

The Gallipolian

***The Journal of the
Gallipoli Association***

No. 130 - WINTER 2012



The River Clyde at V Beach, 25 April, 1915

*by Charles Dixon - reproduced by kind permission
of The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment (Queen's and Royal Hampshires)*

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CHAIRMAN'S REPORT TO THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING HELD ON 17 OCTOBER 2012

The Committee met formally five times during the year, together with much contact at other times between committee members by email and other means.

GALLIPOLI DAY – 25 APRIL 2012

A report on the events on Gallipoli Day was published in the Autumn issue of *The Gallipolian* and on the website. The wreath-laying ceremony at St. Paul's Cathedral was able to revert to the traditional time of 0930 hrs, giving people time to get to Whitehall by 1030 hrs to join with Australia and New Zealand at the Cenotaph and Westminster Abbey.

OTHER EVENTS

There have, as usual, been many different events during the year, and these have been reported in *The Gallipolian* and/or on the website. Of particular interest are the new initiatives which included our presence at the 'Who Do You Think You Are?' exhibition at Earl's Court and the 'Back to Our Past' event in Dublin. The most significant new initiative was the Birmingham Conference, the brainchild of Simon Kleinig, which was a resounding success. This was reported separately in an e-newsletter and will be featured in the Winter issue of *The Gallipolian*. Some 100 people attended four lectures during the day and many were able to stay overnight and meet and have discussions with one another. It is intended that this conference will be held again next year.

We had our usual plot at the Field of Remembrance at Westminster Abbey. Another initiative was for us to be included in the March Past at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday, which we will do again this year. A report on the very successful Dersingham service will appear in the Winter issue of *The Gallipolian*. As I mentioned last year, regional events can be very popular, and if anybody would like to organise one in the name of The Gallipoli Association, do please let us know.

THE GALLIPOLI MEMORIAL BURSARY

No bursaries were awarded this year but we continue to keep this under review. If any organisation or individual would like to be considered please let the Secretary know.

MEMORIAL PLAQUE TO COMMEMORATE THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

As reported in the Autumn issue of *The Gallipolian*, the Association are funding the erection of a plaque in the grounds of the Boston War Memorial, Lincolnshire where other commemorative plaques have been placed in recent years.

FINANCE

Our Treasurer, Mrs Vicki Genrich, has produced her report and accounts which will be published in the Winter issue of *The Gallipolian*. After the ‘one-off’ boost to our income as mentioned last year, we could not expect to have the same sort of result for 2011. We have nevertheless managed a small surplus which is gratifying, but the signs are that we will have to increase the subscription for 2014. The massive increase in the price of postage has hit *The Gallipolian* distribution costs hard, to mention just one reason.

MEMBERSHIP

Our membership secretary, John Crowe, resigned from the committee and his role last May. John did a superb job in fulfilling the task which came to him at a particularly difficult time. He had to contend with discovering that there were hundreds (literally) of members whose subscriptions had either lapsed or were out of date. Each one had to be approached individually and invited to catch up. The result was most gratifying with a very healthy uplift to our funds, and we owe John a great debt of gratitude for the hard work he undertook.

In John’s place we welcome Marc Stewart. Marc was awarded a Bursary some years ago, and has family connections with the campaign. We look forward to working with him.

The present number of members stands at 864. Do please make sure that you encourage anybody who you realise has an interest in the campaign to join.

PAYMENT OF SUBSCRIPTIONS

From the above you will readily understand that the problem of unpaid or out-of-date subscriptions would never have arisen if all UK members had paid by direct debit. I have annually appealed to members to ensure that they use this method, but perhaps the Chairman’s report does not get read!

Please make the change if you have not already done so.

THE GALLIPOLIAN

The production of the journal has been maintained at a very high standard by our Editor, Foster Summerson.

THE WEBSITE

Development of the website has continued under the able stewardship of Stephen Chambers, whose report will be published in the Winter issue of *The Gallipolian*. A number of improvements are planned, and I recommend members to visit it from time to time and to advise non-members to have a look as well.

Please note that there is a link with *Amazon* for buying books etc. **Any** purchase through that link, regardless of whether it has anything to do with Gallipoli, is credited

to the Association which then receives a small commission. We would be grateful if you would remember this and use it.

BATTLEFIELD TOURS

A highly successful walking tour in September was arranged in conjunction with Stephen Chambers and Hugh Jenner through Clive Harris's firm *Battle Honours Ltd.* More such tours are envisaged and they get booked up almost immediately. In addition, it is hoped to arrange a tour for those who want a more leisurely visit.

CHRISTMAS CARDS

We have a reasonable stock of Christmas cards from previous years, and so it was decided this year that we would use them up rather than arranging a new one.

LEGACIES

The Association benefits from time to time from legacies. These range from any amount, both small and large. If you would like to consider remembering the Association in your Will I can assure you that it will be in a very good cause, and help to perpetuate the memory of all who took part in that Campaign.

THE COMMITTEE

I am sure that all members realise that the committee consists entirely of unpaid volunteers who devote a very large part of their personal free time to running the Association. On behalf of the Association I would like to express our grateful thanks to all those who have served in the past twelve months. The committee have said to me that they do not need to be mentioned individually by name, but you all know who they are and I have no doubt that you will greatly appreciate the effort that they put in to ensure the success of the Association and its objectives.

We are, of course, very sorry to lose John Crowe from the committee, but we wish him well and I hope he will continue to run the wonderful service at Dersingham. We were equally sorry to lose Simon Kleinig from the committee, but he is keen to remain involved with the Birmingham conference so we will still be able to benefit from his enthusiasm and expertise.

GENERAL OUTLOOK

We need to recruit new members in sufficient numbers not only to replace those who inevitably pass on but also to increase the overall number. A greater awareness amongst the membership for the need to look out actively for potential members would ensure that this does not become a problem. At the moment we are in good fettle with a

dedicated team, determined to give good value to members as well as striving to live up to the objectives of the Association. The finances are currently in good order, but I have mentioned above that an increase in the subscription must be on the cards for 2014. We will need to use some of our funds for promoting the Association which hopefully will give a good return in the medium term, and with goodwill and a fair wind I see no reason why the Association should not continue well into the future.

C T F Fagan, Chairman

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The minutes of the Annual General meeting held on 17 October will be published in the Spring issue of *The Gallipolian*.

TREASURER'S REPORT

As Honorary Treasurer of the Gallipoli Association, I present the accounts for the year ended 31 December 2011 with certification by the Independent Examiner, Mr Gavin Freemantle FCA from the company, Merchant & Co. These are enclosed with the current issue of *The Gallipolian*.

Income & Expenditure

The Association strives to conduct its operations within the funds available to it on an annual basis, without the need to access reserves. In 2011 the Association achieved this goal with the result that a small surplus of £806 was achieved whilst continuing to deliver the same services to members.

The largest expense continues to be the cost of the production and printing of *The Gallipolian* which contributes to nearly 50% of the Association's operating costs. The 2011 costs appear materially higher than in 2010, however, this is due to the costs in 2011 encompassing 4 issues of the journal rather than 3 issues reported under this expenditure item in 2010.

The Association is always mindful of undertaking activities such that, at worst, only a minimal loss is incurred. In 2011, the Association successfully undertook a range of member activities whilst only incurring a small loss of £150. During 2011, the Association again supported London and regional based activities with the Gallipoli Day commemorations, East Anglian lunch, Norfolk church service and the March Past at Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday. During 2011, the Association supported the memory of Gallipoli by donating £500 to the Trooper Potts VC Memorial.

Cash Reserves

The cash reserves have increased in line with the collection of subscriptions and at 31 December 2011, the combined bank balances stood at £17,156.

The Association continues to build a solid financial base, leading up to the 2015 Gallipoli campaign centenary.

Vicki Genrich CA

SUBSCRIPTIONS – 2013

Members are reminded that subscriptions become due on 1 January 2013. If you have not already arranged to pay your subscription by Direct Debit (or Standing Order under previous arrangements), please do so on, or before, the due date. **Members paying by Standing Order are asked to check that the amount payable reflects the current rate of subscription (see below).**

A Membership Renewal Form (for those paying by cheque) is enclosed and should be sent, together with the subscription, to the address given on the form. The current rates are:

Members in the UK – £20 per annum (£18 if paid by Direct Debit)

Overseas Members – £25 per annum (£22.50 if paid by Direct Debit)

Those who subscribe via PayPal can obtain details for making or renewing payments from the Association website (www.gallipoli-association.org).

As stressed by the Chairman in his report, I would **urge** all UK members not already paying by **Direct Debit** to consider changing to this method of payment, as it is very labour saving and cost-effective for the Association. **It also attracts a 10% membership discount.** There are enhanced safeguards nowadays through the ‘Direct Debit Guarantee Scheme’ offered by banks and Building Societies, and the Association undertakes to notify members 30 days in advance if the amount paid, or the payment date, is to be changed.

Direct Debit forms can be downloaded from the Association website, or obtained from me.

Vicki Genrich, Treasurer

WEBSITE REPORT

Since the website re-launch in June 2011 there have been many changes; those centred on the refining of the website and its functionality, to the increasing of content on the website and associated forum. We are also planning a server upgrade towards the end of 2012, which will increase the site's performance.

WEBSITE – www.gallipoli-association.org

The main growth in content areas are the '*News*', '*Events*', '*On This Day*' and an updated Gallipoli '*Order of Battle*' page. The Association bookstore (Amazon affiliate scheme) continues to attract new book purchases via the website, which is low, but never the less is a valuable revenue stream for the association. We are also in the process of updating *The Gallipolian* journal archive on the website and then running off an updated CD. This will contain 42 years of editions from No.1 (1969) to No. 127 (2011). At the moment the current *Gallipolian* CD is out of print.

FACEBOOK – www.facebook.com/pages/Gallipoli-Association/195718167139500

The Gallipoli Association's official Facebook site called '*Gallipoli Association*' has grown to 254 'likes' within the year. This page also has strong links to another, run by members of the Association, called '*Gallipoli, 1915*' which has grown to 2,300 'likes'. Facebook, the popular social networking platform, is thus encouraging Gallipoli related interaction and knowledge share of the campaign.

THE FORUM – www.gallipoli-association.org/forum/

Managed by member Mal Murray, with support from the webmaster and a small team of volunteer moderators, the forum has increased its profile alongside the website. The forum has increased in popularity and has now over 2,800 information posts and 284 registered users. All new Association members are now setup on the Forum as default, using the same username and password as the website.

