
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THE GALLIPOLIAN

THE JOURNAL OF THE

GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION



VIEW OF "V" BEACH, TAKEN FROM S.S. "RIVER CLYDE"

PRICE TO NON-MEMBERS
55p

No. 50
SPRING 1986

THE GALLIPOLIAN
The Journal of the Gallipoli Association
(Founded by Major E H W Banner in 1969
on the campaign of 1915)

PATRON — HRH The Duke of Edinburgh KG KT OM GBE PC

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CHAIRMAN — Captain C T F Fagan (AM)

SECRETARY — K Tranmer (AM)
100 Ramsgill Drive, Ilford, Essex,
IG2 7TP (01 599 9390)

EDITOR — M E Occleshaw BA MA PhD (AM)
Temporary address: 6 York Avenue, East Sheen, London SW14 7LG (01 876 0613)

HON TREASURER — D F Bland (AM)
Torview, 4 Ridgeway Close, Dorking,
Surrey, RH4 3AS (0306 885360)

COMMITTEE — Captain D M Penrose TD
S Parker Bird FRICS FRVA
Major J F Ford
D A Pollard (AM)
N Anthony (AM)
R M S Hancock (AM)
A Standley (AM)

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REUNION: LUNCHEON AND ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING - 25 APRIL

The lunch will be held at the Officers' Mess, Chelsea Barracks by kind permission of Lieutenant-Colonel S.G. O'Dwyer, Officer Commanding 1st Battalion Irish Guards. A bus will be provided for the journey from the Abbey and anybody wishing to take advantage of it should keep a careful look out for the party by the main entrance to the Abbey.

Members are asked to wear medals and the usual name tab for ready identification. Male guests are cordially welcome but should not be present at the AGM to follow the luncheon.

PRICE: Veteran members £5.00
Associate Members and guests £7.50
PLEASE NOTE THAT PAYMENT MUST BE MADE IN ADVANCE. A SAE SHOULD BE SENT TO THE SECRETARY FOR THE TICKET FOR LUNCH.

A cash bar will be available in the ante room at the Officers' Mess from 12 o'clock onwards. People should report to the sentry at the gate in Chelsea Bridge Road and be prepared to identify themselves.

Lunch will start promptly at 1.30 p.m.

APPLICATIONS: Please write to the Hon.Sec. if you intend to be present at (1) Cenotaph (2) The Abbey and bus (3) The Luncheon. The deadline for applications is the 12th April. Tickets for the Abbey can be obtained from Keith Tranmer at the Cenotaph or Abbey Porchway.

AGM: This will be held immediately following the lunch. The minutes of the meeting in 1985 having been circulated (No.48) will be taken as read. Members (both classes) may raise any relevant points. The accounts for 1985 are sent herewith.

There will be a cash bar in the ante room after the AGM.

ANZAC DAY CEREMONIES: We have been kindly invited to join the Anzacs at the Cenotaph and at the Abbey. Our

wreath will be laid at the Cenotaph by the President.

THE CENOTAPH: Our party should assemble at the kerbside opposite the north (Trafalgar Square) side of the Cenotaph before 10.45 under the direction of a representative of the Association who will give the order to march the short distance to the Cenotaph.

AGENDA - AGM

1.) Apologies for absence.
2.) Minutes of last AGM - circulated in No.48.
3.) Chairman's report.
4.) Treasurer's report and accounts.
5.) Secretary's report.
6.) Election of officers and Committee Members for the period 1986-87
7.) Adoption of the Committee's recommendation that the Annual Dinner should be discontinued and substituted by a luncheon in the autumn.
8.) Adoption of the Committee's recommendation that the 1987 AGM should be held at the autumn luncheon and not on the 25th April.
9.) Lady Members.
10.) AoB - notice must be given of anything being brought up here. Those wishing to raise topics should inform the Secretary in writing by 18th April.

The following committee posts are open to re-election: Chairman, Secretary, Editor.

A new post is being created, that of Assistant Secretary, and nominations are required for this post and those above. Nominations for these posts should be sent to the Secretary as soon as possible.

NEW MEMBERS

In the original printed journal, this page contains names and full addresses of new members, and also address amendments.

For reasons of data protection and personal privacy, this content has been omitted.

OBITUARY (25th February 1986)

With deep regret the following names are recorded.

W J CRAWFORD,MBE	(Pte HLI)	438
R J HAYWARD CBE RD RNR FCA	(Cdr.(S)HMS Irresistible)	658
N PRATT	(RAMC 1st E.Lancs.Field Ambulance 42 Div)	747
W McCOLM	(RE(T)Signals 52nd Div)	749
P S WOOLLEY	(1/5 Lancs.Fus.42nd Div.)	878
C V WEBB	(10th Hampshire Regt.10th Div)	934

RESIGNATIONS

T H WOODWARD	85
H A HIBBERD	270
E CULLEY	685
A R GARRISON	AM896

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199 Will members please carefully note that ALEC WELLS (4 Worcs. 88 Bde. 29 Div.) should be included in the list of Founder Members which appeared in the Autumn 1972 edition of the Gallipolian (No.9). The Association apologises for any upset this omission may have caused.

THE GALLIPOLI MEMORIAL TRUST.

The Gallipoli Memorial Trust will be holding the second annual service on THURSDAY 24th APRIL at Holy Trinity Church, Southend Crescent, Eltham, London. A speech is to be given by

THE RT.HON.EDWARD HEATH M.P.

in the adjoining Church Hall. It is hoped that members of the Gallipoli Association will support this venture, those wishing to do so should attend the Church Hall at 7.30 p.m. for 8 p.m.

HONORARY TREASURER'S REPORT

The Audited Accounts for the year ended 31st December, 1985 accompany this issue of the journal.

I must apologise that the comparative figures for expenditure in 1984 do not appear. This is due to a mix up in the size of paper used for my draft and that for the duplicated copies. The figures are readily available by reference to the Accounts of last year but, as some members may not have retained their copy, they are quoted:-

	£	
Cost of printing Gallipolians	660	
" " Membership list	225	
Stationary and sundry printing	185	
Postage on Gallipolians	157	
Other postage	116	
Sundries	26	
Cost of Ties	89	
Luncheon subsidy	48	
Annual Dinner - loss	82	
Excess of Income over Expenditure	142	£1,730

In the interests of economy I trust Members will accept this explanation and overlook the inconvenience.

Although we finished the year with the small surplus of £19.36p I am very pleased to report a more optimistic outlook for 1986. I am writing this report at the end of January and already income is over £250 more than at this time in 1985.

Many Members have added a donation to their subscription cheques and to them I would express my thanks on the Association's behalf.

DFB.



President and "First Lady".



The Top Table, L to R: Captain C.Fagan,HE NZ HC,Colonel M.Hancock,Mr.A.Vincent Australian Deputy HC,S.Parker Bird.

THE ANNUAL DINNER, 27th November 1985.

