The Gallipolian

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THE CENTENARY ISSUE
Marking the 100th Anniversary of The Gallipoli Landings

The River Clyde at V Beach, 25 April, 1915
by Charles Dixon - reproduced by kind permission of The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment (Queen’s and Royal Hampshires)
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FROM THE EDITOR’S CHAIR

This issue marks the centenary of the April landings at Gallipoli, and to recognise this there are articles focussing on the landings and other aspects and personalities of the campaign. I am grateful to all those who have provided material for this special issue but in particular to Peter Hart, John Lee, Dr. Christopher Pugsley, Brigadier Chris Roberts and Professor Peter Stanley, all recognised authorities on the campaign, who responded so readily to my request to contribute articles. I should also like to thank Katherine Davies for allowing me to publish the account by her great Grandfather, Captain Harold Mynors Farmar, of the landing at W Beach, together with her own research into his life, both before and after Gallipoli.

The next issue, to be published in July, will contain details of the 25 April commemorations and other articles about aspects of the campaign.

OBITUARY – ROY ADAM MBE

It is with great sadness that we record the death of Roy Adam on 31 December 2014, aged 91 years. Roy was born at Pimperne near Blandford Forum, Dorset where he lived nearly all his life, only being absent during the Second World War. Enlisting in the Royal Navy before his 18th birthday, Roy volunteered for combined operations and served in Egypt, Malta, Italy and took part in the D-Day landings.

Roy’s father, Frederick, joined the Collingwood Battalion of the Royal Naval Division at Crystal Palace before being posted to Blandford where the battalion trained before embarking for Gallipoli. The Collingwood Memorial was unveiled in 1919 and was for many years tended by Roy. In June 1950, he organised the Act or Remembrance for the Collingwood Battalion at the memorial, a tradition which has continued to this day. In recognition of his work in organising the commemoration over many years Roy was made an honorary member of the Gallipoli Association. Since 2008 he was helped with the arrangements by his son Stuart, who carries on his work.

During his long life Roy was pig farmer, parish councillor, special constable, shadow pub landlord and was involved in many other local activities. Roy was immensely proud of his Dorset heritage and was a member of the Society of Dorset Men for over 40 years becoming its Chairman in 1988. He was awarded the MBE in 2000 for services to the community. He leaves a widow, Hazel, a son and daughter and two grandchildren to whom we extend our sympathies.

It was a privilege to have met him and to have seen the dedication and devotion to the memory of the Royal Naval Division, and in particular the Collingwood Battalion.

James Watson Smith
GIFT AID

Enclosed with this issue is a Gift Aid Declaration form together with a short explanatory note. Members will recall the announcements in the Spring and Winter 2014 issues of the journal that the Association had been granted charitable status and entered onto the Register of Charities, and more recently that our application for Gift Aid had been approved by Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs.

We hope that members who are eligible to do so will make the necessary declarations and return the form to the Membership Secretary at the address given on the form.

COMMEMORATION IN HAWICK

In continuation of a ceremony which dates back to 1916, members of Hawick Callants Club met on Saturday 12 July to lay wreaths in commemoration of the men from Hawick who served with the 1/4th (Borders) Battalion of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and lost their lives on the Gallipoli peninsula in July 1915.

The Club was joined by Honorary Provost, Stuart Marshall, and members of local ex-service associations for the ceremony, which sees wreaths being laid at both the 1514 Memorial and at the town’s War Memorial. The first wreath was laid by Club President, Derick Tait, at 7.00pm, with the verse from Laurence Binyon’s poem ‘For the Fallen’ being recited by club member Rory Culton. The commemoration then moved to Wilton Lodge Park where piper Colin Turnbull led the march to the War Memorial; here, the Club President laid the second wreath, on behalf of the Gallipoli Comrades Association (see photograph on page 33). The lament ‘Flowers of the Forest’ was played and the bugler, Colin Crozier, sounded ‘Last Post’ before the Silence was observed; following ‘Reveille’, the parade marched back to the museum.

Commenting on the commemoration, President Tait said:

“This is a ceremony unique to the Borders, if not the whole of Scotland. The attack at Gallipoli on 12 July 1915 saw some 60 men from the Hawick area killed with many more wounded. It impacted and left a lasting legacy on the whole community, and it is only fitting and proper that we continue to remember those who made the ultimate sacrifice”.

As part of the centenary commemorations, a party of Callants Club members and friends will visit the Gallipoli peninsula to pay their respects.
Each year, the Gallipoli Association has a Memorial Plot at the ‘Field of Remembrance’ in the grounds of Westminster Abbey, which is open in the period around Remembrance Day. Anyone can place a remembrance cross or symbol in the plot and 40 members availed themselves of the offer made in the Autumn 2014 issue of The Gallipolian for the Association to arrange for crosses to be placed on their behalf.

The plots are set out by staff and volunteers from the Royal British Legion – a substantial undertaking given that there are well over 200 plots. The task of laying the crosses in the Association plot fell to the Editor’s brother and Association member, Clive Summerson, who placed 50 crosses and other emblems on the morning of 6 November (see photograph on page 33).

The Opening Service on 6 November was attended by HRH The Prince Harry. After a brief service, the Last Post was sounded from the parapet of St Margaret’s Church and the Silence kept. Afterwards, Prince Harry toured the plots and spoke to veterans, service personnel and members of the organisations present. A limited supply of tickets for the opening ceremony were made available to the organisations who had plots in the ‘Field’ and 11 members of the Gallipoli Association were present at the ceremony and stood behind the Association plot during the service and inspection.

For the fourth year running, members of the Gallipoli Association took part in the Remembrance Day Parade and March Past at the Cenotaph in Whitehall.

The Association contingent marched as part of the ‘Civilian Column’ whose contingents formed up on Whitehall outside the Old War Office Building prior to the Parade. Our contingent co-ordinators were David Mason and Stephen Chambers, who formed the left and right markers respectively; the left marker handing the Association wreath to the British Legion ‘wreath taker’ on passing the Cenotaph.

It had been raining heavily overnight but this lifted shortly before the contingents formed-up and we had clear skies for the ceremony and parade. On previous occasions the television coverage ended after the service contingents had passed the Cenotaph but this year the parade was covered in full and the Gallipoli Association received a mention. Afterwards, we were invited by one of our contingent, Donna-Marie Kirk-Sargeant, Consular Adviser at the New Zealand High Commission and member of the Association to visit the rooftop suite at New Zealand House where we were treated to breath-taking views over London. A photograph of the Association contingent, taken at
ARCHBISHOP VISITS GALLIPOLI MEMORIAL

The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Most Revd. and Rt. Hon. Justin Welby, paid his respects at the Gallipoli Memorial during a visit to the National Memorial Arboretum on 19 December. He spoke for some time to Nadir Imamoglu, a Turkish architect, living and working in Britain who was responsible for the establishment of the memorial in 2004. The Archbishop told Nadir that one of his Grandfathers had served at Gallipoli.

The photograph on page 34 shows the Archbishop studying the words spoken by Kemal Ataturk when he welcomed widows and relatives on the 1934 Pilgrimage to Gallipoli. The BBC recorded The Archbishop’s Christmas Message at the Arboretum although sadly the TV coverage did not feature his visit to the Gallipoli Memorial; it was, however, reported in the local press.

2015 ANZAC/GALLIPOLI DAY CEREMONIES

An outline of the planned commemorations in London on 25 April were given in the Chairman’s message circulated with the Winter 2014 issue of The Gallipolian; more recently members have been sent full details of the arrangements by e-mail or post.

Details of Anzac/Gallipoli Day ceremonies outside London are posted on the Association Website. As noted in the Winter issue of the journal, the Editor can provide details of local services for those without Internet access.

The Editor would be delighted to receive reports and photographs of the commemorative services.

MAJOR GENERAL’S REVIEW

The Association hopes to receive a small allocation of tickets for the Major General’s Review on Horse Guards Parade on Saturday 30 May – see enclosed booking form for details.
COLLINGWOOD MEMORIAL PARADE

The parade and service at the Collingwood Memorial on the Downs, east of Pimperne, Dorset will take place on the morning of Friday, 5 June (timing to be confirmed later). Please contact James Watson Smith (address inside the front cover) if you plan to attend.

CONFERENCES

This year, the Association will be holding two conferences. The first is the Gallipoli Centenary Conference which will be held on Saturday 6 June at The Møller Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge. See enclosed leaflet and booking form.

There will also be a two-day conference – Gallipoli and the Western Front – which will be held over the weekend of 26 & 27 September at the Tally Ho! Conference Centre in Birmingham. This is being run in partnership with the Western Front Association. There will be an amazing line up of speakers; already confirmed are Gary Sheffield, Richard van Emden, Peter Doyle, Clive Harris, Aimee Fox-Godden and Rob Thompson to name but a few. Full details will be given on the Association Website and in the summer edition of The Gallipolian.

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

As previously notified, the Annual General Meeting of the Gallipoli Association will be held at 11.00am on 22 July 2015 at Wellington Barracks. London SW1 (venue subject to confirmation).

Formal notice of the meeting, reports and papers will be available via the Association website by 1 July from where they can be downloaded by members. Copies will be sent to those members who have not registered an e-mail address.

BATTLEFIELD TOURS – 2015

An additional Association Tour has been arranged for 4-9 October. This is likely to be as popular as the others being held this year, so early enquiry is advised – contact tours@gallipoli-association.org.
THE GALLIPOLI SONATA

Roger Weston

I read with interest Ken Wright’s article, The Gallipoli Sonata, in the Autumn 2014 issue of The Gallipolian (No. 135 pp. 55-59) and the renewed awareness of the compositions of Lieutenant-Commander Frederick Septimus (often referred to as ‘Cleg’) Kelly. Readers might have noticed, and perhaps some were fortunate enough to attend, Prom 42 on Sunday 17 August 2014, Lest We Forget. The concert commemorated the fallen of the Great War, and comprised a programme of work by people who had taken part in the War. It included Kelly’s ‘Elegy for strings, in memoriam Rupert Brooke’. The concert had some very good reviews. The piece has also been recorded by the BBC Symphony Orchestra, 2006. Dutton CDLX 7172.

GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON 1853-1947

John Lee

On 4 August 1914 General Sir Ian Hamilton was sixty-one years old and had been a serving soldier for forty-four years. He was not, as the distinguished antipodean historians, Robin Pryor and Trevor Wilson once thought, a 1914 ‘dug out’ but was the most senior serving General on the Army List. He had many qualities that suited him for independent command at the highest levels and was, in many ways, an ideal commander for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

The son of a lieutenant-colonel of the Gordon Highlanders, he was always destined for the army. He was one of those first intakes of Sandhurst cadets after the abolition of the purchase of commissions and went first into the Suffolk Regiment for a brief tour of duty in Ireland before joining the family regiment, the Gordons, in India. During the long spells of leave granted to under-employed subalterns, he indulged his passion for hunting, proved to be a remarkably good shot and began developing ideas on good shooting and field craft.

Unlike many of his contemporaries he was completely fluent both in French (thanks to the voluptuous Henriette, the Swiss maid that raised him in childhood) and German (after a six-month stay in Germany in 1870), and while a subaltern in India he learned a further four languages, because each one earned a supplement to his pay! He was a published poet and had written a very perceptive book on The Fighting of the Future in 1885 in which he discussed the importance of accuracy in rifle training. He was tasked by Lord Roberts to improve the musketry skills of the army in India and achieved great success in that endeavour. After experience in the Tirah campaign in 1898, important for the lessons it taught in fighting an enemy using the new smokeless powder, he was a
natural and popular Commandant of the School of Musketry at Hythe, in Kent. There he began a series of badly needed reforms that quite transformed the shooting skills of the British infantry. (It has to be said that every Commandant at Hythe claims to be the man who taught the British army the rifle skills that earned it such grudging admiration from the Germans in 1914 but Hamilton deserves credit for at least starting the process based on personal experience and deep thought about the issues involved).

He was not short of combat experience or personal courage. After skirmishes on the north-west frontier in 1878–79, his battalion stopped off in South Africa on their way home and took part in the First Boer War. He achieved celebrity status by his personal gallantry at the disastrous battle of Majuba Hill in 1871. Surviving a serious wound to his left wrist, and being recommended for a Victoria Cross (which was not awarded as ‘he was young and would have plenty of other opportunities to distinguish himself’), he was invited by Queen Victoria to tell her all about the battle. Regrettably, Lord Roberts’ call for him to return to India as his a.d.c. saw Hamilton pass up on a place at the Staff College, Camberley. He saw service in the failed attempt to rescue Lord Gordon in the Sudan, by swinging a posting with 1st Gordon Highlanders when he should have been on leave in England, despite the prejudice against ‘Indian’ officers in this ‘African’ army. Back in India he was Assistant Adjutant General responsible for improving the musketry of the whole Indian army; then Military Secretary to the next C in C India, Sir George White. He saw active service in Burma in 1886 and did the work of Quartermaster General in India (on the pay of the deputy QMG!)

All this made him ideally placed to be posted to South Africa when Sir George White was sent out to Natal at the outbreak of the Second Boer War. His command of an infantry brigade and his crucial role in the first great victory of the war at the battle of Elandslaagte (1899) demonstrated that he fully grasped modern tactics and the problems posed by magazine rifles firing smokeless powder. The way he trained his soldiers to fight in extreme open order and his personal gallantry in leading the charge at Elandslaagte confirmed his hero status in Victorian society. It also saw him recommended again for the Victoria Cross but his time it was declined because the War Office did not want to encourage brigade commanders to get caught up in hand-to-hand fighting with the enemy. He was then involved in the siege of Ladysmith and again personally led his troops in defeating the only serious Boer assault on the defenders (9 November 1899). Once the siege was lifted Lord Roberts immediately recalled him to the main field army and gave him a divisional command. He was one of the few British generals before 1914 to have commanded more than 20,000 men in the field. He guarded Roberts’ flank on the road to Pretoria and played a full part in several successful battles. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien left an account of how much he enjoyed serving under such ‘a delightful leader…always ready to go for the enemy’.

When Roberts returned to England after his ‘victory’ Hamilton accompanied him. But within weeks he was back in South Africa for two years’ service as Lord Kitchener’s indispensable chief of staff. In that capacity he was instrumental in running the last
Boer commandos to ground and inflicting a severe defeat on them at Rooiwal (April 1902) that hastened the peace settlement at Vereeniging.

From 1902 to 1914 Hamilton served in all the great offices of the British Army – Military Secretary to the C in C; Quartermaster General; Adjutant General; Inspector General of Overseas Forces; GOC Southern Command; a strong advocate of the new Territorial Force and of closer links between soldiers and the Royal Navy. He was the official observer (on behalf of the Indian Army) with the Japanese in Manchuria 1904–05 and wrote a thought-provoking book about the war against the Russians there. He continually embraced the modern in war and decried what he saw as outdated elements in training and doctrine. If he had not been away in Australia and New Zealand on an inspection tour in 1914, he would have been an obvious choice for the post of Chief of the Imperial General Staff made ‘vacant’ by the incidents of collective disobedience at the Curragh. Winston Churchill, a close friend, had said Hamilton was one of the few generals he knew who thought ‘in army corps and continents’. On that inspection tour he greatly encouraged the militia forces of the dominions and in Australia he marked one brigadier out for special attention in the future because of his ‘outstanding force of character’, the civil engineer, John Monash.

Most significantly he was GOC Mediterranean, based at Malta, when, in 1912, he hosted a visit by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister Asquith and the Consul-General of Egypt, Lord Kitchener. They witnessed a series of amphibious exercises, at a time when Britain was about to produce its first Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, published in 1913. Hamilton had already done similar work at Malta and Gibraltar, and later at Cairo, getting a good idea of the power of defence against amphibious attack, and warning especially of the danger posed to the ships involved from submarines. He had his long-term Chief of Staff, Gerald Ellison, with him then and would have liked him by his side in 1915.

It is plain to see why, in an article in the German Great General Staff journal, the ‘Militar Wochenblatt’ in 1914, Hamilton was described as the single most experienced soldier serving in any army in the world. His range of combat, staff and command experience had few equals. On the outbreak of war he naturally wanted to see some action. On the sudden death of Lieutenant General ‘Jimmy’ Grierson, GOC II Corps, Hamilton offered to step down in rank if he could take the corps to France. This was turned down, as Sir John French explained, because Hamilton’s experience was too valuable to ‘waste’ on a corps command. Instead he was named GOC Central Striking Force, a slightly ill-defined role, in England but essentially overseeing the mobilisation of the Territorial Force (TF) and the vital task of defending the home islands. The TF promptly doubled in size and was soon far larger than the British Expeditionary Force. Hamilton personally selected the TF battalions that were rushed to the front that autumn to reinforce the severely strained BEF. Sir John French thanked Sir Ian for this in November 1914, at a time when Lord Kitchener was seriously considering replacing French with Hamilton as C in C BEF.
Having been a military secretary, adjutant general and corps commander, Hamilton had an encyclopaedic knowledge of the army and its officer corps. He was in regular contact with dozens of officers of all ranks serving on the Western Front and was soon getting a feel for the new conditions of warfare and drawing lessons on the power of the defence. He still felt he was ‘kicking his heels’ and, after Turkey came into the war in October 1914, began to muse about serving out in the Middle East. But Kitchener had already earmarked him for command of the second ‘New Army’ due to go to France in mid-1915. It notionally included the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th Divisions, some of the most famous divisions in the BEF, and it is one of the great ‘ifs’ of the war to imagine how he would have performed in that theatre. But, as we all know, he was called to the Dardanelles. It is fair to assume that Kitchener would have appointed a general of lesser rank in what, we must remember, was always meant to be a supporting role to a naval assault on the straits. But when the French added a corps to the force under a fairly senior general, Kitchener was obliged to seek a more senior appointee. It is obvious that Winston Churchill had also been lobbying for Hamilton, a man whom he held in high regard, to get the job. As I have suggested, Hamilton also had the recent experience of the amphibious exercises in the Mediterranean to recommend him.

