost a month with the exception of a few days in the 2nd Australian Line. I don't really know where this line was. It certainly wasn't the front line but was near enough to it to have to keep in the trench and be reasonable about keeping our heads down. The reason I mention this trench is because the only day on which it rained while I was on the Peninsular was while we were in this trench; sometime about the middle of May. It rained so hard that the trench was flooded and people's belongings were floating about in the water and drifting out of the end of the trench into the gully. We were wet through but after a while it stopped and the sun came out and we started to dry our clothes. They were nearly dry when it came on again. It was so heavy that water coming off the land rushed through the trench. This was in the afternoon and so there was not much time to dry our clothes before evening. Luckily we were relieved that night and went back to the "White line". Incidenally, the Coy. Sgt. Major that evening tried to prevent a cold by taking rum as medicine! We couldn't wake him up next day until late afternoon.

The month wore on and June came. Cecil Clarke and I were very hungry in our little dugout and one day I told Cecil I was going to beard the Quartermaster Major Cremen in his den on the bank of Krithea Nullah and see

if I could get some extra food. The approach had to be carefully planned because th Q.M. was a tough Regular Soldier and certainly wouldn't yield anything out of the store without the utmost persuasion. It was pretty well known that his soft spots were (i) Commiseration about his wound he had received by being hit with the nose cap of a shrapnel shell on his arm which wasn't bad enough to be evacuated from the Peninsular and (ii) his love of cricket and visits to Old Trafford. One afternoon, I paid him a visit in his dugout and started the softening up process. All seemed to go well and in half an hour I had got to the stage of asking for a little extra food, saying how hungry I was (and Cecil was hungry too). He said "really, Horridge, are you so hungry" and sent for the Quartermaster Sergeant Clem Whittaker. He said, "Mr. Horridge says he is very hungry and I have told him that if he will bring a sand bag down here at one o'clock in the morning you will fill it for him." This was great news and I went back to Cecil glowing with the excitement of a job well done. We were elated and at 4.30 we were sitting in our little hole in the ground thinking of food and how lovely it would be eating it. At 5 o'clock my Company Commander Edmund Ashworth sent for all officers and gave us our orders for the battle that was to start the next day. "The Company will move up into the front line and the move will begin at 10 p.m. tonight". That did it, no food. The day was June 3rd 1915 and at 11 o'clock the next day June 4th one of the biggest battles of the Gallipoli Campaign began with an hour's preliminary bombardment. I must have been very dense because it wasn't until long afterwards I realised the joke. Of course Cremen, being the Quartermaster, knew everything when I went to see him and knew I could never bring the sand bag that night. We moved up that night in battle equipment and I slept on a muddy path on the way to the front line with my head on a stone for a pillow. On our part of the front which was between the Krithia and Achi Baba Nullahs the 8th Manchesters were to attack at noon and our company was to garrison the front line and remain in it when they left it. I can't say much about what happened on our left and right because, of course in battle one knows little about anything but one's own

sector. However, "C" and "D" companies of our Battalion were lent to the 6th Manchester Regiment who were across the Nullah on our left. From what I have heard from my brother Walter who was with "D" company, they eventually advanced as far as anyone ever got on the Helles part of the Campaign and reached the outskirts of Krithia with practically no Turks to their immediate front. However, as the troops on their right and left were held up they could go no further and eventually found themselves isolated in a trench with Turks in the trench on both sides of them and in the trenches in front. Their trench was barricaded at each end and the enemy had to be kept out by bombing. This position was held for many days; how many exactly I don't know but I think about 8. Eventually, they had to retire and for his part, which I think was the leading part, in this action and subsequent defence of the exposed position, Walter received the Military Cross. He told me that he had about 8 days and nights in this trench without much sleep and in constant fear of the barricades giving way. He also mentioned that his little bit of trench where he lived was next to a dead Turk.

To go on with my own story "A" Coy (The one I was in) got into the front trench along with the 8th Manchesters and at 11 a.m. prompt the bomardment of the enemy lines began. I learned that behind us were the famous French 75's. These were field guns of 75 millimetre calibre (about 3 inches) and were noted for their accurate fire. The Turkish front line trench was about 130 yards away and certainly our guns were accurate, they seemed to be hitting the trench everytime. Being only 130 yards or so from where the shells were bursting meant that the shells passed over our heads at no great distance.

To Be Continued