Once again the Association was blessed by the use of the RAF Club in Piccadilly on what is perhaps to be its last annual dinner. After drinks in the bar over which old acquaintances were renewed, members and their guests sat down to their repast. Sadly, on this occasion, the traditional turkey was replaced by chicken and the turkish delight omitted altogether, both on the grounds of cost.

The dinner finished, the President proposed the loyal toast and read a telegram from Her Majesty. His Excellency the High Commissioner for New Zealand, B.Harland, was then called upon to speak and rose to the occasion with a truly memorable speech which delighted and entertained the company, who were most impressed with his detailed knowledge of the Gallipoli campaign and especially his reminder that 27th November was the 70th anniversary of the terrible blizzard. Speeches followed from the Australian Deputy High Commissioner, Mr.A.L.Vincent, the Secretary (who reported that there were still over 120 veterans on the books of the Association) and the Editor.

Both our guests were presented with Association ties, and we were told that the tie was now internationally recognised as the Gallipoli Tie, not merely the tie of the Association.

What is certainly worthy of comment is the fact that this was the first occasion on which a lady had attended one of our dinners. The lady was, of course, Mrs.Vicky Banner our honorary lady member who charmed members and guests alike with her presence.

MEO.

LETTERS.

From F.J.Orton (743).

May I refer to the letter from Captain E.D.Wolton in issue No.49 regarding trench mortars? Probably my earlier letter did not express my meaning clearly.I did not intend to imply that there were no mortars on the Peninsular, but merely my surprise that I, an Ordnance Artificer, had never come across one. I had heard of the use of "home-made" ones - and of the fear of them to which Captain Wolton alludes.

Regarding his recalling seeing shells in flight, that would support my remarks about the use of reduced charges to increase the angle of descent. With normal charges the muzzle velocity is so great that no human eye could follow the flight of a shell, not even the naval 13"! But I have stood in a gun pit and watched shells from the muzzle to the target, when half charges were being used, giving a howitzer effect to the normal gun with,of course,a greatly reduced range.

There has been a considerable response to the editorial in "Gallipolian" No.49. Below are printed representative extracts from the letters of veterans only, this step being taken due to restrictions on space.

From Brigadier R.B.Rathbone OBE (267).

You ask in your editorial in the current Gallipolian (No.49) for views as to the future of the association. Unfortunately I am no longer able to attend General meetings, dinners or luncheons, hence this letter.

The Association has been kept going latterly by the addition of associate members. Personally I do not like the idea of a future association consisting entirely of associate members with evermore tenuous connections with those who actually served in the campaign. When it comes

to the point, which is now approaching, when it is not possible to muster a reasonable number of veterans at an A.G.M., dinner or luncheon, I feel the association should be closed down. I think it is always a mistake to continue with an organisation when its original purpose can no longer be achieved - or at least only to a very small extent.

From Major T.Verschoyle MC, (21).

You ask for opinions on the proposals to be discussed at the AGM, so here are mine:-

(a) Abandon the dinner. Do not seperate the AGM from the lunch.
(b) I have never shared your austere views on the admissibility of ladies (dependants of members)! My experience of the Salonika Society has shown that they have been a valuable addition, creating a less formal atmosphere without in any way forgetting the aims of the Society.
(c) & (d) No comment.
(e) Both from the financial and editorial point of view I have for some time favoured the reduction of the issues to two annually. Suitable material must surely peter out?

From Captain E.D.Wolton (418).

Re - your editorial in the "Gallipolian": below are my answers.

(a) (i) Agreed.
    (ii) I do not think members would attend both meetings and so the answer is - No.
(b) I think that now ladies should be admitted to the Association.
(c) I have sent £17 to the treasurer.
(d) Whole-heartedly agree.
(e) Agree with the Committee's suggestion.

From The President, Colonel M.E.Hancock MC, (731).

Autumn Dinner and AGM. It seems as though increasing expense, in having to stay overnight for instance, may keep a number of members from attending.

May I suggest that:-

i) In 1986 we hold a Lunch and the AGM on Anzac Day as usual.

ii) Also in 1986 we hold a Lunch, in the Autumn, which, if we start in good time, would allow people plenty of time for renewing old acquaintances and so on.

iii) In 1987 we hold a Lunch only on Anzac Day and in the Autumn a Lunch and the AGM.

iv) Lady Members and/or Guests. Now that there is less emphasis as fewer veteran Members attend, on the personal recollections of the campaign, I see no reason why the introduction of lady Members or Guests should detract from the aims and objects of the Association.

v) Gallipolian. I much hope that three editions a year can be maintained. In the past, the Gallipolian has been the only link for the great majority of Members and will continue to be so in the future, when comparatively few will be able to meet, and a reduction to two editions, to my mind, would suggest defeat, but, of course, finance may have to be the governing factor here.

An increase in membership could be the answer to viability.

Sent by the President of Kadikoy Rotary Club,Turkey.
Reprinted by courtesy of Stanley Parker Bird (RAMC 29th Division) (No.249).

Mr.President

Çanakkale is a small Turkish town.

The world came to know this small town during World War I.

The battle of Gallipoli caused terrible losses, the Anzac, British, French, and Turks losing thousands of their brave sons.

Anzac Bay, the doorway to Turkey which, in those dark days, did not open has since proven the route to friendship between our nations.

The past president Haluk B. Berker, members of my club "KADIKÖY ROTARY" and our sister club "ÇANAKKALE ROTARY" and their families visited the Memorial Cemeteries on a spring day to lay wreaths and pay homage to the honourable memory of those who died in war.

While fulfilling our solemn duty, we heard the call of ATATÜRK, the heroic commander of the Battle of Gallipoli and the founder of the modern Turkish Republic:

> "THOSE HEROES THAT SHED THEIR BLOOD AND LOST THEIR LIVES.. YOU ARE NOW LYING IN THE SOIL OF A FRIENDLY COUNTRY. THEREFORE REST IN PEACE.
> THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TOMMIES AND THE MEHMETS TO US WHERE THEY LIE SIDE BY SIDE HERE IN THIS COUNTRY OF OURS.
> YOU, THE MOTHERS, WHO SENT THEIR SONS FROM FAR AWAY COUNTRIES WIPE AWAY YOUR TEARS; YOUR SONS ARE NOW LYING IN OUR BOSOM AND ARE IN PEACE. AFTER HAVING LOST THEIR LIVES ON THIS LAND, THEY HAVE BECOME OUR SONS AS WELL."

With the happiness of the mutual friendships arising from the bitter memories now buried in the depths of history, we would be grateful if you could convey our best wishes

and warmest greetings to our fellow Rotarians in your club.

Yours truly,

Salih Nuri TÜZEL
President.

In Rememberance of The Gallipoli Campaign 1915

By S.Parker Bird (249).

As chanted on frequent occasions during evenings in "dug-outs" or under the shelter of cliffs at Cape Helles, whilst our guns were not firing and the big guns from "Asiatic Annie" at Kum Kale and Channakkale were giving us a rest. Long may they remain silent!

