
THE GALLIPOLIAN

THE JOURNAL OF THE

GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION



SS 'RIVER CLYDE' AT V BEACH 25 APRIL 1915

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THE GALLIPOLIAN
The Journal of the GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATON
(Founded by Major E H W Banner
in 1969 on the campaign of 1915)

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THE ANNUAL DINNER 70TH ANNIVERSARY:
Wednesday 27th November

The dinner will be held as usual at the Royal Air Force Club, 128 Piccadilly W1. It is between the Green Park and Hyde Park Underground stations. There is free parking space in nearby streets after 6.30pm.

TIME	7 for 7.30 ending 10 plus.
DRESS	Dinner jacket with miniatures or dark suit with medals
GUESTS	Male guests are very welcome. Named.
PRICE	£10.00
APPLICATIONS	To be sent to the Secretary, K. Tranmer, 100 Ramsgill Drive, Newbury Park, ILFORD, Essex, IG2 7TP, to reach him not later than first post on 15th November. A stamped addressed envelope must be included with the application for a place card to be sent as a receipt.
ON ARRIVAL	Please leave hats and coats in the cloak-room,on the ground floor. The place card should be placed at a vacant table place.
DRINKS	Payable at the bar and at the Table.
WELCOME	Do make yourself known to other members and show your name tab.

NEW MEMBERS

In the original printed journal, sections on this page and on the two following contain names and full addresses of new members and address amendments.

For reasons of data protection and personal privacy, this content has been omitted.

OBITUARY (30th June 1985)

With deep regret the following names are recorded.

Captain E W Bush DSO** DSC RN (Midmn HMS Bacchante) Vice President)	14
Major-Gen J H Jameson CBE DSO RM (RND) Vice President	105
Major P G H Cripps MC (Lt SLI attached 1st R Dublin Fus. 29 Div.)	464
P V Fisher (Spr. R. E. 72 Field Coy. 13 Div.)	483
J C Graham (Rflmn., 7 Cameronians Scottish Rifles 52 Div.)	593
J A Williams (RAOC 29 Div.)	

Captain Eric Bush RN

Captain Eric Bush (Vice President) was a founder member of the Gallipoli Association and a distinguished veteran with a legendary naval career in both World Wars. He was only 15 when he won the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the campaign when he ran a picket boat towing troop carrying boats for 72 hours on end. He won his DSC for services performed under shell fire on the beaches and in the boat off the beaches.

CORRECTION AND AMENDMENTS

Membership List 1984, p16;

868 WESTALL R V H Lt-Cdr should read: 868 WESTALL R V H Midshipman

Typing error No. 47, p6, PROMOTION:
For Captain P A Pendleton read 828 PEDERSEN.

THE GALLIPOLI LUNCH 25.4.85

The morning of the 70th Anniversary dawned fine and clear although a chill wind swept down Whitehall as the parade formed up to the music of the Parachute Regiment Band on the south side of the Cenotaph. Sixteen veterans attended this year and those on parade along with non veteran members were marched out by Major Verschoyle MC (5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers - 10 Irish Division) whose photograph appeared in the Times the following day, which is worthy of recording because the Reporter sent to cover the event began by asking the assembled veterans "What is Gallipoli?" The remark appeared so incredible that all were lost for words and the laughter of the Secretary and the kerbside comments from onlookers, among whom were Australian and New Zealand veterans of World War 2, drove the embarrassed young man away. One Australian suggested we write to Rupert Murdoch. The Association wreath was laid by Lt Col Malcolm Hancock MC and once again the Gallipoli Association participated at the ceremony at the invitation of the High Commissioners of Australia and New Zealand to whom we extend our thanks.

The service which followed at Westminster Abbey was well attended and members of the Association had their usual reserved seats. If the singing was weak at times the sound was well complimented by the trumpet fanfares and cords from the mighty organ. The congregation left to a peel of bells, the veterans to catch the special army coach arranged for them by the Chairman and the tourists once more were permitted to enter the Abbey curious to know but not daring to ask about the event which had kept them waiting. On arrival at the Wellington Barracks the party were played into the Mess of the Coldstream Guards by Regimental Bandsmen in ceremonial uniform, for an excellent lunch much enjoyed by all present. There was more music and in addition to Regimental Marches an opportunity to sing Lily Marlene, Pack up your Troubles, Tipperary

and Waltzing Matilda. The Boer War song "Goodbye Dolly Grey" was listened to in silence reflecting perhaps the 'Age-Gap.' The lunch was followed by the A G M under the Chairmanship of Captain Christopher Fagan who had so kindly arranged the bus and lunch, and in paying his thanks to our hosts a a former Grenadier generously admitted that the Coldstream Guards live up to their motto "Second to None".

K.T.

There is sequel to the events of the 25th April, namely that a letter was sent to the editor of the Times the following day by the Secretary recording the fact that the Ceremony held in Whitehall marked the 70th Anniversary of the Gallipoli Campaign at which 16 veterans paraded, and among the many decorations were two MC's, an M M a CBE and an ISO. The incident with the Cub Reporter was mentioned without a direct reference to the newspaper concerned and the letter finished with a paragraph stating that although the Press forgot them, the Queen did not and all were much cheered by her message awaiting them at Wellington Barracks. The letter was not published.

Footnote. Her Majesty's letter, the full text of which is reproduced, is a special honour to the Gallipoli Association and was read to the assembled company at the Lunch by the President and was well received.

NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

In spite of the request on page 14 of Gallipolian 46 that further accounts of visits to Gallipoli will not be required for some time due to there having been a glut of these in recent editions, the editor finds himself bombarded with accounts and suggestions of accounts of visits to Gallipoli. The editor fully appreciates that visits to the battlefield are of great importance to those engaged on them, but the fact remains that there have been too many such accounts recently. Only

one such account per annum will be included in Gallipolian from now on, that for 1985 being provided by Commander Brooke MBE, DSC, RN (retd.) AM588. The editor would like members to recognise that no further accounts should be sent in for 1985 as it will be impossible to publish them.