Hamilton was despatched with incredible speed, with an inadequate staff thrown together in a couple of days (and denied his friend Ellison as chief of staff in favour of Kitchener’s choice, Walter Braithwaite). He was given little of no information about his troops or the enemies troops, was warned that 29th Division was only ‘on loan’ to him and might be recalled at any time, was denied any access to the staff studies of the Dardanelles region (including the 1906 report that it should never be attacked with less than 150,000 troops – preferably Greek!) and was flatly denied the reasonable request for some aircraft to assist the operation. The whole affair was to be done ‘on the cheap’ at a time when Great Britain really could not afford to mount a second major operation of war.

The assembled force, numbering some 75,000 ‘rifles’ was largely untried in the current war (including the regular battalions of 29th Division that had been put together from returning overseas garrison units and hadn’t really ‘bedded down’ as a division), but then they were only there as a support for the Royal Navy who were going to force their way through minefields and past coastal forts to intimidate Constantinople into surrender. A promised Russian army corps never materialised. Hamilton arrived just in time to see the great naval attack of 18 March fail spectacularly and within days had agreed that the army would need to land on the peninsula and clear the area of the Turkish artillery that was covering the minefields in the straits – the very definition of ‘mission creep’! The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had been sent out with an eye to saving shipping and wasn’t even remotely configured for assault landings. Everything had to go back to Egypt and be got ready for a wholly unprecedented operation of war – to the delight of the defenders under their German commander, Liman von Sanders. Britain’s long history of amphibious warfare was a catalogue of failures and/or disasters. Now this scratch force was going to have to do something never before attempted in the whole of human history – assault a number of beaches defended by the modern weapons of war.
that included magazine rifles, machine-guns, quick-firing artillery, trenches and barbed wire. Their only guide to conduct was the ‘Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations’ 1913 and, on closer reading, even this did not discuss a direct assault on a defended beach. It envisaged a silent approach to an enemy coast (something Britain could do almost at will, given its maritime preponderance) and the throwing ashore of a covering force to secure a decent bridgehead into which the invading main force could then be delivered. Reading the orders for 25 April 1915, one can see how the inexperienced young staff officers had sat down with the Manual and carefully slotted all the available forces into the programme according to the text.

The miracle of 25 April is not that things went so badly wrong in many places but that the troops got ashore and established themselves at all. There were many anxious people in England who expected or feared the worst. Hamilton’s severest critics suggest he should have argued against the attempt in the first place, or at least made clear the terrible difficulties they were in from the very start. That is asking a lot from a professional soldier in an army that was routinely given near impossible tasks by a parsimonious government and just told to get on with it. Hamilton knew Lord Kitchener better than most and took to heart the admonition of his old chief to ask for no additional forces. That a message to GOC Egypt telling them to give the MEF whatever it needed to complete the task was never seen by Hamilton until the Official History was being written after the war is one of the many tragedies in this campaign.

Far from indulging in the luxurious ship-based surroundings of some (naval) staffs, Hamilton set up his general headquarters on the island of Imbros and ran it in truly Spartan conditions. Meals served there were from the same rations as received by the troops on the front line. He even gloried in going down with a dose of dysentery as it made its way through his force. Any accusation of remoteness can be countered by the post-war recollections of a veteran of the 42nd (East Lancashire TF) Division. Having served in three theatres of war under five commanders-in-chief, the only one he ever met in a front line fire trench was Sir Ian Hamilton at Cape Helles.

From the evidence of his wife Jean’s diary we know that Hamilton did not underestimate the Turkish enemy in quite the way that Kitchener seemed to do in his original instructions. Once ashore Hamilton was under constant pressure from London to ‘achieve something’ but was never given the men, and more importantly the guns and ammunition, needed to defeat the enemy land forces. As Churchill said, he faced the entire Turkish army in relays, while he was drip-fed reinforcements that were always too little and too late. He and his staff officers knew how desperately short of absolutely everything the War Office was and, although their demands on London were much more vigorous that some writers suggest, they knew that there was little to go round. Instead Hamilton began to formulate his new theory on war that recognised the power of the defence. Having inflicted a series of crushing defeats on large-scale Turkish counter-attacks, where the Turkish dead lay in heaps before Allied trenches and the losses of the defenders were miniscule, Hamilton wrote in July a description of
attacking and seizing a Turkish position that they would need to recapture and then inviting their counter-attack which could be duly massacred. This was a clear call for the sort of ‘bite and hold’ operation that the BEF on the Western Front was groping towards in 1916 and was a standard operational procedure by late 1917. The ratio of men killed at Gallipoli was 2:1 ‘in the Allies’ favour’. On the Western Front it was 2:1 against them.

We cannot discuss the fighting in detail here. It is important to remember the wholly inadequate nature of the supply of artillery and ammunition in a war where these factors assumed a decisive role. Early reinforcements arrived with antiquated artillery, and for the Suvla operation whole TF divisions were sent out without a single piece of artillery to their name – cannon fodder in the literal sense. Denied the generals he specifically asked for by name for the August offensive (some of whom were then supplied after it had all gone hopelessly wrong), Hamilton was obliged to work with a singularly inadequate set of generals in IX Corps. Reading of their personal failures at the head of keen Kitchener volunteer divisions, one can only grieve at the intolerable demands placed on men who were completely and utterly out of their depth in terms of age, physical and even mental fitness. As one of Hamilton’s staff officers opined about the unfortunate commander of 11th (Northern) Division, “I thought it was a wicked thing ever to have sent him out there”.

Hamilton was recalled to London in October 1915 and, though many lobbied for his retention in the service, the Dardanelles Commission would keep him inactive until it was too late. After the war he was instrumental in pulling the many, varied and sometimes antagonistic veterans’ organisations together into the British Legion, and
then stood back so that Sir Douglas Haig would receive the credit. He was in constant demand to address reunion dinners and societies, and to open local war memorials. He was always a very popular general, especially amongst the Australian rank and file. He also continued his deep study of warfare and produced important theoretical works that demonstrated his modernist grasp of war. He advocated the large-scale mechanisation of the army; the creation of unified tri-service staff colleges and officer cadet schools; even the creation of air-portable divisions in the early 1920s – years ahead of his time in most things. He stands as the ‘hero’ of the school that utterly opposed the attritional warfare on the Western Front and sought an alternative method of combatting the Central Powers. While military historians are coming to see that the First World War could only have been fought the way it was, by grinding down the main enemy on the main front, Ian Hamilton remains an interesting figure in many ways. Just how would he have performed as an army commander in France and Belgium? How much better might the Empire have mobilised if he had been Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1914?

Editor’s Note: John Lee is the author of *A Soldier’s Life*, a biography of Sir Ian Hamilton.

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**THE ANZAC LANDINGS – A FAILURE IN COMMAND**

**Chris Roberts**

The landing at Anzac is wreathed in myth and misperception. The popular view has the Anzacs thrown ashore on the wrong beach. As the story goes, they stormed ashore under murderous machine gun fire against strong Turkish opposition, suffering heavy casualties, before clambering up the cliffs, and fighting their way inland to gain a precarious toehold on the heights beyond Anzac Cove. Various reasons, some contradictory, are given for the failure to achieve their objective – the misplaced landing, which ‘tore the plan to shreds’, being the most favoured. The reality is somewhat different.

ANZAC was an inexperienced and partially trained force when committed to the Gallipoli operation. With the exception of Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood, the Corps Commander, and Major General Sir Alexander Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division, the common thread among its commanders was their lack of field command experience. Major General William Bridges, commanding the 1st Australian Division, was an Australian Permanent Force officer, who had made his reputation as Australia’s ‘best soldier’ through staff appointments in the fledgling Australian Army – the 1st Division was his first ever field command. Of his three brigade commanders, Sydney lawyer Colonel Henry MacLaurin, had only recently been promoted to command the 26th Infantry in the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) before being elevated to command the 1st Brigade when the AIF was raised. The hard working and abrasive Colonel James McCay, a Victorian lawyer and politician, commanded the
2nd Brigade, and had proven to be a competent Minister for Defence, and head of the Australian Intelligence Corps before the war. Both MacLaurin and McCay were largely self-taught amateurs, with little real practical experience. Commanding the 3rd Brigade, Colonel Ewan Sinclair-MacLagan, was a British regular on loan as an instructor at Duntroon, however his only previous field command had been as a Captain commanding a rifle company during the South African War. Known for his pessimism, Sinclair-MacLagan had grave doubts about the Gallipoli operation, and was deeply impressed with the difficulties of the proposed ANZAC landing.

Between the raising of the AIF and the landing at Gallipoli, the force had had little opportunity to train to operational standards. The training in Egypt was ad hoc and lacked any system. After two months the 3rd Australian Brigade was sent to Lemnos, followed a month later by the rest of ANZAC. None of the Australian or New Zealand formation commanders had undertaken any real training at their level of command, and had largely supervised their subordinates. Nor were there any rehearsals undertaken for the coming operation, other than simple disembarkation activities under battalion arrangements.

The Turkish commanders were all professional soldiers with demonstrated competence on active service – in the Italian-Turkish War, and the Balkan Wars. Two officers played a key role on 25 April. Lieutenant Colonel Sefik, commanding the 27th Regiment, was a tough, energetic officer ready to speak his mind on issues, and had performed competently during the Balkan Wars. Lieutenant Colonel Kemal, commanding the 19th Division, was also tough and energetic, winning praise for his defence of Derna during the Italian–Turkish War, and as a staff officer in the Second Balkan War.

A conscript force, the Ottoman Army had a comprehensive training system, arms schools and advanced officer training colleges. Soldiers served two years full time in the active component, followed by 16 years in the reserve. On mobilisation the reserves were incorporated into the active units, and many of them were combat veterans with experience in the Balkan Wars. The 27th Regiment as part of the 9th Division had been on the peninsula since September, where it had trained hard on anti-invasion exercises in an all arms environment. Similarly, the 19th Division raised in January 1915, largely from veteran troops, had been also been engaged in hard training and exercises.

As part of the Allied operation, ANZAC was to make a subsidiary landing north of Gaba Tepe, take the Sari Bair Range, then advance east to the Mal Tepe Ridge, and interdict the Turkish north – south road communications. Tasked with securing Sari Bair, Bridges sought to achieve this in two phases. Landing immediately south of Anzac Cove, his 3rd Brigade would seize a covering position from Chunuk Bair on the main range, down along Third Ridge to Gaba Tepe. The 9th Battalion would seize the southern end of the ridge, the 10th the central portion, while the 11th would take Chunuk Bair and the northern end, with the 12th Battalion in reserve. Following on, but echeloned further north to include Anzac Cove, the 2nd Brigade would push up the
Defending the area was Captain Faik’s 250 strong 8th Company, of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment deployed as follows: one platoon around the Fisherman’s Hut; a second platoon 1500 metres south on Plugge’s Plateau, overlooking Anzac Cove; while his third platoon sat 900 metres inland on Second Ridge. The rest of the 2nd Battalion covered the ten kilometres of coastline further south. There were no machine guns in a Turkish infantry battalion; they were held in a four gun company at regimental level. Contrary to popular belief, none were deployed covering the beaches at Anzac.

The rest of Sefik’s 27th Regiment, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, and the machine gun company, were in reserve near Maidos, eight kilometres south east, ready to respond once the invasion site had been determined. Closer was Kemal’s 19th Division, seven kilometres due east of Anzac Cove. As the 5th Army reserve, however, it could only be committed on the orders of the Army commander.

In darkness, navigation errors pitched the 4,000 men of the 3rd Brigade astride Anzac Cove against the 85 riflemen of Second Lieutenant Muharrem’s 2nd Platoon. Twenty minutes later, after a brief fight on the plateau, the Turks bolted inland. The misplaced landing is often slated as the reason for the Anzac failure. In fact, the brigade landed adjacent to the intended beach, its right overlapping the left of the planned site, and was ashore with light casualties.

So how was the brigade placed to achieve its objective? On the right, the 9th Battalion was split, with two companies on Plugge’s Plateau and two on Bolton’s Ridge, heading inland for Lone Pine. Although further from their objective than intended, rather than having to fight through the defences further south, they now could swing south east behind them, and advance to the southern end of Third Ridge. From Plugge’s, one company headed right to join the rest of the Battalion, however, the other swung left up Monash Valley.

The 10th Battalion was largely intact on the plateau, and almost the same distance from their objective as if they had landed as planned. Lieutenant Colonel Weir determined it lay behind Second Ridge, and keeping a tight rein on his battalion, set out for it.

Most of the 11th Battalion assembling around Plugge’s were 800 metres closer to their objective, which could be reached via Russell’s Top, and up the main range to Chunuk Bair. North of the cove, Captain Tulloch, with a group of the 11th, was climbing Walker’s Ridge leading to the main range. Before the 11th Battalion moved off, however, Sinclair-MacLagan arrived, and made the first of two fateful decisions which determined the course of the battle – ordering the 3rd Brigade to advance only as far as Baby 700 and Second Ridge, and commence digging in. He then returned to the beach to meet the 2nd Brigade.
Why he did this we don’t know – perhaps he took counsel of his fears, perhaps the misplaced landing overwhelmed him. However, his actions were precipitous. His brigade had punched a gaping hole in the thin Turkish screen, his battalions were endeavouring to reach their objectives, and there was no indication the Turks were in strength ahead of him. Indeed, Sinclair-MacLagan had not even ascertained an even rudimentary understanding of the situation.

By 6:15am, the 10th and 9th Battalions were occupying the 400 Plateau, and two companies of the 12th held the upper end of Bolton’s Ridge. 1600 metres ahead of them their objective lay unoccupied, save for scattered parties of Muharrems’s platoon, and towards which two small groups of Australians were advancing. One under Lieutenant Loutit was heading for the 10th Battalion’s objective, while Lieutenant Plant’s of the 9th was approaching the southern end. A map showing the situation at 6.30am is on page 35.

On the left flank roughly 450 men from three separate battalions confronted the reserve platoon of Turks on Baby 700, while the rest of the 11th Battalion was moving forward to join them, and extend the line south to the 400 Plateau. At this stage the only Turkish forces between the 4000 men of the 3rd Brigade and their objectives were scattered survivors of the 2nd Platoon on Third Ridge, and the 3rd Platoon on Baby 700 – in all roughly 120–140 riflemen.

As the 2nd Brigade began landing about 5:30am, the second fateful decision was made. When McCay arrived, Sinclair-MacLagan, fearing a counter attack from Gaba Tepe,
urged him to divert his brigade from securing the vital heights on the left flank, and move to Bolton’s Ridge on the right. McCay objected, but under pressure finally agreed, and as his battalions came ashore they moved off to the south, prolonging the right flank of the 3rd Brigade. In doing this Sinclair-MacLagan effectively overrode his divisional commander’s instructions, having no information about the opposition confronting him, or any indication that a counter attack was materialising from Gaba Tepe.

These two decisions changed the course of the battle, turning the Anzac attack into a defensive battle on ground of little tactical importance. They also handed the initiative to the outnumbered Turks.

Ninety minutes after the initial landing, Turkish reinforcements swung into action. Departing their encampment at 6am, Sefik’s 1st and 2nd Battalions and his machine gun company marched hard for Third Ridge, eight kilometres away. At Boghali, Kemal readied his 19th Division, and awaited instructions from 5th Army Headquarters.

Coming ashore at 7:30am, Bridges was confronted with a complete change of plan. Arriving on Bolton’s Ridge around 8:15am, he surveyed the country ahead. All was quiet. Seeing no enemy he, and his Chief of Staff, believed ‘there was nothing to stop the advance from continuing’, and that ‘precious time was being lost’. Unbeknown to them, by now Sefik’s 27th Regiment was advancing up the valley beyond Third Ridge. Then hearing firing to the north Bridges decided to investigate, but on encountering troops digging in along the 400 Plateau, he gave up and returned to Anzac Cove, where he remained throughout the day, having done nothing to rectify the situation.

Around 8:30am, having forced Plant’s group to retire from the southern end of Third Ridge, the head of Sefik’s column ran into Loutit’s party further up. A prolonged firefight ensued until around 10:30am when Loutit reluctantly fell back to Second Ridge, where the main Australian line had sat unmolested for four hours. Sefik now surveyed the scene before committing his force. Accurately ascertaining the situation, he determined the Australian flanks were on the main range, and at Lone Pine.

Tulloch, with about 180 men of the 11th Battalion, had occupied Battleship Hill by 9:30am, and was trading shots with two Turkish platoons on Chunuk Bair. Behind him, a mixed Australian force, numbering around three companies, held Baby 700. Others were along the upper reaches of Second Ridge – but the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades held the lower ground, along the 400 Plateau and Bolton’s Ridge, overlooked by Sefik on Third Ridge. An outpost line held the forward edge of Lone Pine, and further south along Pine Ridge.

Sefik decided to attack, pending the arrival of a waylaid mountain battery, to hold the Australians in place until further reinforcements arrived. They were on their way. Leaving Boghali at 8:10am Kemal hurried cross country with the 57th Regiment’s three
battalions, a *machine gun company*, and another *mountain battery* strung out behind. Sefik’s attack had not yet commenced when, at 10am, the head of the 57th’s column arrived on the Third Ridge to his north, and the leading elements headed for Tulloch’s party on Battleship Hill.

Briefed on the situation by Sefik, Kemal set about organising a coordinated attack against both flanks of the ANZAC line. In the south the 27th's 1st Battalion would attack the Australians on Lone Pine; to the north two battalions of the 57th Regiment would thrust down the main range. However, it would take time before they were ready, – the 57th had been badly strung out, and had to move north to Chunuk Bair.

Meanwhile the 1st Australian Brigade was ashore, but it was being fed piecemeal into the Australian line, largely in company groups, from Baby 700 to the 400 Plateau. Rather than taking control of the battle, Bridges sat at the end of a telephone line responding to calls for reinforcements from Sinclair-MacLagan. Consequently, the 1st Brigade became fragmented across the whole front, and ceased to exist as a cohesive fighting force. Clearly Bridges had deferred to his subordinate, who now took control of the battle telling Bridges where the reinforcements were to be sent.