Roaming in the gloaming on the banks of the Dardanelles,
Waiting for the "Goeben" to come down and test her shells,
When she gets down to Chanak
She will jolly soon go back,
When she hears "Queen Lizzie's" roaming in the gloaming!

The Recollections of Three Manchesters in The Great War.
From conversations recorded with
Frank Heaton.
Edited by Sue Richardson.

This small book is compiled from the reminiscences of three soldiers who served in the Manchester Regiment during the First World War and most of the text is compiled from recorded conversations with Frank Heaton and keep to the original words as far as possible. The three soldiers are Mike Lally, Joe Horgan and John Hallows, each of whom served in a different battalion of the regiment and represent, respectively, a regular soldier (2nd Battalion, 5th Division,II Corps) of the original BEF, a Territorial (1/7th Battalion, 42nd Division) and one New Army volunteer

(20th Battalion, 7th Division).

Many members will immediately recognize the name of Joe Horgan who, until his death in December 1983, was a member of this Association (841) and served at Gallipoli on the Helles front. Members will naturally wish to focus on this and will find nearly 7 pages devoted to his experiences there, full of fascinating details which cover matters as diverse as medical treatment, the high command, mining, aerial observation, food (particularly the lack of it), the November blizzard, ship to shore bombardment, and the digging of saps. Joe Horgan was fortunate to land on the peninsula after the major offensives had come to an end, so the reader expecting eyewitness accounts of the great battles on the peninsula will be disappointed, but there is a wealth of detail about the trials and hardships of daily life there and the reader's attention is inescapably drawn to the sadly depleted state of the units there.

The experiences of these three men cover the whole course of the war and involve several fronts. As well as Gallipoli, the Western front, Sinai and Italy receive attention, the latter particularly appealing to this reviewer since relatively little is heard about the British forces there. Those equally interested will find it in John Hallow's account which completes the book.

The extracts from the conversations are linked with backgrounds provided by the editor to give the reader a perspective. On the whole this works well, but there are occasions when the editor goes awry and there are some silly misprints. The editor is clearly not familiar with the more recent work on Sir Douglas Haig's command, attributing as she does the Flanders offensive of 1917 to the alleged need to capture Ostend and Zeebrugge and to divert German attention from the French Army. Readers who are more widely read, or more specialised will know that Haig launched this offensive for very different reasons.

Moreover, the reader will very likely jib at the statements (P.45) that "A massive defeat on the Aisne early in 1914 had led to a mutiny in the French army", and the third battle of Ypres "which lasted roughly from July 1917 to

November 1918"! In the former case the year should, of course, be 1917, and in the latter November 1917. Why, too, was it found necessary to spell Wulverghem as Wulvergem throughout, but then spell it correctly on the map on page 76?

The maps are generally satisfactory, though that of Gallipoli leaves a lot to be desired. The photographs are good and complement the text splendidly. They are original and the great majority will not have been seen before, including one taken of John Hallows in the trenches at Fricourt by a camera smuggled into the line.

Additional interest is added by the inclusion of brief accounts of the childhood and growth of the three men, together with postscripts which outline their subsequent lives.

At only £2.25 (inc.postage) members will find this little book remarkably good value for money and it ought to exercise a wide appeal, especially to those with an interest in oral history.

MEO.

Format 5½ x 8 1/10th inches 88pp illustrated, softback.
Available from: Neil Richardson,375 Chorley Road,Swinton, Manchester, M27 2AY

A TALE OF A WIGMAKER, a short story from Mike Irwin (871AM)

(adapted from the book "Guests of the Unspeakable", by T.W.White.) Captain Thomas (Later Lt.Col SIR Thomas White,M.H.R. and Australian High Commissioner to U.K.) about his experiences after being an Australian flying officer in Mesopotamia. He was captured while on a flying mission to cut the telegraph wires to Baghdad and spent some years in captivity in Syria and Turkey before escaping to Odessa later in the war.

The story concerns a Private S.A.Porter who made some wigs for the concerts which the prisoners (Officers actually) were allowed to hold on certain Turkish feast days.
Private Porter of the 8th Hants Territorials was captured at Suvla Bay on 8th August 1915.

"Private Porter gave me the following facts concerning his capture at Suvla Bay and having seen the various wounds have no doubt that his story is true in every detail.(He (Porter) also had two brothers captured at Kut one of whom died as a result of his treatment after capture). Pte Porter was a signaller in advance of the leading platoon on the day of the big advance on August 8th. Portion of a shell struck him, carrying away a large portion of the right buttock. After freeing himself from a field telephone which he carried, he roughly bandaged the wound and commenced to crawl back to some cover, but before reaching it he lost consciousness through loss of blood. When he regained consciousness the attack was over and he heard enemy voices close at hand. Soon afterwards, a Turkish soldier approached and finding him still alive, struck him many times on the head with the edge of a shovel, inflicting severe gashes which rendered him unconscious. (These blows left long depressions in Porters skull). Once more regaining his senses, he found himself lying on his face and heard a Turk approach, load his rifle and while standing near his feet, fire point blank at his head. The bullet struck him in the back of the neck, gouging out a wound at least four inches long and coming out below his ear. He was again left for dead, but a party of Turkish soldiers on seeing him move bayoneted him no less than twelve times. One thrust went through his arm, another made a bad wound in the stomach, a third punctured his cheek, while the remainder were scattered over various other parts of his body. Fortunately for him, the Turkish bayonets were of the old-fashioned pointed type, or recovery would have been impossible. He again lost consciousness but woke to find a more humane party of Turks were taking him to a dressing station. Nevertheless, they made him walk with a rope tied around him which they jerked whenever he stumbled. Though he was a diminutive little

fellow, he miraculously recovered and quickly, - his most painful memories being the dressing of his wounds without chloroform, while being held down by burly wardsmen. Although his wounds when healed could be plainly seen, he found them only a slight inconvenience, so much so that when we were allowed to play football, he proved himself a dashing outside right."

I REMEMBER

ANZAC COTTAGE BUILT IN A DAY
From The West Australian 25th April 1984,
sent by John D.Young (880AM)

Have you ever heard of the house that was built in a day? Let me tell you about Anzac Cottage in Mt Hawthorn.

It was built to commemorate the first anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli.

In 1916, Mt Hawthorn was a go-ahead suburb with a very good progress association, an Ugly Men's Association and a Women's Guild...as well as lots of other clubs.

Many Mt Hawthorn men were lost on Gallipoli, so members of the progress association each put in 10 dollars towards a memorial.

They decided that a house would be more suitable than a stone monument. The house was to be built for the first soldier to return to Mt Hawthorn.

The whole suburb rallied round with fund raising. All thought it a brilliant idea. A competition was organised and an Anzac Queen chosen.

It was she who hoisted the flag after the memorial stone had been laid in the gate-post.

It read "This dwelling was erected to commemorate the landing of the Australian Forces at Anzac, April 25th, 1915.