The Edgar Banner Memorial Essay Competition

Members reading the minutes of the A.G.M. will have observed that the Association has instituted an essay competition in honour of our late founder and a few words will be helpful to outline the idea for those not fortunate enough to have been able to attend the A.G.M.

The aim of the competition is to encourage new and hopefully original research into the Gallipoli campaign, to stimulate interest in and encourage membership of the Gallipoli Association, and to acquire well researched and informative articles about the campaign for use in The Galllipolian .

The rules of the competition are:

A first prize of £50 may be awarded annually for essays in the form of articles which are suitable for publication in the Journal of the Gallipoli Association (The Gallipolian). A second prize of £10 may also be awarded.

Prizes will only be awarded if essays of sufficient merit are entered.

Prizes will be awarded on the following basis:

(a) Authors do not need to be members of the Association

(b) The subject must be related to the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, but is otherwise unrestricted

(c) The length of the essay should not exceed 6,000 words.

(d) Essays must be typed and four copies submitted.

(e) Authors must include their name on the paper as well as the title.

(f) Authors must include a list of sources used.

(g) Awards will be decided by a panel of four judges who will award marks for:

(i) Originality of thought.

(ii) The discovery of new information and/or sources.

(iii) Style.

(iv) Clarity of expostion.

(v) Logic of argument.

(vi) Insight.

(h) All entries will be considered for publication in "The Gallipolian" and will be the copyright and absolute property of the Gallipoli Association.

The date for submission of entries and the formal launching of the competition will be determined by the dates of either the A.G.M. or the Annual Dinner, which in turn will depend upon the speed with which the prize money can be raised, a matter which the Committee is now investigating. The date for launching the competition will be either October 1985 or January 1986.

The essays will be assessed by a panel of four judges and those who have agreed to act in this capacity are Allan Burgin (AM873) (winner of the 1982 Naval

History Prize), the well-known historians Peter Liddle (AM426) and Dr John Laffin (AM718), and the editor (AM844).

As well as the cash prize it is hoped to award certificates for the winners. It is intended that the competition will carry some prestige which will benefit the Association.

M E O

WANTED

Following the 70th anniversary celebrations I travelled round the south side of Sea Marmara looking at harbours raided by our submarines. In Yalova I was unfortunate to have my car broken into and amongst the items stolen was a case containing colour slide films. I was able to return to the Peninsula and obtain replacements for many of the general views but would like to obtain copies of several sites together with the all important ceremonies, the veterans present and the wreath laying. Sites for which I still require slides are the Doughty-Wylie grave with wreath, Canterbury Cemetry, the Kiretch Tepe Ridge and Jephson's Post and a sunset over Samothace. Any assistance with the provision of these slides would be warmly appreciated, all costs would of course be met in full.
D. R. Saunders (928 AM) Sunnyhill, Rosemarket, Milford Haven, Pembs.

MATTERS ARISING

The mention of the Garland trench-mortar gun and the collection of rifles from the bodies of dead Australians around Norfolk Trench by Captain Wolton in Gallipolian 47 has led to some spirited correspondence.

F G Orton (743) wrote about the mortars:

I have no recollection of any such armaments being employed at Suvla Bay, during the three months before the evacuation. If there had been, I must have seen them or their bombs, as I was always around the Ammo dump testing the diameters of the shells.

Probably the fact that our trenches (at Suvla) were mainly too far from the Turks to make mortaring practical was one reason.

What artillery we had was used, I understood, in duels with the Turks' guns. At the range most common the trajectory of our shells was too flat to be really of use against trenches, although, on occasion, the charges were reduced to as little as half a full charge and the guns' elevation was raised so as to make the trajectory curved and the angle at which the shell dropped much steeper.

On Cape Helles there were two batteries of "screw" guns, the little mountain guns of the N.W. Frontier. They fired a 10lb shell, maximum range 5,000 yards. I believed that they were used with small charges and very high elevation which would give them much the same effect as a mortar.

MY I.O.M. (Inspector of Ordnance Machinery), Lt Morrison O.I.C. Workshops, told me that experiments were being made at Anzac and Cape Helles with mortar type "gadgets" designed to lob a bomb about 100 yards, but that as no suitable bombs were on issue, the makeshift ones

were completely unreliable. This is borne out in the article in The Gallipolian.

I never, either on Gallipoli or since, heard or met with a "Garland trench-mortar gun."

The editor will be pleased to hear from anyone with further information about the Garland.

As regards the "Australian" rifles, it is unlikely that men from ANZAC were in the vicinity of Hill 60 on the 25th April. The bodies referred to are, in all likelihood, those from the fighting for Hill 60 in August. Hill 60 remained in Turkish hands throughout the campaign and the locality mentioned was a spur of the Hill on which we gained a foothold.

In a letter to the Secretary, Captain Wolton clarifies the situation:

"With reference to your letter to me ... suggesting that the rifles collected by the 1/5 Suffolks were those that belonged to the dead Australians who attempted to capture Hill 60 in the August fighting and not from those who landed at ANZAC on April 25, as I had asserted.

"Of course you are correct and I apologise profusely for drawing completely wrong conclusions."

The record should now be straight regarding the issues raised and Captain Wolton should be thanked for inspiring so much interest.

Members living in or visiting London might be interested in an exhibition entitled: Soldiers - a History of Men in Battle opening at the National Army Museum in mid-September. It covers a wide range, from the Roman Empire to the 21st century and is being run in conjunction with the BBC.

Book Review: **GALLIPOLI; The Incredible Campaign** by Tom Swifte. Published by Magazine Promotions Australia at $5 A.

I read with some interest this lavishly illustrated 130pp publication to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of Gallipoli. The name of Tom Swifte is better known in Australia for his journalistic work and his radio and television broadcasts and as an ex soldier he seems the ideal choice to present the Gallipoli Campaign to a generation of Australians who have, like most people today little concept of the life style and experience of the generation which was caught up in the Great War.