While they tried to reinforce Baby 700 on the high ground, only three more companies arrived there. The rest siphoned off along Second Ridge, the 400 Plateau and Bolton’s Ridge, responding to unnecessary calls for reinforcements from inexperienced commanders and troops, or simply losing their way due to vague orders. Sinclair-MacLagan, holding a central position on Second Ridge, did nothing to redirect them to the high ground. Baby 700, which dominated the Australian line, and remained dangerously undermanned. Nor was anything being done to take control of this vital left flank.

With the 1st Brigade frittered away piecemeal, MacLaurin had nothing to command. Rather than deploying him to take control of the left flank, and provide reports on the situation on the ground of tactical importance, Bridges left him as a wasted asset on the beach. Thus control of the left devolved on six rifle company commanders from different battalions.

Finally, at 12:30pm Sefik’s 1st Battalion swept across Legge Valley, and was soon engaged in a bitter, vicious fight with the Australian outposts on Lone Pine, slowly driving the Australians back to the main Australian position. Around 1pm two battalions of the 57th swarmed down the main range, driving Tulloch’s party off Battleship Hill, but were stopped dead in their tracks by devastating fire from the Australians on Baby 700. Both sides engaged in a prolonged and deadly firefight, suffering severe casualties. At 2:30pm two companies of the Auckland Battalion arrived to help the Australians. A map showing the Turkish counter attacks is on page 36.

Coming ashore around 3pm, Birdwood was briefed by Bridges. Rather than assuming
command of the operation, in the tradition of leaving one's subordinate to fight the battle as he saw fit, he returned to his ship leaving Bridges in charge.

With his attack stalled, Kemal threw in the 3rd Battalion of the 57th at 3:30pm, finally overwhelming the Anzacs on Baby 700, and driving them back along Russell's Top, where Lieutenant Colonel Braund of the 2nd Battalion stabilised the situation. At dusk Sefik was reinforced by two battalions of the 77th Regiment, which he sent forward south of Lone Pine, overwhelming the Australian outposts on Pine Ridge. Driving on to Bolton’s Ridge, they were stopped dead under withering rifle and machine gun fire.

The situation was critical. Baby 700, the high shoulder of Second Ridge, and a portion of Russell’s Top was in Turkish hands. Should they take Russell’s Top, they could fire into the rear of the ANZAC line on Second Ridge. Confronted with this, Bridges and Godley called Birdwood ashore, and urged him to immediately evacuate the whole force, which, in the circumstances, would have been disastrous. Wiser heads prevailed, and they were ordered to stay.

Thus, in summary, while the Australians had punched a gaping hole in the Turkish coastal screen, they failed to exploit their success and stopped short of their objective, adopting a defensive stance. Conversely, acting boldly and taking risks, the Turks recovered the vital ground on the main range, dominated the ANZAC line, and confined it to a narrow, cramped beachhead on ground of little tactical importance.

Rather than the usual, hoary, old excuses trotted out to explain away the ANZAC failure, the course of the battle was determined by the command performances on both sides.

The ANZAC plan was poorly executed. War is a business of taking calculated risks, and he who waits for certainty in battle will wait forever. History is replete with examples of commanders in advantageous positions losing the battle through caution or inaction, while through boldness and aggression, others have turned dire situations into victory.

Sinclair-MacLagan’s risk averse decisions to halt on Second Ridge, and divert the 2nd Brigade curtailed exploitation of the initial success, wrecked the plan, and condemned ANZAC to a purely defensive battle almost from the outset. In making them, he acted hastily without acquiring an even adequate battle picture. Undoubtedly his inexperience at that level of command played a part. Consequently, when faced with the unexpected, he opted for a cautious approach and fell back on what he felt comfortable with — a defensive posture that avoided the risks and complexities of the offensive.

Sinclair-MacLagan’s decisions were compounded by Bridges’ inaction. A generous assessment would rate Bridges’ performance as mediocre at best. By any measure it was uninspiring. Early in the morning, despite believing there was nothing to stop the advance continuing, he did nothing to get things moving. He never took control of the
battle, never sought to gain an even adequate battle picture, never sought to impose his will or influence the battle — the very actions expected of a commander. He simply accepted the situation presented to him, and rather than getting into a position where he could assess the evolving situation himself, he remained at Anzac Cove at the end of telephone lines responding to calls for reinforcements from his subordinate commanders.

Again inexperience and inadequate training can explain his lacklustre performance. His reputation as a competent staff officer in peacetime, required very different attributes to the psychological and technical demands of battlefield command. It is little wonder, that when saddled with the heavy responsibilities of commanding a division in battle, committed to operations without any requisite training, and confronted with an unexpected situation, he was found wanting.

In direct contrast were the well trained Sefik and Kemal, with a history of demonstrated command experience, and who had conducted much hard training and rehearsals prior to the landing. Although outnumbered and starting at a significant disadvantage, they acted quickly to seize the superior ground, and gained a reasonably accurate battle picture before committing to a course of action. Correctly assessing the situation, they resolved to attack to forestall ANZAC from regaining the initiative. Fundamental to their success was a willingness to accept risk, and act boldly.

In the end a failure in Australian command and Ottoman boldness decided the fate of the landing.

Editor’s Note:

Brigadier Chris Roberts AM, CSC spent 35 years in the Australian Army including operational service in South Vietnam. He is the author of The Landing at Anzac, 1915.

FROM THE UTTERMOST ENDS OF THE EARTH
– The New Zealanders at Gallipoli

Christopher Pugsley

The nine month long Gallipoli Campaign began with the landings on 25 April 1915 and ended for New Zealanders with the final evacuation on 20 December 1915. It was the ‘baptism of fire’ for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) in the First World War and one that saw the highest percentage of casualties suffered by New Zealand for any campaign in its history. Major-General Sir Alexander Godley’s New Zealand and Australian (NZ & A) Division formed part of Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood’s ANZAC Corps and left Egypt on 10 April 1915 for Lemnos Island. Godley’s division consisted of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade commanded by
Colonel F E Johnston and the 4th Australian Brigade commanded by Colonel John Monash together with its divisional artillery and supporting units. Left behind in Egypt was the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, together with the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment and the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.

The New Zealand Infantry Brigade was a volunteer force made up of Territorial soldiers whose pre-war annual training amounted to some 20 days a year. The New Zealand Territorial Force was raised and commanded by Godley who did everything in his power to prepare it for the war he assessed was coming. Mobilisation plans were in place and on Britain’s declaration of war, the Main Body of the NZEF was quickly mobilised. It sailed on 16 October and began disembarking at Alexandria on 3 December 1914. Time in Egypt was spent whipping the New Zealanders into shape, Godley was a demanding trainer of men and as events showed, this rather than tactics was his forte. It was hard demanding training with rarely a word of praise from this tall impassive general that they grew to hate, but it was to their benefit in the months ahead.

The main landings were by the 29th British Division at Cape Helles, with a diversionary landing by the French Expeditionary Force at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore. There was also a feint by the Royal Naval Division off Bulair. It was here that the New Zealand-raised Lieutenant-Commander Bernard Freyberg, of the Royal Naval Division was awarded a DSO for swimming ashore by night, lighting flares on the beach to simulate a landing before swimming back out to sea.

Godley’s New Zealand and Australian Division had the supporting role in the landings on 25 April. It was to land and remain in reserve before being tasked to advance across the peninsula to the straits. As we know nothing went according to plan. The 3rd Australian Brigade landed at the northern tip of Anzac Cove and faced a tangle of ridges and gullies. Turkish opposition was slight but a change to the plan by the leading Australian brigade commander ashore saw the first two Australian brigades directed to securing the southern flank, leaving the northern ridgeline climbing up to the 971 feature only weakly occupied.

It was on this axis that Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal launched his initial counter-attacks mid-morning on 25 April just as the first elements of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade were wading ashore at Anzac Cove. Johnston, the Brigade commander, was sick and so Brigadier-General Harold ‘Hooky’ Walker, Birdwood’s Brigadier, General Staff was appointed to command. The New Zealand Infantry Brigade was placed under Bridges’ command and committed from midday on to reinforce the Australians on the threatened left flank with the 16th Waikato Company of the Auckland Battalion being the first to see action. This became the battle for Baby 700, involving in turn elements of the Auckland and Canterbury battalions that came ashore from the troopship \textit{Lutzow}. So critical did the situation seem that by late afternoon when the Otago Battalion landed it was used to secure the Plugge’s Plateau above Anzac Cove should evacuation be necessary. In the battle for Baby 700, Lieutenant-Colonel D MacBean Stewart
commanding the Canterbury Battalion was killed, and all of the officers, and all but one of the Senior NCOs in the 16th Waikato Company were either killed or wounded. It is estimated that of the 3,100 New Zealanders who landed on Anzac Day some 600-700 became casualties with 153 being killed in action.

When the Wellington Battalion landed in the late afternoon of 25 April the battle for Baby 700 was lost. Fragmented groups held pockets of ground along Second Ridge. The nearest of these to Baby 700 would later be known as Quinn’s Post but on that first night it was held by Major T H Dawson, Company Commander of 3rd Auckland Company of the Auckland Battalion with a mixed garrison of Australians and New Zealanders. A handful of machine gunners from the Auckland Battalion held the saddle later known as ‘The Nek’. At Anzac Cove the increasing number of stragglers, the chaotic evacuation of wounded and increased Turkish artillery fire which forced the transports to stand further out to sea, led Bridges in consultation with Godley, to halt the landing of the artillery and recommend the withdrawal of the force. His divisional commanders’ concerns led Birdwood to recommend evacuation to Hamilton but, after briefings from his naval advisors, Hamilton refused, stating there was no other option than to dig in and fight.

In the days that followed, the ANZAC Corps consolidated on the two ridges, dominated at their junction by the Turkish-held Baby 700. There was savage fighting to hold Walker’s Ridge and extend a grip on Russell’s Top in the three days after the landing. It was in this fighting that Lieutenant Colonel W J Malone of the Wellington Battalion and Captain J Wallingford, a former musketry instructor at Hythe and now a commissioned officer of the New Zealand Staff Corps (NZSC) showed the determination and leadership which prevented a disaster. It was Wallingford working with Captain J M Rose, NZSC, machine-gun officer of 4th Australian Brigade, who developed the system of mutually supporting machine guns at the head of Monash Gully. It was this that ensured the failure of the Turkish counter-attack on 19 May.

The perimeter was consolidated. It was a tiny triangle of rugged ground on a hostile coast. Godley’s New Zealand and Australian Division became responsible for the northern part of the perimeter, (Nos. 3 and 4 Sections) which stretched from Courtney’s and Quinn’s Post across the head of Monash Gully to Pope’s Hill, a spur leading off Baby 700, and then across to what was later known as Russell’s Top which faced Baby 700 at the ‘The Nek’. The line continued along Russell’s Top, then down Walker’s Ridge to the sea, then north again along Ocean Beach to a number of isolated positions, known as Nos.1 to 3 Outposts, movement to which was impossible by day. There was not enough room within the perimeter for all of the divisional artillery and the 3rd Battery NZFA was employed at Cape Helles. Monash’s 4th Australian Brigade initially held Courtney’s, Quinn’s and Pope’s with the New Zealand Infantry Brigade holding Russell’s Top, Walker’s Ridge and the outposts sited to protect any Turkish advance on this flank.

The logical lynch-pin of the Anzac defensive line was Baby 700 but this was now
strongly held by the Turks. No breakout was possible unless it was taken. An attempt by Godley’s New Zealand and Australian Division to seize Baby 700 on night 2/3 May 1915 was defeated with heavy casualties to both brigades. Heavy losses among officers and NCOs saw a decline in morale. This was particularly so in the Otago Battalion, which, until reinforced, was effectively, destroyed as a combat force. This was due to poor planning and inexperience at every level from Godley’s Divisional Headquarters, Johnston’s Brigade Headquarters to Lieutenant Colonel A Moore commanding the Otagos in what was the NZ & A Division’s first formal attack.

The ANZAC Corps failure to breakout confirmed to Hamilton that an advance in the south from Cape Helles by the Regulars of the 29th Division held the only prospect for success. Hamilton ordered Birdwood to reinforce this attack with the strongest brigade from Godley and Bridges’ divisions and on the night 5/6 May the 2,443-strong New Zealand Infantry Brigade embarked at Anzac Cove and was transferred to Cape Helles.

On 8 May both brigades were committed in poorly thought out and hastily mounted attacks. At 11.00am, after rushed orders, Johnston’s four battalions began their advance from the British support lines alone and unsupported by either artillery fire or by other British formations. The brigade received heavy casualties even before its leading elements reached the forward British trenches, and its advance beyond this was quickly stopped by Turkish fire. Few of the attacking New Zealanders sighted a Turk. Later in the afternoon a further attack was ordered and also failed. The New Zealanders suffered 835 casualties and were now some 1,700 strong having lost 2,800 casualties since the landing. The Wellington Battalion at half-strength was the strongest of the four battalions. The realities of war struck home and morale was seriously affected.

At Anzac two half-brigades of the Royal Naval Division replaced the New Zealanders until they too were relieved on 12 May by the arrival of Colonel A H Russell’s New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, including the Otago Mounted Rifles, and the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade on 12 May. Fighting as dismounted infantry, Russell’s Brigade took over No.4 Section and immediately sapped forward the defensive line on Russell’s Top but this was still incomplete when the Turk’s launched a major attack on 19 May. Its destruction by Wallingford and Rose’s machine guns and the rifle fire of the Anzac defenders left no-man’s land carpeted with Turkish dead. On 26 May an armistice was held in a futile attempt to bury the dead of both sides. The stench of decaying flesh 1200 metres inland could be smelt as one approached the beach.

The Anzac perimeter was now under a state of siege. Turkish defences effectively barred any advance. Turkish snipers made the supply of water, rations and ammunition up the main artery of Monash Gully particularly hazardous, and Turkish miners began to tunnel under Quinn’s Post.

Russell’s New Zealand Mounted Rifles holding No. 4 Section began patrolling and reconnoitring the coastal ridges north of Anzac to see if this offered a possible route to
the high ground of the Sari Bair Range. Scouting parties led by Major P J Overton, established that the foothills were lightly guarded and that a night advance onto the heights was possible. This became the basis of planning for an offensive, which would involve a series of attacks both at Anzac and Cape Helles, together with a landing by a fresh British Corps at Suvla Bay.

In May, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade returned from Helles and was placed in reserve on Wellington terraces below the Sphinx and in Reserve Gully. In early June the near success of the Turkish attacks on Quinn’s and Courtney’s Posts saw the New Zealand infantry replace the now exhausted 4th Australian Brigade. This crisis was resolved by the determination of one man; Malone of the Wellington Battalion. He believed that: “The art of warfare is the cultivation of domestic virtues” and demonstrated this with his achievements first at Courtney’s Post and then at Quinn’s Post in June 1915. Each post was put into a proper state of defence; the front trenches were covered over as a defence against Turkish grenades, bombproof shelters were erected on the rear slopes to protect the garrison and an aggressive defensive policy adopted. In no-man’s land snipers stalked and killed their Turkish opponents so that by late June, mule supply trains could move unmolested up Monash Gully. Meanwhile an underground war was waged to prevent Quinn’s Post from being destroyed by mines. New Zealand Engineers such as Sergeant Alexander Abbey turned the tunnels beneath Quinn’s Post into an underground fortress while Malone turned it into an impregnable fortress above ground. He was made Post Commander at Quinn’s and the New Zealand battalions were rotated through under his command. The hot summer, a monotonous diet of bully beef and biscuits, limited water and an epidemic of flies that fed on the dead in No Man’s Land saw the sickness rates soar – a fit man became someone who could stand in a trench and hold a rifle.

Godley’s New Zealand and Australian Division had the major role in the August offensive. Reinforced by the New Zealand Maori Contingent in early July the plan involved the seizure of the foothills by two brigades including Russell’s New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. This was to be followed by an advance onto the Sari Bair Range by two assaulting columns, the Left consisting of Monash’s 4th Australian Brigade seizing the Hill 971 Feature and the Right, Johnston’s New Zealand Infantry Brigade seizing Chunuk Bair, which dominated the Turkish defences enclosing the Anzac perimeter.

Russell’s Mounted Rifles, supported by the Maori Contingent, seized the foothills in a brilliant night attack on the night 6/7 August. It was hard fighting against a strongly entrenched enemy with heavy casualties. Johnston’s infantry columns moved up through the ground that the Mounteds had won onto the high ground heading for Chunuk Bair. Dawn on 7 August found the Wellington Battalion with the Auckland Battalion in support on Rhododendron Ridge some 500 metres below Chunuk Bair. The Apex was secured, but the New Zealand column failed to attack. Johnston the Brigade Commander hesitated, his Brigade Major later indicated that he was drunk, either way,
it left his battalions exposed in daylight on an open ridge to Turkish artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire. Once a telephone line was established with Godley’s headquarters an immediate attack was ordered. It was a needlessly rushed affair and Johnston refused to wait for Wallingford’s machine-guns to get into position to provide covering fire. The Auckland Battalion attacked and failed, losing some 300 men for a gain of some 80 metres of narrow ridge. Johnston now ordered Malone’s Wellingtons to attack, but Malone refused and stated he would attack that night.

Before first light on the morning 8 August after a preliminary bombardment, the Wellington Battalion seized Chunuk Bair. Two supporting British battalions the 7th Gloucesters and the 8th Welsh Pioneers followed up and moved through onto either flank on the high ground. At daybreak this forward line came under Turkish fire and both British battalions broke and retired in rear of the Wellingtons, playing little effective part in the battle that followed. The two forward Wellington Companies on the crest were overrun and the crest itself became No-Man’s Land fought over by both sides and held by no one. Cut off from further reinforcements on Rhododendron Ridge Malone’s dwindling band held the seaward slopes against Turkish counter-attacks. The Auckland Mounted Rifles reinforced the Wellingtons after midday, and at last light somewhere between 50-70 New Zealanders still held the trench line immediately below the crest. However Malone, who had been the spirit of the defence leading each counterattack, was dead – killed by New Zealand artillery fire from the two 4-5-inch howitzers positioned above Anzac Cove. Of the 800 Wellington Infantry on Chunuk Bair, 398 were killed and missing, 311 were wounded.

