THE GALLIPOLIAN

THE JOURNAL OF THE GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION



Mountain gun of The Indian Brigade "Making Ready"

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THE GALLIPOLIAN
The Journal of the Gallipoli Association
(Founded by Major E H W Banner in 1969
on the campaign of 1915)

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NEW MEMBERS

In the original printed journal, this page and a section of the next contain the names and full addresses of new members, and also address amendments.

For reasons of data protection and personal privacy, this content has been omitted.

AWARDED LIFE MEMBERSHIP

250 H V L TUBBS

423 S A HALL

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

OBITUARY (at 22nd October, 1986)

With deep regret the following names are recorded.

89 Col.C W ROGERS, 9th Royal Warwicks.Regt., 13 Div.
512 C MACINTOSH, OBE, BA, Lt.,9th Royal Warwicks.Regt.13 Di
515 C A MEAGER, TEM, Rfmn, 1/8 Hants.(I.of Wight), 54 Div.
584 Capt.W P LINES, Ment.Disp.,6th Royal Welsh Fus.,53 Div.
790 A J CLUTTERBUCK, DCM,MM, 7 Glosters.
830 H B COX, 7 Glosters attd.ANZAC.
855 Lt-Col.Sir JOSEPH NAPIER,Bt.,OBE., 2/Lt.4th So.Wales Borderers, 13 Div.

RESIGNATIONS.

AM643 Major C E E SCOTT.
AM837 Brigadier the Hon. H E C WILLOUGHBY.
AM861 D P HOLYOAK.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Joseph Napier,Bt.,OBE.

Sir Joseph Napier (855) who died in October aged 91 served with the 4th South Wales Borderers of the 13th Division at Gallipoli. He served as a Second Lieutenant at Cape Helles in July 1915 and thereafter at Anzac.


He succeeded to the baronetcy on the 13th August, 1915 when his father, Major Sir William Lennox Napier, was killed when commanding a company of the 4th South Wales Borderers. Sir Joseph was himself wounded shortly afterwards and evacuated from the Peninsula. He later returned to the 13th Division and served in Mesopotamia where he suffered two further wounds and was captured by the Turks in the early summer of 1917.

The title was created in 1867 for Sir Joseph Napier, then Lord Chancellor of Ireland and a descendant of the famous historian of Wellington's campaigns.

Sir Joseph was educated at Rugby and Jesus College, Cambridge, and was re-employed in the Second World War as a lieutenant-Colonel, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Movement, on the Headquarters Staff of Eastern Command and in Italy. He was associated with his namesake "Dome" Napier, the mathematical genius largely responsible for the highly successful Ultra operations. He was appointed OBE in 1944.

He acted as a Gold Staff Officer at the coronations of 1937 and 1953 and at the time of his death was a distinguished director of Philips industries and other public companies. Sir Joseph became a Vice President of the Gallipoli Association at the beginning of 1985.

The photograph opposite shows the President and the late Sir Joseph Napier at the Imperial War Museum in 1985. (By kind permission of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum, London.)



The President & the late Sir Joseph Napier in 1985

EDITORIAL

The first of the Association's autumn luncheons has now passed and all who where present agreed that it had been a great success, not least because of the presence of ladies for the first time in the history of the Association. We were honoured to have Mr.Michael Heseltine M.P., P.C., as our guest of honour and a precis of his talk is printed in this edition of The Gallipolian for the benefit of those members who were unable to attend.

Judging in the Edgar Banner Memorial Essay Competition has now been completed. The judges were unanimous in deciding that none of this year's entries were of a sufficiently high standard to justify the presentation of a prize. This is disappointing but we should be justified in expecting a better performance next year.

Some members have expressed concern in recent years that there has been no new membership list for some time. The editor is delighted to be able to announce that, thanks to the kind offices of Mr.Norman Pollitt (AM946), the membership list is to be computerised at minimal cost to Association funds. This may mean that computer printouts of the list will be available to members for a modest sum early in the new year. Watch this space for further details.

There are some very interesting - and even important - articles which will appear in this journal over the coming year. Nevertheless, the editor is anxious to encourage more in-house contributions, especially from Associate Members. If you have a special interest in the Gallipoli campaign, whether it is a family connection or the employment of 'Beetles' or whatever, we would like to hear from you.

The Editor is joined by all members of the committee in wishing both members and associate members a merry Christmas and a happy and prosperous new year.

MEO.

BOTH CLASSES OF MEMBERS ARE REMINDED THAT SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR 1987 ARE DUE IN JANUARY NEXT. OFFICERS OF THE ASSOCIATION HAVE BEEN PUT TO SOME CONSIDERABLE TROUBLE OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS IN CHASING DEFAULTERS. IT IS IN EVERYBODY'S INTEREST THAT THIS IS AVOIDED. SUBSCRIPTIONS SHOULD BE SENT TO THE HON. TREASURER, MR.D.F.BLAND, AT TORVIEW, 4 RIDGEWAY CLOSE, DORKING, SURREY, RH4 3AS.

THE AUTUMN LUNCHEON

The Autumn Luncheon on Tuesday, 30th September at the RAF Club, Piccadilly, saw the introduction of two innovations. One was the change from a dinner to a luncheon, the other was the extending of invitations to lady guests and to the newly appointed lady associate members. The decision to establish this precedent was taken, you will recall, at the last AGM. I am pleased to report that the new arrangements went very smoothly, both the President and the Chairman extending a warm greeting to the seven ladies present. Unfortunately, Mrs. Banner was unable to attend and sent her apologies via Lt. Col.Hancock.