The story of Gallipoli is well documented and the Bibliography includes a number of well known titles familiar to all students of the campaign and a few not so well known in this country and the presentation as a series of brief essays is not unfamiliar to those who have read John North's, Gallipoli, The Fading Vision. Illustrations take up half of most pages but they have been well selected and will have a strong appeal for readership unfamiliar with the extensive range of photographs of Gallipoli which are held by the Imperial War Museum and the Canberra War Memorial and I anticipate that many members of the Gallipoli Association will be seeing them for the first time. They do bring home the conditions under which men lived and fought at Anzac and I stress Anzac because the majority of this work deals solely with the Anzac Front. The chapter dealing with Victoria Cross awards lists only the Australian and unfortunately when one is writing for a public which is unlikely to read further into the subject the impression gained is that the brunt of the conflict fell on Australia's shoulders. Some of the printed remarks are ill conceived. What value is the printed opinion of soldiers when one says "Had the force at Helles been thrown in with ours, there's no doubt we would have made the Narrows", or the New Zealander who dismissed the British as useless?

There is an attempt to explain briefly the failure of Gallipoli which is not in balance. The balance

being that in a work dealing with the Anzac Front the uninitiated reader for whom this book is intended is hardly likely to understand the reference to the campaign as a whole on all the fronts. Perhaps I may be permitted to summarise the failure at Anzac which is more inkeeping with the coverage of the book. The fate of ANZAC was sealed on the first day 25th April 1915 and nothing could change it. General Hamilton for all his faults, and he cannot escape the blame for some of the failure, had little time to prepare for the invasion of Turkey for that was the magnitude of the campaign. His choice of landing points were good but he failed to exploit them and his one great punch when he entered the arena was the 29th Division and I have no doubt that he reflected long and hard where best he could deliver that punch before selecting Cape Helles. The valiant spirit, the boldness and daring of the Anzac soldiers is beyond dispute but they were landed on the wrong beach, often poorly trained, and all of them untried in battle. The spirited groups who pushed off towards the Narrows without support and in isolation on the first day, fire the imagination and make one realise what could have been done with them if properly landed in a disciplined and co-ordinated effort. Instead by the afternoon they were mopped up and killed to a man by the Turks who advanced to meet the opposition and secure the landing zone, and once the ring around this zone was sealed nothing would break it. The attack at Lone Pine was a success but not one which could be repeated and the break out from Anzac in August battles was a brave final effort to beat the deadlock by experienced (by that time) but worn out soldiers. Even if the Turks had drawn off troops to meet a real threat from the Suvla landing the outcome would have been no different. The Australian staff had insufficient room to manoeuvre and attempted to carry out a plan to a timetable that was impossible to match. Space was

all important and one can reflect that the career of that fine soldier General Monash would have been very different if he had been confined to Gallipoli for the remainder of the war. Many writers repeat the extracts from earlier writers and Tom Swifte is no exception. What he has drawn on are some interesting extracts from personal diaries or letters written home, and reproductions of newspaper cuttings which throw some light on the release of news from the front. The often repeated story of the reluctance to leave mates buried in various plots when the evacuation was announced was in truth the expression of a few, the majority at Anzac were glad to get away and who could blame them. The mistakes at Anzac will never be known in full, many incidents were not recorded or if recorded are kept quiet if it suits the writer. It was Australian shells according to Dr C E W Bean which fell among the Gurkha troops on Sari Bair Ridge when many (not the present writer) believe victory was at hand. Survivors of the 7th Battalion brought back from Cape Helles to Anzac paraded under their C O for a rifle inspection in spite of protests that some of them were in view of the Turks. Minutes later shrapnel shells were bursting over them and men who were lucky to have survived the attack on Krithia now fell victim to the Turks while out of the line. Men of the 12th Battalion who were angered at the casualties in a diversionary attack similar to that conducted by the Light Horse at The Nek about the same time, collected their dead and laid them in rows outside the dugout of the Brigadier.

The author recommends the reader wishing to know more to the Official History volumes by Dr Bean and perhaps his own work will stimulate sufficient interest in Australia to direct readers to this excellent history but that is a formidable task and one hopes that some of the other suggested reading by authors like North and Rhodes James will be a better choice for sadly the 70th Anniversary has been a vehicle for commercial ventures rather than one for rememberance.

Keith Tranmer

Some Lighter Moments - by Joseph Clements, Royal Marine Light Infantry Deal Battalion RND (925)

Everyone knows the type of warfare it was on Gallipoli, so I am not going to talk about tactics as there are many who are better informed than I was. I was just a " private in the line". I thought I would just relate a few instances that stuck in my mind, and maybe stir up other people's memories.

Shortage of water as you know was a big problem, so this little incident may enlighten or amuse you. Our unit was in reserve at one time and it was rather quiet, so a couple of mates and myself strolled along the reserve trench looking for dry wood etc. to make a small fire. As you know, if we wanted a cup of tea or a bully-beef stew we had to make our own fire. We got to the end of the trench and saw a small gully. We climbed over and to our delight found a small stream there. We filled our bottles etc. with the water and made our way back. That evening we had a nice biscuit and bully-beef stew and a nice mug of tea. Next day we thought we would explore further up the stream, which we did. Round a bend in the gully we came across three dead Turks lying in the stream. As you can guess we looked elsewhere for our water in future.

The "Anson" Battalion of the RND and ourselves seemed to relieve each other in the line regularly. One period when we were up, Johnnie Turk came over and took quite a section of the wire in front or our trench. You can guess the ribbing we got next time we passed the "Ansons" on the way up to the line. We got our own back a little later, when just after "stand-down" one morning Johnnie Turk came over and chased the "Ansons" out of the line, just as they were getting their breakfast. Ever after when we

passed in the communication trench, they would call out: "Who pinched your wire?" We would reply "The same B so who pinched your breakfast." A couple of small incidents but I believe they and others like them helped our morale.