A block of land was chosen in Kalgoorlie Street and the block was cleared on Saturday afternoon, January 26th, 1916.

Councillor Gibson took charge. Mr.A.Levido from

Coogee Street was the architect.

Mr.Gibson interviewed many firms' representatives before he was satisfied. Most firms gave a very good discount because they were pleased with the idea.

Then all the material had to be carted to the site. The carriers donated the cartage. The men donated their time.

On February 5, 1916, a procession of 150 men and at least 70 drays, headed by three motor cars (all gaily decorated to match the streets), left James Street for the site.

They were led by Mrs.Roberts, the Anzac Queen, who was in the lead car with a Metters stove and copper which had been donated.

A week later, on February 12, about 4000 people gathered at the building site. They had been told that the house was to be erected by a 'busy bee'.

By 3.30am the stone-masons and their assistants were on the job. By 4am 50 artisans and tradesmen had arrived and by 8am 100 men were at work.

Mr.Gibson found the right job for each man who turned up. They all brought their own tools.

Bricklayers, hod carriers, carpenters, plasterers, plumbers, painters and gardeners worked as though their lives depended on getting that house finished.

The ladies kept the men well fortified with food and refreshments.

I was one of the many children who played among all the activity.

By nightfall a fine brick and tile bungalow with two gables was completed - even to the fence.

It was a record day's work and Mt Hawthorn citizens were justly proud.

The home still stands and is now vested in the Mt Hawthorn Progress Association.

A Pilgrimage to Gallipoli
by Captain C.A.Bennett (713)

As old Gallipolians we were offered one free place on Holts' Battlefields Tour during the 70th anniversary of the landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 25th 1915. Several names were submitted by our Secretary, but acceptance carried with it the condition that the participant must be fit and accompanied on the journey.

Eventually I was chosen and my daughter offered to come with me, and, I am pleased to say she appreciated the tour.

On April 25th 1985 we flew to Istanbul, and on our arrival were immediately faced by photographers and plied with many questions by press representatives. Our photographs appeared in the Turkish press next morning. The remainder of Saturday and Sunday were spent in Istanbul visiting mosques and other places of interest including the Military Museum to hear the Military Band play, which was quite different to our style of military band.

On Monday we were taken to the military establishment at Scutari where we received V.I.P. treatment and visited the apartments once occupied by Florence Nightingale in the Crimean War. After visiting the Pera Palace Hotel, including the rooms which at one time were occupied by Ataturk and also those occupied by Agatha Christie, our coaches took the road to Kannakkale across the famous Golden Bridge, then along the shores of the Sea of Marmara, a distance of 200 kilometres. We then crossed from Eceabet on the European side to Kannakkale on the Asiatic side, where we made our base.

On Tuesday the battlefields of the northern part of the peninsula were visited; Lone Pine, Johnston's Jolly, Courtney's and Steele's Posts, Quinn's Post, 4th Battalion Parade Ground, the Nek and CWGC cemetries. On Wednesday the party visited Troy and Turkish battery positions with a lecture on the naval battle of March 1915, returning to Kannakkale to visit the Military Museum and Mine Depot.

Thursday April 25th was the great day when we visited the New Turkish Museum with the British, Australian and New Zealand ambassadors present, together with a Turkish Minister. It was here that I met and was photographed with a Turkish veteran.

Our next stop was at the unveiling of the Anzac Memorial and this was followed by stops at Lone Pine, the Australian Memorial and the New Zealand Memorial. At these memorials the Last Post and Reveille were sounded and wreaths laid. The final memorial to be visited was the Allied Memorial at Cape Helles, our ambassador being present.

The company, about 120 strong assembled in front of the memorial and wreaths and bunches of flowers were laid by friends and relatives of the fallen. I was priveleged to lay a wreath on behalf of the Old Gallipolians. The Last Post and Reveille were sounded and the President of the Royal British Legion recited: "They shall grow not old... we will remember them". I recited two verses of Kipling's "The Children": "These were our children who died for our lands.....but who shall return us the children". Arrangements were made by Major and Mrs.Holt with a member of the Hampshire Regiment, who took my daughter and I to 'S' Beach where I landed in 1915. Members of the regiment had driven 2,000 miles from Berlin to be present at the ceremony, as their predecessors attacked 'V' Beach from the River Clyde in 1915. On our way back to our base we visited a Military Museum at Krithia; a village we looked towards in 1915 but never reached.

On Friday we returned to Istanbul, crossing the Narrows at Gariboalu and visited the Covered Market in Istanbul. On Saturday we had a free morning and flew back to London in the afternoon.



Captain Bennett laying the wreath at the Cape Helles Memorial.



The Old Gallipolians' Wreath on Cape Helles Memorial.

The Evacuation From Gallipoli
By R.C.Chadwick, ISO, RN (416)

We don't hear much about the evacuation of Gallipoli on the night of the 8th January 1916, but here's how I vividly remembered it. On the night of the 7th/8th January H.M.S. Edgar steamed towards the Cape Helles Peninsular and in the lee of the River Clyde. Meanwhile an armada of ships were gathering in their allotted positions, stretching the length of the Peninsular from Helles to Suvla Bay and their guns commenced a systematic bombardment of all the Turkish positions. from which the Turks fell back, being under the impression that our land forces were about to make an all-out attack, whereas instead the small boats, the cutters, launches and picket boats from the ships and trawlers were concentrating to pick up all the troops from whenever they were disembarking, almost like the landing in reverse.

The Peninsular was ablaze from one end to the other, what a spectacle the scene was! All the time the troops were being evacuated and this was safely completed as dawn approached.

The "Edgar" battered the Turkish positions from dusk to dawn, firing 1,000 rounds of six-inch shell. How fortunate we were to have Captain Dent in command, for he was a gunnery expert and during the campaign the "Edgar" was mentioned 8 times in despatches. Captain Dent was previously captain of the "Irresistible" and was transferred to the "Edgar" after "Irresistible" was sunk. I was his messenger from joining until I was honoured to be promoted from a boy to an ordinary seaman at 17½years, i.e. man's pay, but only boy's privileges until I was 18. The old "Edgar" had not come off unscathed as No.3 starboard gun received a direct hit which killed all the gun crew, and the ship was on fire twice.

As dawn approached and all the troops were safely off, the ships commenced to bombard the large dumps of ammunition, stores and equipment and also the despatching of the herds of horses and mules, which were stampeding madly around. These were systematically slaughtered by the ship's gunfire; how tragic that these faithful animals should die

in this way.

When full daylight reappeared Johnny Turk would be very surprised to find that the foe had vanished just like the "Phantom Army". Perhaps the evacuation was a miracle, but the whole campaign had been a catastrophe. After the evacuation I, along with 2 ratings manned the signal station on the Island of Imbros for 6 months.