The Otago Battalion and Wellington Mounted Rifles totalling 583 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W Meldrum relieved the remnants during the night 8/9 August. Meldrum consolidated the defences below the crest and despite heavy casualties held off Turkish counter-attacks all day on 9 August 1915. That evening 9 August two British New Army battalions relieved Meldrum. The next morning, 10 August, they offered little if any resistance and were overrun in a Turkish counterattack. Chunuk Bair was lost. Wallingford’s massed machine guns prevented the total collapse of the British line on Rhododendron Spur with Wallingford threatening any man who attempted to retire with his pistol.

Attempts to utilise the foothold the New Zealander’s held on Chunuk Bair was botched by Godley’s lack of grip of the battle. No Divisional staff officer moved forward to Johnston’s Headquarters on the Apex of Rhododendron Ridge and in the same way, no Brigade staff officer moved forward onto Chunuk Bair – no one could ask more of the soldiers but the failure to hold Chunuk Bair was a failure in command at brigade and divisional level. Communications were maintained by signals wire taken forward and maintained under intense Turkish fire, this would see Corporal Cyril Bassett receive the NZEF’s sole VC of the Gallipoli Campaign. More VC awards were recommended including a number of officers, but Godley believed that such bravery was expected of an officer and no New Zealand officer was awarded the VC in the First World War.
The NZEF was effectively destroyed as a fighting force, losing some 2,400 killed wounded and missing which reduced the New Zealand Infantry Brigade to 850 men. The exhausted remnants were further depleted in the two fruitless attacks on Hill 60 in late August. What was left of Godley’s division was withdrawn to Lemnos on 15 September for rest and reinforcement. Rested but still at less than half strength it returned to Anzac and took over the sector below Chunuk Bair in early November. When Birdwood assumed acting command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, Godley commanded the ANZAC Corps and Russell assumed command of the New Zealand and Australian Division and commanded the rear guard at the evacuation of Anzac in December 1915.

In all 8,556 New Zealanders of the NZEF served on Gallipoli, 2,779 died, 5,212 were wounded. A soldier could be wounded and later killed and so appear a number of times within the statistics, but even allowing for this, the figures are horrific. 7,991 out of 8,556 is 93% of those who served on the Peninsula: far in excess of any other country involved in the campaign and this figure does not include those evacuated with sickness and disease. Australian battle casualties number 28,150 including 8,709 dead, dwarfing the New Zealand total, but as a percentage of Australians who served in the campaign, which curiously with all the Australian preoccupation with Gallipoli, remains an estimate of 50,000–60,000, amounts to 47–56%. New Zealand’s share of the burden was out of proportion to any other member of the British Empire and the implications of this preoccupied New Zealand for the rest of the war. No country had come so far to fight in this campaign or had suffered so much. It was a chilling forecast of the likely cost of what was now inevitably a long war and one that dictated New Zealand’s decision to commit no more than a division to the Western Front. This as circumstances were to prove was the maximum New Zealand could sustain.

In New Zealand terms, the Gallipoli Campaign forged a sense of kinship with Australia, but it also demonstrated how different we were to each other as peoples. It also showed that a citizen force had to be totally professional in its approach if it was to survive the stresses of war. Enthusiasm was no substitute for careful planning and preparation under capable leadership matched by thorough training and detailed administration, including most importantly of all, the regular supply of trained reinforcements. These were the lessons that the New Zealand Expeditionary Force took to the Western Front.

**Editor’s Note:** Dr Christopher Pugsley ONZM is a freelance historian living at Waikanae Beach north of Wellington, NZ, having retired as Senior Lecturer in War Studies, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 2012. An authority on New Zealand at war, he has published some 18 books including Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story, recently revised and reissued in its fifth edition since first published in 1984 (see Book Review on pages 67–68).
A regular soldier in the Lancashire Fusiliers, Captain Harold Mynors Farmar served at Gallipoli as the Staff Captain in Brigadier General Hare’s 86th Brigade HQ, working for the brigade major, Major T H C Frankland. Farmar temporarily took over as brigade major when Frankland was killed on the morning of 25 April and continued in his new post until the brigades were reshuffled after the 2nd Battle of Krithia when he moved to the 88th Brigade as their brigade major. On 30 May he damaged his ankle and was evacuated to a hospital ship and then on to Lemnos. He returned to Gallipoli on 15 June but was wounded on the head by shrapnel (his head thankfully was protected by a helmet) and received a bullet wound on his forearm during the action at Gully Ravine on 28 June. He subsequently became ill with fever and on 8 July was evacuated from the peninsula for good.

Harold Mynors Farmar, the youngest of twelve children, was from a military family. His father was Major-General W R Farmar and his two brothers both served. Hugh, of the 60th Rifles, died of enteric fever after the Battle of Firket in 1896. George Jasper, initially a Lancashire Fusilier, later a Worcester and eventually a Major-General, served on the staff of the Canadian Corps during the Great War.

Farmar’s first campaign was in the Sudan in 1898 during the war against the Mahdi. Then in the South African war in 1899, he was mentioned in dispatches, having served with the 7th Dragoon Guards, the 3rd Battalion of Mounted Infantry, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, the Queensland Mounted Infantry, the Queensland Bushmen and the Canadian Royal Dragoons. Here he began his long association and love for the Australians. A tour at Wei-Hai-Wei, a British naval and coaling station on the North East coast of China followed before he returned to his regiment’s 1st Battalion in May 1903. A brief sojourn in Barbados with the 3rd Battalion was followed by a posting as adjutant of the 4th Battalion in Ireland, followed by a posting to the staff of The Royal Military College, Sandhurst. In 1911 he was sent temporarily to the 2nd Battalion at Tidworth and became staff captain in 7st Infantry Brigade (for Brigadier-General Laurence Drummond) which was followed in 1913 by a happy interlude studying for his degree at The London School of Economics and becoming a military lecturer to the Inns of Court OTC. He returned to the 1st Battalion at Multan in the Punjab in 1913.

Farmar says that it was in Multan that ‘the way was prepared for the achievements of Gallipoli, where six VC’s were won by the battalion in the first few weeks of that campaign, not by individuals but given to recipients as representatives of each full rank, by votes of survivors.’ The extremely hot weather and trying circumstances, together with some intense training in harbour defence was, he said, to prove useful during the Gallipoli
campaign. He believed the 1st Battalion was unusually used to the rigours of hard work in the intense heat of Multan. Many of the men suffered terribly from disease and this he felt had hardened their natural resistance, which he believed helped to serve them well in the trials of Gallipoli.

At the outbreak of war in August 1914 the battalion was ordered to Aden in reserve for the Sheik Said Expedition, to capture the forts that overlook the Perim Channel. Once the battalion was included in the 86th Infantry Brigade of the 29th Division, Farmar became the Staff Captain. The extract below is taken from a letter written to his wife, Violet, while on the hospital ship, HMS *Prince George*, on his way to Lemnos on 5 June 1915 recalling in as much detail as possible the landings of 25 April.

April 24th, the day the force steamed out of Mudros bay, ship after ship packed with soldiers, from England, Scotland, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia. French troops, black Senegalese, Foreign Legion and European battalions, past battle ships and smaller war craft of both the British and French. It was inspiring, the sounding cheers, started by the Australians as they went out first, and taken up by ship after ship, and to see the mass of rigorous soldiers. Our turn came and we steamed to Tenedos, where I transferred with our brigade headquarters to a mine Sweeper, The Whitby Bay, under command of Captain Townsend RN. She was filled with men.

We woke to the sound of the bombardment, a thunder of ships guns about the coast, in the first light of dawn, and made ready to disembark. I thought a good breakfast was the best preparation, and had one, and made the men eat all they could too. As we stood in towards the beach east of Cape Helles, which was named W, aimed fire began to strike the ship. While I was on board no shell hit her, but men were wounded and killed on the deck, as they stood paraded to file into the boats. There was no cover. My servant, Phillips, was hit at this time, through the shoulder and back. The men o’wars boats came alongside, arranged in tows of four and five, to be taken in by steam pinnaces. The men filed into them after the dead and wounded from the first trip, which had been made by Lancashire Fusiliers in the Euryalus, had been taken out.

I sat in the bow of the first boat and found it a damp spot, as a bullet hole under the water line sent a squirt of water up as we were towed rapidly. When the steamboat could get no closer the blue jackets took to their oars, the boats were separated and made for the beach. There was no confusion, but it was not easy to be quick as the boats were crowded, and some of the rowers had been hit, a little readjustment had to be made to let soldiers get to vacant oars. We were sufficiently close in by this time to make very little rowing necessary.

Frankland, in the tow ahead, had seen the first party of Lancashire Fusiliers, who were put ashore in the middle of the beach, suffer severely in the barbed wire entanglements near the water edge and up the sandy slope. They were subjected to cross fire of machine guns and rifle fire. The survivors, led by Tallents and Seckham forced their way through and pushed forward up the centre of the little valley leading from the shore. Frankland
diverted the boats with him to the left, where the men were able to land under a certain amount of cover afforded by the cliffs. He collected a few men and went up, the General also went. Major Adams Company of Lancashire Fusiliers had landed and made for the cliff edge on the left of the beach, which they took and got into some Turkish trenches. The men, handicapped by their heavy packs and burden of ammunition, had difficulty in getting up the very steep bits near the top of the cliff, and Frankland, with the General found themselves with only half a dozen men on the plateau, and Turks only 20 to 40 yards distant. Frankland took a rifle from a man, who was a little excited and firing rather wildly, and shot three Turks, if not a fourth.

The General was then severely wounded in the leg. More men then arrived and went for the enemy, who gave way. Frankland bound up General Hare and, seeing all was going well on the left, ran down to his right to get the company there to conform and go forward. There is no doubt that the General’s action in landing with the foremost in this unprecedented enterprise, with Frankland’s mastery of the situation, were together responsible for our success. Good as was the conduct of the Lancashire Fusiliers, each separate party to land found themselves with an individual task to perform, and were at once closely engaged. The General and his brigade major were the power that gave cohesion to the operation, and at a moment when the troops were enduring the effects of a bewildering shock, they gave them a plan to pursue with confidence. The General and Frankland had the energy and enthusiasm of boys, and the coolest bravery and skills, it was contagious.

A message came through from The Royal Fusiliers, who had landed North of Cape Helles without much opposition on beach X, that they were moving to attack the hill separating the landing places and to join hands with our centre battalion. No news of the remaining two battalions of the brigade, who were to land from the collier, River Clyde, in the little haven of Sedd el bahr, on our right. A message giving the situation was sent to the Euryalus, where were the headquarter staff. I came up after the General was wounded, and while Frankland had just left him. He was alone, and only anxious to know if all was going well. I was able to tell him that it was and gave him brandy and help to get a little way down the cliff. Frankland then returned and said all was doing well on the left and centre, that we must go to the right and endeavour to take the Turkish redoubts between our beach and Sedd el bahr and to assist the Munster and Dublin Fusiliers landing there. Also to establish our brigade headquarters at a ruined lighthouse which had previously been named as a spot to which all reports should be sent when we had recovered our footing. This lighthouse happened to be within 200 yards of the Turkish redoubts, but was close to the edge of the cliff.

The General’s servant was found and left in charge of the General, then Frankland and I went down to the beach. We found Richard [Haworth] on the Southern end, having just re-organized the remnant of his company. I believe the first to land. There were about 50 left out of 220. Frankland explained what was wanted and led under cover of the cliff to the lighthouse. Shaw had moved his men onto the high ground to the right of the beach,
which helped us. Haworth extended his men below the crest of the cliff, along a ledge, and then moved them towards the redoubt which one could see close behind a thick entanglement of barbed wire. They got as far as the wire and then could get no further; there was a fold of ground in which they could lie without much risk. The Turks could not fire straight into it from their parapet. But any effort to cut the wire meant instant death. Cunliffe came up with a small party and took up a position between Shaw and Haworth. The ground rose to a ridge, on our right, which was at right angles to our line facing the redoubt, the ridge commanded both the ground we were on, and also on the far side, the ground over Sedd el bahr. Beaumont, with twelve men, was sent to protect his flank, his advance was checked also by wire but he was able to prevent any Turks coming down on us. It is a mystery why we were not counter attacked. The only explanation is that the Turks were rattled by the landings at different places and sounds of firing behind them, and did not grasp the situation. There were a considerable number in the redoubt and fort above Sedd el bahr.

At about 8.20am Frankland discussed briefly with me future plans, asked me to stay where I was, halfway between Haworth and the lighthouse ruins, to await reports which might come in. He said he wished to see if he could see a way on to assist the Munster and Dublin Fusiliers. He went in the direction of Beaumont's party and stood up to use his glasses. He was killed instantly with bullets through head, neck, and heart. I did not see this, but Kane found me, went onto speak to Frankland, and came back in a few minutes to say he was dead.

I then withdrew under some shelter, afforded by the walls still standing of the lighthouse and got our brigade signals section at work. The Turks fired at us. I could not locate where from, but the signallers were excellent and established communication with our battalions on the left and with division headquarters, also with the signallers on board the River Clyde, which had been beached below Sedd el bahr. All the day the Turks sniped our headquarters and Haworth's men, but not many were hit, about a dozen I think. Haworth was shot through the back and body about 11am, but continued to command his men until 4 in the afternoon when reinforcements of two battalions came up and took the place.

I tried to find a senior officer to command the brigade, but The Royal Fusiliers had lost all theirs. I could not get hold of Bishop or Pearson, and the two battalions at Sedd el bahr were cut off. So I had to control the situation to the best of my ability and continue to send messages and instructions as if the General were still on the spot. The Royal Fusiliers sent in precise and accurate reports, they got into communication with the 87th Brigade on their left, and I was able to get them to co-operate in the work of pushing back the enemy sufficiently far to give freedom in landing more troops.

The Worcestershire and Essex Battalions came up at 2.20pm and by 5.20pm we had the Turkish positions in our hands, which had held us up all day. I interviewed both Colonels, and explained the situation and kept the headquarters of the division informed throughout.

The troops then entrenched themselves. Kane had left me early in the day to organize
ammunition supply, and had been collared by Colonel Wolley-Dod on the beach to help him. At 7 o'clock he sent for me too, as he alone of the divisional staff had landed. The General had to stay on board ship to be in touch by wireless with the situation at all landings. By running and then slipping over the edge of the cliff, we could see the River Clyde and get signallers to talk to her. By making way gingerly we could talk to some men who had landed from her, who had come as far as they could on the sea level, but had reached a spot where they could not get further and could not climb up. There were very few of them and some of them were wounded.

I reported to the division that the two companies had landed from the Collier and the rest still appeared to be on board. I did not know that all those who appeared to have landed were dead. That beach on the first day proved impossible to live on. Every boat which was filled with men for landing had every soul in her killed before one got to shore. And only some thirty men, I believe, were able to get on dry land from the beached collier. Those that did made their way towards the lighthouse. Attempt after attempt was made. Fortunately the Collier was not shelled on this day, and she was protected from rifle fire from iron plates. Arrangements had been made to make a causeway with lighters and boats from the collier, when she beached, to the shore. Big square outlets had been cut in the ships side to facilitate rapid egress. The men told off to manoeuvre the causeway were killed at once, and the boats and lighters drifted out of position. The men who had run on to them, the brigadier and his brigade major, were all killed. A number of men reached a rocky promontory and were killed on it. Unwin, who was in naval command, was magnificent. Innumerable rescues were made by him, of men wounded in the water, and he escaped himself. At night the survivors landed and began their work, finishing it on the next day by clearing Sedd el Behr, and helped by the troops near the lighthouse, they drove the Turks in the most brilliant way out of a very strong position. It was a very wonderful achievement.

The night of the 25th April was dark; The Royal Scots were landed and formed our reserve. The Turks attacked, and there was a great volume of fire. The reserve was all used up and every man with a rifle, servants and orderlies, pushed up for defence. It began to rain a little and was cold. One of the most unpleasant nights I have ever spent. Our signal section had to vacate their position, and we were out of communication with everyone, except by orderly, and the orderlies only brought in requests for reinforcements, of which there were none. On the 26th April the Turks gave us an opportunity to reorganize on our left. They were busy with our right at Sedd el Bahr and with the KOSB and some of the naval division at beach Y, on the Gulf of Saros side. I was sent to the old castle ridge over Sedd el Bahr and arrived just as the force had achieved success, and to find Colonel Doughty-Wylie who had organized and led the attack, killed as success was attained. I found a staff officer of Sir Ian Hamilton’s, also just arrived, and agreed with him on measures to be taken to secure the ground gained. I went to The Munster and Dublin Fusiliers, told them how well they had done; there were no senior officers left on the spot and few of any rank; and set them to work reorganizing and preparing to meet a counter attack. They were splendid. I then went down the whole
length of our advanced line to see if it was secure and to tell officers the general situation. That night I slept soundly.

On the 27th I was appointed brigade major and Colonel Cayley of the Worcestershire regiment came temporarily to command the brigade. The ambition of being a brigade major to a regular brigade on active service had become a reality, but with great sadness. I had learnt to value Frankland.

After being evacuated in July Farmar had a long period of recuperation at home, suffering he says from neurasthenia, ‘induced largely by lack of sleep and broken sleep, by lack of proper food and a kind of mild dysentery.’ For his efforts on 25 April he received the DSO. Of being a brigade major at Gallipoli he said:

‘...you can only get sleep in snatches, always to be given reports and messages as they come in and to deal with them on the spot. Constantly called to speak on the telephone by units of the brigade and division headquarters, it is intensely interesting work and I get used to jumping awake to deal with anything and have been able to sleep very quickly in the intervals.’