E-NEWSLETTER

During 2012 we have sent out seven electronic newsletters which helped tremendously to promote events like the Conference, Battlefield tours, Lectures, Remembrance events and the Dublin and Olympia ancestry shows. Subscribers have increased from 365 to 564 in this period. We are still short of about 300 members, so we are hoping that we can add more in the coming months. What has impacted the Newsletter is the withdrawal of Simon Kleinig, so no newsletter has been sent since August. **We will need a volunteer editor to continue with this initiative**, although I am still happy to provide the IT input for the design, layout and email sending.

Stephen Chambers, Webmaster

THE GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE – 2012

Simon Kleinig

Everybody who attended the Gallipoli Association Conference in Birmingham voted it a resounding success! Nearly 100 people attended—a fantastic result for our inaugural conference. Apart from the opportunity to learn more about the Gallipoli campaign, the day ended up a highly successful social event. It enabled members and non-members alike to share conversations and information in a relaxed and friendly atmosphere. Our guests travelled to Birmingham from all over Britain and we had several people who made the journey from Ireland.

A number of people arrived on Friday night and enjoyed an early start to the weekend in the relaxed and convivial surroundings of the ‘Old Contemptibles’ pub. The conference got underway at 10.00am the next day with a welcome and introduction from Simon Kleinig, followed by the traditional verse from Laurence Binyon’s *Ode to the Fallen*. This ensured that the commemorate aspects of Gallipoli remained a primary focus for the day.

As expected, our four guest speakers did us proud. Gallipoli Association historian **Michael Hickey** opened with an illuminating address on *The Men of Gallipoli*. Delivered in his inimitable style, Michael combined hard historical fact with regular injections of humour to guarantee a polished and informed presentation. Between speakers, guests had ample opportunity to mingle, recharge their batteries and share conversations over friendly cups of tea and coffee.

Next, Gallipoli Association webmaster **Stephen Chambers** invited us to relive the campaign in his address, *Gallipoli through a camera’s lens*, a captivating visual presentation featuring original images from his personal photographic collection of Gallipoli. Scenes from the Peninsula and of military personalities were brought to life through Stephen’s masterful commentary, drawn from a deep knowledge of every aspect of the campaign.

A buffet lunch was served with an appetising selection of hot and cold dishes and ‘bottomless’ tea and coffee. Over lunch the bar was open for business — for those wishing to further complement their meals with a glass of wine, beer or soft drinks.

By the time **Peter Hart** stepped up to the lectern everybody was eager to absorb more information. And we weren’t disappointed — Peter’s choice of subject, *The French at Gallipoli*, opened new windows of knowledge for many of us by presenting an absorbing but frequently overlooked aspect of the campaign. As always, Peter’s style of delivery was arresting and by the end of it, it was impossible not to feel a clearer grasp of the importance of the French contribution to Gallipoli.

Afternoon tea gave everyone an opportunity to explore the numerous promotional stands set up around the conference centre. The Western Front Association, The Salonika Campaign Society, World War Books, Spirit of Remembrance, Battle Honours Ltd and Len Sellers were joined by our own Gallipoli Association stand. Collectively, these stands made a valuable contribution to the flavour of the day. A wide selection of military books was on offer from authors Peter Hart, Stephen Chambers, Gavin Roynon and Richard Van Emden, all of whom were happy to discuss and sign books throughout the day.

For many people our final speaker, **Chris Pugsley**, instilled in our minds a balanced picture of the campaign viewed from the perspective of nearly 100 years. His address, *The Gallipoli Campaign— valid gamble or forlorn hope?* left little doubt why Chris remains a foremost authority on Gallipoli. His passion for the subject shone through, and his presentation touched objectively all areas of the campaign, particularly how Gallipoli has affected us, both in the past and in the present.

The day concluded with a **Question and Answer** panel comprising all four guest speakers and chaired by **Richard Van Emden**. Guests had the opportunity to submit written questions, after which an open forum was held and questions were answered from the floor. A healthy number of guests remained at the Tally Ho Centre to enjoy an excellent evening meal and to further soak up the friendly atmosphere which had proved such a strong feature of our first Gallipoli Association Conference — hopefully it will not be the last. A selection of photographs taken during the day are on pages 29–30.

Editor's Note: I am most grateful to Simon for providing this comprehensive account of the conference, which first appeared in the Association's e.newsletter. On behalf of the Chairman and committee I would also like to record our thanks to Simon for his hard work in arranging the conference. Its success is due in no small measure to his commitment and organising skills.

2012 GALLIPOLI ASSOCIATION TOUR REPORT

Hugh Jenner

We were a group of fourteen people who, were it not for our membership of the Gallipoli Association, and Clive Harris of *Battle Honours Ltd*, would never have met. As it was we spent 5 days together on the Gallipoli peninsula, walking the ground and sharing information and stories of those half a million men who fought so gallantly in this beautiful land for reasons which, except to the defenders, became ever more difficult to understand.

Most of us met at Heathrow, Terminal 5, but some met our BA flight at Istanbul. From there we were taken in a comfortable coach to the hotel in Canakkale. This hotel, the

Grand Anzac, is ideal in several ways. It is situated in the centre and close to several good restaurants, bars and places of interest; notably the old coaching inn and the Naval Museum. The staff were friendly and efficient and it is very quiet. Each day began with an excellent breakfast and then we made the 5-minute walk to the ferry.

Our group included the Pullen family from Australia, whose presence, in addition to imparting lively humour, ensured a fair understanding of the experience of all who fought in the campaign. Greg Pullen has provided a separate report, which can be found elsewhere in the current issue. Then there was Dennis! Dennis Greenslade, QPM, is a veteran of the Second World War and the son of a veteran of the campaign. Although he did not walk everywhere, he was omni-present and endeared himself to everyone even the local residents whose charm he could match, even if they did not understand the stories he told. He beat his son, Martin, into the water for a swim near the Creek in Suvla Bay.

Our guide was Stephen Chambers. Readers of his books on the campaign will understand how good it is to follow someone with such a thorough knowledge of the events of the campaign, but more especially where they occurred. Although I have walked nearly everywhere on the Peninsula, the walk past the Apex and down Rhododendron Ridge with a full description of what took place exemplified for me the benefit of following in the footprints of an expert. The other notable experience was to follow the line of advance of the 5th Norfolks, Stephen having given each one of us an envelope with the name of an individual in that advance. At the appropriate point, we were told where our story ended. Several photographs taken during the tour are featured on pages 30-31.

I am stepping down from the management of tours for the Association. I do so in the sure knowledge that if Stephen and Clive have a hand in the future, the tours will get even better. The next Walking Tour is planned for September 2013. Before that *Spirit of Remembrance* have offered to run a full 9-day tour, including a week-end in Istanbul in May. As in 2011 the tour will be guided by Colonel Christopher Newbould.

If you have never been to the Peninsula, I can only repeat how beautiful is the land and seascape; the events are compelling enough and in the stories of the guides they come alive. Then there are the cemeteries. They are superbly maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, and, in the main, places of perfect peace. The most moving moment on this last tour was when I noticed, flapping precariously in a strong breeze, beside the headstone for a young man in Lancashire Landing Cemetery, a family collage including the photograph of a young soldier. It surely could not resist the wind and there was little I could do to make it stay. It must have been placed there on behalf of the man's niece whose picture was also in the group. On it were the words: 'You are not forgotten. We are so proud of you'; that goes for us all.

Throughout the tour the arrangements made by Battle Honours Ltd were first rate, and Clive who guided his own tour concurrently with ours, kept a watchful eye on every

detail. I would like to end this final report by thanking and paying tribute to Colonel Michael Hickey who was our guide for nearly ten years. Who can forget the history, anecdotes and understanding of the campaign which he shared with us, all delivered in his booming voice and chortling good humour. He was never defeated by Plugge's Plateau, and I'm sure would come with us still were he not banned from flying. From all of us who had the pleasure and privilege of having you tell the story of the campaign to us, Michael; thank you.

GALLIPOLI MEMORIAL SERVICE IN NORFOLK

John Crowe

On Saturday 15 September the annual Gallipoli Memorial Service was held in North West Norfolk for the eighth consecutive year. Thanks to the generosity and staunch support of the Revd. Michael Brock, the service was held for the second year running in St Nicholas Church, Dersingham.

As in previous years, sunny weather was the order of the day and over 130 people gathered in this beautiful old church which has a special chapel with a plaque dedicated to the widow of Captain Frank Beck of the Sandringham Company of the 5th Norfolk's who along with other local men was killed on 12 August 1915 at Suvla Bay.

The service was conducted by the Revd. Michael Brock with great dignity remembering all those that suffered in the campaign from all the countries involved. There was also special mention of the local men of the 5th Battalion, The Norfolk Regiment. Lessons were read by the Mayor of King's Lynn and Gallipoli Association member Anthony Clifton-Brown. Fifteen Standards were presented during the service and 18 wreaths laid. Once again the bugler was Salvation Army Officer Henry Goodall who, at the age of 85 years, put on a wonderful performance. Arthur Coxon read the exaltation in a spectacular manner with heartfelt emotion.

We were honoured by the presence of the Mayors of King's Lynn and Hunstanton, as well as the National Vice Chairman and County Chairman of the Royal British Legion. The Military Attaché for Turkey Colonel Erdinc Kocyanak attended for the third year running. Also present were Lt. Col. Nick Gillard for New Zealand, Squadron Leader Matthew Grinham for Australia and Wing Commander Neil Tomlin OC Base Support Wing RAF Marham, Norfolk. Col. David Hedges, County Commandant of the army cadets also attended as he has done in the previous years. Many members of the Gallipoli Association were also present; most notably they included Lt. Commander Arthur Coxon, who once again travelled from the Vale of Glamorgan, and Sir Michael and Lady Angela Oswald. Many branches of the Royal British Legion, the Britain-Australia Society, London Legacy and the Police were also represented. There was a

good turnout from the army, air force and naval cadets who were a real credit to the young people of Norfolk. For the first time local leaders of the Girl Guides and Scouts were represented and assisted with the service.

Afterwards, everyone was invited to take tea and ANZAC biscuits at the Church Hall where they were welcomed by the organizer John Crowe. There followed some lively conversation among everyone in the hall. A large number of those present have had family links with the Gallipoli Campaign in 1915. It was indeed a wonderful opportunity for them to exchange stories, keeping the memory very much alive. A selection of photographs taken during the day are on pages 31-32.