THE ROYAL NAVY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN OF 1915 (contd.) BY CPO A.L.BURGIN (AM873)

SECONDARY TASKS

In his orders for 25 April, de Robeck stated without qualification that after the Army had made its position secure 'the Navy will attack the forts at the Narrows, assisted by the Army'. This now formed the basis of the Navy's tasks, but to the concern of many naval officers, this promise was not kept. On that fateful 25 April, with the exception of HMS Implacable, the ships gave poor covering fire, and in some cases none at all. Because of Implacable's gunnery, the landing at X Beach was the most successful of the landings on that dreadful day. Captain Eric Bush, who served at Gallipoli as a midshipman, has written that, 'It was the paucity of firepower during the actual touch down which resulted in the appalling casualties on the beaches. Not only did bombarding ships stand too far out, whence they could see nothing, but they lifted their fire much too soon, which enabled the defenders to stand up in their trenches and pour murderous volleys into the men in the boats while our naval shells fell harmlessly inland'.[20] Lieutenant Commander Andrew Cunningham (later Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope)has also written, 'We destroyers lay off the beaches though for some incomprehensible reason we had the strictest orders not to open fire in support of the Army. I have never discovered who was responsible for this stupid edict, for many opportunites were missed of

directly helping the landings by destroyers - so close inshore that they could even see the Turks bobbing up and down in their trenches. It was a tragedy and a mortifying situation for a well-gunned destroyer'. The order not to fire was rescinded a few days later but was directly responsible for the deaths of many soldiers. HMS Albion was stationed off V Beach (the scene of the famous River Clyde incident), but was unable to open fire. It is hardly credible that the official historian of the campaign (Aspinall-Oglander) has written that, 'The situation at V Beach was only saved from complete disaster by the machine-guns mounted in the bows of the River Clyde'. HMS Albion was equipped with four 12 inch, twelve 6 inch, some 12 pounder guns and machine-guns. It is difficult to understand why such an order should have been given.[21] It is equally hard to imagine why a warship captain, seeing British soldiers in such desperation, would fail to open fire on the Turks regardless of an order to the contrary.

On 9 May, Keyes was urgently pressing for a renewal of the naval attack of 18 March but with more purpose. Keyes wrote 'I can think of nothing more detestable than to watch our troops being destroyed by rifles and machine-guns which, in spite of our great armament, we were powerless to silence'. Of all the senior naval officers at the Dardanelles, Keyes was the one most affected by the inactivity of the Navy. Following the shambles of Suvla on 7 August, he was again angry. 'It is awful; I can't bear it when I think and believe that we could stop it all, and end the business in a few weeks. I had it out again with the Admiral (de Robeck) on Friday and again on Saturday'. De Robeck had already effectively blocked Keyes' plan for a renewed naval attack, but Churchill asked for an attack on the Narrows forts and an operation large enough to clear the Kephez minefield. But Fisher could not now be swayed and he was becoming increasingly exasperated with Churchill's interference in concerns which were properly those of the First Sea Lord.

Fisher did not consider the original attempt to force the Dardanelles with ships alone to be a practicable operation, and he would not now be a party to any order to de Robeck to make any attempt to pass the Dardanelles until the shores had been effectively occupied by troops. On the night of 11 May, HMS Goliath was sunk by a Turkish torpedo boat in Morto Bay with the loss of 618 officers and men. The following day HMS Queen Elizabeth, now considered too valuable to be risked, was withdrawn from the Dardanelles, a decision that angered Kitchener intensely. Matters between Churchill and Fisher were coming to a head. When an agreement between the two concerning precisely what naval forces should be deployed to the Dardanelles had been reached but was subsequently changed by Churchill, Fisher had had enough. The result was his resignation on 15 May. He wrote to Churchill 'After much anxious reflection I have come to the regretted conclusion that I am unable to remain any longer as your colleague'. Fisher's resignation, the crisis at the Dardanelles, and the 'shells scandal' (together with the bloody setback on Aubers Ridge in France), made it impossible for the Conservatives to continue to support the Liberals without a new 'arrangement'. The first step was taken on 17 May when Churchill, and others, were requested to resign. In desperation, he offered Fisher a seat in the new Cabinet if he would withdraw his resignation. This was an extraordinary offer, and one which Churchill had absolutely no power to make.

Such was Churchill's force of personality that,despite his dismissal, he was given a seat on the Dardanelles Committee - the new name for the War Council. But it was a junior position, and Sir Arthur Balfour was now First Lord; Admiral Sir Henry Jackson was First Sea Lord. During the summer, Keyes had prepared detailed plans for a naval operation, and wanted desperately to be given an opportunity to put them into effect. De Robeck, while not supporting the ideas of his young Chief of Staff, gave him leave to report to the Admiralty to explain his plans. These audacious plans were in keeping with Keyes' personality, and it is worth examining his concept in detail. The fleet would be divided into four squadrons,

three to take part in the attack, the fourth to support the Army on the peninsula. The Second Squadron would consist of about 8 old battleships and cruisers, four very old battleships to act as supply ships, as many dummy battleships as possible, and several merchantmen carrying coal and ammunition. All these vessels were to be fitted with mine-bumpers. Preceded by four of the converted destroyer-sweepers, and accompanied by eight destroyers and two sloops, this Squadron - led by Keyes himself - was to enter the straits just before dawn, keeping below the searchlight area until dawn. Then it would steam through the Narrows at full speed. Keyes believed that aided by smoke screens, darkness and surprise, he would break through with more than half his ships to above Nagara. The ships would then attack the Narrows forts from the rear. Meanwhile, the First Squadron, comprising Lord Nelson, Agamemnon, Exmouth, King Edward, Glory, Canopus, four French ships, eight sloops and ten destroyers for mine-sweeping, would simultaneously attack the Narrows forts at dawn from below the Kephez minefield.

The bombardment of the forts and the minesweeping would be a continuous operation. Keyes' plans allowed for the operation to continue for up to three days if necessary before the First Squadron made its final advance through the Narrows. The thorough plans also provided arrangements to supply the ships in the Sea of Marmara while they were preventing Turkish supplies from reaching the peninsula.

While Keyes' plan still called for ships to attack forts in defiance of the old naval axiom, it recognized the logic of that axiom and made due allowance for it. Seen in the light of previous attempts to force the Straits, Keyes' plan was far-reaching and, in theory, stood every chance of success. But a theoretical plan it remained. For although Kitchener and Balfour favoured it for a time, the Sea Lords demurred and demanded not only guarantees of military support but also a particular strength of Army backing. Since the Army could not satisfy the Navy's requirements,the plan was rejected.

Kitchener, informed by Balfour of this, noted that the Navy was 'afraid to wet its feet'.

Keyes remained insistent that the Navy could achieve a breakthrough if given the opportunity. When de Robeck went on leave in November his successor, Rear Admiral R.E. Wemyss (previously the commander of the island of Lemnos), had already informed Keyes that he was in favour of a continued naval attack. But in London, de Robeck had already been at work and told the War Committee that 'there was no definite object to gain by it'. This truly illustrates de Robeck's lack of vision. The Navy had by now left it too late to avert what Keyes was to call 'one of the most disastrous and cowardly surrenders in the naval, military and political history of our country'.