This may amuse any machine gunners. I was No 1 of No 1 gun section, and on this particular occasion we were up the line at a place called "Munster Terrace", the Munster Fusiliers having been there. We were on a small rise just behind our front line, so we could fire over our line to the Turks' front line a bit further down a small slope in the ground. During a period of firing we got a split barrel. That had to be changed of course, so I stripped it down and left it to cool. Just at that moment our R.Q.M.S. came along and wanted to know why the gun wasn't in action. I told him the reason. He said it must be cool enough now and put his hand in and caught hold of the barrel to pull it out. The barrel stuck to his hand as it was still very hot. He let out a yell and made off as fast as he could. It was quite a while before we saw him in our section again.

I hope some of these will be of interest to some of the readers of our magazine.

Gallipoli Tours Members are reminded that the Secretary leads private tours of the Gallipoli battlefields departure mid-May each year. These are usually 10 day tours costing £595 each for a party of 4 persons and further details are as published in Gallipolian no 45. The tour is arranged around the specific requirements of those taking part and those wishing to see the battlefields in detail. Energetic participants may expect to visit Jephson's Post on the Kiretch Tepe, take the route of Kitchener from the beach to Russell's Top, or follow the New Zealanders route to the Apex and Sari Bair and

at Helles explore Gully Ravine and the seldom visited Gurkha Bluff and 'Y'Beach. The tours are open to non-members and those who simply wish to visit memorials and cemeteries but who would like the landscape pointed out to them and places of special interest where particular incidents took place indicated.

INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION?

The following is an extract from a letter received by our Honorary Lady Member, Mrs Vicky Banner:

"I thought about you when we visited a military camp at Waiouru in New Zealand. The very first thing I saw when I went in to the exhibit was: GALLIPOLIAN!

In quite a big stand about 20 books glittered in my eyes. After having a look I really understood what happens in Gallipolian. I have still "The Journal of the Gallipoli Association" which you so kindly sent me at Christmas. And from there I understand you have got a beautiful bouquet of roses as THE FIRST LADY HONORARY MEMBER of the brave men from Gallipoli."

It should be appreciated that Mrs Banner's friend is Norwegian.

In response to members requesting a supplier for medal ribbons the Secretary has obtained a quotation of 85p + VAT and postage for the 1914-15 Star, Service and Victory (3) from Global Coins, PO Box 107, Westcliffe on Sea, Essex. Tel. No. 0702-332744. Please mention the Gallipoli Association.

THE ROYAL NAVY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN OF 1915. CPO A L BURGIN (AM 873)

PREFACE

It is doubtful whether any military campaign of modern times has aroused more passion and controversy than the tragic venture of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915. Certainly none has attracted an equally voluminous library of histories and commentaries. While most address predominently the military campaign, this essay seeks to discover the reasons for the failure of the Navy at the height of its power and prestige to carry out its primary and secondary tasks during a campaign that was to last eight and half months, and to end in defeat for the Allies at an appalling cost in life. No attempt is made to discuss the wider political and military issues.

The primary task of the Royal Navy was to break through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmara, with Constantinople (Istanbul) as its objective: the secondary task was to support the troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula with gunfire. While British submarines were successful in their individual role, they were not considered an integral part of naval policy at the Dardanellles, and their potential was never exploited. Unfortunately, the same must be said of the Royal Naval Air Service, and the intrepid Commander Samson.

The manner in which the Asquith Government drifted into this vast committment of men and resources - neither of which were in adequate supply for the one major theatre of France - must be viewed as failure in the higher direction of war in Great Britain. It cannot be denied, however, that evidence exists for identifying political, military and naval figures personally for the germination of the project, and the extraordinary manner in which it was progressed.

This essay has been researched wholly in Turkey, with visits to the Dardanelles and the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Not all the recommended books are obtainable, and the Royal Navy's contribution to the Galllipoli Campaign of 1915 is directed primarily at the role of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill.

HISTORICAL APPRECIATION

The problem of forcing the Dardanelles had engrossed the attention and imagination of naval and military strategists long before the First World War. All naval authorities agreed that an opposed passage of the Dardanelles would be a difficult and dangerous operation.

In 1807, Admiral Duckworth reluctantly completed an opposed passage with negligible losses. The return to the Aegean proved more difficult, and many more casualties than anticipated were endured. In the ensuing storm of criticism in Great Britain, the opinion was generally expressed that had Duckworth's squadron been accompanied by a sufficient number of troops with which to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Turks would have been overawed by the prescence of his ships-of-the-line.

In 1877, Admiral Hornby was equally apprehensive about making such a passage. But technological advances and the strengthening of the land defences of the Dardanelles with Krupp guns caused the Admiralty to doubt whether even a combined assault on the Straits might be practical. One of Hornby's subordinates was the future Lord Fisher, who undertook several examinations of the problem while in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, and when he became First Sea Lord in 1904. He concluded that it was 'mightily hazardous', a view shared by a joint military and naval investigation in 1906. It stated that although a squadron of 'His Majesty's least valuable ships' might well succeed in 'rushing' the Straits, the attempt was 'much to be deprecated.' In March 1911, Winston Churchill was

writing in a Cabinet memorandum that the days of forcing the Dardanelles by warships were gone. 'It should be remembered', he wrote, 'that it is no longer possible to force the Dardanelles, and nobody would expose a modern fleet to such a peril.'

Winston Churchill exposed such a fleet to such a peril exactly four years later.

TOPOGRAPHICAL APPRECIATION

Since early times, when the Dardanelles - the ancient Hellespont - was the scene of the seige of Troy, the Gallipoli Peninsula had remained largely undisturbed. Apart from the construction of two fortresses at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kilid Bahr[1] in the sixteenth century, little had occurred to alter the appearance of this bleak, narrow, wind-swept and barren peninsula.

The Dardanelles links the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara, and is approximately 40 miles in length. The western mouth of this narrow strip of water is only some 4,000 yards wide. But once the outer fortesses of Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale[2] have been passed, the channel widens considerably for about 4 miles. The peninsula then rises steadily from Cape Helles, and the western shore of the Dardanelles becomes tall and uninviting. By the time that the Narrows,[3] only some 1,600 yards across, have been reached, the Kilid Bahr plateau on the peninsula rises sharply from the water[4]. On the Asian shore the hills behind Chanak (Canakkale) are oppressively close.