The highlight of the lunch was a talk by the Right Honourable Michael Heseltine MP. Mr.Heseltine gave an interesting account of some of his experiences at the Ministry of Defence, stressing the urgency of maintaining a strong defence if we are to continue to enjoy another 40 years of peace. He pointed out that our past enemies were now fully committed to NATO and this must surely give us hope for the future. He then kindly invited questions from the members and spent a further 15 minutes answering queries ranging from the Falkland War to National Conscription. After a vote of thanks by Captain Fagan, the members dispersed to the bar for a final drink before saying their farewells.

Unfortunately, Mr.Dixon was unable to make the journey to London due to ill-health and could not therefore give his talk about his first hand experiences at the Dardanelles, where he was engaged in minelaying with the Royal Navy. We all send him our good wishes and hope he will soon be well again. We look forward to hearing his reminiscences at some

future date.

The fact that only 33 people attended this luncheon was a considerable disappointment and it would appear that holding this function mid-day is not the answer to our problems.

Norman Pollitt, AM946

The following is a letter from Her Majesty's Private Secretary to Tom Williamson (930) in acknowledgement of his presentation of a copy of his book to Her Majesty in 1979.

Dear Mr.Williamson

I am commanded by The Queen to thank you for your letter of 20th November and for the booklet "The Disappearance of The King's Company (Sandringham) in Gallipoli". Her Majesty is very touched that you should send her this account of that campaign and of the part played in it by the Sandringham Company. She is looking forward to reading it and will preserve it in the Library at Sandringham House.

Yours sincerely

W.Heseltine.

H.M.S.ANGORA (MINELAYER)
by Leading Seaman F.G.Dixon (737).

H.M.S.Angora was a specially equipped ship fitted with 4 sets of rail tracks, 2 sets on the Portside and 2 sets Starboard, below the upper deck. The stern of the ship was cut away to allow the mines to drop into the sea.

Electric winches pulled the mines along the tracks as required and 300 mines were carried on the tracks.

Objectives

The German warships GOEBEN and BRESLAU which had evaded our patrols in the Mediterranean Sea at the outbreak of war in August 1914. They were allowed to enter the Dardanelles by the Turks and anchored off the capital Constantinople (now Istanbul). War was declared on Turkey in October 1914. British Army and Naval units assembled at Mudros and naval bombardments were commenced and maintained until the landings on the 25th April, 1915. H.M.S.Angora was despatched to Mudros for mining operations in case the GOEBEN and BRESLAU ventured down the Dardanelles to attack our forces.

Mines

The mines consisted of an iron sphere about 24" in diameter and packed with wet guncotton. The mine sat upon a heavy iron dustbin shaped object, with four bogey wheels which ran on the tracks. This was a sinker which contained a drum of mooring wire, the end of which was shackled to the base of the mine. There was a brake on the drum and this was connected by a chain to a heavy weight which hung on a hook outside the sinker. This chain was adjustable in length and the length determined the distance of the mine below the surface of the sea.

Mine laying in enemy waters was done at night, with the depth of water and differences in tide having to be known. A moonless night was also essential. There is little tidal difference in the Mediterranean Sea. The mines were prepared for laying by fitting a pistol in the top of the mine. This pistol contained a spring operated striker. A priming charge of dry guncotton with a fulminate of mercury detonator was attached to this pistol. The pistol was inserted into the mine and bolted down, making the mine watertight and being operated by a hydrostatic valve. An iron rod about 3 feet




Diagram of Mine, Sinker, Plummet Weight etc.

long fitted under this valve and prevented it being pressed home by water pressure. When the rod was struck by a passing vessel it turned and allowed the valve to go in, which in turn compressed the spring to operate the striker and so fire the priming charge which detonated the main charge.

Laying Mines.

On arrival at the position of the new minefield the ship turns round and mining commences at slow speed on the return journey. The mines were laid by stop watch and according to a pattern which was charted on the bridge of the ship. A bell was rung on the mining deck and that was the signal for the first mine to be laid. The mine slid along the rail and fell over the stern into the sea. The plummet weight would fall off its hook into the sea and immediately sank, thus pulling off the brake on the mooring wire drum. The mine, being buoyant, remained on the surface and the sinker filled with water and gradually submerged. The wire was being payed out as the brake was OFF and the mine remained on the surface until the plummet hit the sea bed when the chain slackened and ON went the brake. No more mooring wire was then released, the sinker was still going down and it pulled the mine below the surface, to the same distance as the length of the chain. The mine depths were of course calculated by the Navigating Officers according to circumstances.

The GOEBEN and BRESLAU tried to break out in 1918 and both struck mines, the BRESLAU sank and the GOEBEN was damaged and beached.

MONUMENT FUND SET UP FOR WAR HERO

(by courtesy of Post Newspapers.
This article originally appeared in the South Tyneside Post and was sent in by J.Heldcroft (AM937). Members may think that a contribution to the appeal would be a just and fitting means of ensuring that John Kirkpatrick's deeds continue to be celebrated).

Tyneside war hero, John Simpson Kirkpatrick, may after all have a monument dedicated to him.

For an appeal has been launched to raise money for a statue of him to be put up in South Shields.


The trust to honour the memory of Kirkpatrick is being headed by Northumbria Tourist Board President, Mrs.Jennifer Robinson.

The idea was that of South Shields Councillor, Mrs. Gladys Hobson, who would like to see a full-size statue in the town.

She has already received pledges of support from Australian veterans.

There is already a monument to Kirkpatrick who was shot dead after carrying dozens of wounded Australian soldiers to safety during the First World War, in Melbourne,Australia.

Anybody interested in contributing to the appeal can contact Coun. Mrs.Hobson through South Shields Town Hall.