It is difficult to dispute this view. What might have been accomplished had the Navy acted early enough and with its customary determination, is perhaps best described by the American Ambassador in Constantinople at this time, Morgenthau. A keen observer, and in close contact with officers of the Turkish High Command, he probably had a better understanding of Turkish attitudes and reactions than any other foreign diplomat in Turkey. He wrote, 'In giving his assent to a purely naval expedition Lord Kitchener had relied on a revolution in Turkey to make the enterprise successful. Lord Kitchener has been much criticised for his action but I owe it to his memory to say he was absolutely right. Had the Allied fleet once passed the defences of the Straits the administration of the Young Turks would have come to a bloody end. As for Constantinople, the populace there would have welcomed the arrival of the Allied fleet with joy, for this would relieve them of the controlling gang, emancipate them from the hated Germans, bring about peace and end their miseries'. It must be said that the misery of the Allied troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula would also have ended.

Much later, Keyes was writing, 'Nothing will ever shake my opinion that from the fourth of April, onwards, the fleet could have forced the Straits, and, with

losses trifling in comparison with those the army suffered, could have entered the Marmara with sufficient force to destroy the Turco-German fleet'.

EPILOGUE

The Gallipoli Campaign ended in January 1916 with the final evacuation of Helles. It is difficult to determine accurately the number of casualties as Turkish records were loosely kept. The total British casualties were about 205,000, including 43,000 killed or dead of wounds or disease; 90,000 were evacuated from the peninsula through sickness. Within these overall figures are 26,094 Australian casualties, including 7,594 killed and 7,571 New Zealand casualties, with 2,431 killed. The French suffered 47,000 casualties, including 5,000 killed. Total Turkish casualties were probably in the order of some 251,000, although the official British history states that 'other Turkish authorities place the total losses as high as 350,000'. This is not the view of Turkish authorities today.

Winston Churchill has written that 'It will be seen that the genesis of this plan and its elaboration were entirely naval and professional in their character'. It is here argued, however, that this was Churchill's plan, which he persuaded the War Coumcil to accept. Professor Marder has written that Churchill's Service advisors had solid justification for resentment at being in a major operation which most of them regarded with alarm. It is further argued that, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill was to a very real extent responsible for the Dardanelles operation. He had at no stage conducted anything approaching a critical examination of the immense problems involved. He had grossly overestimated the effect of naval guns with flat trajectory against land forts; but his major error of judgement, as viewed in Turkey today, was that he totally underrated the capacity of the Turk to fight.

Admiral Wemyss wrote that Churchill's name would be handed down to posterity 'as that of a man who undertook

an operation of whose requirements he was entirely ignorant'. There is no doubting the anxiety of senior naval officers during the latter period of Churchill's tenure of office. On his dismissal as First Lord, Beatty wrote 'the Navy breathes freer now it is rid of the succubus Churchill', and Jellicoe described him as 'a public danger to the Empire'. It is difficult, when examining Churchill's role as First Lord in a wartime situation, to dispute these viewpoints. Moreover, it is equally difficult to seriously deny that the Gallipoli Campaign, while an imaginative concept that was in direct contrast to the futility of the Western Front, casts very serious doubts on Churchill's ability as a military strategist at that time.

Lloyd George had in effect written the epitaph on the Gallipoli Campaign before it had begun in December 1914 in a memorandum to the War Council. 'Expeditions which are decided upon and organised with insufficient care generally end disastrously'.

Over thirty years later, Churchill himself was to write 'I was ruined for the time being over the Dardanelles, and a supreme enterprise was cast away, through my trying to carry out a major and combined operation of war from a subordinate position. Men are ill-advised to try such ventures'.

FOOTNOTES

1. See figure 1

2. See figure 2

3. See figure 3

4. See figure 4

5. Lord Mountbatten has said of this episode concerning his father, 'Winston had to find someone in a hurry, and went back to that old has-been, Jackie Fisher, which was an act bordering on lunacy'. (Hough - Mountbatten Hero of Our Time).

6. Before the year was out, however, Admiral Sturdee was to win the Battle of the Falkland Islands.

7. Churchill has written, "We had seen fortresses reported throughout Europe to be impregnable collapsing after a few days' attack by field armies without a regular seige'. (Churchill - The World Crisis).

8. Churchill - The World Crisis page 323.

9. The suggestion arose after Kitchener had opened a discussion on the defence of Egypt, and Churchill argued that the best way of defending Egypt would be to threaten Turkey in a decisive area.

10. Churchill admitted this to the Dardanelles Commission in 1916.

11. Carden had been Superintendent of Malta Dockyard before his promotion in September 1914 to command the Allied Squadron in the Aegean. His career had been undistinguished, and he had never commanded a force of this size. Churchill and Fisher were under no illusions about him, and one of the major questions of Gallipoli must be why Carden was not replaced when the importance of the Dardanelles operation was realised. The Admiralty first proposed to appoint Admiral Limpus, who had been the Chief of the British Naval Mission at Constantinople, and probably knew more about the Dardanelles defences than any other British officer. The subsequent cancellation of this appointment on the grounds that it would arouse suspicions concerning Britain's protestations of continuing friendship towards Turkey in September 1914, must be seen as a fundamental error of judgement on the part of the Admiralty.

12. Churchill has written 'It was Sir Henry Jackson and the Admiralty Staff who embraced this idea and studied and approved its detail'. (Churchill - The World Crisis).

13. Hankey has recorded, 'The idea caught on at once. The whole atmosphere changed. Fatigue was forgotten.

The War Council turned eagerly from the dreary vista of a 'slogging-match' on the Western Front to brighter prospects, as they seemed, in the Mediterranean.

14. This remains one of the most significant and fascinating episodes of the Great War. A single German capital ship with one small escort (Breslau) eluded 15 Allied capital ships, breaking through from the Adriatic to Algeria, and back via Messina to the Dardanelles, and subsequently to Constantinople. The escape of the Goeben proved to be a significant factor in Turkey entering the war on the German side, and also brought about the controversial Court Martial of Rear Admiral Troubridge.

15. Fisher wrote to Jellicoe on 21 January, 'I just abominate the Dardanelles operation, unless a great change is made and it is settled to be made a military operation, with 200,000 men in conjunction with the Fleet'.

16. The overall military commander at Chanak was German.

17. A number of the German gunners at the Dardanelles had been brought from the Goeben, which was lying at Constantinople.

18. At the outbreak of war, de Robeck had been on half-pay but had been recalled to command the Ninth Destroyer Flotilla in the North Sea, with considerable success. Rear Admiral Wemyss, who had been sent from England to establish a base at the Aegean island of Lemnos (with considerable difficulty owing to the complete lack of planning beforehand) was senior to de Robeck but declined to accept command of the Allied fleet.