Few places have so many natural advantages for defence. Any fleet attempting to force a passage would find itself under fire from both the towering massif of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and from the rising ground on the Asiatic shore. A four to five knot current flows continuously down from the Sea of Marmara.

From May to October, apart from an occassional storm, the sun is fiercely hot, and the area radiates a haunting beauty. In winter it is bitterly cold, and the sea becomes hostile.

NAVAL PROLOGUE

At the outbreak of war in August 1914, the Royal Navy had undergone a rigorous rejuvenation. This transformation from complacent slumber - effectively since Trafalgar - into intense activity and rethinking, was due largely to Admiral Lord Fisher of Kilverstone. His first tenure as First Sea Lord (1904-10) witnessed many major reforms. The highlight, in 1905, was the completion of HMS Dreadnought and, in 1906, the Invincible class of battlecruiser. Both designs were original concepts in terms of speed and gunnery, and led directly to the major confrontations at sea during 1914-18.

By 1910, Great Britain had completed 7 ships with ten 12 inch guns, while Germany had only 4 ships with 11 inch guns. By his revolutionary rebuilding programme, Fisher had succeeded in bottling up the German High Seas Fleet until the major project of enlarging the Kiel Canal could be completed in 1914. In Professor Marder's words, Fisher had 'converted the Kiel Canal into a useless ditch.'

There can be little doubt - even among his strongest opponents - that Fisher's foresight and imagination had ensured that the British fleet was at its zenith in 1914. But by virtue of his dictatorial vigour, he had also accumulated bitter enemies. Most naval officers were drawn from a restricted and privileged class (Fisher's own background was relatively unprivileged), and he calculated that only three per cent of the population were in a position to cope with the monetary barrier. A study of Fisher's letters allows perhaps the best insight into his character and balance. His enemies were dismissed with savage contempt, and designated as 'traitors'. It is unecessary here to related his bitter and sad feud with Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, which threatened to tear the Navy in two and was

eventually directly responsible for Fisher's retirement. Such was the man who, though no means unassisted by others of similar drive and vision, swept the Royal Navy into the twentieth century.

The pre-war role of Winston Churchill is less simple to define than might at first appear. It is crucial to the understanding of the Gallipoli Campaign to distinguish the young and assertive First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911 from the vastly experienced politician of 1940. In 1906, he was an improbable leader of the pacifists and social reformers who desired a 'little Navy', and advocated public expenditure accordingly. While Churchill rapidly advanced from subordinate Minister to the Cabinet in 1908, and from the Home Office to the Admiralty in 1911, his own enemies remorselessly increased. Following the crisis of the Dreadnoughts in 1909 - and the Agadir crisis of 1911 - Churchill was appointed, at the age of 36, to be First Lord of the Admiralty. With this momentous appointment was coupled the intention of providing the Admiralty with a proper War Staff on military lines.

The relationship between Churchill and Fisher is critical. The two had first met in 1907, and it was the beginning of a remarkable love-hate friendship. After Churchill went to the Admiralty, with clear instructions to effect drastic changes in the senior administration of the Navy, he kept in close touch with the Kingfisher. He found the aged Admiral 'a veritable volcano of knowledge and inspiration.' Fisher was, at the age of 73, 'still bubbling over with ideas,' and this clearly greatly influenced Churchill in his decision to restore Fisher as First Sea Lord on 30 October 1914, following the disagreeable resignation of Lord Louis Battenberg.

At first all went well. Fisher's old enthusiasm and personality was once again felt in almost every sector

of naval administration, and he bullied naval contractors with orders for over 600 ships. But Fisher was in many ways an impossible colleague, and this was to be the calm before the storm. The two were both bent on autocracy, and eventually proved to be totally incompatible under the same Admiralty roof.

Initially, the war at sea was a series of setbacks for the Royal Navy. With Admiral Cradock's defeat by von Spee off Coronel, and the sinking of three British cruisers - in broad daylight in the North Sea by a single German submarine with great loss of life - the nation became at first disconcerted and then angered. From criticism of the Navy it was a short step to criticism of Churchill. He had at his disposal the mightiest weapon of war - apart from the German army - in the world. The prospect of it being inadequately employed was alien to Churchill's restless temperament. Professor Marder has written, 'Churchill's large view of his office - 'his business everything and his intent everywhere' - worked badly, and it tended to diminish the authority of the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the War Staff, and to cramp their freedom of action.'

Churchill's conception of his position was imperious, and any consultation with his Service advisers tended to take the form of seeking approval for actions that had already taken place.

THE WAR COUNCIL

Until November 1914 - on the formation of a War Council - the Cabinet, assisted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, Was responsible for the higher direction of the war. This Liberal Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, Asquith, contained some of the most celebrated political names of this century. But the War Council is of primary concern here. For its inablility - and particularly that of Churchill and Kitchener - to grasp the fundamental

difficulties in mounting a naval and military operation at the Dardanelles, proved largely contributory to its failure.

Asquith was essentially a peacetime leader, and lacked the quality of decisive leadership so necessary in war. The choice of Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War on the outbreak of hostilities was to have profound consequences. He predicted, correctly, that the war would be long and huge new volunteer armies began to emerge. But the despatch of the most able officers to France meant that Kitchener assumed the burdens of the War Office almost single handed. He was excessively secretive, and found open discussion of military strategy with his civilian colleagues in the War Council 'repugnant'. Furthermore, he kept the newly formed General Staff in almost total ignorance of the vital matters of policy and strategy, on which it was its statutory function to advise the Government. The Admiralty was represented on the War Council by Churchill and Fisher.