The dates for future services have now been reserved up to and including the centenary year. They are **21 September 2013**, 20 September 2014 and 9 September 2015. Anyone interested in attending any of the future services please contact John Crowe on 0208 697 2787 or Mobile 07956 188826 or e mail johncrowe@uwclub.net

‘BACK TO OUR PAST’ – DUBLIN

For the second year running the Association had a stand at the ‘*Back to Our Past*’ event Dublin. Our participation was the initiative of **Mal Murray**, our Forum Manager, who was keen to build on last year’s success. The event ran from 12-14 October and I attended on the first day, so this ‘Editor’s report’ is very much a personal one. A photograph of Mal Murray at the Association stand is on page 32.

When I arrived I was surprised to find a large array of stands not all of which appeared to have a link with family history research, the reason being that the event was part of an ‘*Over 50s Show*’! Although the variety of stands at first glance appeared to be a little incongruous with everything from the delights of Tipperary to bathroom equipment for the elderly, most of those related to family research were located in fairly close proximity; the Dublin Branch of the Western Front Association and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission both having stands near to ours.

One advantage of the wide variety of stands was that they undoubtedly attracted a more diverse attendance than might otherwise have been the case. Certainly, we were kept busy throughout the day and Mal was a mine of information for those with enquires about individuals, being equipped with his laptop and access to the CWGC data base, together with *Soldiers/Officers Died in the Great War* and various reference books. There was a constant stream of enquiries and Mal has told me that they were even busier on the next two days when he was assisted by members **John Gibbin**, who had travelled all the way from County Galway, and **Philip Lecane** – the author of ‘*Torpedoed! The RMS Leinster Disaster*’ – who assisted on Sunday, the latter’s detailed knowledge of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers being of great benefit. Overall, throughout the three days, there was a larger ‘footfall’ than last year.

The degree of interest shown by visitors to our stand, most of whom took away one of the Association leaflets, together with the sale of Christmas Cards and other items was certainly encouraging and it is to be hoped that it will be reflected in more new members joining the association. Certainly, participation would appear to have raised the profile of the Association.

THE 29TH DIVISION MEMORIAL

The annual commemoration at the 29th Division Memorial, Stretton-on-Dunsmore, Warwickshire will take place at 1145am for 1200 noon on **Sunday, 10 March 2013** when a wreath will be laid on behalf of the Gallipoli Association. Wreaths will also be laid by representatives of other organisations, and by individuals. The memorial is in the centre of a large roundabout on the A45, at the junction with the B4455, about 5 miles east of Coventry (grid reference SP 415733). Please contact James Watson-Smith (address inside the front cover) for more information.

NEWS FROM TURKEY

Member, **Güven Pinar** reports that excavations have started to dig out nine big Turkish guns buried by villagers around Kumkale after 1918. The barrels of the guns, which were buried 1.5m. (5 feet) deep, are about 5m. (16 feet) long and 24-26 cms. (9-10 inches) in diameter.

OBITUARIES

PATRICK GARIEPY

It was with great sadness we learned of the death, on 11 August, of Patrick Gariepy (1923) at the early age of 49. Patrick lived in Eugene, Oregon. As far as I am aware, Patrick had no family links with the Gallipoli campaign but had a fascination with it.

In 1988 Patrick began an exhaustive study to establish and document the casualties incurred by British, Dominion and Empire forces engaged in the Gallipoli campaign, both on the peninsula itself and those who died at sea, or of their wounds in Egypt, Malta or elsewhere. A member for over 20 years, Patrick was a continuing source of information and advice to others in their own researches. He contributed a number of articles to *The Gallipolitan* based on his research, the most notable being an introductory article about his plan to create 'A Register of The Fallen' (No. 72) and 'Gallipoli Campaign Hospitals' (No. 110) as well as later articles on the casualties identified in his research.

As is often the case in Associations like ours, we tend to focus on subjects of mutual

interest rather than on more personal matters, and apart from knowing that Patrick was married and liked cats – ‘critters’ as he called them – neither I nor my predecessor knew much about his family life. However, tributes published at the time of his death provide a wider insight. Patrick was born in May 1963 in Corvallis, Oregon. He studied history at the University of Oregon and was awarded a bachelor’s degree. He served in the Army of the United States in Military Intelligence and as a German interpreter. After leaving the military his career was spent in the health care sector.

We extend our sympathies on their loss to his wife, Karlann, to his father Dennis Garipey, his mother, Judy Campbell, and to brother Jake and sister Shari.

COLONEL RALPH MAY

Sadly, we also learnt of the death in September of Colonel Ralph May (725), who had been a member of the Association for over 30 years.

Colonel May had several family connections with Gallipoli; his father, Lt. Geoffrey May, served with the 1st Bn. The Border Regiment, being seriously wounded in the thigh during the attack on Hill 70. His Uncle Ralph had been killed on 12 July while serving with the 1/5th Highland Light Infantry. His father’s experiences were recounted by his son in an article ‘Experiences of an Officer at Gallipoli: 25 April to 21 August’, which appeared in the Spring 2000 issue (No. 92). Colonel May contributed a number of other articles to *The Gallipolian*, most notably ‘The Border Regiment at ANZAC’ (No. 86) and ‘Medical Cover at Gallipoli’ (No. 104). He also took part in the 2006 Association Tour to Gallipoli, his account being published in issue No. 111.

Educated at Ampleforth and Sandhurst, Ralph May was commissioned into his father’s former regiment in 1948, having been badly injured in 1944 when a V2 struck the Royal Hospital Chelsea Hospital (where his father was ‘Captain of Invalides’) killing his mother. He went on to have a long and distinguished military career seeing service in the Middle East and Germany, followed by three years as the British Instructor at the Royal Military College in Duntroon, Australia. After further service he retired from the army in 1964 but in 1967 was asked to take command of the 4th Bn. (TF) The Border Regiment. He later became Commandant of the Cumberland and Westmorland Army Cadet Force, a post he held until he retired in 1977 when he was appointed honorary colonel.

In addition to his military duties Colonel May led a busy life involving himself in the local community. In 1970 he helped establish the Border Regiment Museum in Carlisle and was its curator until 1991. He wrote and presented television programmes on the history of the Border Regiment, and he was the author of *Glory Is No Compensation*, the story of the regiment at Gallipoli in 1915. Colonel May is survived by his wife, Bridget, three sons, a daughter, six grandchildren and three great-grandchildren to whom we extend our deepest sympathies.

We also record with sadness the death of another member, **Mr Ray Davies** (No. 2297)

ANZAC DAY COMMEMORATIONS ON LEMNOS 2012

Jim Claven

In April this year, a visiting delegation of Australian Members of Parliament took part in the annual ANZAC Day commemorations held throughout Greece. These included commemorations at two of the Commonwealth Military Cemeteries on Lemnos.

As readers will be aware, the island of Lemnos played a critical role as the main military base for the allies during the Gallipoli campaign, Mudros providing a safe harbour for the hundreds of Allied ships involved in the campaign and its shores the necessary facilities for landing preparations, hospital facilities, supply bases and rest and recuperation for the hundreds of thousands of troops on the peninsula.

The Parliamentary delegation also involved members of the Melbourne-based, Lemnos Gallipoli Commemorative Committee. The latter has been established to promote the commemoration of the role of Lemnos in the Gallipoli campaign, especially as part of the Centenary of Anzac commemorations in 2015. The delegation included the Hon. Alan Griffin MP, former Australian Minister for Veterans Affairs, the Hon. John Pandazopoulos MP and Lee Tarlamis, MP.

The annual ANZAC and Gallipoli commemorations are held on Lemnos on 23 April, prior to the ceremonies held on the peninsula and at Athens on 25 April. The day began with a flag-raising and wreath laying at the Australia – Lemnos Gallipoli commemorative plaque at the harbour, officiated by the Australian Ambassador, with Australian and Greek military representatives and local Lemnian government representatives present. The plaque was made by a local Melbourne enthusiast, paid for through fundraising by the Australian Lemnian Community and is maintained by the local Lemnos authorities. The first service was held here in April 1999 through the auspices of Lemnian Community of Victoria, Australia.

The main commemorative event then took place at East Mudros Military Cemetery – see photograph on page 33. This involved representatives of various Allied military forces, Australian and Greek government and diplomatic representatives (including the Australian Ambassador to Greece, Ms Jenny Bloomfield), representatives of the Greek Red Cross, local school students and the Lemnian community. Church services were conducted by the local Orthodox Church. This cemetery dates from April 1915 and contains over 880 graves from the First World War and one Second World War burial. 96 Australians are identified individually.

It was interesting to identify some of the more famous as well as the less well known soldiers buried at East Mudros. These include Brigadier General Linton, a native of

Scotland, who lived in Melbourne, Australia, and commanded the 6th AIF Brigade. He died of exhaustion following the torpedoing of the HMT *Southland* near Mudros in 1915. Also commemorated is Private Andrew Wilson, a 26 year old 'new' Australian from Ireland, who joined the 28th Battalion in 1915. He was badly wounded by shrapnel, at the Apex on 'Lower Cheshire' ridge in the Suvla sector, and was sent to the 7th Field Ambulance and then to the 16th Casualty Clearing Station. He was evacuated on the hospital ship *Formosa*, and died at sea on 26 October. He was buried in the East Mudros Cemetery, the service being conducted by the Revd. R W Cole-Hamilton. The cemetery also contains separate British, French and Indian memorials as well as to those lost from HMS *Agamemnon*.

The commemoration at East Mudros was followed by a display and audio-visual presentation by school children outlining the story of Lemnos and the First World War at the nearby Mudros secondary school. The Australian War Memorial assisted with the display of images and photographs from Lemnos and the Gallipoli campaign. A final, smaller wreath laying service was held at Portianos Military Cemetery, also attended by the Australian Ambassador and Australian military representatives – see photograph on page 33. This is located on Anzac Street in Portianos, West Mudros, and contains 347 Commonwealth burials of the First World War, including 50 Australians. One of the more interesting graves at this cemetery is that of Sadik Khalil, a member of the Egyptian Labour Corps. There is also a memorial to those lost from HMS *Endymion*.

The delegation also visited the West Mudros Moslem Cemetery which contains the graves of 170 unidentified casualties of the Egyptian Labour Corps as well as 57 Ottoman prisoners of war, none of whom are marked individually. The former made a major contribution to the Gallipoli campaign, including on Lemnos, undertaking a range of important construction projects necessary to transforming Lemnos into a military base.

The Australian parliamentary delegation has issued a report recommending better promotion of the role of Lemnos and its importance to the Gallipoli campaign and Anzac legend. This includes fostering links between the Australian and Greek authorities, support for enhanced interpretative and museum facilities at Lemnos and the erection of a memorial in Melbourne. I know all members of the Gallipoli Association would welcome this push to improve the awareness and commemoration of this often forgotten aspect of the Gallipoli story.