Once recovered, Farmar went to work for General Monash on the staff of the 3rd Australian Division. A deep personal friendship was forged between the two men and Monash stayed with the Farmars when on leave in the UK and while training on Salisbury Plain. The Division would have hard fighting ahead in the Ypres Salient, including the Battle of Messines. He was with the Division from June 1916, till September 1917 when it was decided all the British staff officers would be removed from the staff of the Australian and Canadian Divisions. A further posting followed in France and Flanders as AQMG of the 35th Division taking part in the 3rd Battle of Ypres, Passchendaele. From the 35th Division he went briefly to help set up the American Staff College at Langres before returning to the main body of the British Army as AQMG to the 9th Corps, joining them in their advance into Germany after the Armistice. He was finally sent home via the hospital at Wimereux, on 10 January 1919 suffering from exhaustion and flu.

Once recovered Farmar continued to serve and indeed returned to Turkey as part of the British staff serving under Sir Charles Harrington, the Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief during the occupation of Constantinople. His work involved organising the Gendarmerie for Asia Minor and he was part of the British delegation sent to determine whether or not atrocities had been committed by the Greeks during the war. Farmar returned to India in 1922 to serve with the 2nd Battalion, The Lancashire Fusiliers and then as AQMG Southern Command India, he retired from the Army as a full Colonel.

Sources: The information contained in this article is from the memoires and letters of Colonel Harold Mynors Farmar, CMG, DSO late Lancashire Fusiliers 1878-1961
Hawick Callants Club President, Derick Tait, lays a wreath on behalf of the Gallipoli Comrades Association at the War Memorial in Wilton Lodge Park.
[see page 3] Photograph by Alistair Learmonth

The Gallipoli Association Plot at the Field of Remembrance [see page 4]
Photograph by Clive Summerson
The Gallipoli Association Contingent at the Royal Naval Division Memorial after the Cenotaph Parade on Remembrance Sunday [see pages 4-5]

The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Most Revd. and Rt. Hon. Justin Welby visits the Gallipoli Memorial at the National Memorial Arboretum [see page 5]

Photograph courtesy of the National Memorial Arboretum.
The Anzac Landings – The 1st Australian Division plan [see pages 14-15].

The Anzac Landings – The situation at 6.30am on 25 April [see pages 15-17]
The Turkish counter-attacks on the afternoon of 25 April [see pages 18-19]

Students from Bay House School at Lancashire Landing Cemetery. They are at the grave of one of the casualties from their home town of Gosport [see page 37] Photograph by Robin Clutterbuck,
In the last edition of *The Gallipolian* we described the early stages of this project, which has been made possible by a grant from the Heritage Lottery Fund and substantial additional funding from the Association and personal benefactors. The main focus of the project is a group of regional partnerships in Britain, where museums are working with schools on the theme of Gallipoli. We have maintained and developed these partnerships, most of which will be working on Gallipoli projects later in 2015, focussing on local regiments which took part in the later stages of the campaign. Nevertheless, some of the projects are already in action, including a full series of activities with primary schools in Bury and Rochdale.

As we went to print for the Winter edition we were about to carry out a 5-day pilot trip to Gallipoli, with a group of 13-17 year olds from Bay House School in Gosport. This took place in early November and was a resounding success. A photograph of the group at Lancashire Landing Cemetery is on page 36. The school chose drama as its main subject focus and linked up with the nearby Submarine Museum to provide historical detail in preparation for the trip.

During the visit the pupils, some of whom had never travelled outside Britain before, spent time on the battlefields, looking especially at the naval context, which was helped by the fact that they stayed in Çanakkale and had to cross the Dardanelles every day. They also visited the graves of men from Gosport. During their stay they developed a contemporary drama production which they performed in a Turkish school. Back in Britain, they followed up the visit by making contact with local families with links to Gallipoli and performing their play in front of parents, staff, local councillors and Gallipoli Association members. The councillor responsible for education in Hampshire’s 532 schools was full of praise:

‘You always have to judge the outcome of projects such as this by its effect on the young people involved. There is no doubt in my mind that this involvement brought about a life changing experience that will impact their thinking, particularly about bravery and the horrors of war, for the rest of their lives. I thank the Gallipoli 100 team and the Bay House teachers who worked so hard on behalf of the students involved. They enabled them to have an experience that I have not seen bettered in all my years in education.’

We took a professional film-maker to Gallipoli with us, and you can see his film on our website: www.gallipoli100education.org.uk.
Building on the success of the trip, we applied to attend an international conference in Germany in February 2015, where two of the students were invited to speak about Gallipoli to an audience of pupils and teachers from Germany, France, Italy and Romania. We will report on this in the next edition of the journal.

We have also been developing our project website, and as we go to press are about to transfer from a draft to a final format. The purpose of the website is to offer a platform for schools to present their work on Gallipoli and for teachers to find thought-provoking issues which they can explore with their pupils. As part of the development process, we have been reviewing the main Gallipoli Association website to make sure that in the long term the two sites will work together, so that there is a young people’s section on the GA site as well as the services for members and historians. For further information on the Education project contact: Robin Clutterbuck, National Coordinator, Gallipoli Centenary Education Project. E-mail: robin@gallipoli100.co.uk

Local communities

In addition to the work carried out through the education project, we have continued to support local communities in their Gallipoli commemorative activities. A small grant has been made to support the production of the Orders of Service for the Doughty-Wylie Commemorations to be held in Theberton, Suffolk, on 26 April 2015.

In the London Borough of Southwark, a wreath will be laid on behalf of the Gallipoli Association by Cllr. Ian Wingfield, an Association member and an officer of the Southwark Council, at their local Commemorative VC Paving Stone Ceremony in April. This ceremony will mark the valour of Sgt. Frank Stubbs, one of the VC recipients at Gallipoli who was from the Walworth area in the borough.

‘Images of Gallipoli’ Photographic Competition

The photographic competition is continuing and it is now be possible to submit entries through 2015. See the Association website for more details.

Gallipoli Dawn

The sales of our specially named daffodil, ‘Gallipoli Dawn’, went well in 2014 and many of us will have enjoyed these flowers blooming at the time of year of the start of the Gallipoli campaign. The sales have generated a donation for the Gallipoli Association and will do so again in 2015. To enquire about ordering please contact Mr Ron Scamp at www.qualitydaffodils.com/ or 01326 317959.

For further information about Gallipoli 100 contact Lyn Edmonds, Executive Officer. Email: contactus@gallipoli100.co.uk
Gallipoli was a campaign fought by a multi-national expeditionary force. Within that force the role of the French has long been downplayed. Well-trained and supported by a strong artillery presence, there is a very real argument that the French were the most effective fighting unit at Gallipoli. It should be no surprise to find them involved deeply at the Dardanelles. The French had long kept a close eye on the British in the Middle East. When the temporary Russian problems in the Caucasus, coupled with the ‘vision’ of Churchill, dragged Britain into the ill-conceived Gallipoli campaign, the French were deeply concerned, French Naval Minister Victor Augagneur was sceptical of the chances of a purely naval operation forcing the Dardanelles, but his underlying attitude was crystal clear.

Not to take part in the operation would have been, in case it succeeded, to witness the appearance of the English fleet alone before Constantinople. For us French, who are deeply involved in the Orient, it would have been a very painful renunciation of our national pride and perilous for our interests.

Thus the French were present at the first naval bombardment on 3 November 1914. They remained a key component of the Allied fleet that conducted the methodical shelling of the Dardanelles forts from 19 February 1915. As operations progressed it became apparent that the Turks had managed to create a formidable, integrated defence system of mines, heavy batteries, howitzers and torpedoes to guard the Straits. Frustrated at the slow progress the Allies decided to force the Narrows. Simple in concept, the plans enacted by Vice-Admiral John de Robeck divided the Allied fleet into three lines of battleships. The most modern available Royal Navy ships were to go first in Line ‘A’. Next, the Line ‘B’ made up of the French ships (Suffren, Bouvet, Gaulois and Charlemagne) would press forwards to as close as 8,000 yards. Line ‘C’ of older British pre-dreadnoughts would act as reliefs. Unfortunately for the Allies a Turkish minelayer had laid a line of mines in the bay where observers had seen the Allied battleships manœuvring during previous bombardments.

As Line ‘A’ advanced into the Straits at 10.30 on 18 March 1915, it came under a considerable amount of Turkish fire. At 12.06, de Robeck considered that it was time to order the French forward as the fire seemed to die down. This proved an extremely dangerous undertaking when the forts burst back into life, as recalled by Rear-Admiral Émile Guépratte aboard the Suffren:

In a few minutes the flagship was hit by a large number of heavy shells, one of which caused major damage: a casemate and a turret were knocked out of action and all of their crew killed and incinerated. There was an escape of flame and burning gases into the port.
magazine and the boiler-room with fires between decks and the destruction of the port fire control station. The port magazine was flooded to save the ship from the threat of explosion. The scene was tragically macabre: the image of desolation, the flames spared nothing.

Just before 14.00, the Bouvet was hit by a shell and then ran onto a mine. She went down in under 4 minutes. Seaman Sauveur Payro had just been sent to fetch more ammunition when disaster struck:

_The boat immediately listed to starboard. I was completely covered in the coal dust from the bunkers. I went to the signal ladder and climbed up with the second mate. From the bridge I got myself onto the funnel which was entering the water. Then onto the hull. I believe that the second mate was trapped and fell into a hatchway. From the keel I threw myself into the water. I couldn’t breathe; blood was coming out of my mouth, my ears. When I was on the surface again, if I hadn’t found this piece of wood I would have been a goner._

As the Bouvet disappeared she took with her Captain Rageot de la Touche and 638 of his crew.

After the loss of a further two British pre-dreadnoughts, de Robeck threw in the towel and ordered his ships to fall back. Almost a third of his fleet had been lost or put out of action – the naval operations were effectively finished.

Now the baton was passed to General Sir Ian Hamilton and his Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Although the French were not keen to get embroiled in land operations, they were still determined to keep an eye on events. A new force was thrown together from units left in the depots in France and North Africa, the 1st Division of the Corps Expéditionnaire d’Orient (CEO), which consisted of the Métropolitaine Brigade (the French 175th Régiment & 1st Régiment de Marche d’Afrique), and the Coloniale Brigade (the 4th Régiment Mixed Coloniale & 6th Régiment Mixed Coloniale). It was a cosmopolitan mixture of various French, Senegalese, Foreign Legion and Zouave battalions. Although hastily raised the CEO was composed of tough well-trained troops, blessed with a full complement of artillery – mainly the much admired 75mm guns. In command was General Albert d’Amade.

Right at the start of the planning process for the April landings, it was decided to abandon the option of serious operations on the Asiatic side of the Straits. Nevertheless, to counter the possible impact of the Turkish Asiatic batteries firing into the ‘back’ of the British landing forces at Helles, Hamilton decided to land a French Force at Kum Kale, which would have the additional advantage as a diversion in confusing the Turks. The Turkish XV Corps was responsible for the defence of the Asiatic sector. A weak screen would try to obstruct any invaders at Kum Kale, while the main force would counter-attack at night, hidden from the naval guns.
One thing is clear: the French faced a more serious conglomeration of Turkish units than the British or ANZAC forces. Although the actual landing place was as unguarded as Anzac Cove, Y Beach, or X Beach the Turkish main lines of defence were fairly close at hand on the other side of the Mendere River. Here no less than three battalions were waiting, while only a couple of miles further inland were two whole Turkish regiments. Kum Kale was an extremely dangerous undertaking.

On 25 April, the French troopships moved forward under cover of a naval bombardment of Kum Kale. The strong Dardanelles current caused serious delays for the landing tows and it was not until 10.00 that they were able to get ashore. The Turkish screen had withdrawn so the landing was relatively unopposed. The fort and village were quickly occupied but the usual confusions meant it was late afternoon before the 6th Colonial Regiment and a battery of 75mm guns were ashore. When at 18.00 an aerial reconnaissance warned strong Turkish columns were approaching, any further advances were suspended and Kum Kale was readied for defence.

All that night the 3rd Turkish Division attacked the makeshift French line. At one point the French trenches were over-run, only for a vigorous counter-attack to hurl back the Turks. The 75mm guns and supporting fire of the fleet firing blind in front of the French lines was crucial, and the situation was stabilised. On 26 April, Hamilton ordered d’Amade to evacuate Kum Kale to bolster the stalled efforts of the 29th Division at Helles, and the French were successfully withdrawn that night. The fighting at Kum Kale is often ignored or presented as a skirmish but the French had 778 casualties and the Turks 1,730 – in addition to the loss of more than 500 prisoners.

Once ashore at Helles on 27 April, the French were assigned to the right, next to the Straits. This was a significant move which, whilst giving the French the traditional position of honour on the right of the line, also condemned them for the rest of the campaign to the very worst of the fire from the Asiatic Batteries from their flank and rear.

The First Battle of Krithia commenced at 08.00 on 28 April. On the right, the French pushed forward alongside the Straits, moving along the Kereves Spur towards the mouth of the deep Kereves Dere ravine. As the British and French advance stuttered to a halt, the Turks counter-attacked the French, as they began to fall back, the British 88th Brigade ‘conformed’ – a word that hides a multitude of sins – and some of the gains made were lost.

The real Turkish counter-attacks began when their 9th and 7th Divisions simply charged out of the cover of the night at 22.00 on 1 May. The worst attacks hit the Colonial Brigade and the Métropolitaine Brigade. Massed screaming Turks with glittering bayonets were a terrifying prospect and there is little surprise that many of the French troops bolted. The Turks pressed forwards, some even reaching as far as Morto Bay before they were stopped. This was not the often cited case of ‘colonial’ troops
failing to keep up to the mark but it was a vicious well-executed attack on exhausted troops who had had insufficient time to dig in properly. In the dark there was little that the Royal Navy could do to support the French, but once it was daylight they caused devastation amongst Turkish troops caught in the open. Taking heart, the French counter-attacked vigorously and regained the ground they had lost.

The night of 3 May brought another vicious attack. Second Lieutenant Raymond Weil was at the gun positions of the 39th Régiment d’Artillerie in orchards on the outskirts of Helles...
of the Sedd el Bahr village.

_In the pitch-dark we immediately let go a furious barrage; the fusillade carried on – a dreadful uninterrupted racket. We fired without a break all out! I had to yell in the middle of the din to make myself heard. All the neighbouring batteries were firing without respite. The Turkish batteries replied. The Asiatic coast, behind us, sprayed us copiously with shells. We were perpetually dazzled by the flashes so we couldn't see and we were deafened. Up to 1am it was veritable furnace; the gunfire never stopped for a second._

In the end the Turkish attacks failed as comprehensively as the previous Allied attempts. The narrow front at Helles restricted the possibility for manoeuvre and raw courage meant little in the face of modern weapons. Indeed the French 1st Division had already suffered severe casualties and the 2nd Division of the CEO, (General Maurice Bailloud), arrived to act as much-needed reinforcements on 6 May. This consisted of the 2nd Métropolitaine Brigade (176th Régiment and 2nd Régiment de Marche d’Afrique) and the Colonial Brigade (7th Régiment Mixed Coloniale & 8th Régiment Mixed Coloniale.

The plans prepared for the Second Battle of Krithia on 6 May, envisioned a general advance with the French charged with advancing between the sea and Achi Baba Nullah to seize Kereves Dere, then acting as the solid pivot as British units wheeled round before attacking Achi Baba. Lieutenant Henri Feuille had a close view of the French attack whilst observing for the 155mm heavy guns of the 52nd Battery, 30th Artillery Regiment:
They advanced as on exercise, no gaps in the ranks, punctuated by flashed of bayonets and blue glint of the rifles reflecting the rays of the mid-day sun. You would think they were on a training ground. But what is there to say? This wall of steel stops, hurls itself at an obstacle that it can’t breach, hesitates, immobile for an instant. Then, all the geometric lines fall apart. Groups running right, left, thrown into confusion. All the while Turkish machine guns, rattling away, tearing at the air, ceaselessly firing into a wall of palpitating flesh.

All along the line the advance staggered to a halt. With the exception of trivial French gains, the attack was an utter failure. Hamilton responded by ordering repeat performances on 7 and 8 May, resulting in more failure, no advance of any importance and swathes of casualties. In truth, the Allied commanders had little choice as they could either attack again or accept defeat. When General Albert D’Amade was recalled to France his replacement General Henri Gourard was equally keen to make progress. Every day that passed would allow the Turks to improve their defences and move up more reserves. The situation could only get worse. The one saving grace for the Allies was the Turks’ desperate shortage of shells. As the British batteries were equally short of munitions; only the French artillery was properly equipped for modern warfare.

By now it should have been obvious that the French were entering a death trap, as they drew ever closer to the precipitous cliffs of the Kereves Dere and the series of strongpoints such as the Haricot and Quadrilateral, which barred their way along the Kereves Spur. Behind them, shooting into their base at V Beach, harassing their headquarters and communications and taking their lines in enfilade were the Turkish
Asiatic batteries. The Turkish fire had been considered too much for the 29th Division to risk for just a couple of days – the French had to endure it throughout the campaign.

Hamilton and Lieutenant General Sir Aylmer Sir Hunter-Weston, commanding VIII Corps, had convinced themselves that a successful general assault could still be made at Helles and launched the Third Battle of Krithia on 4 June. The French 1st and 2nd Divisions would assault the Haricot Redoubt on Kereves Spur; on their left was the RND attacking between Kereves Spur and Achi Baba Nullah; the 42nd Division would advance between Achi Baba Nullah and Krithia Nullah along Krithia Spur; while the 29th Division pushed forward between Krithia Nullah and the sea. Facing the Allies were the 9th and 12th Turkish Divisions, with most of 7th Division in reserve.

The bombardment opened at 08.00, concentrating on the main Turkish redoubts, before it became a general barrage of the whole Turkish lines at 11.05. On the right of the line the French artillery pounded the Haricot Redoubt and the Turkish trenches that still barred their progress. But the Turks retaliated with their own artillery. As the French lurched over the top, the dreaded rattle of the machine guns and massed small arms tore them apart.