Mike Irwin (AM871) in front of the Melbourne Shrine with the statue of Simpson and his donkey.

Members may have been concerned by item (d) under Any Other Business which appeared on Page 4 of the minutes of the AGM sent out with Gallipolian No.51. Certain facts were not available to the Association regarding the fate of the Liddle Archive at the time of the AGM and, in order to clarify the situation and hopefully allay concern, these facts ought to be brought to the attention of members.

1.) There is NO intention to sell the archive for Mr. Liddle's personal benefit, nor has there ever been.

2.) Attempts are being made to rehouse the Archive in this country in order to overcome problems presented by fire-risk, overcrowding and under-financing.

3.) It is hoped to entrust the Archive to the library of a British University with a librarian deputed to care for it.

4.) The press reports which gave rise to the question at the AGM were ill-informed. An approach from an institution in the United States might have been considered as a means of forcing the hand of the British Government, which appears to be indifferent to the fate of a remarkable and singularly important archive about our past.

5.) In a letter to the Chairman Mr.Liddle has stated categorically that the only solution to the problem of housing the archive would have been to rehouse it in this country.

It is to be hoped that this information will set everybody's minds at rest and reassure those members who were alarmed at the prospect of the Archive going overseas.

RECEIVED FROM THE NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM.

ONLY A "SCRAP OF PAPER"?

Selected items from the Archives of the National Army Museum.

During the 25 years of the Museum's existence it has been acquiring pieces of paper written on or collected by soldiers, letters, diaries, telegrams, scrapbooks, newspapers, maps, and much more. They now occupy over 800 feet of shelving, to

form a fascinating record of almost 400 years of British military history.

From this considerable assemblage of paper a small sample has been selected for this exhibition. The main themes that it illustrates are life in the army, its recruiting, food, sport, recreation, leisure activities, and return to civilian life; eye-witness accounts of battles; and documents relating to famous soldiers. Among the items on display are a medical prescription for Lord Kitchener, a letter describing how General James Wolfe died in the writer's arms, a map of the battle of Minden, architect's drawings of Victorian barracks, and a letter describing the unorthodox sexual appetite of one Edwardian general.

The variety of items on display should convince the most confirmed sceptic that pieces of paper can reveal much about the people who wrote them and the times in which they lived.

The exhibition will be opened on 1 October 1986, and run until 18 January 1987.

Further information on the contents of the exhibition and on the archive collection from the Museum Archivist, Peter Boyden on extension 47.

THE EVACUATION OF SUVLA,
by Brigadier R.B.Rathbone,OBE (267).

It was about this time late November that we were officially told that evacuation had been decided upon. It had been in the air for some time, so the news was no surprise, but we received it with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it did not seem possible, without heavy reinforcements and practically a new plan, to bring the campaign to a successful conclusion; we were therefore glad at the prospect of having done with what seemed hopeless, and moving to fresh adventures elsewhere. On the other hand, here was a gallant enterprise which had promised so much and so nearly - so very nearly, on at least three occasions - succeeded, abandoned for good and all.

The orders were to maintain normal activity and to give no hint, even by any small change in routine of what was afoot. Also, anything of any value at all which could not be taken away was to be destroyed. Therefore we lit fires in the empty forsaken Scottish Horse trenches, and carried out, from them as well as from our own, routine firing and patrolling. Later on we slit with bayonets every sandbag in the trenches. Stores were moved by night; one gun fired the same number of rounds as two, and eventually of six. Many were the devices, including rifles timed by means of candle and string and so forth, to fire long after no British soldier remained at Suvla Bay. In one dugout, we left in rum jars - I blush to remeber it even now - a grim mixture of rum and paraffin (very little of the former).

The morning of the 19th December 1915 dawned bright and clear. There was hoar frost on the ground. Never had our little Battalion Headquarters on Green Hill looked so attractive. I had, strongly, the feeling which Masefield later put into words in his admirable little book "Gallipoli": "No man does anything consciously for the last time without a feeling of sadness." It seemed a pity to be leaving it all. That night we filed silently down to the beach in three parties, at intervals to conform with the evacuation plan. There was a bright full moon. From the Turkish trenches came only an occasional shot it was even quieter than, for the last two or three weeks, had been normal. Evidently complete surprise had been achieved. We passed a huge dump of supplies - reserve rations in case we had been unable to get away - timed to go up in smoke soon after the last man had left. (He, we afterwards heard, was General Maude, who had insisted on being the last to leave the shores of Suvla, and who was very nearly left behind by mistake).

Finally we embarked in lighters, and thence to a ship whose name I forget, and set sail for an unknown destination. But in this ship were bunks - with sheets - hot water, comforts innumberable and ashore all things to buy. Cigarettes which we had not seen for three weeks. Chocolate, cake, soap, razor blades, small evidences of a civilisation we had long since left behind. (A canteen was established at Suvla in October, but it seemed impossible to keep it stocked. The first issue was wide and varied. The second time we went to

purchase there was little to be had but herrings in tomato sauce, and thereafter remained only such items as strawberry jam, bootlaces, and string.)

Early next morning we landed at Imbros - General Headquarters throughout the Campaign.

LETTERS.

From Dr.Ross J.Bastiaan, MD.Sc.,M.Sc.,F.R.A.C.D.S.
(Forwarded by the Royal Army Medical Corps Association.)

September 9th, 1986

Dear Sir,

Re: Gallipoli Campaign

I write to you in the hope that you may be able to assist me locating any remaining Veterans who served on the Gallipoli peninsula during the Campaign of 1915. My reason of interest is that I have recently unearthed 600 negatives taken of the British Units that served in the Army Medical Corps on the peninsula. The units I am interested in are any of the Field Ambulances and in particular Three Field Ambulance that appears throughout the collection.