Editor's Note:

Gallipoli Association member, Jim Claven, participated in this delegation as a member of the Australian Lemnos Gallipoli Commemorative Committee. He is a historian and published author. His interest in Greece began with his study of ancient history and classical literature at Monash University, Australia. He is researching the Anzac-Greek connection in the First World War and working on developing and leading tourist trails

of the Anzac connection with Greece. You can find out more about his tourist trails to Lemnos at – www.anzactoursingreece.com

For further information, including a copy of the parliamentary report on the work of the Lemnos Gallipoli Commemorative Committee, contact Jim Claven on jimclaven@yahoo.com.au. Further information on the Australian developments concerning the Centenary of Anzac go to – <http://www.anzaccentenary.gov.au/>

THE MONMOUTH SAPPERS

Bryan Jarvis

In September 2008, my wife and I joined the Gallipoli Association's battlefield tour, led by committee members Colonel Michael Hickey and Major Hugh Jenner. It was a highly commendable experience that enabled us to understand the enormous sacrifices made by men and their families from the United Kingdom and all over the then British Empire, and by the gritty Turkish defenders too.

The superbly organised tour included visits to ancient Troy, to the wonderful Florence Nightingale museum in Istanbul and glimpses of the ancient city itself, but seeing so many of the Peninsula's 31 beautifully tended military cemeteries, was simply unforgettable. With highly evocative names such as Lancashire Landing, Anzac Cove, Hill 60, Scimitar Hill and Quinn's Post, their sun-bleached walls surround row upon row of Portland white grave markers intermingled with roses and Mediterranean flowers. They are a real credit to the generations of Turkish gardeners that care for them under the auspices of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission.

At Hill 60 and the 7th Field Ambulance cemeteries lay Connaught Ranger pals of my wife's grandfather Fred Stinson and of the South Wales Borderers that fell in early August 1915, taking the Kabak Kayu water wells. Fred survived only to die on the Somme the following year.

For our visit, it all looked dazzlingly idyllic with calm clear blue seas lapping up to the shoreline, one or two distant fishing smacks creating gentle ripples, and here and there the odd weed-bedecked skeletal shipwrecks and broken jetty posts protruding from the shallows. Wandering amongst the trees, the scrub and broad uncultivated areas, wild rosemary and thyme gave off a heady aroma but around battlefield areas, overgrown trenches slowly became apparent as do the odd weathered items which poked out from the loose earth; brass trouser buttons, cap badges, bullets and shrapnel.

After visiting Anzac Cove, our party moved northwards to where forbidding cliffs rise steeply from the beach. Trudging amongst scrub-covered cliff tops, we stopped for a snack near two rather dilapidated concreted reservoirs almost overgrown by shrubs, the

slightly larger one being around 25ft long, 12ft wide and perhaps 15ft deep. Both are in a poor, weather-worn state with plants growing from the lengthy cracks, and metal corner rungs rusting away. The only visible clue as to their origin is set into the head of the larger tank; a rather hastily cemented-in plaque inscribed:



5 Coy. R.MON.R.E. Aug 1915.

The intervening years haven't been kind as pieces of the inscription are falling away but it can still be recognised as the handiwork of a team of extremely brave Welsh Sappers. This small but very determined group were from No. 5 Siege Company, Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (RMRE), based in Monmouth Castle. Perched on the edge of town overlooking the winding Monnow River, the Castle also houses the regimental museum and within its archives is a full account of the unit's history and its outstanding achievements^[1].

Originally formed in 1539, the RMRE is said to be amongst the oldest formations in the British Army and has a noble history. It was initially a militia (infantry) unit charged with home defence, but in 1877 it became an Engineer unit and then a Royal Engineer unit in 1896, thus becoming the only regiment with two 'Royals' in its title. It is also the only RE unit whose members wear the Prince of Wales Divisional cap badge and the militia flash instead of a Brigade affiliation.

No 5 (Siege) Company of the RMRE was formed on 28 November 1914 for Suez protection duties and had a strength of seven officers, 257 men, 48 horses and 19 vehicles. But as the Gallipoli assault faltered in the face of stiff Turkish resistance, the group joined the five divisions under Lt. General Stopford, due to land at Suvla and thus help clear the way to the Turkish capital.-

The Welshmen sailed from Avonmouth for Port Said on 10 June 1915 and during its brief stay there, one section was ordered to span the Suez Canal with a Barrel Pier bridge. It was thought to be the very last such bridge to be built in war-time, but remained incomplete owing to a lack of barrels in the region. A few days later, 5 (Siege)

Company arrived at Alexandria where they boarded the Khedival Mail Steamer *Osmanieh* and headed for the Greek island of Lemnos. At Mudros harbour, they were tasked with building two wooden piers which were barely finished when the *Aquitania* and the *Mauretania* arrived carrying most of the 10th Irish Division.

But 5 (Siege) Company; were not bound for Suvla with the 10th (Irish Division); the engineers left Mudros on 19 July, aboard the *Ibex* and reached V Beach, Cape Helles. After a lengthy wait for darkness and a lull in Turkish gunfire, they disembarked through the beached *River Clyde*, along the pier to safety below the cliffs. That night they bivouacked in what turned out to be a fresh graveyard. However, the company should have been on X beach so during the following evening, the unit moved to the beach and dug in alongside a field bakery. Despite constant bombardment and sniper fire, it reinforced the immediate areas, for which the Sappers were rewarded with fresh bread rolls and steaming mugs of tea.



X Beach

Initially the RMRE were tasked with repairing and extending W beach jetties. They did this by sinking two ships; the *Messina* and the *Sigalion*, which were linked with stone-filled timber caissons. Some sections also worked on Anzac beach and beyond at Suvla, but they all had a hand in building cliff steps, access roads, storehouses, workshops, magazines, water storage and tramways from the piers.

Throughout the campaign the scarcity of drinking water presented major problems not least that of getting it to the forward troops who were either moving forward fighting hand-to-hand, or digging-in under continuous fire. Local wells were generally useless;

they were either contaminated or lay in dangerous open ground, so from April onwards the majority of water supplies arrived in converted barge tankers. Having come from the Nile or the Sweetwater Canal, and having to be carried away in the limited amount of petrol or kerosene cans, it was extremely foul-tasting.

The further the troops advanced, the further water had to be brought up manually from the beaches, and as the Turks defended from the high ground and used many snipers, water supplies dwindled and troops rapidly dehydrated. In the hellish heat, often pinned down in areas stinking from half-buried bloated corpses and besieged by hordes of flies, if bullets, shrapnel or bush fires didn't kill our soldiers, it was a toss-up whether the fleas, rats, dysentery or jaundice would finish them off. The infantry's best runners became water boys, racing to supply points at night, but hastened on their way by shrapnel or sniper bullets, and usually with a dozen or more water bottles slung around their necks.

In late July, 5 Siege Company was tasked with building two reservoirs above the cliffs each capable of holding up to 30,000 gallons of water. So toiling under cover of darkness, these brave industrious men hastily dug the pits and built the spoil up to protect against the murderous rifle, machine gun and mortar attacks raining down incessantly from the higher ground. Meanwhile, others hauled building materials from the supply boats and stacked them under the cliff in prepared storage areas, from where it was either winched or hauled up by mules from the beach below, enabling the men to mix the concrete. Just how long the work took or how many of these courageous, unselfish sappers were either injured or killed in the process is largely unknown. However, their signature survives today in the form of that cement plaque set into the head of the largest reservoir inscribed – *5 Coy. R.MON.R.E. Aug 1915*.

As previously noted, today the tanks look rather dilapidated, however building them under such trying conditions was an exceptional achievement, all aimed at alleviating the chronic lack of drinking water that had brought dysentery, untold suffering and death to many of the troops.

Perhaps 5 RMRE's final and most vital achievement was in covertly preparing for the evacuation which would start with Suvla Bay, Anzac Cove and finally Cape Helles. One half of the company worked day and night modifying piers to obscure Turkish observation, and cutting holes through the two sunken ships *Messina* and *Sigalion*, to allow troops to pass through them at night and onto lighters coming alongside. Others built and then concealed portable piers that could be wheeled out in the dark from X and W beaches, while the rest of the Monmouth Sappers loaded most of the useable materials onto lighters ready for taking to Mudros.

The front lines were kept at full strength until the final two nights and gun positions remained under camouflage so that although many guns were removed and destroyed, some (mainly French 75mm) remained firing to the end and were then destroyed at the

last moment. There was a final attack on the Turkish lines to show some intent, and then in the dark our infantry hurried quietly down to where a fleet of lighters were waiting to carry them away. One of the Sapper's many Beau Geste-like ruses was to mount rows of rifles along the front line and attach cans to their triggers. Carefully positioned hoses with regularly-spaced holes dripped water into the cans which when full, fired the rifles to give the impression that the trenches were still manned.

With the fuses all set to destroy the Cape Helles HQ facilities, stores and magazines, infantry and Sappers funnelled down in the darkness, along the piers and onto the lighters that were being thrown about by the violent New Year storms. Securing the lighters against this battering by high seas was yet another remarkable achievement by these hearty Welsh engineers. Finally in a series of mighty explosions which showered debris over our retreating forces, the last ships pulled away from the Peninsula shoreline, thus bringing to an end a disastrous campaign that had been hampered at the start by poor planning, inept leadership and a determined and greatly underestimated enemy.

For the surviving Monmouth Sappers, it was on to other battle arenas; the Sinai Peninsula, building water pipelines and pumping stations from the Sweetwater Canal to El Arish and Gaza itself, to Palestine, France and Belgium.



Monmouth Cenotaph, Monmouth Castle

Considering the massive loss of life throughout these campaigns, 5 RMRE suffered just 12 fatalities; their names are inscribed on the cenotaph in the grounds of Monmouth Castle.

Notes:

1. Monmouth Castle, Monmouth, NP25 3BS is open from 2 to 5 pm daily – from 1st April to 31st October (and over Easter, if early). Admission is free – donations are welcomed. It will open at other times – for groups or individuals – on request. Tel: 01600 772175. Email: curator@monmouthcastlemuseum.org.uk

THE SNIPERS' NEST RAID

Ian Gill

By late June 1915, the 10th Light Horse Regiment had been on the Gallipoli Peninsula less than six weeks. In that time casualties had been relatively light, despite a daylight attack on portions of Turkish Quinn's on 30 May led by Lieutenant Tom Kidd of 'B' Squadron. This sortie, while not completely successful, had shown the men's mettle in close quarter combat. In early June the men were moved further north onto Walker's Ridge and nearby No.1 Outpost, which lay just south of Fisherman's Hut. A significant amount of trenching and tunnelling was performed in the latter position, and it was from this location that a small party of men was selected to perform a hastily organised raid on a Turkish position known as Snipers' Nest, which held commanding views of North Beach down to Ari Burnu. Raids of this sort were in their infancy at the time and it would not be until later in the war that more thorough planning and careful reconnaissance replaced the hastily organised efforts of 1915.