The French assault was a disaster. It was not their fault: fired at from almost every angle, against dug-in Turks, covered on one flank by the chasm of Kereves Dere. As the French attack broke down the RND began to experience enfilading fire from their right flank as the Turks counter-attacked. Even the 42nd Division gains in the centre were threatened. The battle lay in the balance: Hunter-Weston and Gouraud had a choice as to whether they should use their last reserves to support the success in the centre, or order a renewed attack on the flanks. They chose to try again where they had failed, but the French were simply unable to mount another attack in the dreadful circumstances that prevailed in front of the Haricot.

The battle ground to a halt; not with the Allies astride Achi Baba and poised for an untroubled advance on Kilid Bahr, but clinging on to meagre gains, with no possible hope of a successful advance. The British had suffered 4,500 casualties and the French 2,000; would a Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Battle of Krithia offer anything but more deaths? A French staff officer, Captain François Charles-Roux, realised the gravity of their situation:

Theoretically our situation is untenable. I’d say that if we were on peacetime manoeuvres the exercise umpires would have adjudicated that we were all dead. That is the logical consequence of our troops living under the cross fire of Turkish batteries firing from Achi Baba to our front and the Asiatic coast to our rear.

More prosaic was Private Jean Leymonnerie of the 1/175th Infantry Regiment:

We were afraid of being attacked, but, believe me, we were even more afraid of attacking
ourselves. In scarcely three months my regiment has lost 1,700 men. And isn’t over yet.

Hunter-Weston and Gouraud came up with an alternative to the discredited idea of a general advance. It was decided to concentrate all possible artillery resources to support localised attacks with the aim of biting off small chunks of the Turkish line and then using a wall of shells to assist the infantry in holding off the Turkish counter-attacks. The French were given the honour of trying out the new tactics.

On 21 June they would launch a concentrated attack hammering into the Turkish lines between the Ravin de la Mort offshoot of Kereves Dere, and the Haricot and Quadrilateral Redoubts that dominated the upper reaches of the Kereves Spur. The artillery support was crucial and they deployed seven batteries of French 75mm guns, two batteries of 155mm howitzers, trench mortars and seven British howitzers to shatter the Turkish defences. At the same time six more batteries of 75mm guns were assigned to fire into the rest of the Turkish lines facing the French to keep them busy, while other French long-range batteries and ships would be trying their best to suppress any interference from the Asiatic batteries. It worked out at a gun or howitzer for every 10 yards of front to be assaulted.

The final bombardment opened at 05.15 and lasted for just 45 minutes. At 06.00 the 176th Regiment lunged for the redoubts, while to their right the 6th Colonial Regiment tried to clear the Ravin de la Mort. The French had plentiful ammunition and during the attack would expend over 30,000 shells crashing down on the narrow front. The attack went well and the dreaded Haricot was swiftly over-run, along with the Turkish second line, although the Quadrilateral remained inviolable. Corporal Charles Thierry of 176th Regiment was sent forward:

\[\text{Only 25 metres across the open. At last I am in the first Turkish trench at the side of a wounded captain. We are subjected to a short bombardment. Surrounded by corpses we occupy the trench. At every moment reinforcements are called for but none come; ammunition is also demanded but nothing comes. The heavy shells from the Asian side rained down: Brumel is hit, Henriot as well. At about 6pm an intense and well-directed bombardment from their lines warns us of a counter-attack. But we enfilade them and they retreat swiftly. It is a veritable manhunt with our bullets. We throw our kepis in the air with shouts of joy.}\]

This time, aided by their massed artillery, the French threw back the Turkish counter-attacks and the Haricot was finally captured. But the slaughter was intense as witnessed by Private Jean Lemonnerie:

\[\text{The dead formed the parapets of the trench. At each turn there were smells that became more and more fetid, carried to us on the gentle breeze. Down the wall of the trench ran a reddish liquid where the maggots swam. If you looked a little harder you realised that it had been a leg, an arm, a thigh, rotting away covered in green flies, which}\]
indiscriminately land on the dead flesh and then you. The more we went forward the worse
the stench became unbearable and the more the bullets whistled past.

All told, casualties were heavy at over 2,500 killed and wounded, but the Turks had lost
nearly 6,000 casualties. Yet the Quadrilateral still remained to bar the French path.

On 28 June, the British made a successful attack on the left at Helles using the same
tactics – with French artillery assistance. The lesson was clear: the Allies needed to
focus their attacks, but above all they needed more artillery, more howitzers, and more
high explosive shells. This was further confirmed when the French managed to capture
the infamous Quadrilateral on 30 June. One French problem had been removed but the
harassing fire from across the Straits was still a grievous thorn in their side. Even at this
moment of triumph, Gourard was wounded by a shell crashing down from the Turkish
Asiatic batteries; he was evacuated, but would lose an arm. His replacement would be
General Maurice Bailloud.

The French participated in the attacks launched by the 52nd Division in the centre of
Helles on 12–13 July. They made some minor progress but were then caught up in a
battle to hold their gains against the usual Turkish counter-attacks. Although the
French only lost 840 casualties in contrast to 3,100 British casualties, this concealed a
greater predicament. The French had driven themselves right into the ground and had
little more left to give. In effect their battles were over and they would do little more
than hold the line for the rest of the campaign. The Asiatic fire, the determination of
the Turkish resistance, added to the unfavourable terrain of the mordant chasm and the
tortured ground around Kereves Dere had finally defeated them. They had fought hard, backed to the hilt by their splendid artillery, but they could give no more.

The darkening scene was augmented by the wavering of the French Government who refused reinforcements for Gallipoli. At the same time the French were moving towards supporting the Serbians against the threat of the Bulgarians who had mobilised in September 1915. So the Salonika campaign was born and the French 2nd Division of the CEO was despatched to help form a new Allied expeditionary force. This was the beginning of the end for the French involvement in Gallipoli. Over the next 3 months, the 1st Division was gradually withdrawn and soon there was nothing left but some old heavy French guns which were left behind during the final evacuation in January 1916 – and are still there today.

In contrast to the Australians, New Zealanders and British, the French have always rather ignored the doomed campaign for the Dardanelles. This may seem perverse, as for the most part their troops fought both bravely and with considerable skill against terrible odds. They were backed by their magnificent artillery which not only had to deal with the Turks in front of them, but had to support the British attacks. All this, while engaging and suppressing as best they could the batteries firing into their flank from the Asiatic coast just across the Dardanelles. Yet, to the French, Gallipoli was always a British campaign. Their more pressing concerns were rather closer to home and, while their losses at Gallipoli were painful, they were as nothing compared to the horrendous casualties suffered on the Western Front. Perhaps one day French historians will re-evaluate their role at Gallipoli; one can only hope so.

Editor’s Note: Peter Hart is the Oral Historian at the Imperial War Museums and author of a number of books about the First World War including Gallipoli and Defeat at Gallipoli (the latter co-authored with Nigel Steel). He also operates Peter Hart’s Battlefield Tours.

INDIANS ON GALLIPOLI, 1915

Peter Stanley

Looking at photographs taken on Gallipoli, Indians become visible: just as they are largely invisible in the published record of the campaign. British, Australian and New Zealand men and officers brought many cameras to Gallipoli, in defiance of orders. Their record, held in official collections and in hundreds of private photographic albums, shows that as well as photographing their countrymen in trenches and dugouts, and recording graves, ships offshore and the peninsula’s landmarks, they also took many photographs showing Indian troops. My research has disclosed that over 16,000 Indian troops – about three times the number hitherto thought – served on Gallipoli. They belonged to a force which had become legendary to the people of Britain and the white dominions (through, say, cigarette cards, novels, water-colours and the verse of Rudyard
Kipling) invisible except through the participation in great occasions by contingents from the Indian Army (at jubilees, coronations and ceremonies such as the celebration of Australian federation in 1901). On Gallipoli, men who had heard of but never met Sikhs and Gurkhas at last encountered them, and many recorded that fact, with their cameras and in their letters and diaries.

The British Empire force assembled for the Gallipoli campaign demonstrated the might of the empire. It comprised British troops (the largest component, though the fact is largely not known in Australia), troops from the dominions of Australia and New Zealand. Men from British possessions contributed – labourers from Egypt, a Zion Mule Corps, and later in the campaign a battalion from Newfoundland. From the very outset the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was to include troops from the Indian Army, though in a much smaller proportion than the Indian Army’s size would suggest. In 1914 the Indian Army (a force of about 200,000 men) provided a vast reservoir of trained military manpower, one immediately used by Britain as it entered the Great War, though largely not on Gallipoli. In the war’s earliest weeks, from August 1914, the Indian Army was mobilised for service, and within months the first Indian troops saw service against imperial Germany in East Africa, but also on the Western Front in France and Belgium.

‘Sepoys of the 14th Sikhs shortly after landing at Anzac Cove on 7 August 1915’[1]  
[Reproduced courtesy of the Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, 077922]

Before the war’s end over a million Indians had volunteered to serve the King Emperor, and over 60,000 had died fighting in Europe, the Middle East, Mesopotamia, Africa and on Gallipoli. The first books about the Indian contribution to the Western Front
appeared during the war, while the disasters of the Mesopotamian campaign (fought in present-day Iraq, which became India’s major responsibility) became notorious at the time. But the Indian involvement in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 remains almost unknown. Only a handful of articles have appeared about it, and the scale of India’s contribution, and its significance, has remained a subject known only to a few specialists, such as Squadron Leader Rana Chhina, the author of one of those articles and the instigator of a recent historical conference in New Delhi, the first event marking the centenary of India’s part in the Great War. Indeed, it is only in this, the centenary year that the first book devoted to the experience and impact of India’s part in the Gallipoli campaign will be published.[2].

Indian troops, a large force of which had been sent to Egypt to help to defend the Suez Canal, were a part of the invasion force from the start. With the exception of a division of British regulars (largely created from units withdrawn from the garrison of India in 1914) Indian troops were the only professional soldiers available. The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force’s commander, Sir Ian Hamilton specifically asked for Indian troops. He had served in India and wanted a brigade of Gurkhas, because he recognised that the terrain of the Gallipoli peninsula resembled that of the North-West Frontier, where the Gurkhas trained and served.

In the end, the Indian force allocated to Hamilton’s force comprised a brigade of mountain artillery (used to support the Anzacs), a brigade of infantry (eventually comprising five-and-a-half battalions), and a large Supply and Transport organisation, which was perhaps India’s most important contribution.
The Indian force reflected the composition of the Indian Army at the time, largely drawn from what were regarded the ‘martial’ peoples of India – Sikhs and Muslims (‘Musalmans’, as the army quaintly termed them) from the Punjab and especially the Gurkhas, mercenaries from Nepal. The force’s composition reflected both Ian Hamilton’s desire to have troops experienced in mountain warfare, but also the religious politics of the war. The brigade originally sent to Gallipoli (arriving on 1 May) included two battalions of Punjabis, half of whom were ‘Musalmans’. Fears that Muslim troops would be reluctant to fight their Ottoman co-religionists led to the withdrawal of the two Punjabi battalions and their replacement by two more Gurkha battalions, meaning that the ‘Indian’ infantry force comprised a Sikh battalion (the 14th Sikhs) and three Gurkha battalions. It seems plausible that Hamilton exploited the fear of the Punjabis’ reliability to obtain the Gurkhas he had wanted from the start. By June, the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade comprised the 14th Sikhs and battalions of the 5th, 6th and 10th Gurkhas.

The mountain artillery brigade’s two batteries (composed of Sikhs and Punjabi Musalmans) landed with the Anzacs on 25 April 1915, and served alongside them for the entire campaign. The Indian gunners’ helped to hold the Anzac lines against Turkish assaults. One of their British officers recorded that the Australians admitted that ‘they could never have stopped in Quinn’s Post – one of the most precarious positions at Anzac – if it had not been for them’.

Though British and Anzac troops and the Indians had little shared language, Hindi and Urdu speakers were found among Australians who had lived in India (or worked with Indian indentured labourers in Fiji), and Indian troops learned English as they lived with and fought alongside British and Anzac troops. Soon men of the various forces were sharing meals and conversations – and trenches in which death and wounds came to them equally. What one of their (British) officers called ‘an entente most remarkable’ grew between the two forces. Men from a profoundly racist society (one which had enacted a ‘White Australia’ policy) came to respect and admire their Indian comrades.

Sergeant Fred Aspinall, an Australian signaller, recorded how he made friends with Subedar–Major Paktar Singh of the mountain artillery. The two chatted at Aspinall’s signal post and Aspinall established that Paktar Singh hailed from Ludhiana. The subedar wrote his name in Aspinall’s notebook; apparently the only handwriting by an Indian soldier on Gallipoli that has survived. Gunner Frank Cooper, a New Zealander, recalled the Indian gunners especially as ‘the finest type of coloured men’ – a patronising judgment but sincerely intended.

Meanwhile, in the British sector of the Gallipoli peninsula, Cape Helles, the Indian infantry provided a skilful, professional force, which for two months held the vital coastal sector of the British line. The Indian infantry brigade made an impression soon after arriving. In mid–May the 1/6th Gurkhas attacked and seized a strong Ottoman position on a coastal headland soon named ‘Gurkha Bluff’ in their honour. The
Gurkhas took the hill using exactly the tactics they had learned on the ridges of India’s North-West frontier, though hardly a man of the battalion had seen action previously.

The Indians’ value was also seen in the way they took part in a series of major, though ultimately unsuccessful attacks as Ian Hamilton’s force attempted to break out of the beach-head. In the attack at Gully Ravine on 4 June the 14th Sikhs lost heavily as its men repeatedly tried to force their way through strongly held Turkish trenches.

The Sikhs attacked in two waves, separated by fifteen minutes, most along the bed of the ravine, between the Gurkhas on the left and British troops to the right. The British novelist-turned-staff-officer, Compton Mackenzie, listening to the reports as they came into Hunter-Weston’s headquarters, described what he imagined as the messages arrived: ‘The Sikhs … came into the full cross-fire of rifles and machine-guns as they moved over the exposed slope… the day went badly for the Sikhs’.

The Sikhs’ losses were staggering. Of those who took part (15 British officers – including Captain Herajee Cursetjee, the battalion’s Parsi medical officer, 13 Indian officers and 450 sepoys), no fewer than twelve officers, eleven Indian and 371 sepoys were killed or wounded. The battalion suffered losses of 80 per cent, most within a few hours. (With Cursetjee wounded and evacuated, the battalion’s sub-assistant surgeon, Jemadar Bhagwan Singh took over until a new medical officer arrived, for which he was awarded the Indian Order of Merit.)

The debacle had several effects. The losses of 4 June crippled the 14th Sikhs for months. Heavy casualties among its British and Indian officers and Sikh ‘other ranks’ led to Hamilton seeking to use the Sikh Patiala Infantry, one of the units of the Indian princely states serving in Egypt. In July and September half of the Patiala Infantry’s companies reinforced the 14th Sikhs. Though British officials assured the Maharaja of Patiala that his regiment would be recognised, in fact the Patialas became part of the 14th Sikhs and their contribution remained largely overlooked. The other effect was to stimulate Sikh recruiting, which previously had lagged under the influence of nationalist activists.

After a brief rest on the nearby island of Imbros (within earshot of the sound of gunfire on the peninsula) the 29th Indian Brigade returned to the battle, from early August in the Anzac sector. There it formed part of the spearhead of what became known as the August offensive, the invaders’ final chance to break through the Ottoman defences and resume the advance on Constantinople. The offensive involved diversionary attacks at Helles and Anzac, a complex plan involving advances over the rugged Chunuk Bair range north of Anzac and a large British landing at Suvla Bay, to the north. (The Suvla landing was intended to create a base for further operations: the advance on the range was the core of the plan). The 29th Indian Brigade, reinforced and rested, was one of three attacking brigades. The other two were the 4th Australian and the New Zealand brigades, whose men were exhausted from four months on the peninsula and seriously
weakened by diarrhoea. The Indian mountain artillery supported the attack, the climax of the campaign.

On the night of 6-7 August, while Australian troops launched diversionary attacks on the Turks at Anzac, the three attacking columns marched north from Anzac, along the beach and coastal plan, before turning right and climbing the tangle of gullies and ridges leading to the range. While Ottoman resistance was light (they had few defenders on the ridge), the columns became lost in the rough country and by daybreak were far from its crest. Over the next two days Indian infantry (the 14th Sikhs and three Gurkha battalions) and the Australians and New Zealanders made unavailing attempts to gain the summit. Meanwhile the Turks, realising that the ridge needed to be held, sent reserves toward it. The New Zealanders lost heavily in attempting to seize the heights, while after heroic efforts a small party under major Cecil Allanson of the 1/6th Gurkhas, supported by British New Army troops, approached the summit. Again, the Gurkhas’ mountain warfare skills enabled them to attempt an assault that, had it been better planned and supported, might have brought success, if not victory. (The astonishing fact of the assault on the summit of the Sari Bair range is actually not that Gurkhas managed it; it is that men from Staffordshire and Lancashire, in their first action, accompanied them).

‘Men of the 2–10th Gurkhas on the slopes of Sari Bair during the August offensive.’ A rare photograph of Gurkhas in battle. [Reproduced courtesy of the Gurkha Museum, Pokhara]

At dawn on 9 August Allanson’s men – hillmen from Nepal and men from the industrial counties of England – reached the crest, for a few minutes. Then, artillery shells began
to fall among Allanson’s party and they were driven off, as the Turks rallied and counter-attacked. They had briefly been able to look down on the Narrows in the distance, the goal of the entire campaign. The shell-fire, long thought to have come from British warships, was actually from Anzac artillery firing on pre-arranged bombardment in ignorance of the attack. The rest of the offensive died down amid allegations of sluggish command and lost opportunities. It was the last chance for the invaders’ victory, and the Indian Army was central to it.

For the rest of the campaign the Indian infantry, growing to five-and-a-half battalions by the arrival from the Western Front of the 1/4th Gurkhas, held the trenches around Demakjelik Bair, lines overlooked by the Ottoman troops. In August they and a mixed bag of empire troops (Australians, New Zealanders, Connaught Rangers and South Wales Borderers) became embroiled in savage fighting for an inconsiderable hillock called Hill 60, in which hundreds of empire and Ottoman soldiers died for no real purpose. As autumn and then winter set in, Indian troops endured bitter cold, and in early December hundreds of men were evacuated with frost-bite, causing men to lose fingers and toes.