19. Moorehead - Gallipoli, page 77. See photograph of NUSRET and illustration of her commanding officer. Mr.Moorehead's spelling of the minelayer is inconsistent with the Turkish.

20. In a private letter to this writer, The President of the Gallipoli Association - Vice Admiral E.W.Longley -Cook CB CBE DSO - has stated that, 'I remember well that we could <u>not</u> locate the mobile guns firing at us, but the real trouble was the appalling lack of secrecy prior to 25 April, the extremely inadequate planning, the bad overall generalship of Sir Ian Hamilton, and finally there were two vital errors. On 25 April we landed the Anzacs a mile north of the intended beach. This was the fault of the No.1 tow - the starboard (southermost) tow on which we had to keep station. (12 tows - mine was No.5). The second vital error was the utter failure of the Army to march on unopposed as they were after the Navy landed them at Suvla Bay'. Churchill was himself guilty of a breach of security in a speech at Dundee on 5 June, in which he outlined British war policy.

21. In his book, Damn the Dardanelles!, Mr. John Laffin has written, 'A few veterans, still bitter after fifty or sixty years, have suggested to me that the Navy did not want the landing to succeed; if it did, their reasoning goes, the Army victory would make the naval failure of March 18 all the more shameful. It is hard to believe that, even in the climate of stupidity prevailing at that time, any naval commander would have sent soldiers to their deaths for such a reason'. Page 184.

<u>MY GALLIPOLI STORY (Contd.) - Major G.B.Horridge</u>

<u>1/5 Lancashire Fusiliers (129)</u>

In fact they seemed to us to be only just above our

heads because the whizz as they went by and the bang as they burst seemed almost simultaneous. One felt that sooner or later some shells must fall short in our own trench. In consequence of this no one was anxious to look over the parapet to watch the shells bursting in the Turkish trench. However, I did have a few looks over the parapet and bits of stuff were flying up in the air all the time. Great sods would fly up. Then something like pieces of woodwork and then something which might be a body. Of course we wanted the trench smashed to pieces and everyone in it killed because at the end of the bombardment men had to charge with the bayonet to take it. The bombardment stopped for a few minutes at 11.30 and everyone had to shout. This was to get the Turks back in their trenches (from dug-outs and communicating trenches etc.) and then continue the bombardment. So for an hour I crouched in our trench listening to the crashing of the bombardment and wondering whether some shells would fall short and burst in our trench and also wondering whether any Turks would be left alive at zero hour (noon) and what would happen after that. At last, twelve o'clock approached and no shells had fallen in our trench. The officer of the Manchesters near me began to count, 5 minutes to go, 4 minutes to go, 3 minutes to go, two minutes to go, one minute to go, half a minute to go, a quarter of a minute, 10 seconds, 5 seconds, 4, 3, 2, 1. Come on lads, over the top and the Manchester boys scrambled out to a man, through our own wire and over nomansland to the trench we could see in front of us. As I said we had to stay behind in the trench to garrison it. Let it be said very softly that I was rather pleased I hadn't to go over the top. The bombardment stopped but of course then the Turks started to fire. Their shrapnel was bursting overhead, their machine guns were going and of course a lot of rifle fire. The bulk of the Manchesters disappeared into the trench ahead which we had been watching. Still because of the amount of metal flying about from the Turkish trenches one wasn't anxious to keep one's head above the parapet very long. The attack started at 12 o'clock the second wave coming from the trench behind was to advance, leap frog our trench and go forward after those that had already gone at zero hour. Some minutes after

zero and the Manchesters had gone I looked over the parapet of the trench and then came one of those moments which may be unique in a person's lifetime and can and moreover probably do alter the course of a person's existence. I saw a man lying in nomansland in front of me and about 30 yards away. He was lying face downwards and was holding one hand up as though asking for assistance. I then realised that this was the moment of decision for me. As I suppose most people must wonder what they will do when the moment arrives in war that faces them with a dangerous decision. It is not too difficult to go over the top when everyone else is going. If you go over with the others you take your chance along with your comrades. Like them you may be killed or wounded or maimed for life, but on the other hand you may not be and you may come through it unharmed. But if you stay behind you are finished morally for good and it can never be recovered. The moment can never come again. In this case the matter was voluntary. Would I go out voluntarily and bring him in or would I not risk it? I did not know the man and I had no need in duty to go, in fact in duty I should not go. But it struck me very forcibly that <u>this</u> was the moment I like every other soldier had subconsciously been waiting for. I felt that if I did not go I should have mentally branded myself as having failed at the moment of decision and the moment of no return. I felt that all through my life although no one else would know I should know that, did they know, they would consider I had failed. So in a way I had no option. I went to one of my platoon who was acting as a sentry named Parks and asked him if he would come with me and get this man in. In answer he climbed over the parapet and I went after him. Up to this point all this seems possibly very good, but mark what happened. I had only run about 7 or 8 yards when I felt as though a hammer had hit me in the left side. Of course I knew I had been hit by something and promptly turned round ran back and jumped back into the trench about 7 feet deep. I might easily have jumped onto a bayonet or two but I didn't think about that. As soon as I was hit I forgot all about the Manchester soldier which shows that in reality I had been concerned

about my own feelings and not really about him. I had satisfied my own conscience and I am afraid that was what mattered most. Parks got him in but I am afraid the poor fellow died shortly afterwards. Cecil Clarke bandaged me up and I lay on the firestep wondering if I should die. I was lucky, the bullet had hit my ribs, bounced off and came out again. After a little I thought I wasn't going to die and in about an hour my left arm became strangely stiff. I then discovered the bullet had gone through my left arm first. I wondered if the Turks would counter-attack and take the trench with me lying in it helpless. About 4 o'clock or so Capt.Ashworth sent me an order to go down to hospital, so I handed over my revolver and field glasses to Cecil and proceeded to get down the line. There were no stretchers, there were a large number of wounded and I did my best to walk or be half carried by a stretcher bearer and managed to get along. After a time I came across Lt.Duckworth of the 6th Lan.Fus. who was in a support line and who was brewing some tea. I stayed with him a little, had some tea and then he found me a stretcher and I was carried off to a field dressing station. Duckworth was killed, I am sorry to say, during the battle in the "Vineyard" on August 7 1915.

I was doctored up at the Field Dressing station and lay the night on a stretcher amongst many other wounded in the deep mule track. Next day I was put on board a hospital ship for Alexandria. This ship was, of course, crammed with wounded, lying everywhere on the decks and from time to time it would stop to bury at sea the wounded who had died. And so I arrived in hospital in Alexandria. I have described all this in detail so that anyone of my descendants who may read this in the future may get an impression of a few moments in the life of a soldier in war. Perhaps there will not be battles of this nature any more and in 100 years it may be interesting reading. One doesn't know anything for certain but I have always believed that if I had not answered the call of my conscience when I did I should have been killed two days later.