The Snipers' Nest raid of 30 June 1915 ultimately failed, albeit with no casualties. Lessons were learned, and for one man, Lance Corporal Henry [Rod] Kingdon, the enterprise proved a most harrowing affair. His survival was testament to his cool thinking and lack of panic in a dangerous situation.

The following is taken from the new regimental history of the 10th Light Horse Regiment, *Gallipoli to Tripoli*, and relates to the raid on Snipers' Nest by a small party of men under Lieutenant 'Paddy' Hamlin of 'C' Squadron. Snipers' Nest was located approximately 500 yards due east of No.1 Outpost, then held by the Regiment, and 300 yards due south of Destroyer Hill and Rhododendron Ridge. The southern fork of the Sazli Beit Dere (valley) ran around the base of the Turk's position and was the approach route ultimately used by Hamlin to make the attack from a northerly aspect.

On the morning of Tuesday 29 June, sentries of 'C' Squadron on Walker's Ridge noticed Turk's on the isolated and precipitous Snipers' Nest carrying sheets of corrugated iron, with which to reinforce their position. This enemy post commanded dominating views towards Anzac, especially on North Beach.

Despite warships and artillery shelling the post regularly, the Turks, who had better



H R R Kingdon rear row fifth from left, Lt. H B Hamlin is front row extreme right

access to local resources, maintained and even strengthened this position from where their snipers took a daily toll on those in and around the beach. Major Love was informed and immediately proposed to brigade headquarters that a reconnaissance be made to determine a method of attack in which to destroy the post. Having received approval for both, Lieutenant Hamlin of 'C' Squadron was detailed to carry out the raid with a party of eight men. Love's orders for the task were despatched to Hamlin:

*Lt H B Hamlin
Senders 36*

30/6/15

Orders for Sniper's Nest raid

You are detailed to command a patrol of 8 NCO's & men, one of whom must be experienced in the use of explosives, to capture and blow up sniper's position on Sniper's Nest, which I had previously pointed out & which is known to you AAA This work is to be carried out between 2030-2230 tonight AAA You will, I think, find the best approach position from trench near No1 Outpost & I suggest you approach position from the rear & return same direction AAA You will at once make a personal reconnaissance from Walker's Ridge trenches and No1 Outpost & intermediate positions of advantage & make all necessary arrangements AAA You can choose any man from the detached miners to accompany you who is experienced in the use of explosives, to demolish the position under your instructions AAA You will be expected back at or before 2330 AAA You will report with your patrol at Regimental HQ at 2200, ready to move off.

From CO 10th LH

Time 1200

AJ Love, Maj^[1]

Lieutenant Hamlin wrote modestly and succinctly in his diary on Wednesday 30th June on returning from the, by then, aborted raid:

Relieved by 'A' troop 11am. In afternoon went around Walkers & No1 Outpost to reconnoitre country round Snipers Rest. At 8.30pm at Major Love's direction, went out with Sgt. Bain [364 Sgt. Duncan Bain] & Cpl. Kingdon + 6 men to try & take Sniper's Rest & blow it up, starting from No1 Outpost. Thunderstorm, vivid lightning when just north of position Turks opened fire so reversed engines for home. Very dark with occasional vivid flashes of lightning. Lost Kingdon on way back. Probably disabled, but has not yet returned. Kennedy and Hallett going out to try & find him on Thursday night.^[2]

Trooper Hugh Gillam, of 'C' troop, 'C' Squadron, recorded his thoughts on the raid on 1 July.

...During the night a party under Lt. Hamlin and consisting of L/Cpl. Kingdon & Tprs. Pride, Bolger, Kennedy, Hallett, Pazarini [sic], Facy [sic] went out to lay and blow up Sniper's Ridge. The night was rather against them being inky black & with lightning now & then. They got out there but encountered Turks in a large body & had to get away as fast as they could being almost surrounded. In the rush Kingdon got lost. The remainder got back to our lines. Next night Hallett and Kennedy again went out to try & find Kingdon. Kingdon returned at 2am safely & the others got back alright later.^[3]

The attempted raid had failed. On the men's final approach to the position, lightning illuminated all before them, the Turks being alert and in sufficient strength. A brisk fire was opened on the raiding party and a hasty retreat was made. Hamlin woke up next day somewhat sore and bruised from his foray into the rugged terrain, while an inquiry was ordered into the disappearance of L/Cpl. Henry Kingdon. There was much criticism in the way in which the raid was ordered so quickly without thorough research and reconnaissance. Lieutenant Tom Kidd wrote damningly of the enterprise, laying the blame squarely at the feet of his commanding officer:

Love organised an idiotic scheme to blow up Sniper's Nest (Ye Gods). Hamlin was deputed to carry it out. Party came back quicker than they went. A fortnights mining & a ton of guncotton might have altered the contours of sniper's nest, but to perform the job in one night under the noses of a strong Turkish outpost & with about 14lb of guncotton appears to me to have emanated from a hysterical brain.^[4]

'Rod' Kingdon wrote to his brother Norman in early May 1916 a long account of his nerve wracking ordeal:

... Stumbling along, softly swearing as the stones rattled, we rounded a bend in the creek about 100 yards from the hill we were to blow up. Our Lieut. in front leading the way, I was 2nd or 3rd following, carrying the gun cotton on my shoulder having handed my rifle

over to the Sgt. who was I believe bringing up the rear of the party. It was extremely hard to tell who was next to you on account of the blackness of the night, and the men were constantly changing positions.

Suddenly a rifle cracked, and the flame from the muzzle appeared to be only a few yards away on our left. Without quite realising what the noise was about I carefully placed the box on the ground and rose just in time to see the flashes and hear the crack of rifles in front and on our left and right and even in our rear. Certainly a trap and a place to get out of at once. A sharp order from our troop leader and down the creek bottom we ran, falling and stumbling against the stones, with the rifle bullets making sparks as they hit the rocks. Remembering the bend I climbed the two foot bank, intending to run parallel with the creek and enter it again after passing the bend.

I soon found out I had made a mistake which might prove fatal to my escape for, although the stones in the creek made it hard to get away fast, it was infinitely harder going through the scrub on the bank. Perceiving my mistake, [I] fell down once and lost valuable time, rose, and fell again — this time into a sort of a hole. Rising quickly onto my knees in time to see a rifle flash and show up the form of a Turk 10 to 15 feet away. By this time rifles were firing from all the hills in the vicinity, and I could hear the men (Turks) rushing past, their water bottles rattling as they ran.

Cut off from my comrades with no weapon to defend myself with I pressed myself down into the hole and waited till things got a bit clearer before venturing out. After about half an hour the Turks returned, having evidently only gone as far as the creek to get a clear range for firing. They were very much excited and were evidently expecting our attack in force, otherwise by advancing they would probably have killed or captured some of my mates. As the Turks returned I could hear and occasionally see them when the lightning flashed, then probing the bushes for persons like myself. Luckily for me they missed my hiding place. I found out I was lying in a small drain about 12 ft. long and 12 inches deep and just wide enough to get my shoulders down. A few bushes hung over the top making a good screen. This drain was made through a little mound to drain a patch of cultivated ground.

My eyes were glued on the first solitary Turk who stood so motionless in the same place waiting and expecting him to move away. Time passed and he still remained, and during a flash of lightning I could perceive more Turks on his right and left, within whispering distance of one another. Suddenly the thought entered my mind that these men formed a "picket line" and would remain there all night.

The storm which had been brewing all night increased in violence and rain started to fall in torrents. The water started to run down the drain and the first chilly touch of it ran through my clothes and trickled down my pants nearly started me out on a bid for more friendly places. The water rose to 4 inches and nearly washed me out of the drain, but I stuck to it and the rain ceased and the water flowed away leaving me lying on a muddy floor.

The sentries were relieved twice during the time I was lying there by a Turkish Officer wearing a thick military over-coat with a revolver strapped on by a leather belt. The relieving was done in silent whispers, and the sentries did not move from the positions they were given, and I could not help admiring their silence and vigilance.

Dawn came and the picket faded away to a spot 50 yards away where they commenced to get a meal ready. Immediately they were gone I commenced to crawl for the creek (which was only 10 yards), across the creek bottom and up the opposite hill. The ground was still very wet and muddy and I had to be as careful as possible not to make my tracks too visible to a chance spying Turk. Crawling under the bush (about 2'6" high) on the hill side I carefully scanned the neighbouring hills and the flat I had just left and felt a chilly sensation creep down my back bone as I saw a Turkish sniper apparently looking straight down at me from a hill 200 yards away. The Turkish piquet had finished breakfast and were sauntering about the flat, and other Turks were also carrying timber and iron up to "the Sniper's Nest". As the scrub was very scanty ahead I decided it was too risky to try and get back that day and made myself comfortable as I could on the steep sloping ground.

Tormented by flies and thirst, I lay there all day turning over from time to time in a vain endeavour to dry my clothes. Once I made certain I would be located when a Turkish Sniper passed down the creek bed and stopped to examine the ground on which I had crawled. He intently looked at the ground for some time and scanned the neighbouring bushes but apparently seeing nothing suspicious he moved on. Had I a rifle, I might have made a name for myself by capturing him and forcing him to remain quiet until night-fall, and then marching him back to Camp. As events turned out I would not have been able to have got him into our lines.

At dusk a strong body of Turks came out of their trenches on the hill-side towards my hiding place and the Officer-in-charge commenced to post the sentries. Then my hope of escape was small as the double line of sentries were posted on a different front to the one occupied on the previous night. Evidently last night's rumpus had scared the Turks and accounted for the double line of sentries, but what really concerned me was that I still had to crawl through these two lines to get back to my comrades.

When quite dark I commenced the most awful wriggle I ever had to do. Slowly raising one hand and knee after the other, I first tested the ground before trusting my weight on possible dead twigs and leaves that the vigilant sentry might hear crack. It took me at least two and half hours to crawl through the danger zone – about 40 or 50 yards, then rising up I quietly stole off through the scrub towards safety, taking a different route to the one I had come out on the previous night. I passed a Turkish Cossack Post and carefully avoided our own out-post & Cossack Post, for I knew it was just as dangerous running into my own men as the enemies. No challenges are given here – it is a case of shooting on sight or hearing.