I have located a doctor that served in the 17th Stationary Hospital on W.Beach and have interviewed him in Australia. I am certain that there are still veterans alive in the U.K. and if your records allow I would ask that if you are unable to direct me, do you have any further avenues of contact? I have already contacted the British Legion and they have referred me to you.

THE EDITOR'S RESIGNATION.

This space should have been occupied by a letter from Major T.Verschoyle, MC (21), but instead brings notification of the editor's resignation.

The facts which have led to the editor taking this step are as follows:

1.) Major Verschoyle sent a forthright letter to the Journal commenting on the proceedings at this year's Annual General Meeting.

2.) The editor informed the chairman of the fact as he felt honour bound to do so.


3.) The chairman desired that the editor suppress the letter on the grounds that he felt it would be divisive. The editor disagreed and declined to comply with the chairman's request.

4.) The chairman then claimed that this was a matter for the committee and proposed to circulate a copy of the letter to committee members requesting them to vote on the issue.

5.) This was duly done and the committee voted by 6 votes to 3 with 4 abstentions to suppress the letter. The letter has therefore not been published.

The editor feels that this is highly improper and that he cannot, in point of principle, continue to edit the Gallipolian under these conditions. He feels members ought to be able to make their own judgements about Major Verschoyle's opinions and, as he pointed out to the chairman, the correspondence columns were equally open to dissenting views. The editor also felt that a clear case of censorship was likely to prove far more damaging and divisive than Major Verschoyle's letter. Under these circumstances the editor, after much deep and careful thought, feels it would be dishonest, dishonourable and unprincipled for him to remain at his post. It is therefore with the greatest regret that he has found himself forced to resign the position of editor, and the secretary has been accordingly informed.

M.E.Occleshaw (844AM).



Veteran Bill Carroll (right) of the 21st Australian Battalion (Courtney's Post). With him is Bob Pearce, brother of Sam Pearce,V.C.,M.M., who served Gallipoli, Egypt and France before being killed near Archangel in Russia (courtesy of Mike Irwin).

THE RT. HON. MICHAEL HESELTINE, M.P., SPEAKING AT THE GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION LUNCH ON 30 SEPTEMBER, 1986:

Amongst the most moving experiences of serving in the Ministry of Defence was the privilege of taking part in the commemoration services on the Normandy beaches and in the cemetries of the Pacific. Nothing could bring home more vividly the agonies and sacrifices of earlier generations who had given so much so that my generation might live in the freedom that we treasure. I could not but remember that I belong to a generation, rare in European history, now too old to take part in any future conflict and then too young to have taken part in the last of the European wars.

I sense that same feeling of awe and respect as I come here today amongst the veterans of Gallipoli. No one will ever know finally, beyond doubt, the full cost or the precise balance of gain and loss. What everybody will know is of the human suffering and of the human bravery; they are a legend of our time.

However, it is not for me to try to parade before you stories gathered from the history books. You were there. Nothing I can say can be more relevant than that. It is my experience, however, and it was my inestimable privilege, to serve as Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Defence for 3 years. Perhaps I can say, in what is a sign of the remarkable transformation in the political world in which we now live, something that would have seemed inconceivable to you in 1916. You will remember the Germans and the Turks as relentless and indefatigable enemies. I remember the Germans and the Turks as two of our principal allies in the NATO alliance, bound together in a common purpose to preserve in Europe a state of peace that has eluded all previous generations.

Out of the horror through which you were mercilessly propelled, as was another generation 20 years later, there has been born in Europe a determination that it shall never happen again. That determination is shared strongly by those who were then our enemies as it is by those who were our friends. In no small measure the horror of the suffering to which you were exposed gave birth to that determination. And if the politicians in the western world have the will and the wit to preserve intact the political institutions and the defence deterrent upon which our peace depends, then subsequent generations may continue to live in peace as we have now done for forty years. And then indeed future generations will owe you a debt of un-repayable proportions.

I am proud to be your guest. Your country is proud to remember the debt we owe you, proud to remember the gallantry for which you will always remain a legend of military history.

Afterwards Mr.Heseltine was pleased to answer questions from the floor which ranged over a wide variety of topics. As might be expected, he dealt with all questions in a most able manner.

THE MUNITIONS MYTH - M.E.Occleshaw (84AM).

Whenever the Gallipoli campaign is discussed the opinion is frequently voiced that one of the main reasons for launching the campaign was the desire to send badly needed supplies of munitions to our Russian ally, and this view has even been repeated in the pages of this very journal.[1] Winston Churchill skilfully advocated this opinion in The World Crisis but it is, I believe, a view founded on error.

Churchill opened his argument in the first chapter of the second volume of his book[2] with typically brilliant oratory and no less impressive statistics. He argued that the problem on the Eastern front revolved around the fact that

"Russia had entered the war with about 5,000 guns and 5,000,000 shells. During the first three months of fighting she fired on an average about 45,000 shells a day. The output of her factories in Russia did not exceed 35,000 shells a month. By the beginning of December, 1914, scarcely 300,000 shells, or barely a week's requirement, remained out of the initial reserve. At the moment when the Russian armies needed the greatest support from their artillery, they found their guns suddenly frozen into silence.....the Russian Armies, hamstrung and paralysed, must await and endure the vengeance of their foes. Such was the prospect which opened upon Russia and her Allies before the first Christmas of the war was reached."[3]