The War Council's conduct of affairs belied its title. It was cumbersome, lacked leadership and direction, and conducted its business on Cabinet lines. Lieutenant Colonel (later Lord) Hankey, the Council's Secretary, has described it as 'a supplement to the Cabinet for exploring some of the larger questions of policy, rather than an instrument for the day to day conduct of the war.' It did not meet regularly, did not work to an agenda, and was summoned only when the Prime Minister deemed it necessary. When it did meet, the Service representatives - apart from Kitchener - were invariably silent; a fact which subsequently brought them heavy censure. It is important to pursue this point. From the outset, there was a fundamental lack of understanding between the political and Service members of the War Council concerning the latter's position. As Lord Crewe remarked the political members did too much of the talking and the experts (i.e. Service) members

too little.

Lord Fisher told the Dardanelles Commission in 1916, 'it is a mistake to call us members of the War Council - it was no such thing. We were the experts there to open our mouths when told to.' Fisher's silence - and that of Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson - at War Council meetings on 13 and 28 January 1915 was the product, says a writer in the Naval Review of October 1957, 'of a pseudo-disciplinary naval training and environment which did not differentiate between obedience to orders, which is right, and thinking as ordered, which is wrong.' Nevertheless, the politicians inferred from a naval or military expert's silence at these meetings that he was acquiescing in what-ever had been put forward.

THE 'DEMONSTRATION'

By the end of 1914, the British army had suffered horrifying losses on the Western Front, and it was clear that an alternative strategy to a war of attrition in France was required. Fisher, Lloyd George, Hankey and Churchill were the most prominent exponents of attack elsewhere than in France or Flanders. Churchill was thinking of using British strength - and particularly sea power - in another, more decisive, manner than 'to chew barbed wire in Flanders.' He wrote to Asquith on 29 December, 'we ought not to drift. We ought to concert our action with our Allies, and particularly with Russia.' This shift of opinion in the War Council coincided with a plea for assistance from the Russian Grand Duke Nicholas, calling for a British 'demonstration' to relive the pressure of Turkish forces in the Caucasus, Kitchener, after abandoning his first choice of an attack on Alexandretta because

of inadequate harbour facilities, suggested that the Dardanelles would be ideal for such a demonstration.

The idea of forcing the Dardanelles was first raised by Churchill at the end of August 1914, and on 1 September he had requested the General Staff, in conjunction with two officers from the Admiralty, to propose a 'plan for seizure of the Gallipoli Peninsula, by means of a Greek army of adequate strength, with a view to admitting a British fleet to the Sea of Marmara.' The report of the Director of Military Operations, Lieutenant General Callwell, was far from optimistic, but Churchill was eager to pursue the idea. 'Mr Churchill was very keen on attacking the Dardanelles from a very early stage,' Callwell later told the Dardanelles Commission. 'He was very keen to get to Constantinople somehow.'

Why should Churchill now be considering forcing the Dardanelles with warships? His subsequent evidence to the Dardanelles Commission - but not so prominent in the World Crisis - emphasises the extent to which he, and many others, had been deeply impressed by the effect of modern artillery bombardment on the Belgian forts. But to be absolutely fair to Churchill, Admiral Oliver, the Chief of Staff, who had witnessed the German shelling on the Belgian forts, was equally impressed.

The Dardanelles fortifications, which extended on both shores from the Aegean to the Narrows, were based on three groups of defensive positions. The Outer Defences consisted of batteries at and around Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale, with a total of 4 long-range and 20 medium range guns. The Intermediate Defences were between the entrance to the Dardanelles and Kephez Point, and at this stage comprised 7 medium-range guns in two batteries,

and one or two field batteries. The first mines were laid on 3 August. The Inner Defences at the Narrows consisted of approximately 80 guns, of which only 8 were long range. Before September 1914, the distribution of guns and batteries was poor, and guns, ground equipment and communications were old.

On 3 November 1914, Churchill ordered the British squadron off the Dardanelles, under Vice Admiral Sackville Carden, to bombard the Outer Defences. This action, which lasted approximately 20 minutes, and was ordered without reference to the Cabinet, was subsequently heavily criticised. Professor Marder has written that 'the cost of this premature attack far outweighed the slight advantages, since it put the Turks and their German military advisers on the alert. From that moment there was no possibility of surprise, and the Turks began to pay special attention to the defences of the Straits.' An equally significant result was that the attack produced over-confidence on the part of the British. Because the ships had destroyed the Outer Defences with consummate ease, it was assumed that similar actions could be repeated at will. One of the ironies of Gallipoli is that this brief attack caused more damage - mainly by two lucky shells hitting the magazine at Sedd-el-Bahr - than throughout the remainder of the naval campaign. Doubt was also cast on the established naval view that, even with improved methods of observation, warships were unable to deal adequately with land forts. Furthermore, it suggested a use for the considerable number of ships surplus to the requirements of Jellicoe's Grand Fleet. These pre-Dreadnought British and French battleships and cruisers, markedly inferior to the Queen

Elizabeth class of battleship that was nearing completion, were unsuited for service with the main fleets owing to their comparative slowness and vulnerability to submarine attack. Most of them had been earmarked for scrap in 1915. However, they were heavily armed, and the prospect of employing them against the Turkish fortifications was compelling. Moreover, while the Army was extremely short of ammunition, the Navy had used less than expected.

(Churchill's explanation of the bombardment of 3 November dismissed somewhat briefly in the World Crisis, is open to challenge. A considerable number of detailed intelligence reports had been forwarded to the War Offfice by successive Military Attachés at Constantinople, and Vice Consuls at Chanak, between 1911 and 1914. In particular, Lieutenant Colonel Cunliffe-Owen's survey - conducted on his own initiative in 1914 - included information on gun sites, minefields and the topography of the peninsula. Had use been made of this intelligence - an essential requirement of any military undertaking - it is clear that 'the necessity to know accurately the effective range of the Turkish guns and the conditions under which the entrance to the blockaded port could be approached' would not have arisen. Indeed, intelligence work as a whole was lamentable; much information readily available was either totally ignored or misinterpreted).