Throughout the campaign the mule and cart trains of the Indian Supply and Transport Corps transported supplies, overwhelmingly to non-Indian units, the length of the invaders’ lines. They risked artillery fire and snipers (because the Ottoman observers could generally see their lines) and suffered hundreds of casualties. Their dedication attracted widespread admiration from British and Dominion troops, often the first time that mainly wartime volunteer soldiers from Britain, Australia and New Zealand had seen or spoken to Indian troops. After several months on Gallipoli many Indian soldiers had learned to speak English, and they were able to converse with men they would never have otherwise met but for the war.

To take one example: a surveyor from Tasmania, Archie Barwick encountered ‘a good many Sikhs’, describing them as ‘fine big men’ and noting that they dressed their uncut hair in turbans. He was ‘on good terms with them and often paid their camp a visit’, and must even have offered them something – cigarettes or food, perhaps – because he wrote that they ‘will take nothing from you as it is against their religion’. But the Sikhs offered food to Barwick, and he accepted. ‘Many’s the taste of their curry, jam and chupputties I have had’. Thinking of their ‘White Australia’ policy, the Indians’ British officers feared that Australians would treat Indians badly. Why did the Anzacs not treat Indians on Gallipoli as they would have in Australia? One officer wrote simply that ‘I put it down to the fact that “Johnny” [a common nickname for Indians] was as brave as the Anzacs themselves’.

What did Indians think of the Australians they met? Almost nothing is known from their own mouths, though when in the 1970s Indian Great War veterans were asked about how they got on with white soldiers ‘the most enthusiastic comments were about the Australians who apparently treated them heartily and with a spirit of equal
comradeship’. Because most Indians were illiterate and their few letters have not survived (unlike letters from France they were not censored, which is how we know more about Indian troops in Europe) we know very little how Indian soldiers reacted to the war they fought on Gallipoli.

By this time the British government had decided that the entire campaign was lost and in November issued orders for the evacuation of the peninsula. This was expected to cost huge casualties – how were the troops to withdraw without attracting Ottoman retaliation. By clever ruses, the invaders were able to deceive the Turks (though there is some doubt whether they realised that the evacuation was occurring and allowed them to go.) Indian muleteers, some from south India, misheard the destination of their evacuation – the island of Mudros – as Madras. When an officer queried their ‘pathetic’ wish to return to India, one replied ‘Does a man want to go to heaven?’ The Indian units – infantry, transport and mountain artillery – were among the last to be withdrawn, on the night of 19–20 December 1915. The British evacuated Cape Helles a month later. The campaign had failed to gain any of its objectives.

The Gallipoli campaign had cost about 85,000 Turkish and 57,000 British and French empire dead, including about 1,600 Indians. The Indian dead, mostly Sikhs and Gurkhas were cremated, while Mohammedan soldiers (including many of the Supply and Transport men and the mountain artillery) were buried, though few of their graves were marked or survived. The names of all of the campaign’s Indian dead, however, were inscribed on panels on the great memorial to the missing at Cape Helles, and on memorials in Egypt and Malta.

Though a relatively small part of the invading British force, the Indian Army’s contribution to the campaign was more influential than its numbers might suggest. The mountain artillery helped to hold Anzac, while the Sikh and Gurkha infantry’s attacks at Cape Helles and on Chunuk Bair demonstrated the value of involving a force of regular, trained soldiers. The supply troops’ services, which contributed to maintaining the force on the peninsula, was arguably the most significant. Perhaps the greatest contribution, however, was that the campaign brought together men from all over the British empire, who for the first time met, talked with and grew to understand each other. The ‘entente most remarkable’ that grew between Anzacs and Indians arguably presaged the situation today, when Indians are Australia’s fastest growing migrant group and when Britain has large South Asian migrant communities. In both Britain and Australia Sikh communities especially are increasingly interested in their forebears’ contribution to the Gallipoli campaign.

Britons, New Zealanders, Australians and Indians can look back on a century of shared endeavour and a relationship that has grown – not always easily or steadily – but which can find in the shared ordeal of Gallipoli a common history.
Notes:

1. This photograph was taken just before the unit left to join the rest of the regiment in the foothills of the Sari Bair range. Note the captured Turks in the cage behind them – men probably captured in the Australian assault on Lone Pine and the advance north of Anzac.

2. *Die in Battle, Do not Despair: the Indians on Gallipoli, 1915* by Peter Stanley will be published by Helion Books, UK in mid-2015, and is expected to be widely available in India. An associated website funded by the Australian Department of Defence will allow Indians and others to read about the Indian contribution to the campaign and perhaps stimulate further research in India into one of the Indian Army’s hardest and perhaps most futile military ventures under British command.

**Editor’s Note:** Professor Peter Stanley of the University of New South Wales, Canberra, has published 26 books and is one of Australia’s most productive military historians.

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**CAPTAIN ERIC BUSH DSO**, **DSC 1899-1985**

**David Saunders**

Eric Bush, a founder member and a Vice President of the Gallipoli Association, his membership number being 14, regularly attended Association commemorations and events. In retirement he lived in Tunbridge Wells where he died in 1985 being afforded a brief nine line obituary in *The Gallipolian* (No. 48 page 5). It seems appropriate, in this centenary year, to place fully on record the career of this distinguished Gallipoli veteran.

As a fifteen year old midshipman serving on the cruiser HMS *Bacchante* Eric Bush had commanded a picket boat towing ships’ boats ashore during the first wave of landings at Anzac on the morning of 25 April 1915. He was born on 12 August 1899 at Simla, the youngest child of the Revd. Herbert Wheler Bush, chaplain to the forces, and his wife, Edith Cornelia, daughter of Dr George Cardew, Inspector-General of the Indian Medical Service. In 1908 Mrs Bush returned to England with her two sons, Eric Bush being educated at Stoke House, Stoke Poges, while her husband followed in 1912 to become vicar of Bathford.

In his autobiography *Bless our Ship* Bush remembers how the family always visited Southsea at Easter, and how he was fascinated by the ships, even recalling seeing the *Titanic* depart from Spithead on 10 April 1912. That same year he was interviewed for a place in the Royal Navy, later recalling how he failed to find either Madagascar or Tasmania on the map and to cap it all tripped over an electric light lead on the way out.
‘Later, when I told my parents about it and also how I was stumped by the geography questions, gloom descended over the Vicarage.’ However, all was well and on 10 May 1912 he entered the Royal Navy.

So to the Royal Naval College at Osborne House on the Isle of Wight where one of the few lighter sides was dancing on Saturday nights, but no girls were allowed, Bush recalling that as he was small, it was always his lot to be a ‘lady.’ From Osborne to Dartmouth in the summer of 1914, but for one term only as on 1 August 1914 the order was received for the fleet to mobilise, the cadets dispersed throughout the fleet, so many not to survive the war. Bush joined Bacchante, flagship of the 7th cruiser squadron commanded by the Honourable Algeneron Boyle MVO, RN who he described as ‘strict but kindly and made every allowance for our youth and ignorance’. On 28 August he experienced his first naval action, as a sight-setter on one of the 6-inch guns at what became known as the Battle of the Heligoland Bight, though Bacchante was at some distance from the firing during which the Germans lost the four cruisers. They did however take both wounded and prisoners on board and Bush later recalled how, on returning to Sheerness, he and other cadets were on deck at an unusually early hour:

“A few of the wounded who had died in the night were placed behind a screen on the upper deck, so we had a peep at them. I had never seen a dead man before. Later on we had a look at some of the amputated limbs hidden behind a cushion in the Captain’s cabin. This was quite an experience for a boy of just fifteen.”

More months were spent on English Channel and North Sea patrols before Bacchante was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean, and on 25 April 1915 the landings at Anzac. Bush was in command of a picket boat with a crew of seven, which was to tow the ship’s launch, the first cutter and a borrowed ship’s lifeboat to the beaches. Together these held some 150 soldiers, as he described it ‘not a bad command for a Midshipman.’ These were collected from the battleship Prince of Wales and at 0430 landed as part of the first wave. Able Seaman Hodgson whose station was the stern of the picket boat was hit and subsequently died, later the picket boat was hit by a 15-pounder shell but none of the crew was injured. All day long Bush was ferrying troops ashore and bringing the wounded back to the ships, the work continued through the night and all the following day; indeed it was midnight on the 26th before he was back on board Bacchante. He writes:

‘I am lucky. Lieutenant Tom Phillips [later Admiral Sir Thomas Spencer Vaughan Phillips GBE, KCB, DSO nicknamed ‘Tom Thumb’, due to his short stature, lost on HMS Prince of Wales 10 December 1941] has lent me his cabin. It is on the upper deck just by the Quartermaster’s lobby. As I go to it, I notice the time; it is midnight. We have been on our legs for seventy-two hours. No wonder we feel weary. My gear has been put out for me and some hot water, too, but I’m too tired to wash, so tip the water away and close the basin.
I cannot sleep for the moment. My mind is too full of thoughts. Visions come back to me of Anzacs cheering and charging up the beach. I see wounded coming out of the water and crawling to safety. I hear the noise of rifle and machine-gun fire and the occasional crump of heavier shell. I see bronzed faces of soldiers all around me.

I wake up to find that it is still quite dark, and it takes me a minute or two to remember where I am. I hear voices, so get down off my bunk and go over to the cabin door to investigate. I await my opportunity and then sing out ‘Quartermaster, what’s the time please?’ The talking stops, and a sailor appears, smiling. ‘It’s close on midnight, Mr Bush,’ he says.

Is it my appearance, I wonder, which amuses him? I must look a sight. No, of course it isn’t, I see what’s happened. I’ve slept the clock round.’

The Bacchante remained off the Anzac beaches for almost a month, Bush spending most of his time running the picket boat to and from the beaches. On one occasion he was invited to dine with General Birdwood:

‘To prepare for this great event, I scrounged some freshwater and tried to get my hands clean and improved my shirt by rinsing with sea water. It was natural that I should expect a party, but when I reached his dug-out I discovered I was his only guest. Commander-in-Chief and Midshipman sitting on upturned boxes sharing a meal. What a man he was! No wonder he is remembered as the ‘Soul of Anzac.’

Bush’s tasks at Anzac were many. Taking casualties from the beaches to the hospital ships. Burying Indian dead at sea, ‘we would all lean over to watch it twist and turn until it reached the bottom. The water was very clear.’ Another task was to tow dead mules and horses out to sea:

‘If we could puncture them with a bayonet tied to the end of a broom handle, they would sink quickly. But sometimes this didn’t work and we would churn them up with our propellers going full speed astern. If that was no use, we’d tow them further out and then slip them, hoping they would eventually drift into the Turkish lines.’

During the landings at Suvla in August Bush again commanded a picket boat later recalling how different it was to Anzac, no opposition and not a single casualty. Subsequently Bacchante sailed for Malta and was not present during the evacuations from the Peninsula. He was awarded the DSC for his service during the Anzac landings and the first of four mentions in dispatches.

In March 1916, Bush joined the new battleship Revenge and was on board at the Battle of Jutland on 31 May/1 June 1916, his action station being in the spotting top. From here he witnessed the last moments of the cruiser Defence commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot a stern disciplinarian, physical fitness enthusiast and one of the great characters of the Royal Navy:
We could see the shells explode as they struck her mercilessly. There was a brief pause, and then the whole ship went up in one tremendous explosion. Great clouds of brown smoke soared and billowed hundreds of feet into the air. We saw her foremost fall clear, and then followed some dark object, a boat perhaps, which somersaulted to a great height. When the smoke cleared, the ship was gone.

All 903 of the crew of the Defence were lost. Later they passed the wreck of Invincible, just six survivors from a crew of 1026, her captain, not one of them, was Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood who had been Bush’s Captain at Osborne. Later he saw a torpedo strike the battleship Marlborough which ‘carried on as if nothing had happened.’ About 1900 the thrill of seeing the German squadron of nine battleships emerged from the haze and years later recalling the reports of the Spotting Officer to Gun Control during the subsequent action ‘Hit, hit, hit’ followed by the order to fire ‘Rapid salvoes.’ Later the excitement at seeing a Zeppelin at which they fired, though without success with their 15-inch guns, the shells coming ‘down somewhere over the horizon uncomfortably near the Fifth Battle Squadron.’ They passed through the wreckage, both British and German of the previous day’s action, before heading for Scapa Flow.

Then long months with Revenge based either at Scapa Flow or at Invergordon, spare time, such as it was, was spent walking, though they had to keep the ship in sight at all times. During these walks they often called at a crofter’s cottage for a cup of tea.

‘One day two of us were on the look-out for a new spot and found what we wanted. It looked all right, so we went up to the front door and knocked. No reply, so we knocked again. Still no reply. Just as we were leaving, an upstairs window opened and an ugly old women stuck her head out and said, “The whore’s away in a drifter.” I wish I could reproduce her accent.’

There was one final encounter with the German High Sea Fleet, on 16 November 1917 when:

‘As usual in the spotting top of Revenge we got all worked up to a high pitch of excitement. Our Commander, Neill O’Neill, had seemed particularly hopeful that morning, too, as he ordered everyone in the ship to put on clean underclothes, in case they were wounded, but even that precaution did not do the trick.’

For Revenge did not see action that day, though later excitement, danger of another kind, an encounter with a fierce Atlantic storm during which some 300 tons of water flooded some of the forward compartments including the tobacco store, debris from which choked the pumps. Now with in his own words ‘the exalted rank of Acting Sub-Lieutenant’ he was in charge of the Transmitting Station and a crew of Marine Bandsmen. One final action, this in July 1918 escorting the Furious as she flew off her aircraft to bomb the Zeppelin sheds at Tondern.
The war over and following his first Christmas at home in five years off to Cambridge University for two terms. An Admiralty brain-wave to send those whose education had been interrupted in 1914 back to school, some 370 in all. In praise of this, Kipling wrote:

Hallowed River, most gracious Trees, Chapel beyond compare,
Here be gentlemen tired of the seas – take them into your care.
Far have they come, much have they braved. Give them their hour of play,
While the hidden things their hands have saved work for them day by day.
Till the grateful Past their youth redeems return them their youth once more,
And the Soul of the Child at last lets fall the unjust load it bore.

Bush later recalled that he was very glad to have been to Cambridge,

‘It was a privilege to be there, and in spite of what I have said about our wildness, I think it civilised us a bit and in some queer way made us normal again. After all, we were very young when we went to sea and had manhood thrust on us, as it were, not only prematurely, but violently. Of a great many things that boys and young men learn automatically we knew nothing. In fact, it would not be untrue to say we knew extremely little about life ashore, about how boys of our own age thought and lived and the general run of things outside the Service and the sea. All sailors have a rather different outlook from that of landsmen, and in our circumstances had accentuated it. We must have been queer creatures. But Cambridge took us in her stride, and taught us a lot.’

On his last night he and Sub-Lieutenant Stephen Richardson climbed on to the roof of Trinity College and managed the no mean feat of securing a large White Ensign on the lightening conductor above the lantern. One of the two who were subsequently prevailed upon to climb the roof and remove the White Ensign was R H Fowler a mathematical physicist who had been in the R.N.V.R and wounded at Gallipoli.

Leaving Cambridge, Bush commenced his inter-war career with service first in the Baltic on the destroyer Spenser. An experience marred by the loss of the drifter Catspaw with the loss of all hands, her commander Geoffrey Williams was a chum from the Cambridge days whose sword became one of Bush’s most treasured possessions.

In 1922 Bush joined the light cruiser Columbo on the East Indies Station. On leaving home his father’s advice had been ‘Keep out of the sun’ while his mother had said, as his train stood on Bath station waiting to move ‘Don’t bring home an Indian wife.’ Then ashore as a Term Officer to Special Entry Cadets, his infectious enthusiasm producing an exceptional term with two of its members R E D Ryder and Sam Beattie subsequently being awarded the Victoria Cross for their actions at St Nazaire in 1942. Further postings included his first command, the gunboat Ladybird on the Yangtze and two years at the naval intelligence division’s Japanese desk. Back to sea on board the cruiser Devonshire during which he had the honour of being present at Ataturk’s funeral.
in Istanbul in November 1938. That same year he was married in Cannes to Mollie Noel, daughter of Colonel Brian Watts DSO of the Royal Army Medical Corps, they were to have two sons who both followed their father into the Royal Navy.

At the beginning of the Second World War Bush was a Captain, Auxiliary Patrol in the Straits of Dover; later his tireless efforts during the Dunkirk evacuation, during which he was responsible for the La Panne beaches, earned him the first of three DSO’s. He commanded the anti-aircraft cruiser *Euryalus* from June 1941 until September 1943 in many actions including the landings in Sicily and at Salerno and a second DSO. Then back to England and command of the Force Sword assault group which he trained and led for the invasion of Normandy where he was responsible for the landings at Ouistreham where the bodies rolling in the surf reminded him again of Gallipoli. For his services during the invasion he received his third DSO.

Then a brief spell in command of the battleship *Malaya*, during which Bush was pleased to receive several letters from Admiral Sir Algeron Boyle his Captain in *Bacchante* who had commanded the *Malaya* at the Battle of Jutland. Next to the Far East, to combined operations as the chief staff officer of Force W, the amphibious component of the South-east Asia command, recalling as he sat down to Christmas dinner that he had spent more Christmas Days at sea than at home but previously never with the Army. Among his duties was Operation Zipper, the plan to attack Singapore in the largest all-British amphibious operation of the war. In the event this was modified following the Japanese surrender on 15 August and Bush was present on 12 September when the official surrender of Japanese forces in South-east Asia took place in Singapore.

The war over, Bush had taken command of HMS *Ganges*, the Seaman Boys Training Establishment at Shotley opposite Harwich and Felixstowe, to inspire the new entries with his love of the Service, something he continued to do until June 1948. Then, while staying with his family at a cottage in Cornwall, he received a letter from the Admiralty.