On the morning of June 6th my platoon were in a trench joining two forks of the Nullah. It was a Turkish communication trench, I think. The bank of the left hand fork

was high and on that morning when, of course, the battle was still in progress, a party of Turks had got through our line and getting a machine gun on top of this bank fire along the length of this line. Many of my platoon were killed then and had I been there, being tall and an officer, I fear my chance of survival would have been small.

I was in hospital for just over a month. When I entered it my spirits were at a very low ebb. The scenes of battle, being wounded, the sights and sounds of wounded soldiers all the way from the front line to hospital, the shock of seeing - when I was waiting in hospital to have my wound dressed - a man walk in without a lower jaw, all caused tremendous depression and I vowed to myself that nothing, absolutely nothing would get me back to actual fighting again. Strange, therefore, that within a month I found myself wondering how the lads in my platoon were getting along on the Peninsula without their leader! I began to worry about it; I ought to be there with them and behold in a month I was enquiring if I could go back. So much for the recuperative powers of youth. Five weeks after being wounded I was landing for the second time on Gallipoli. Some of our senior officers had their wives in Alexandria, staying at the same hotel. As soon as I could walk about I used to go to see them. Mrs.Isherwood the Commanding Officer's wife claimed she was in contact with James, her husband.

One day she said to me "I feel much better to-day. James is telling me that he is safe for the time being". Later word came that the battalion had gone to Imbros for a rest. She was right! Apart from wounds sickness was starting amongst the troops which was to grow much greater later. There was dysentery and typhoid fever. My Company Commander's wife Leonie Ashworth, who often visited me in hospital, caught typhoid. I went to see her before I left to return to the Bn. She died a few days later.

I landed back with a small draft of returning wounded on the Peninsula on July 12th. The battalion was

in the line (that means the front line). We were wending our way up when we met the Divisional Commander Major General William Douglas. He said he was pleased to see us and that we would be pleased to know that very shortly we should be having another crack at the Turks and would be able to get our own back. This was about the most depressing news I had heard up to then. We joined the battalion in the front line trenches called K11 and almost at once we took part in a battle, the chief participants of which on our side were the 52nd Division of Scottish Lowland Territorials. Our part was to stand on the firestep and shoot at the Turkish trenches (to keep their heads down) while the scotties attacked. They attacked on our right and lost heavy casualties. Two of my men were killed, shot in the head as they were firing. We remained in this trench and the support trench for eleven days. Of course in the front or support line we could never undress or take our boots off, we had always to be ready for action. Now had arrived, apart from bullets and shells, the worst abomination of Gallipoli, the flies. There were none when I had left, they were there when I returned. A species of green bluebottle but smaller than our English bluebottle, with green bodies. After the battles on June 4th - 6th, the land in between the trenches was covered with dead. As the Turkish firing was almost incessant at night and the dead were so numerous it was impossible to bury a big proportion of them. It was a horrible job to do so because they had decomposed very quickly in the very hot sun. The flies bred there until their number was tremendous. At night they lived on the dead and in the daytime they buzzed just around our trenches. All the trenches were covered in flies like a swarm of gnats that one sees in the garden in summertime. They attacked our food remorselessly. In order to eat one had to wave one's hand about just over one's food and then bite suddenly or a fly was in with it. Any bit of food uncovered was blotted out of sight by flies in a couple of seconds. This was frightfully trying and the contamination made everyone ill. Typhoid and dysentery were rife. Those that didn't get either had very unpleasant tummy trouble and were continually on the trot. I hadn't remained away long enough to get properly well and I soon began to be affected though not by actual typhoid or

serious dysentery. Our food now was something different. Bread was being baked so the dog biscuits disappeared. Dessicated vegetables had been introduced and there was an alternative to bully beef in Maconnachie's rations. However the illness that the flies caused took away any appetite and I remember that eventually the smell of cooked dessicated vegetables as the meals were brought down the trenches was almost nauseating. I remember a peculiar incident in K11. We were about 150 yards from the Turkish front line and one late afternoon I saw Sergeant Hutchinson go to a sand bag on the parapet of the trench, take it out of its place and put it back again as though he was putting it back in a better position. Then he walked away, but suddenly turned round and went back to the sand bag and took it away again. He said that when he lifted the first time he had seen a Turkish face looking at him from the other side of the parapet. He thought it must be "seeing things" and put the sand bag back. Then in a few seconds he realised that he must have seen a Turkish listening patrol but when he took the sand bag off the second time the face was no longer there.

After the Scotties' battle of July 12th nothing of interest happened in these K11 trenches. Once I took a walk up to "B" Company's part of the trench where the Turks were only 25 yards in front and when we were in support we were allowed an odd time to go a few at a time to bathe in Morto Bay. Other visitors we had beside flies were body lice. These were transferred from one to another in blankets. They were very hardy and no amount of washing clothes in the sea would get rid of them. When things were quiet of a morning the men would get their shirts off and have a delousing session. The method was to squash them between their thumb nails. I only had them for a very few days. My method was simple. My mother sent me a parcel every week containing a shirt, vest, pants, piece of chocolate and some pipe tobacco with paper and string all sewn up in a parcel made from Calico and sewn up in the works at Bolholt. I changed clothes and sent the dirty ones back tied up in the paper and string from the parcel I had received. So I

had a change of clothes every week. This was very simple but everyone laughs now when I tell them I sent my weekly washing home from Gallipoli. I didn't have any creepy crawlies afterwards.

After I had been back about 3 weeks I had become quite poorly and I was sent off by the M.O. to Madros hospital on Lemnos island. Here I was given a cure consisting of no food except a bowl of ideal milk three times a day. Ideal milk may be nice the first time you have it or even up to the 20th time. But when it gets to the 30th bowl or so it becomes repulsive. It becomes so bad that Gallipoli seems better. In two weeks I couldn't stand it any longer. I declared myself cured and asked to go back. I went back and for the 3rd time landed on Gallipoli.

In my absence the big battle of August 7th was fought and the casualties were very heavy. I believe my brother Walter and my ex-corporal Cecil Clarke were the only two officers in our battalion to go over the top and come back un-hit. On the day before the battle Commissions on the field had come through for 3 of our N.C.O.s namely Sgt.Hinckley, Sgt.Whittam and Corporal C.Clarke. The first two names were killed the day after. I believe that many men who were killed had premonitions of it. Lt.W.C.Yapp who was killed on August 7th had a premonition. Quartermaster Sgt.Yates of my own company had had a premonition ever since he had heard in Egypt that the battalion was ordered to Gallipoli. He survived the battles of May 7th. and June 4th. They say that he spent the night of August 6th in prayer. The next day he walked over the top carrying a walking stick. He returned unharmed and was killed that night by a shell. I never felt I was going to be killed, which by the way didn't mean I wasn't frightened, and I didn't feel Walter would be killed. Towards the end of the war I began to feel that the penny couldn't always come down tails and that if I went into another attack in all probability I should be "for it". I never went into an attack after the Battle of Passchandaele which is about the time I was referring to so I don't know if my feeling was right.

To Be Continued