At the first meeting of the War Council on 25 November 1914, Churchill proposed a naval attack at the Dardanelles. 'Mr Churchill suggested that the ideal method of defending Egypt was by an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula.' Although the idea was not accepted (Kitchener stated that the had no troops for such a venture), Churchill instructed that ships at Suez - which had been used to convey Australian and New Zealand troops to Egypt - should not disperse. As Lloyd George has written, when he (Churchill) has

a scheme agitating in hispowerful mind, he is indefatigable in pressing it upon the acceptance of every one who matters in the decision.' By retaining the ships at Suez, Churchill had taken preparatory steps to enable an operation to begin should it be sanctioned.

(To be Continued)

Members might be interested to know of a forthcoming Exhibition in London entitled The Great War. This will take place at the Hahn Gallery, 47 Albemarle Street, London, W1X 3FE, from Friday 8th - Saturday 23rd November 1985.

The Exhibition seeks to record the various stages of the war at sea, on land and in the air, together with what was portrayed in books, newspapers and magazines at home. Many exhibits were produced on the spot by eyewitnesses who were serving in H.M. Forces

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Association Ties

The colours of our Association tie represent the green of Gallipoli edged with red and blue bands representing the Army and Navy, the grey represents the sea. These ties were designed along with a

Gallipoli Association Shield by the late William Francey (No. 615) ex Lance Corporal Piper 1/6th Highland Light Infantry 52nd Division, at the request of the late Major Edgar Banner.

The shields are available from C H Munday Ltd., 8 St. Johns Road, St. Johns, Woking, Surrey, GU21 1SE. Tel. Woking 71588.

MY GALLIPOLI STORY - Major T Verschoyle MC, 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (21)

There are many books written on the Gallipoli Campaign by writers on both sides which can be read by those interested. I shall deal only with my own experiences or those near to me. On arrival off Cape Helles in daylight it dawned on one more forcibly than ever that this was it. Everyone wonders what will happen when one actually arrives at the war. Will it be horrible, will one be afraid, will one be able to carry out one's duty, will one be killed or maimed or perhaps only mildy wounded. One could get away without injury possibly. In fact very few did get away without injury or illness.

There were a quantity of warships lying off the peninsular and sometimes one of them fired. White puffs of smoke could be seen over the land and of course this was shrapnel. The landing had taken place on April 25th 10 days before and various rumours were about. The chief story was that the 29th Division had landed with heavy losses and had advanced inland. However, there was a hill barring the way and this had not been taken. It was said that the troops were half way up but had been unable to get any further. This hill was the famous Achi Baba which many

thousands of British and French soldiers were to gaze at for many months but were never destined to reach. As I write it is only 8 months since I visited Gallipoli on the occasion of the 50th anniversary. Some of the party wanted to go to the top of Achi Baba. Alas, there wasn't time. Again they were thwarted; in fact I have never met or heard of a British soldier ever reaching the top of that tantalising hill.

On our way from Alexandria the Menominee had called at Mudros harbour on the island of Lemnos. As we sailed out of the harbour we passed ships whose occupants had already been on the battlefield. Probably most of them were wounded. In our excitement our men had given the then popular cry. "Are we downhearted?" "No". The reply came from some of the ships we were passing. "No, but you bloody soon will be!" We felt this was hardly an encouraging start.

In the evening of May 5th we were put into small launches to be landed. It seemed to take a long time and it was very cold. At last we were put on shore - on the famous W Beach or Lancashire Landing where the 1st Batt The Lancashire Fusiliers had won 6 V.C.'s and landed on April 25th. It was dark; we marched up the beach and lay down in some shallow holes until daylight. Early on the 6th May we marched over to the left and remained throughout the day somewhere near Pink Farm. I was ordered to report to Brigade (commanded by Brig. General Frith) as liaison officer between Batt and Brig. On this day the 6th Lan. Fus. attacked a Turkish trench and took it. At Brig. H.Q. the day passed without incident and a few shrapnel shells burst somewhere in sight. That night Gen. Frith decided to reconnoitre the front line and I and my runner (Harry Greenhalgh) along with other liaison officers went with him. Had I known it I was to do to the same place, which I was visiting in the

safety of darkness next day and under fire for a good deal of the way. Going round the line by night didn't mean much because one could see little. However a few dark shapes lying still in the grass seemed somewhat ominous.

We returned to Brigade and I went back to the Battalion. It was cold that night. We had no blankets and our greatcoats were not enough to keep us warm enough to sleep. We walked about, tried to sleep, stamped our feet and eventually morning came. With it I was called to the company commanders' conference. Capt. Ashworth said we were ordered to advance up the left side of the peninsular near the sea and after taking the village of Krithia, or in the event of its being taken, to pass it and dig in on the left side and on a level with Achi Baba. In effect no one ever reached this position during the whole campaign.

I presumed I was still liaison officer to Brigade and felt that it was not right that after training my platoon for 8 months I should not be there to take them into action. I said so and Ashworth told me I could go with my platoon. What happened about the liaisoning I never heard.

We left our bivouack on the morning of Friday May 7th and went up a path on to the high ground between the sea and Gully Ravine. I should say that the main features on our part of the peninsular were the streams that ran from North to South or in other words along the length of the peninsula. On the left was "The Gully" a deep cleft which ran from Gully Beach through our front line into Turkish territory. Nearer the centre but still on the left was "Krithia Nullah" or on the maps Kereves Dere. On the right centre was "Achi Baba Nullah" or on the map Kanli Dere and on the extreme right among the French was another Nullah whose name I do not know. It doesn't come into the story. Although in the 10 days since the landing