Jumping into the big trench along the sea front I was halted by the sentry at the barb wire gate and after stating my name was allowed to proceed towards my own lines up the steep hill. It was now 2.30am and the sea looked so inviting and I felt so dirty I decided to have a swim. Feeling much refreshed I climbed the hill and reported back for duty about 3am in the morning.

Every-one was much surprised at my appearance, for they had given me up for dead or captured. Two or three good fellows still persisted in reckoning I was still alive, although possibly wounded and unable to get back. Two of them had set out that night to look for me; they could not get far tho on account of the Turkish outpost and returned just before I got back.

So endeth a little adventure of mine, the details of which might interest you.

R Kingdon

P.S. I found that all the rest of the party returned safely – one chap got grazed on the chin by a bullet.^[5]

The Regiment later participated in the much written of charge at The Nek on 7 August, where the men sustained heavy casualties. They hit back at the Turks three weeks later at Hill 60, where 2/Lt. Hugo Throssell was recommended for, and later awarded, the only Victoria Cross to a member of the Light Horse.

The majority of the original Regiment was evacuated from Gallipoli in November, the others leaving in December, before rejoining their horses in Egypt to rest and re-equip. They then served in Egypt, Sinai, Palestine and Syria, becoming a fine fighting force on horseback as the war progressed. Kingdon would go on to be commissioned later in the war and survive the hostilities. Hamlin was not so lucky, and died of illness on 30th May 1919, having been awarded the DSO and a Mention in Despatches.

Sources:

1. Papers of H B Hamlin, courtesy of Mr Peter Davies. AAA = stop
2. Diary of H B Hamlin
3. Diary of H E Gillam. The named men were No.429 L/Cpl H R R Kingdon, No.708 Tpr. F Bolger, No.428 Tpr. M F Kennedy, No.416 Tpr. J Hallett, No.886 Tpr. D L Passerini, No.396 Tpr. J T Facey and No.632 Tpr. J Pride.
4. Diary and papers of T A Kidd
5. Letter by No.429 L/Cpl H R R Kingdon, 'C' Squadron, 10th Light Horse. Henry Rodney Robert Kingdon was born in Wellington, New Zealand on 15 April 1885. He was an original member of the Regiment and stood just over six feet tall. Kingdon rose to the rank of sergeant on 16 August 1915, and after Gallipoli he saw service in Egypt, Sinai, Palestine and

Syria. He was commissioned a second lieutenant on 30 October 1917 and his officer's report stated that he was excellent in bayonet fighting. The Kingdon letter is reproduced courtesy of G & LE Boyce.

Editor's Note: The book *Gallipoli to Tripoli – 10th Light Horse Regiment AIF 1914–19* by Neville Browning and Ian Gill is available in its second edition direct from Hesperian Press in Perth, Australia (Price:\$A95.00 plus postage). It is a 648 page, B5 hard bound and dust wrapped production with more than 500 photos and a multitude of appendices.

AN ACT OF REMEMBRANCE ON THE DARDANELLES

Simon Bromage

Together with my family, we took a cruising holiday with Thomson Cruises in the summer on board *Thomson Celebration*. One of the ports of call was Istanbul, which meant sailing up the Dardanelles. A ship's announcement three hours before entering the Straits informed all the passengers that the ship intended to honour those who fell on the Gallipoli peninsula and that passengers should assemble on deck for 7.00pm. By 6.45pm the deck was full.

The Cruise Director gave a 'potted history' of the event and as we entered the Straits at 7.00pm, the whole ship fell silent for two minutes whilst passing the Turkish memorial with British and French memorials visible also from the sea. The silence was brought to halt by the sound of the ship's horn. This was the first time I had been near the Gallipoli peninsula and it was a truly moving experience.

I understand that Captain John Westgarth-Pratt, Master of the *Thomson Celebration*, undertakes this Act of Remembrance every two weeks when the ship sails through the Dardanelles.



Gallipoli Association Conference. Peter Hart speaking about 'The French at Gallipoli'
[Pages 8–9]



Gallipoli Association Conference. Chris Pugsley discusses 'The Gallipoli Campaign – valid gamble or forlorn hope?' [Pages 8–9]



Gallipoli Association Conference. Q & A Session (L. to R.) Chris Pugsley, Michael Hickey, Stephen Chambers and Peter Hart [Pages 8–9]



The Association Tour. Ian Walton & Dennis Greenslade (with medals) hold a short service at 'B' Beach, Suvla. [Pages 9–11] Photograph – Stephen Chambers



The Association Tour Group at Gully Spur after walking up Gully Ravine. [Pages 9–11].
Photograph – Stephen Chambers



Some of those attending the Gallipoli Memorial Service at Dersingham [Pages 11–12]



Lieut. Commander Arthur Coxon in St. Nicholas's Church Hall after the Gallipoli Memorial Service at Dersingham [Pages 11–12]



Mal Murray at the Gallipoli Association's stand at the 'Back to Our Past' Exhibition in Dublin [Pages 12–13]



Students from local schools attend the ANZAC Day commemorations at the East Mudros Military Cemetery, Lemnos [Pages 15–17]



The Australian Parliamentary Delegation at the ANZAC Day commemorations at Portianos Cemetery, Lemnos [Pages 15–17]



Blake – The Gallipoli Tortoise
[Page 46] Photograph courtesy of *The Times*



The port side of E14's bow; one of the forward hydroplanes is clearly visible [Pages 46–50]
Photograph – Adnan Büyük.



Savaş Karakaş investigating the periscope of the E14. [Pages 46–50]
Photograph – Erol Öztunalı



The Diving Team which located and photographed the E14 at the Helles Memorial where the missing of E14 are commemorated [Pages 46–50] Photograph – Adnan Büyük.



Remains of dugouts constructed for RNAS Armoured Cars near Pink Farm Cemetery, Cape Helles [Pages 55–56] Photograph – Richard Szwed



Gallipoli Legion of ANZACS Lapel Badges [Page 59]

BRITISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AT SUVLA BAY, AUGUST 1915 – PART 1.

Sarah Pikarski

Introduction

The historiography on the British landing at Suvla Bay in August 1915 pays little attention to intelligence. Where intelligence is discussed, it is the failure to use information properly, in particular that collected before the war, and not the failure to collect enough prior to the landing at Suvla that is considered. The ways in which more detailed intelligence would have seriously advanced the mission are vitally important to our understanding of the failure of the attack at Suvla Bay and resultantly, intelligence is far more important than the historiography reflects. The staff at General Headquarters (GHQ) drew their conclusions from the sketches made of the coastline from ships, captured maps and from aerial photography. This intelligence proved to be relatively accurate and would in no way have jeopardised the operation. Considerably more intelligence was, however, needed to ensure its success, but Hamilton decided it was more important that the attack remained a surprise.

Historians have focused on those factors seen to contribute most seriously to the failure at Suvla. Had the army and navy carried out the necessary reconnaissance, the most important of these factors could have been reduced, or even removed. The most serious factor was the failure of command, in particular of Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stopford, the commander at Suvla. Despite initially being enthusiastic, he became convinced that his men would be attacking a significant number of heavily entrenched Turkish troops, supported by large guns. Regular aerial reconnaissance over the preceding months showed otherwise, but was not enough to convince Stopford. Patrols from the Anzac sector would have been able to confirm the accuracy of the intelligence already collected, but were not sent. If he could have been convinced of the reality of the situation his men would be facing, Stopford would have been far more likely to have pursued a more offensive strategy and achieved the little that was needed for success.

Patrols could also have provided vital information on the topography of the Suvla area. After their experiences on the harsh terrain of Gallipoli, the British should have been aware of the difficulties they could encounter at Suvla. They did not learn this lesson, embarking on the landing at night, without first-hand knowledge of the terrain. Those planning the operation needed detailed intelligence to accurately determine the problems the troops would face. As was subsequently proven, the topographical information that they had was too basic and they failed to grasp the serious difficulties that would be encountered by the troops.

In addition, men suffered for many days with dehydration after failures in delivering water to the beach and from there to the troops. The natural springs and wells in the

bay and on the surrounding hills should have been enough to relieve their suffering. GHQ assumed that this water would be easily found, but most troops were unaware that there was water nearby, let alone where to find it. Patrols could again have confirmed the presence of usable water supplies and pinpointed their location, removing this as an obstacle to success at Suvla.

The lack of intelligence did not cause the landing at Suvla Bay to fail, but had more detailed intelligence been collected and distributed, it might have been enough to remove, or at least reduce those factors that most greatly contributed to this failure. As such, it is far more likely that the mission would have succeeded.

The intelligence they had and why they did not collect more

The intelligence that had been collected before the attack at Suvla Bay provided much vital information for the planning of the operation. Trenches and guns were photographed and plotted, troop numbers and movements were recorded and outposts and strongholds identified. The intelligence section had become an efficient organisation and most of their information proved to be accurate. No intelligence sources were, however, fully utilised as Hamilton decided that ensuring the attack came as a total surprise to the enemy was a greater priority. As a result, not enough was known to guarantee the success of the mission.

The intelligence for the Suvla Bay attack came from four main sources: sketches drawn on the decks of the Royal Navy's ships a few miles from the coast, aerial reconnaissance, captured Turkish maps and patrols sent from beaches occupied by the Allied forces. The sketch on page 39, which gives little accurate information about the Turkish defences, is representative of all similar drawings that were made from the sea and highlights their minimal use in planning an operation, as the distance prevented useful information being obtained. The beaches where they were to land appeared flat, but they could only judge the slope of the beach, whilst distances and heights had to be estimated. These sketches were also of no use in determining the position of any defences that had been erected, or in the topographical planning of the operation. They gave the impression that the task being set for Stopford at Suvla was easier than it was. Hamilton was aware that visual reconnaissance from ships was inadequate and that features were often not as they appeared yet was prepared to base important assumptions on this type of information.

More valuable was aerial reconnaissance, which revealed the 'exact location' of the Turkish trench system, their gun placements and any Turkish troop movements. There were some minor problems with perspective in this relatively new technique, but these did not result in information being missed. Importantly to the Suvla mission, it revealed the limited number of Turks guarding the area. Colonel Samson, who commanded the Royal Naval Air Service, reconnoitred the Suvla area on 23 July 1915 and recalled: "I ... came down pretty low; I couldn't see a sign of life and only a few trenches". Intelligence

officers concluded from photographs that there were only 5 battalions totalling a maximum of 4,000 men plus artillery, to oppose over 20,000 British forces. We know that some of these men were sent to reinforce areas believed to be under greater threat and that there were only 1,500 Turkish infantry and 11 guns opposing the British on the 6 and 7 August, with reinforcements approximately 30 miles away. This was confirmed on the day of the landing.