This assessment was reputedly based on the reports of Colonel A.W.F.Knox, the British Military Attaché on the Russian north-west front who was, according to Churchill "an agent of singular discernment"[4], whose "series of luminous and pitiless despatches"[5] exposed the inadequacies of the Russian munitions reserve to the scrutiny of the British Government. Colonel Knox's despatches are now open to public view at the Public Records Office and for our purposes the most important of these is despatch H, dated the 12th December 1914, which relates that

"As already reported by telegraph, the Russian offensive has been brought temporarily to a standstill owing

to lack of rifles and ammunition. There is no reason to be depressed that the invasion of Silesia has been postponed. The Russian advance from the Vistula that commenced early in November was never the steam-roller movement that Press-correspondents have described. Units were many of them at less than half-strength after the battles on the Vistula. Drafts came up slowly and were thrown at once into the fighting line, allowing the cadres no time to assimilate the new material. The men and horses were tired with three months of long marches, hard fighting and irregular food. No units had received warm clothing and many of the boots were worn out.

"About the middle of November we commenced to suffer from shortage of ammunition. Officers at the front ascribed the shortage to indifferent organization on the lines of communication. They complained that the officials in rear were failing to supply them with the one thing that was indispensable. Their men could live on what they picked-up locally - frozen potatoes and turnips, - they could stick the frost, but ammunition did not grow in the fields.

"Our complaints were only just as regards the shortage of small-arm ammunition. It was not the fault of the people on the lines of communication that the guns were silent, for shell had run short throughout the Empire."[6]

Although the shortage of munitions is given prominence, the failure of the Russian winter offensive cannot be put down to that alone and Knox grants equal weight to the lamentable organizational shortcomings which characterised both the Czarist armies and society. We shall return to this point again since it will be seen to have exerted a critical and far-reaching influence on the Russian war effort.

Knox's reports do not paint a picture of unmitigated gloom where munitions are concerned. General Byelaev, the representative of the Chief of the General Staff in Petrograd told the French Military Attaché that the "rate of expenditure of ammunition gave no cause for anxiety"[7], whilst Knox stated in December that some 300,000 rounds of artillery ammunition had been manufactured in Russia between August and the end of November, and these would, of course, have to be added to the total remaining from the pre-war stock. Moreover, Knox's report stated quite categorically that: "The steps taken to increase the home output are now

commencing to produce results" and the daily output of shells in December had reached the 8,000 mark and it was expected that there would be a further increase by stages to 20,000 per diem in February. Even this was not the end of the story for Knox noted that "It is hoped that the rate of production will mount still further in the succeeding months, but it is not certain to what extent."[8] Once the fruits of this increased output reached the armies, together with munitions ordered abroad and coming through Murmansk and Vladivostock, then Knox was able to calculate that "From the beginning of April it is hoped that the Artillery will be able to resume its normal activity. For the next 2½ months it will be reduced to a shell expenditure of less than half the volume of that used in the first months of the war," when expenditure had been exceptionally high in the desperate bid to win a decisive victory.

By January 1915 Knox was calculating that the Russians had a stock of 160 to 200 shells for each of their 5,000 guns[9] and by the end of the month he was able to estimate that on the 1st April there would be a stock of 2,433,000 rounds, or 570 rounds per gun, provided there was no further expenditure over the next two months.[10]

From Knox's despatches we can see that the question was not so one-sided as Churchill claimed, and that while the Russians did face a shortage of munitions for a time, the shortage was not the insuperable obstacle some would have us believe. Furthermore, the munitions crisis does not appear to have exerted the slightest effect on the marked successes the Russian Army enjoyed against the Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia at this time. Here, the Russian Army routed the Austrians at Lemberg and pushed on into the Carpathians and even reached the Hungarian Plains, capturing tens of thousands of prisoners (not all of whom were by any means Slavs) and laying siege to and capturing the fortress of Przemsyl. So, too, in the winter of 1914/15 the Russians fought the German attempt to seize Warsaw to a standstill around Lodz - no mean achievement for an army supposedly desperately short of munitions.

After the blood-stirring opening chapter of The

World Crisis the munitions factor disappears altogether from Churchill's account of the decision-making process leading to the Gallipoli campaign. Instead the emphasis shifts fairly and squarely to attempting to break the deadlock on the Western front by taking a short cut to victory via the Baltic or the Dardanelles. It is my contention that it was here that the real motive for mounting the campaign lay. The key chapter is entitled "The Choice" (PP.92-123) which covers the respective merits of the two contending plans, both of which envisaged employing the strength of the Royal Navy in a more direct rôle. The munitions question is not even referred to in passing and the strategic implications and possibilities of Fisher's and Churchill's proposals dominate the proceedings exclusively. When the choice was being made the munitions question was conspicuous by its absence, an argument endorsed by Churchill's own account of the meeting of the War Council on the 28th January, 1915, which relies on Hankey's minutes of the meeting.

Munitions are not mentioned at all and Mr.Arthur Balfour's opinion of what the forcing of the Dardanelles would achieve covered the following points only:

"It would cut the Turkish Army in two;

"It would put Constantinople under our control;

"It would give us the advantage of having Russian wheat, and enable Russia to resume exports;

"This would restore the Russian exchanges, which were falling owing to her inability to export, and causing great embarrasment;

"It would open a passage to the Danube;

"It was difficult to imagine a more helpful operation."

Had the supply of munitions been a prime motive in attacking the Dardanelles it is simply not credible that it would have been treated with a neglect which amounts to contempt.