the 29th Division had advanced perhaps 2 miles there were still snipers in our territory behind the front line and of course everyone was on the qui vive for these gentry for one felt that one might get a bullet out of the blue any moment. They hid in trees or bushes or holes dug in the ground and in some cases had no rations for a week or more. They were brave men because when discovered their days work in the world was over! On our way up to the high ground between the gully and the sea we thought we were sniped at because quite a few shots rang out. The order for advance was "D" Coy, "B" Coy and "A" Coy, so that my platoon was at the rear. On arrival at the top of this path I got the order to extend to 10 paces across to the cliffs, turn right and advance in two lines at 100 yards interval. My platoon was advancing behind No. 2 Platoon moving North up the Peninsular in two lines each extended to 10 paces between each man. As there were 30 men in each line that made the distance between the Gully and the Cliffs 300 yards. The scrub was fairly high and obscured one's view, consequently I couldn't see all my men. The platoon in front kept halting and lying down (which they had to do when halted) and then moving on. At first there was an occasional whine overhead which one recognised as being the bullets one had been thinking about. The further we advanced the more often did we hear the whines and the sharper the noise sounded. On one occasion I thought the platoon in front had halted but I found it was a wounded sergeant; his name was Sergeant Parker. He was the first man on our side that I saw wounded in the war. The order was that no one was to fall out to attend to wounded. Apparently they would be attended to by R.A.M.C. coming in the rear. It was a very serious offence to fall out, which was correct because if an unwounded soldier stayed to attend to wounded as time went on there would be no one in the

advance. After a time the whine became a whistle and a great deal more of them. Then we came to a trench and this held men from other battalions of the Brigade and of other companies, in our own battalion. We got into this trench and there I began to lose control of my own men. The reason of course was that I couldn't see far to my right or left because of the scrub and I couldn't distinguish my own men from the others in the trench. One could only call for an advance to No. 3 Platoon (my own), get out of the trench and go forward hoping that all my own men would do the same. As I advanced out of this trench the whistling of bullets was much heavier and one had to go at the double. At the next trench the same thing happened and by then I didn't know how many of my own men were following me. I gave the word to advance out of this second trench and ran as fast as I could to my front. Half way between this trench and the next (which turned out to be the front line trench which had been captured by the 6th Lan. Fus. the day before) there was a mound and I made for this about 120 yards away. I got down behind this and found I was accompanied by Collinson, an old soldier of my own platoon. I couldn't see anybody else. We stayed there for a breather and then I told Collinson we should have to go on. The front trench was about another 120 yards ahead. I got up and ran for my life. Bullets seemed to be whizzing past me everywhere and it seemed impossible not to be hit. I think I jumped the last 10 yards into the trench and fell on my face with my rifle muzzle buried in the soil of the parapet. I had run faster than Collinson and I looked back at him. About 10 yards from the trench he was hit in the region of the solar plexus. He got into the trench but was badly wounded. I regret to say that he died later. In the previous trench a party of Inniskilling Fusiliers had passed down the trench while I was there. They were 29th Division and regular soldiers. I remember being very impressed with their bearing. There

might have been no bullets flying about because although the trench was only about 5' 6" deep they didn't stoop to keep their heads under the parapet. I think one of them was wounded in the head as he passed me.

To continue the narrative. I had now arrived in our front trench and the enemy were somewhere in front with one thought, a couple of machine guns as well as rifles firing. Bullets were hitting the parapets of trenches as though they were the butts on a rifle range. The trench was the one captured by the 6th Fus. the previous day. It was not very deep and was full of men from each battalion of the Brigade. One could hardly move about as it was so shallow. After a time I heard Capt. Sidney Milnes calling for the 5th Lan. Fus. to be prepared to advance. I don't think anyone had seen any enemy except some dead ones. I hadn't and all I knew was that plenty of bullets were coming from our front where there was an amount of scrub and bushes. I never knew how far they were away - I should guess 250 yards, could be more. I made my way along the trench to my left and found Milnes. He then gave the word to advance and I with some others got out and started to run forward. The whizz of bullets was terrific and one knew it was impossible not to be hit within seconds. The only thing to do was to lie down. Bullets were hitting the trench we had just left and cutting the grass round about. I got my entrenching tool out of its sheath and held that and my rifle butt in front of my head. Possibly they might have stopped a bullet, Men were firing out of our trench and I saw Bob Butcher giving fire orders. I don't know how many had come in our advance, not many I think.

I only know that Sidney Milnes was just in front of me and Patrick Hudson was on my right. Eventually. after about five minutes I said to Sidney, "It is no use stopping here shall we make for the cliff." Having moved to the left up the trench I had got to within 20 yards of the cliff before getting out of the trench. Sidney said "all right, you go first." I then got up and made a dash over the edge of the cliff. Patrick Hudson followed me and was hit in the neck as he reached the edge. He practically fell on me. It seems strange because he almost fell on me when he was killed at Ypres at the 3rd battle of Ypres (Paschendale) in September 1917. When we got over the edge of the cliff we were for the first time under cover from fire. There were many others of our officers and men there. Being a 2nd Lieut. it was hardly my job to plan anything - but in any case no plans seemed to be being made. I helped to get Hudson and other wounded down to the beach where they were taken off by a gun boat. I remember getting a drink from a Navy water cask which had once contained rum. It tasted wonderful. Well, I had had my first experience of war. The first hour had definitely convinced me that it was a "bad egg". I should have liked the war to stop there and then, but it didn't, it went on for 3½ years more. One man on that day seemed to have the right idea he said "This isn't war, its bloody murder." Another man felt a severe burning sensation suddenly in his tummy. He promptly clapped both hands to his tummy, yelled "Im wounded," and set of running to the beach. When he got there someone examined his "wound" and found that a bullet had just grazed him. Of course it would be hot which gave him the burning sensation. He was sent up the line again. While I was down below the top of tne cliff I couldn't see any of my platoon and assumed that as the firing was so heavy, they were all casualties dead or wounded.

(To be continued)

BUCKINGHAM PALACE

Lieutenant-Colonel M.E. Hancock, MC,
President,
Gallipoli Association,
Wellington Barracks.

On the 70th anniversary of the Gallipoli Landings, I send my warm greetings to the members of the Gallipoli Association. Although so distant in time and place, my thoughts turn with yours to the sad events of 70 years ago, when so many young lives were sacrificed. Too often since then, young men of selfless courage and determination have been called upon to serve and lay down their lives. Time heals the wounds of personal tragedies, but we shall always recall their splendid achievements with gratitude and pride.

ELIZABETH R.

25th April, 1985.