Pencil sketch from the sea reflecting the limited information available about the defences at Suvla Bay [Source: Papers of Rear Admiral H J England held at and reproduced by courtesy of the Imperial War Museum (London)]

Intelligence officers were also able to inform those who would lead the attack where the Turkish troops were located. Photographs correctly led intelligence officers to identify undefended, weakly held and strongly defended hills and the disposition of the troops in these areas. Aerial reconnaissance was both detailed and accurate and was proven to have located where the Bavarian commander of the Turkish forces at Suvla, Major Wilmer, had positioned his forces. Aerial reconnaissance also confirmed the movement of the Turkish troops towards Suvla Bay in the days following the landing.

Even from its considerable height, aerial reconnaissance was able to determine the limited trenches and barbed wire on the hills, the position of any guns and the absence of defences on the beaches at Suvla. Photographs revealed a maximum of 150 yards of trenches in the Suvla area. All this was shown to be accurate and Hans Kannengiesser, one of the senior Turkish officers on the peninsula, later recalled that the British were always: 'excellently informed as to the whereabouts of our system of communication trenches or ways'. The accuracy of the information provided by aerial reconnaissance is

highlighted by the fact that there are no records of the troops discovering guns, trenches or troops that intelligence had not already identified.

It is necessary to note that the Turks were aware of the British reconnaissance from the air. As the whole peninsula was photographed, it need not, however, have drawn attention to an attack near Suvla. Despite the obvious benefits in the detail that could be collected through aerial reconnaissance, it was intentionally only used sparingly and from a considerable height, in case the Turks were alerted to the intentions of the British. Aerial reconnaissance was also not able to provide all the information that was needed for the attack. This resulted in gaps in intelligence that handicapped both the officers and men who participated.

The information that was collected was plotted on the most accurate maps the British had; namely those they had captured from Turkish prisoners since the April landings. These were important as they gave the Allies, for the first time, a reasonably accurate picture of the peninsula's layout. They did, however, only detail the main spurs on which the British would have to fight, thus not providing all the information that was needed.

The fourth form of intelligence available to the British was information from reconnoitring parties sent from the allied-held beaches. This was the most important form of intelligence available, as at night, the patrols were almost completely secure from detection and would be able to collect very detailed information that could not be provided by other sources. Throughout June, the New Zealand troops in the Anzac sector sent patrols to investigate the local area, some looking specifically at the Suvla plain and routes on to the surrounding ridges. All returned without being detected, proving that reconnaissance on land was possible. To prevent alerting the Turkish forces, patrols were scaled down in July, reducing the amount of intelligence at the time it was most needed. In particular, patrols could have acquired intelligence on the topography of the Suvla area, the local sources of water and the best paths by which to attack the surrounding hills. Instead they were hardly utilised and the invading troops encountered many avoidable problems. This absence of detailed intelligence was crucial to the failure of the attack.

The most important reason for the failure to collect the necessary intelligence was Hamilton's obsessive desire for secrecy. After leaks before the April landing, he became determined to ensure that his next mission remained secret and went to unnecessary lengths to do this. Despite never closely liaising with them, Hamilton believed his intelligence department to be exact in their figures and he trusted their intelligence reports. He seemed to feel that aerial and sea reconnaissance provided enough information, failing to appreciate that they could not provide all the intelligence that was needed. He resultantly did not instruct the collection of intelligence that could have proven instrumental to success. It is likely that he never recognised intelligence to be as important as it was and therefore believed secrecy to be of greater importance. He told

the Dardanelles Commission, which was set up to establish the reasons for the failure to capture the Gallipoli peninsula, that there was both the opportunity and the men to reconnoitre, but even on a dark night it could not be done in case it aroused suspicion. He turned down requests from the Indian Brigade to scout the Suvla area in preparation for the attack, deliberately preventing the collection of vital information. Remarkably, the Dardanelles Commission did not question Hamilton more fully on this and does not recognise its contribution to the failure at Suvla.

It was Hamilton's responsibility to ensure that each man knew his job. Instead, through his excessive secrecy, even his most senior officers were kept ignorant of his intentions. Details of the operation were kept secret until the last minute, even Stopford only being informed of his mission on the 22 July. This was not conducive to a successfully planned attack. The intelligence that had been collected was not distributed to the men who were to participate in, or even lead the operation, in case the Turks discovered that an attack was planned for Suvla Bay. No officer who was to participate in the landing saw a map of the area before midday on the 6 August, whilst some never saw a map. The troops and many officers did not know until they landed where the attack was to take place. When officers were inevitably killed, men of lower rank had to take over, who would never have seen a map of the area, or any of the intelligence that had been collected. It is therefore impossible to understand how men were supposed to identify their objectives. Equally damaging was that General Hammersley, General Officer Commanding (GOC) 11th Division, ordered maps of the Asiatic Coast and distributed them to the British troops, as GHQ believed that any leaked information would convince the Turks that an attack was planned in this area. In doing so, he confused the British troops to an equal, if not greater extent than the Turks.

In rigidly enforcing secrecy at the expense of intelligence, Hamilton was going against all regulations. The 1914 *Field Service Regulations* specifically stressed the importance of intelligence: 'Every commander who orders a night operation which is not preceded by a complete reconnaissance increases the risk of failure and incurs a heavy responsibility. Reconnaissance from a distance is insufficient'. The failures at Suvla proved these regulations correct, and Hamilton wrong. Secrecy was indeed vital to the success of the mission, but Hamilton took it to the extreme and it instead seriously contributed to the failure of the operation. The attack on Suvla did surprise the Turks, but it also confused the British troops.

The intelligence that the British collected, from aircraft, ships and maps proved to be both useful and accurate. It was not, however, enough to ensure the success of the mission. In his planning for the landing, Hamilton intentionally halted the collection of intelligence that his manuals told him he needed, even turning down requests to reconnoitre. As such he prioritised secrecy over knowledge, ensuring that the attacking troops had intelligence of only minimal detail. Had he ordered that additional intelligence be collected and distributed, the attack would have been far more likely to succeed.

Failure of command

The most significant contributory factor to the failure at Suvla Bay was the inept leadership of Stopford. Hamilton intended that bold ideas and execution would overcome the problems encountered through lack of intelligence. Instead, the lack of intelligence compounded the problems created by the inexperienced Stopford. Despite all the intelligence to the contrary, Stopford became convinced that his men would face entrenched Turks in large numbers, with significant firepower. His pessimism was reflected in the operational planning and filtered down in the orders given by his officers during the attack. He rejected the intelligence that the British had collected, believing it could not provide enough guaranteed information. Reconnaissance patrols would have verified the intelligence he was shown and as such might have forced Stopford to recognise the reality of the situation he faced, driving him to push his men to succeed. This failure of command was fundamental to the failure at Suvla and could, at the very least, have been reduced in importance by detailed intelligence.

Stopford was not Hamilton's first choice for commanding officer. He was plucked from obscurity simply because he was senior by date of promotion. Retired since 1909 and aged 61, Stopford had accumulated minimal fighting experience, never leading troops in battle and serving only as a military secretary during the Boer War. As Suvla was seen as the easiest part of the mission, it was believed he was capable, but he had neither the ability, nor the personality, to carry it out successfully. Stopford was told that the key to the operation was for the leading forces to push forward rapidly to seize their main objectives as early as possible on 7 August. It was emphasised on numerous occasions that little resistance was expected. He was initially enthusiastic, declaring himself 'confident of ... success', but over the 15 days that followed, he became pessimistic and progressively scaled down the mission's aims. Despite denying it to the Dardanelles Commission, he became convinced there were heavily armed and entrenched Turks on the beaches, Anafarta plain and the surrounding hills, even though aerial reconnaissance up to and including the day of the attack proved otherwise. He believed that daylight preparation was vital before attacking these powerful defences and became very anxious that he would not get it.

The reason for Stopford's escalating worries was the influence of his Chief Staff Officer, Brigadier-General H L Reed. Brigadier-General Aspinall-Oglander, who helped plan the attack, recalled that Reed had an 'air of one who does not think he is going to achieve his task'. Stopford should have silenced his junior officer and believed in his intelligence, but he was not able to do so. Reed had a good knowledge of the Turkish forces and their ability to fight through his experiences as Military Attaché during the Turkish war with Bulgaria. This made him determined not to underestimate them and fearful of the problems the British could encounter should there be more Turkish troops, guns or trenches than anticipated. Reed had served in France until being posted to Gallipoli and his experiences there also shaped his perception of the situation on the peninsula. He was convinced the men would face 'western front style' trenches and that howitzers were needed. Despite frequent attempts, Aspinall-Oglander failed to make

Reed appreciate the differences in the situation in France to that which he now faced. Reed believed that it was ‘impossible to estimate numbers, [of Turkish infantry] or very difficult’, as the Turks would fool British intelligence analysts by leaving infantry movement and trench digging to night-time, as the British had done in France. He believed that only moving troops or firing guns could be seen by aerial reconnaissance. In the same way, Reed argued that dummy guns and repositioning the real guns would make it appear that the Turkish forces were better armed. He failed to appreciate that the men analysing the photographs would be as aware of this as he was. Reed would have been present when Stopford was given intelligence on Suvla Bay and would therefore have had an immediate impact on the way in which Stopford interpreted this information. Reed’s apparently greater knowledge of both the Turkish forces and aerial reconnaissance allowed him to convince the inexperienced Stopford to disbelieve the intelligence he was shown. The height from which photographs were taken for security, reinforced Reed’s argument that important information could be missed. Despite GHQ’s frequent attempts to reassure him, Stopford became convinced he would find significantly greater numbers of Turkish troops at Suvla than intelligence indicated.

Reed also incorrectly gave Stopford the impression that the Gendarmes they would face would be the pick of the Turkish Army. Even if true, this would not have been important as there were so few of them. Reed convinced Stopford to doubt the intelligence and both believed they would get little further than the beach. They therefore called for a preliminary bombardment and artillery, for which there was no need and which would have removed the element of surprise that was vital to the attack succeeding. On 7 August, the first full day of the attack, aerial reconnaissance was able to warn Stopford that large numbers of Turkish troops were heading towards the Suvla area. Yet again he failed to act and allowed his men to rest rather than attack whilst victory was still possible. Stopford had been defeated in his head before the operation began.

Aerial reconnaissance was the basis of the intelligence used to attempt to convince Stopford, but in addition, Lieutenant-General William Birdwood, Commanding Officer of the Anzac forces, took him to vantage points on the Anzac cliffs to show him the absence of continuous trenches near Suvla. Stopford also viewed Suvla Bay from a destroyer but from both of these, little could be seen of the flat plain hidden by the hills. Translated Turkish intelligence bulletins also never mentioned Suvla, revealing that it was not a cause of any concern or a stronghold for them. All of this together was not enough to convince Stopford that the intelligence department estimates were correct and not Reed.