There are other factors, too, which militate against any intention of sending munitions to Russia being a practical proposition. Not the least of these is the question of what munitions could the Allies have sent to Russia in 1915? In May 1915 the munitions scandal exploded in Britain and the flames were assiduously fanned by the Northcliffe Press. From the very beginning of 1915 alarm had been growing over the

inadequate supply of munitions to the B.E.F. in France. It is well known that in March 1915 the British artillery on the Western front was limited to the ludicrous expenditure of 3 rounds per gun per day - or as one gunner of the Territorial Army's Leek Battery (46th Division) expressed it: "We get 3 rounds per gun, per day, perhaps"[12] - and Churchill says the Russians had problems! The munitions crisis at home was largely responsible for the fall of the Asquith Government and led directly to the creation of the Ministry of Munitions under the guidance of Lloyd George. When the British Army was itself faced with such crippling shortages, how could it be expected that Britain could spare munitions for Russia? Nor is it simply a question of supplying shells. There are many different types of artillery piece, each requiring its own calibre of shells; the Russians had adequate supplies of 3" shell for their light field-guns, but were woefully short of ammunition for their medium and heavy pieces. This was precisely where lay the greatest shortages in the British Army.

The tactical situation on the Russian front deserves closer attention than it is normally given. The starting point for most of the criticism levelled at the Russian Army over the munitions question is the ill-fated campaign in East Prussia which culminated in the destruction of Samsonov's Second Army at Tannenberg. The view that shortcomings in the numbers of guns and shells available to the Russians was responsible for the disaster stems from N.N.Golovin's Campaign Of East Prussia. Golovin attributed the two Russian armies engaged with a total of 1,040 field-pieces, 108 howitzers and 12 heavy guns between them, whilst arguing that Hindenburg's German Eighth Army had 1,200 pieces of all types. This is erroneous as it is based on calculating all the German divisions engaged as regular first-line formations with 80 guns each, whereas in fact fully half of the German Order of Battle was made up from reserve divisions (with just 36 guns - 20 less than a Russian reserve division) and Landwehr with even less. According to the German official monograph on the battle the Eighth Army had no more than 800 guns until the beginning of September. This was more than the Russian First Army had,

but was actually less than Samsonov's Second Army.

Prior to the successful German offensive at Gorlice-Tarnow in 1915 the Grand Duke Serge Mikhailovitch, the Inspector-General of the Russian artillery, reported that 400 rounds per gun were available in depots at the front, which strongly indicates that the German success was due more to their superior staff work with its ability to concentrate superior resources at the decisive point than to any great disparity in ammunition reserves. During this offensive Russian batteries were at times unable to reply, but this leads our attention to the chaos reigning in the Russian rear services rather than to industrial shortcomings, since depots not far from the front held reserves of shell and the nearby fortress of Novogeorgievsk held over a million rounds which were never used at all. Needless to say, these reserves were captured by the Germans in consequence of their break-through.

What are we to make, too, of the situation in the summer of 1916 when, despite the alleged shortage of munitions, the Russian General Brusilov won one of the greatest victories of the war, coming within an ace of destroying the Central Powers? Here any inadequacy in material resources which might have existed arguably brought the Russians closer than they had ever been to winning the decisive victory everyone was urgently seeking. Nor should we fall into the trap of believing that superiority in artillery is a panacea for all military ills; to observe the falsity of that approach we need look no further than the contemporary campaign on the Somme. Here the Allies rejoiced in a significant advantage over their adversaries (some 60: 1 in heavy guns), a proportion infinitely more unfavourable to the Germans than to the Russians in the East - even in the terrible summer of 1915.

The real problems on the Eastern front should be seen for what they were. The larger distances in the East permitted the protagonists to make easier breakthroughs and exploitations than on the congested Western front, and the German General Staff proved themselves far more adept at exploiting these opportunities than their Russian opponents did. The internal situation in Russia should not pass unnoticed either as it did exert a far-reaching influence on

the situation. The Russian railway network (by which means the armies and all their supplies had to move) was centred on the major cities, each of which radiated railway lines like a spider's web. This network was terribly easy to dislocate by the capture of even one such city, for each nodal point lost to the Russians inevitably entailed a lengthy and circuitous redirection of all traffic in European Russia, which is precisely what happened when the Austro-German forces began advancing in 1915. The situation was further exacerbated by the Russian attempt to re-employ the scorched earth policy of 1812. This led to enormous numbers of refugees fleeing eastwards and hopelessly congesting an already overstretched railway system and completely unbalancing the already clumsy and inefficient civil administration. Just how bad the situation had become can be seen from the fact that the Czarist Government could no longer feed its people, a factor which was vital in inspiring the March revolution. During the winter of 1916-17 no less than half a million poods (one pood = 36 lbs) of desperately needed meat lay rotting at Siberian railheads and sidings.

In the light of all these facts the idea of the Dardanelles being forced in order to send Western munitions to Russia should be seen for what it is: an ex post facto justification for an attempt to take a short-cut to victory by opening a second front. Britain was simply not in a position to undertake such a considerable venture in 1915, though that said it must be added that the real reasons for launching the campaign have at least an arguable justification. One is, however, inclined to suspect that it owed more to Winston Churchill's restless and over-sanguine temperament than to any well-considered plan, but whatever the case it had nothing to do with sending munitions to Russia.

Footnotes.

1.) For example see The Gallipolian No.42 (Autumn 1983), P.42.

2.) The World Crisis 1915 by the Rt.Hon.W.S.Churchill, C.H., Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London, 1923.
3.) Ibid., PP.26/27.
4.) Ibid., P.27.
5.) Ibid.
6.) Public Record Office (PRO) WO106/1049, Despatch H.
7.) Ibid.
8.) Ibid.
9.) Ibid., Despatch J.
10.) Ibid., Despatch L.
11.) Churchill, op.cit., P.163.
12.) Interview with Private Horace Barks, 1/5th North Staffs Regt., 46th (North Midland) Division, TA.