‘I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you with regret that they do not see their way to offering you further employment. . . . . . My Lords desire to take this opportunity to convey to you an expression of their high appreciation of the services you have rendered during a long, gallant and successful career …. And to express My Lords’ great regret that the time has now come for the transfer of your name from Active to the Retired List of the Royal Navy . . . .’

‘It was quite a time’ he said ‘before I felt equal to going downstairs and joining the family at breakfast.’

Within a year Bush had been appointed Secretary of the Sea Cadet Council, a post he was to fill with distinction until 1959 when he became general manager of the Red Ensign Club in Stepney where he remained until retirement in 1964. Then back to sea
on an occasional basis as a liaison officer and lecturer accompanying educational cruises on board the British India Steam Navigation Company ships Nevassa and Dunera. His lectures about the Gallipoli campaign were much acclaimed and he was persuaded to write one of the finest accounts of the campaign by one who had served there – Gallipoli – being published in 1975. His biography Bless our Ship, a modest account of his epic life at sea was published in 1958. He also compiled two excellent anthologies of poetry and prose, Flowers of the Sea in 1962 and Salute the Soldier in 1966 and from his wealth of experience How to Become a Naval Officer (Special Entry) in 1935 and How to Become a Naval Officer (Cadet Entry) in 1963.

Sources:

Eric Bush Gallipoli (1957) and Bless our Ship (1958); Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

Archives: Liddell Hart Collection, King’s College, London. Recorded lecture Imperial War Museum.

GALLIPOLI CENTENARY EXHIBITION IN ISTANBUL

One of our Turkish members, Savaş Karakaş, will be opening a Gallipoli Centenary exhibition at the Is Bank Museum in Istanbul. Entitled ‘Gallipoli: from the Depths to the Trenches’, the exhibition, in Turkish and English, runs from 7 March to 15 August. It includes contributions from Professor Haluk Oral, the author of the book ‘Gallipoli 1915 -Through Turkish Eyes’ (reviewed in the Autumn 2008 issue of The Gallipolian – No. 117) along with a display of Gallipoli related military equipment and war relics from Mr Onur Akmanlar’s collection. Savaş hopes that members of the Association visiting Istanbul will have a chance to see the exhibition.

The museum is located on Bankacilar Street in the Hobyar neighbourhood of the Eminonu district and is housed in what was one of the oldest banks of Turkey, founded by Ataturk. The museum focuses on the economic and cultural heritage of Turkey and its recent history. It is open between 10am – 6pm, except on Mondays. Entry to the museum and exhibition is free.

MORE ON THE ROYAL MUNSTER FUSILIERS AT COVENTRY

Readers may recall the two photographs published in the Winter 2013 issue of The Gallipolian (No. 133) showing the 1st Bn. The Royal Munster Fusiliers on parade in Coventry at sometime between 10 January and 15 March 1915. The precise location in the town was not specified but was later identified as being in Hill Street, Coventry by
Chris Holland and David Fry and details were published in the Spring 2014 issue (No.134).

Reference was also made in the latter article to the marriage of 2/Lt Timothy Sullivan in St Osburg’s RC Church, Hill Street on 11 March, and to his death from wounds on 4 May 1915. More recently, Mr Peter Simmonds has identified another member on the parade. He writes:

‘I can positively identify the soldier in the front rank nearest the camera as 7019 RQMS Stephen Ahern. I have on loan to me from his family the diary which he kept from the 15 March 1915 with the battalion leaving Coventry until October 1918. The diary also contains a sketch of Lt. Sullivan’s grave’.

Peter also sent me the ‘Nominal Roll of Officers, WO, NCOs and men of the 1st RMF who embarked at Avonmouth with the Bn. on 15 March 1915 and who are still present with the Bn. on 18-12-10 [presumably it was meant to say 1915], having never left, remaining on the G/Peninsula’. [Details are reproduced below exactly as stated in the document]

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Stephen Ahern was born in Cork, Ireland in 1883. He enlisted in the 1st Bn. Royal Munster Fusiliers in 1902 and served in India, the Northwest Frontier, Burma, UK, Egypt, Gallipoli and France/Flanders. He later served in, Germany (Upper Silesia) in 1922-1923 and was discharged at Cologne in April 1923 while serving with Northumberland Fusiliers.
Stephen married Annie Kennedy in Karachi in March 1911. They had three children, Marjorie and Stephen, both born in India and Victor, born in Plymouth. From 1915 - 1918 the family resided at 3 Waterloo Terrace, Tralee but later moved to London. He died in 1940 and is buried Kensal Rise cemetery.

Editor’s Note: An interesting postscript to this continuing story came a few days before the journal went to the printers. Simon Shaw of the Earlsdon Festival, Coventry advised me that the Festival would be remembering the 1st Bn. Royal Munster Fusiliers and all who died at Gallipoli at their ‘RMF 100’ launch event to be held at The Albany Hotel, Coventry on Sunday 26 April.

The event will celebrate the strong bond that was formed between the soldiers and their hosts during their billet in Coventry 100 years ago through re-creations of key events that took place in the city. These include presentations to the regiment from the people of Coventry and children from a local school will play the lead roles in a wedding of a Munster Fusilier to a local lass – loosely based on the wedding of 2/Lt. Timothy Sullivan to Maud Bates of the Albany Hotel in March 1915 – so we now know the name of the bride!

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**NEWS FROM NEW ZEALAND**

**Gallipoli – The Scale of Our War**

The National Museum of New Zealand – Te Papa Tongarewa – is mounting a major exhibition entitled *Gallipoli – The Scale of Our War* which opened on 18 April. It is one of the largest and most expensive exhibitions ever mounted by the Museum and has been funded by a grant from the New Zealand Lotteries Fund. It will run until the end of 2018 and admission is free.

The joint project has been undertaken by National Museum staff and Sir Richard Taylor’s Weta Workshop which was responsible for design work on many major films including the *Lord of the Rings* and the *Hobbit* trilogies. The principal historian for the project is Dr Christopher Pugsley, an authority on the Gallipoli Campaign and author of *Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story*.

**The Nga Tapuwae Audio Guide**

Working with the New Zealand Ministry of Culture and Heritage, Dr. Christopher Pugsley and a team of designers and computer specialists have created the first of the Nga Tapuwae, (which means ‘the footsteps’ in Maori); these are free mobile audio guides to the New Zealand story of the Gallipoli campaign.

Together with Turkish historian Kenan Çelik and the concept director Chris Hay, five
trails have been set out for visitors to walk and drive covering the Anzac and Allied Gallipoli experience in general and the New Zealand experience in particular. The five trails comprise: Anzac Cove, covering the line along Second Ridge from Lone Pine to Quinn’s Post, The Nek and Walker’s Ridge; Chunuk Bair covering New Zealand’s role in the August offensive of 1915; Cape Helles covering operations in the south of the Peninsula and New Zealand’s part in the Second Battle of Krithia on 8 May 1915; and a look at the Turkish perspective. The guide can be used to provide an overview, or a detailed step-by-step picture; or listened to before arriving on the Peninsula, or indeed wherever you are, if you want to know anything about New Zealand’s role in this campaign.

You can download the free audio guide for Android, IPad or IPhone by visiting ngatapuwae.govt.nz or searching for ‘Nga Tapuwae Gallipoli’. A similar guide will be released this year for New Zealand trails on the Western Front.

GALLIPOLI VETERAN RE-BURIED IN ISRAEL

The remains of John Henry Patterson (1867–1947), whom the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called “the godfather of the Israeli army”, were re-interred on 4 December in an impressive ceremony attended by the Prime Minister and other dignitaries in the cemetery of Moshav Avihayil, near Netanya.

Patterson was born in Dublin in 1867 to a Protestant father and Roman Catholic mother. Trained as a railway engineer, he became well-known for building the railway bridge over the Tzavo River in Kenya in 1898/99 and later fought in the British army in the second Boer War. In the First World War, with help from his second-in-command, Joseph Trumpeldor[1], Patterson established the Zion Mule Corps[2], a military unit of 650 men, with 750 mules, which was sent to Gallipoli in 1915; the first Jewish military force for nearly 2,000 years. The unit, whose insignia was the Star of David, was disbanded in May 1916 but Patterson later commanded the 38th Bn., Royal Fusiliers, which was established in August 1917 and was sent to fight in Palestine. He thus fulfilled his dream of commanding ‘the children of Israel’.

The Moshav Avihayil cemetery was established in 1932 by Jewish veterans who had fought in the British Army in the First World War. Patterson died in 1947 and despite his request to be buried in the Holy Land alongside the men he had commanded, his ashes were interred in a cemetery in Los Angeles and his name forgotten. It resurfaced in 1999 when his grandson, Alan Patterson of Boston visited the Jabotinsky Institute in Tel Aviv and read about his grandfather in the archives. Ten years later, he conceived the idea of bringing his grandfather’s ashes for burial in Israel beside the graves of his men in the Jewish Brigade. With the assistance of the Israeli Government the legal arrangements were completed and his ashes returned to Israel.
Notes:

2. *The Zion Muleteers of Gallipoli* by Martin Sugarman published in the Autumn 1999 issue of The Gallipolian (No.90)

Editor’s Note: I am grateful to Michael D. Robson for drawing my attention to the article in the newspaper *HAARETZ* on which this report is based.

### QUARTERMASTER’S STORES

The following items are available from the ‘Stores’. It has been necessary to increase the cost of postage due to rise in such costs since the last review in November 2012. All postage costs are now shown separately from the cost of the item and the relevant amount indicated should be added when making the order.

**Silk Ties** – silk, non-crease ties in the Gallipoli Association colours – green bands for the land of Gallipoli and blue-grey for the waters of the Dardanelles, with narrow stripes of navy-blue and scarlet for the services – are available at **£16.90 plus postage** [Cost including postage – UK £17.83. Europe £20.10. N/S America £20.70 Australia/NZ £20.90.]

**Standard Ties** – in Association colours are available price **£7.70 plus postage** [Cost including postage – UK £8.63. Europe £10.90. N/S America £11.50 Australia/NZ £11.70]

**Blazer Badges** – hand embroidered wire and silk blazer badges are available at **£7.70 plus postage** [Cost including postage – UK £8.63 Europe £10.90. N/S America £11.50 Australia/NZ £11.70.]

**Lapel Badges** in the Association colours are available, price **£6.20 plus postage**. [Cost including postage – UK £7.13. Europe £9.40. N/S America £10.00 Australia/NZ £10.20.]

**Simpson Badges** – produced by the Anzac Day Commemoration Committee of Queensland. The badge is oval in design and 3/4 inch in size showing Simpson in classic pose with his donkey. Each badge costs **£3.90 plus postage**. [Cost including postage – UK £4.83. Europe £7.10. N/S America £7.70. Australia/NZ £7.90.]

**Binders**, which hold 6 copies of *The Gallipolian* are available, finished in attractive simulated leather, coloured maroon, with the title blocked in gold on the spine. Price per Binder is **£6.45 plus postage** [Cost including postage – UK £8.10. Europe £11.60. N&S America £13.90 Australia/NZ £14.35]

‘**Gallipoli Trench Map CDs’** – includes over 400 maps and 10 Watercolours, the latter by Sapper Moore-Jones, the New Zealand Official War Artist. Price **£16.70**

Orders with payment, cheques and postal orders made out to ‘The Gallipoli Association’, to the Secretary, James Watson Smith Chelsea Lodge, Coopers Hill Lane, Englefield Green, Surrey TW20 0JX.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE DEFENCE OF THE DARDANELLES – FROM BOMBARDS TO BATTLESHIPS
Author: Michael Forrest. Publisher: Pen & Sword (Maritime) 2012. Hardback.
254 pages including 11 maps and many photographs/illustrations. Price £25.

This book was not reviewed in The Gallipolian at the time of publication and only came to my attention recently. It begins with a brief history, covering the 500-years in which shore defences have protected the narrow channel between the two continents. The study reveals that from the 1860s, the Ottoman defences relied on the German firm, Friedrich Krupp, for almost all its guns. However, the Turks were notoriously slow payers and Krupp, for its part, never supplied the most up-to-date guns. The developing relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire is also examined, together with fortifications and other coastal defences along the Dardanelles; these included not only minefields but other devices such as torpedo launchers that could be rolled into the water for firing.

The book goes on to consider the relative strengths of the British and French Navies in 1914 and the flaws in the strategies applied; particularly that of the weaknesses inherent in using warships against forts and mobile land based defences. There are detailed descriptions of the attempts by the allied navies to reduce the fortifications in 1915 and their eventual failure to break though. The work undertaken by submarines and smaller naval vessels on both sides is also not overlooked. Those visiting or planning to visit the Peninsula will also find the concluding chapter – ‘The Fortifications Today’ – of considerable interest and assistance.

Although this is a detailed and comprehensive account, the book is well-structured and very readable, and one I would commend to members of the Association.

Foster Summerson

GALLIPOLI THE NEW ZEALAND STORY

First published, in hardback, in 1994, this is now the fifth edition of what is surely one of the great classics of Gallipoli literature. The author, previously a Senior Lecturer in
War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, from where he retired in 2013, has returned to live in New Zealand. He first visited Gallipoli in 1980 and has walked the battlefield many times since having quickly fallen under its spell. On each visit the same questions are asked; could the campaign have succeeded and what does it mean today? Sometimes the answers differ. It will always be so, but that too is part of the fascination. A fascination which members of our Association share.

The author, in concluding the first chapter, says:

‘Every man who served on Gallipoli endured, and established a reputation and a sense of identity that is important to us today. Through it we can establish who we are.

This then, is a tale that diaries, letters and the oldest of old men once told. This is Gallipoli’s and New Zealand’s story.’

If you do not already possess this book then hurry to add it to your library shelves. If you do possess an earlier edition it is high time to meander through the pages once more, for this is an epic story amongst epic stories.

TRACING YOUR GREAT WAR ANCESTORS: GALLIPOLI

Simon Fowler, formerly an archivist at the Public Record Office, now the National Archives, is well known as the author of several guides to tracing ones ancestors. In his new book the Gallipoli campaign is briefly described, supplemented by extracts, sometimes of several pages, from The Uncensored Dardanelles by Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and The Secret Battle by Aubrey Herbert. Although The Gallipolian is not mentioned as such, the Association receives an appropriate plaudit when its website is described as the best devoted specifically to the campaign. As the title suggests, the book provides a detailed guide to researching individual soldiers and sailors at Gallipoli and the units and ships with which they served; although it largely focuses on British forces, there is a short chapter devoted to Dominion and Indian troops. Members whether embarking upon research, or not, really should ensure this book is on their shelves.

THE ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE DURING THE GREAT WAR

Drawn from the extensive archives of the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Yeovilton, Malcolm Smith provides a stirring account of these pioneer days. From 1912 when the Naval Wing of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) was formed, until two years later when the Admiralty declared independence, the Naval Wing becoming the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS). Four wartime years followed until, in April 1918, the RFC and RNAS were combined again as the newly fledged Royal Air Force (RAF). A short life but an epic one.
The chapter which will interest members most is headed ‘Mediterranean and the Middle East’, here the reports of Flt. Lt. George Bentley-Dacre, based on HMS Ben-my Chree, Flt. Lt. R S W Dickinson on Kephalo, Henry Preston of No 3 Kite Balloon Section HMS Hector and Air Mechanic Stammers enliven the pages. The grimmer details of operations, perhaps none more so than the occasion when Dickinson and his co-pilot Davey, who couldn’t swim, were shot down and crashed in the sea. Sitting in the water with destroyers passing close but not spotting them for well over an hour before being picked up over an hour later. A letter from his father having just arrived suggested he ‘…was having a very dull life.’

Not only operational details but the day to day minutiae of life both on board and ashore, Thus a cricket match won by one wicket against a team from HMS Russell took place on coconut matting, while the outfield was ‘a bit rough.’ Pleased with their victory the aviators returned to find an order from the CO ‘forbidding the consumption of alcohol owing to officers disobeying previous orders re. wine bills. General fury …..’ Numerous stories to be treasured, one wished there had been space for more.

**THE HOOD BATTALION**


First published in 1995 and reviewed in *The Gallipolian* (No 78) that year, *The Hood Battalion* is without question one of the classic books concerning the First World War. The Battalion served first at Antwerp and then at Gallipoli, with nearly one hundred pages devoted to those months, and finally to the Western Front. Those with long memories will recall that one of our last veteran members attending Association events was Joe Murray who served in the Hood Battalion and recorded his experiences in his own book, *Gallipoli As I Saw It*, another Gallipoli title that should find a place, like *The Hood Battalion*, on members' book shelves.

David Saunders MBE

**ARTICLES FOR THE GALLIPOLIAN**

Articles and items of interest about any aspect of the Gallipoli campaign are always welcome. These should be submitted direct to the Editor at the address inside the front cover. For those considering the submission of articles I can provide a copy of ‘Notes for the Guidance of Contributors’ on request.

**DISCLAIMER**

Readers are reminded that the observations and opinions expressed in articles and letters published in *The Gallipolian* are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of either the Editor, or of the Association.
OBJECTIVES

To advance education for the public benefit by raising public awareness of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915 and by encouraging and facilitating the study in the legacy and lessons of that Campaign, keeping alive the memory of the Campaign and ensuring that all who fought or served in it, and those who gave their lives, are not forgotten by applying such means as the Trustees deem fit.

The Gallipoli Campaign is characterised by countless deeds of heroism and endurance. It took place in an area smaller than Southampton amid appalling conditions, such as heat, flies, lack of water, equipment and proper sanitation. Later on, rain and a freak spell of sub-zero temperatures had to be endured, to say nothing of the desperate close quarter fighting throughout the campaign. Some 559,000 Allied personnel were committed, of whom 420,000 were British and Empire troops, 80,000 French, 50,000 Australians and 9,000 New Zealanders. The cost in human terms was terrible. The Allies had 250,000 casualties, of whom approximately 58,000 were killed with only 11,000 having known graves. Ottoman forces with some Germans, numbered between 300,000 and 400,000 and of these some 87,000 were killed. The evacuation in December and early January 1916 was a masterly operation – one of the great feats of military history.