THE ESSENCE OF THE BATTLE.
By Ross Kerridge. Sent by J.V.Griffiths (AM927).

ANZAC: the most perennial event in the Australian schoolchild's year.

Young children standing in little-comprehending silence while meaningless words are recited. Later learning the legends about people, places, and events previously unheard of: Simpson and his donkey, gallantry, bravery, Lone Pine, heroic withdrawal, 'Australia becoming a nation', the conundrum of men dying for 'King and Country', amid whispers of swimming at Suvla.

Growing world awareness challenges the myths: a new age cares little for bayonet charges, thinks little of gallantry. A questioning age rejects the glorification of war and sings songs asking what are they marching for.

An Australian in London with time available, I packed my bags to go to Gallipoli. I wasn't really clear then why I was going, and I still don't know why I went, but I thought I'd find something.

We climbed out of the car at the south end of the cove before dawn. There were 12 of us. We had coincidentally met the night before in a local hotel.

We had all come independently: Kiwis from Istanbul and Libya, Australians from Cyprus, Zimbabwe and Greece 'just travelling', myself from London and an American.

We stood in the early dawn, lost in our own thoughts. The cold, wet bleakness held a tension that was almost palpable and somehow appropriate.

As the light came up and silhouetted the horizon, we made the same discovery in silence that the Anzacs made in the battle. The cliffs rose steeply above us. The foreground became an outrageous mix of cliffs, ravines and precipitous hillsides. One couldn't think of a less likely place to stage a landing, nor comprehend any mistake of this sort being made. Thoughts turned to the feelings of the Anzacs, who learnt of the country while under fire.

The light increased and the cove itself was clear. We looked over the headstones for a while, contemplating the ages, 19, 23, 17, and the epitaph, 'Till the dawn breaks, and the shadows flee away'.

Later that day, joined by some 30 other travelling Australians, we attended the official ceremonies at Cape Helles and Anzac, organised by the British. The only official Australian present was a solitary embassy official.

It was all somewhat perfunctory, with wreaths, a minute's silence and abbreviated Ode, then to the cottage for luncheon. A British officer said we should keep it in perspective; it was only a small part of the 1914-18 war. Which is true, for the British.

The Anzac legend taught yearly to schoolchildren includes mention of the ruggedness of the country, but does not prepare you for the shock when walking over it. Apart from a few hectares at Lone Pine, there is virtually no flat ground, and most of the Anzac area is exposed to what were Turkish positions.

The total area involved, for which more than 10,000 Anzacs died, is barely 300ha. Walking that country, and looking at the rugged country beyond, the folly of the whole Anzac campaign is magnified to one of the great military disasters of history.

Even today, the ground is still littered with the

debris of war: bullets, tins, shrapnel and water bottles. Pale fragments become familiar shapes as you suddenly recognise human debris among the clay.

The trenches remain, slowly filling in. A few tunnels are still collapsing. The ditches along one side of today's narrow road are the Turkish front line. The other side of the road marks the Anzac lines.

The total area is a shrine, but there is little need: the land is useless for anything else. The main Australian cemetry is at Lone Pine, where some of the most bitter (and 'heroic') fighting took place. Regardless of this, from a practical point of view it is the only place with room for a formal cemetery.

Many headstones have no epitaph, which can only reflect the inadequacy the parents must have felt.

The American found his uncle's grave at Quinn's Post cemetery. He had spent years sifting through records to match up the false name with a few mementoes. Now he places a medal to the headstone. 'A medal and a visit long overdue'. An emotional moment.

One of us found a grandfather but no body, no grave, just a name on the wall.

At sunset we were at The Nek, site of the disastrous charge recreated in Peter Weir's film Gallipoli. It is a tiny spur with ravines on either side. A Turkish memorial and the Anzac mass grave occupy the width of the spur.

On that day, seven minutes earlier, the artillery ceased; (someone forgot to synchronise watches) the men of the Light Horse charged against machine guns and into certain death. After the third wave a Turk was yelling 'no more', but by mistake the fourth wave went as well.

In 1919 more than 300 bodies lay on the area of a tennis court. They lie where they fell in a mass grave in No Man's Land.

We watched the sunset, contemplating the madness of it all.

After walking the hills of Anzac for a couple of days, it is easy to become fascinated by the stories of the battle itself. Gradually, the small bumps on the ridges became the strategic points of Quinn's, Courtney's and Steele's posts; suddenly we realised the significance of 'German Officers Ridge' to The Nek.

It wasn't long before we could really identify with the horror in that hell-hole at the top of Monash Valley. Every point was under fire. It could be fatal to stretch out or stand up in the shallow trenches.

They knew it was hopeless, right from the start. Peter Lalor, who brought his grandfather's sword from Eureka Stockade, was saying, 'It's a ..... up', as he was preparing to defend 'Baby 700' hill on the first day. The Turks were so stunned by the sight of the officer commanding his small group of men with a sword that they now call it 'Sword Hill'.

Bored in the trenches, the men gambled at two-up in an innocent parody of the great gamble in which they were playing. In this unlikely gamble, however, the prospects of a win became dimmer as the men slowly realised the only 'tosses' were for death or diseased evacuation.

The wounded in this pre-antibiotic era found themselves on hospital ships that were often septic way-stations on a course to oblivion. More than 1000 were buried at sea.

The men at Lone Pine bribed each other to get into the battle 'with their mates'. Overwhelming hardships were faced and sometimes overcome. Fantastic improvisation of all sorts took place. There was the strange camaraderie that grew up between the Anzacs and 'Johnny Turk', tossing food across the front line. The avacuation was a brilliant deception full of the stuff of legend.

C.W.Bean, the official historian, wrote of the legendary 'Men of Anzac'. He spoke of their 'pluck', their 'gameness' and vague quality of heroism, but says these are unimportant. The main feature of the 'Men of Anzac', in Bean's account, was their pride, their honour, and the way they stuck together through the whole bloody fiasco.

There is something strong and powerful, something great, lying there still among the memories of mistaken murder and misery.

Certainly this is where Australia became a nation. A network of old soldiers, and a national consciousness, being born in the mud and gore of trench warfare. Thousands died, and a nation was born.

But Anzac itself? It remains unresolved. A disaster of such magnitude cannot be ignored, cannot be hidden. The Anzacs had something, and did something, quite outside the life experience of we who follow them.

I remember talking to an old digger about the war, how wasteful and cynical it was, how worthless it all seemed now. He asked me to consider his feelings. He and his mates had gone to the war that we laugh at now. And when they went, yes, they did seek adventure; yes, they did seek glory. But they also believed it was a war to end wars. They really did believe that by giving their young lives, a world would come where there would be no more wars. But instead, those who are left contemplate the nuclear age.

I think if we are to win the gamble of learning from history, we should play with a double-headed coin. At the going down of the sun, let us remember the disaster of Anzac, and the horror of all wars, without fear or shame.

But in the morning, we should remember them and the great things they believed in.

And if you think that is glorifying war itself, then you miss the point of the words, said in both honour and dread:'Lest We Forget'.

H.M. Destroyer Leader "TALISMAN" at Scapa Flow 1918-19. Surrender of German Fleet Nov.21 and Guard Duties at Scapa Flow, covering the Christmas Period Dec.1918.

by R.C.Chadwick ISO RN, (416)

On Wednesday the 20th November, 1918 I was a member of the crew of H.M.Destroyer Leader "TALISMAN" and having lately returned from our patrol duties in Northern Waters we were moored in the "Pens" at Queens Ferry, Firth of Forth, preparing for the biggest event in Naval History, taking place the next day Thursday the 21st November, when the surrender of the "German High Seas Fleet" takes place.

About midnight the "Talisman" had left her moorings and taken up her position at the head of the starboard lines of destroyers and were moving slowly down the Firth of Forth

towards "May Island", astern of us the great armada of ships from every nation of the Allies were forming into 2 lines, i.e. Port and Starboard, the distance between the 2 lines about 2 miles. As the morning crept on to 4 A.M. this gigantic array of ships, the most formidable the world had ever seen were approaching "May Island" and every ship was at full "Action Stations", every gun and torpedo tube loaded, every man alerted and tense, slowly at 12 knots we proceeded into the North Sea and at approximately 8 bells, 8 A.M. in the grey dawn we saw the light cruiser "Cardiff" approaching with her kite balloon in tow and leading the first German ship, the battle cruiser "Seydlitz", the first in a line of 70 ships, with the faint early morning sun trying to enhance the grim and silent spectacle, with emotions, I'm sure, nigh on every ship, both Allied and German.

As the order was given to the 2 great lines of Allied ships to turn inwards and so box in the 70 German ships, one realised what a breath taking occasion it was, with hundred of warships of every size and class, it was a never to be forgotten spectacle, and so we made our return journey to the "Firth of Forth" slowly and uneventfully and as this "Great Armada" anchored in the shadow of the Forth Bridge, the "Talisman" and the rest of our flotilla moored once again in the "Pens" at Queens Ferry.

After a short stay, we refueled, took in stores etc., then resumed our normal patrol duties and later when the German Fleet had been safely berthed in "Scapa Flow" the "Talisman" was ordered to "Scapa" to do one month's guard duties on the interned "German Fleet" in "Scapa Flow", this was no 'picnic' as at this time of the year the conditions are atrocious, our duties comprised of going round the groups of destroyers, mustering their crews and if they didn't appear sharp enough, a couple of bangs of the rifle butt on the steel deck did the trick, then we used to collect our rations from each group and take them to the "Seydlitz" to draw stores and food etc. and Chrismas Eve 1918 the first "Peace on Earth and Goodwill Towards Men" lingers in my memory, as, on this day we

collected the usual rations from each group and proceeded to the parent ship "Seydlitz" to draw the limited supplies of stores and food, and as they returned to the boat I noticed the awful condition of the meat. I've had my share of "Salt Pork", but this was a delicacy in comparison! On the other hand how surprised I was to see that each man had a plentiful supply of every kind of Christmas decorations, seemingly they were going to try to be "merry" even in the absence of any other kind of Christmas spirit. How different on the H.M.S."Talisman" where things were very drab, but we did have our "TOT OF RUM" to provide some kind of "spirit".

Our guard duties continued and one day I remember one of the German sailors telling me in perfect English how much he regretted the war ever starting as he had a good job at Southampton and a girl there too and he had lost both.

Before we completed our guard duties there was a little trouble ashore, and it appears that the crofters had been missing a few sheep, which I imagine had found their way to the German Ships, a case of "Ja for a Baa" and what a treat this would be to have fresh mutton, instead of putrid meat.

Our guard duties completed we left "Scapa Flow" and resumed our normal patrol duties for awhile and then the "Talisman" and many more destroyers eventually found their way south to their different home stations and "ROTTEN ROW".

The strength of the German High Seas Fleet, interned "Harwich" 20. U.Boats, "Scapa Flow". 9 Battleships, 5 Battle Cruisers, 7 Light Cruisers and 49 Destroyers. German Commander, Admiral Ludwig Von Reuter. Flagship Friedrich der Grosse.