Stopford wrote to Hamilton on the 3 August, saying that he did not anticipate getting further than the bay itself, but Hamilton and GHQ failed to grasp the seriousness of the situation. They did not realise that additional intelligence was needed to convince Stopford of the reality of the situation, or that his pessimism was jeopardising the whole attack. The intelligence that they had was repeatedly shown to be insufficient to convince either Stopford or Reed, when intelligence from more varied sources might

have done. As a result of Hamilton's insistence on secrecy, not enough intelligence had been collected to convince Stopford that his task was an achievable one.

The allies had been established on the peninsula since the end of April. The information that they had gathered had been useful, but reconnaissance patrols close to the date of the landing were needed to reinforce other intelligence and ensure the situation had not changed. Instead, Hamilton halted these patrols in the lead-up to the attack, allowing Stopford to believe that the area could have been reinforced and better defences erected since men last patrolled. It would have been relatively easy to carry out these vital patrols before the attack and even if infrequent, they would have provided Stopford with the guaranteed, eyewitness proof that he needed to reinforce the intelligence that he already had. This would probably have been enough to convince him of the weakness of the Turkish defences, which might have altered his actions before and during the attack at Suvla, making him urge his men forward to capture the sparsely occupied hills Hamilton so desperately desired. This intelligence could have been so important, yet was never collected, as Hamilton was unwilling to risk compromising the secrecy of the mission.

Hamilton's leadership style was such that he told his subordinates their resources and aims, but left it up to them how to achieve them. This would not have been problematic had a positive and purposeful leader been left to make these plans. When the job instead fell to the pessimistic Stopford, his instructions had ingrained within them his lack of optimism and drive. He wanted to push on to the high ground, but did not believe this would be easy or even possible and this came across in his orders. Stopford reduced the aims of the landing from the capture of the surrounding hills, to simply becoming established on the beach, as he came to believe heavy resistance would make nothing more possible. Capturing the hills was only to be done if it would not be detrimental to the landing and capture of Suvla Bay itself. He told his men to advance only if not heavily resisted by men or artillery and not to 'make frontal attacks on entrenched positions' and instead to 'try to turn any trenches' as there was not enough artillery support. This wasted vital time and makes it very clear that he did not believe the intelligence that showed there to be very few trenches, none of them continuous. He was setting conditions and providing excuses for his officers, which gave the men on the ground a reason not to push forward. This was definitely not the decisive leadership and motivation that was needed. Stopford seemed not to have fully realised how important it was to progress rapidly. He was looking for problems which the intelligence showed would not be encountered and failed to press forward his numerical advantage whilst he could. If Stopford could have been convinced of the limited obstacles in his path, it is likely he would have planned a more offensive operation.

The failure of command was also found amongst other officers. As a result of Hamilton's secrecy, the commanders on the ground knew little or nothing of the strength of the enemy, or the country they were in. The intelligence that had been collected, in particular in the form of maps, had not been adequately distributed. This

resulted in officers being far less able to solve problems as they arose. With more widely available intelligence, they would have been able to deal with the situations they encountered. Instead they were not equipped to think for themselves, only follow Stopford's pessimistic and ineffective orders. This was exacerbated as most of the commanding officers were ingrained in the ways of western front fighting and therefore desired to dig in, rather than press on. When men were tired and thirsty, being resisted, however lightly, became a good excuse to follow Stopford's instructions and halt the attack. GHQ mistakenly believed that the officers who landed would realise that Stopford and Reed overestimated their Turkish opposition and push on. Instead they followed Stopford's cautious orders and the attack became almost certain to fail. This is clearly illustrated when at dawn on the 7th, news was relayed to Hammersley from the Anzac sector that the Turks were retiring from Suvla. He ordered an attack on Chocolate Hill, but it was carried out with trepidation, as his officers were not convinced that they would not find themselves faced with enemy entrenchments. Despite limited resistance, it took until dusk to succeed. More importantly, despite the fact they were now only two miles from their main objective, no orders were given to press forward. This saw the British attack grind to a halt when the Turks had yet to be reinforced and they could have swept them aside. Hammersley, like his fellow officers, did not have the confidence to take decisive action.

All the historiography on Suvla Bay states that greater pressure and determination from Stopford throughout the mission would have seen the attack succeed. Without this, it became almost impossible. Increased intelligence to confirm that which they already had, would have probably been enough to convince him that there were only minimal Turkish defences and therefore no need for artillery preparation. He would resultantly have been far more likely to force the attack forward. His determined instructions could also have resulted in more decisive action being taken by the troops on the ground. This would have increased the likelihood of the attack on Suvla succeeding. The intelligence that GHQ was able to provide was accurate, but more importantly, it was not enough to convince Stopford or the influential Reed. If proof was what Stopford needed, Hamilton should have provided it.

Editor's Notes:

1. The final part of this article will be published in the Spring 2013 issue and will examine factors such as terrain and the lack of water in terms of the conduct and ultimate failure of the Suvla campaign, and will present the author's conclusions.
2. After consulting the author, I took an editorial decision to exclude the lengthy 'notes on sources' and bibliography from the published version. This was necessary because of space constraints and to avoid publication of the article continuing into in three parts. Should any reader wish to have a copy of the original article including these notes etc. I would be happy to supply this but a pre-paid large-letter (A4 envelope) would be appreciated.

‘THE GALLIPOLI TORTOISE’

I am grateful to the many readers who alerted me to media coverage of the tortoise, named ‘Blake’ (after the village of Blakeney in Norfolk), which was brought back from Gallipoli in 1915 by a soldier named Marris. Sadly, nothing is known about Mr Marris’s war service beyond the fact that he served at Gallipoli.

According to the news reports, ‘Blake’ – see photograph on page 34 – outlived his soldier-owner and was looked after by his widow until 1983 when Mrs Marris gave it to Mrs Marion Skinner whose hobby was breeding tortoises. When Mrs Skinner gave-up her hobby this year ‘Blake’ came into the care of the Norfolk Tortoise Club who are trying to find him a new home. News reports suggested that Blake’s last owner expressed a wish for the tortoise to be returned to Gallipoli and this was picked up by several Turkish newspapers who reported that the Mayor of Canakkale was ‘demanding’ the reptile’s return to Turkey! Fortunately, in the Editor’s view, international regulations would make this very difficult and hopefully ‘Blake’ will find a home to his liking in Norfolk.

This is not the first time that a tortoise has featured on the pages of *The Gallipolian*. In the Autumn 1986 issue (No. 51) there was an article about another tortoise, called ‘Ali Pasha’, which was brought back from Gallipoli by Henry Friston RN, who was serving aboard HMS *Implacable* and picked up the tortoise while assisting wounded into boats for evacuation. ‘Ali’ spent two years on the cruiser before being Henry brought him ‘home’ to Lowestoft in Suffolk. Thus, by one of those strange co-incidences ‘Ali Pasha’ was a near neighbour of ‘Blake’.

Sadly, the publicity was not beneficial as in 1987 the journal (No. 55) reported Ali’s demise although it appears that he was already fully grown when he came to Suffolk.

THE ENEMY I RESPECT: *HMS E14*

Savaş Karakaş – Film-maker & Diver

My hunt for the long lost WW1 ships and submarines in the Dardanelles has been going on for over 15 years now. I started diving, filming and documenting these sacred war graves in 1997 with the *Gallipoli: History in the Depths* documentary. Some of the major battleships like HMS *Irresistible*, HMS *Triumph*, HMS *Majestic* and landing craft, along with trawler *Lundy* were among the first I visited. They clearly showcase not only the Naval Assault of 18 March 1915 but also the subsequent land campaign, which started on 25 April.

But the tragedy of Gallipoli, where my grandfather took part and was wounded in


action, was not staged on the surface of the sea and on land alone. Submarines also joined this frontal attack on the Ottoman Empire, and a few of those were the only ones to reach its capital, Istanbul. In the First World War, Allied submarines had to brave a series of natural and man-made obstacles in their fight to enter the Sea of Marmara: swift and swirling currents, mines and heavy nets strung across the Dardanelles Strait to ensnare them. During the campaign more than half those that attempted the passage were lost, but some managed the ‘mission impossible’. To pinpoint Gallipoli’s lost submarines we launched a new expedition in 2004 with the collaboration of Mr Selçuk Kolay, the famed underwater researcher, who discovered the wreck of HMAS *AE2* in the Sea of Marmara in 1998. Our objective was not only to find the wrecks of the British and French submarines lost in the Dardanelles but also to document some of the Turkish vessels, which were the victims of Allied submarine attacks.

The *Gallipoli: War Beneath the Waves* documentary revealed not only the wrecks but also the major role played by the submarines during the Gallipoli Campaign. Both sides inflicted heavy losses on their opponents with silent and secret attacks coming from the deep. In fact, on the allied side, along with the miraculous evacuation of Gallipoli, the operations of British submarines in the Sea of Marmara should be counted as the most successful phase of the whole campaign. Certainly one must not forget the bitter losses of the HMAS *AE2*, the French boats *Joule*, *Mariotte*, *Saphir* and *Turquoise* and the British submarines *E7*, *E14*, *E15* and *E20*. We have located and identified most of those boats which became eternal POWs in Turkish waters. However, *E14*’s wreck could never be reached despite the fact that its whereabouts was clearly known. Yet Kumkale, the site of a Turkish naval base where *E14*’s story came to an end in 1918, still poses a challenge for the researchers.

In 1915, HMS *E14* was very active in the Dardanelles. Following HMAS *AE2*, it was the second submarine to successfully force a passage through Dardanelles and the first to sink an Ottoman war vessel in the Sea of Marmara. We have also dived and filmed the *Nur-ülBahir*, a gun boat which was torpedoed on 1 May 1915 off Mürefte, where 4 Turkish officers and 32 ratings lost their lives. *E14* managed this type of successful sorties three times in 1915 and its commander, Lieutenant-Commander Edward Boyle was awarded the Victoria Cross.

In 1918, *E14* got back to the Dardanelles, this time to finish off Ottoman Navy’s flagship *Yavuz* (ex-*Goeben*) at Nagara point. *Yavuz* along with the light-cruiser *Midilli* (ex-*Breslau*) made a surprise attack on Imbros Island, where British had a base harbouring Royal Navy’s war vessels. Nevertheless, the British minefields took its toll in the Aegean Sea, where *Midilli* was sunk and *Yavuz* had to limp back to the Dardanelles for safety and finally grounded at Nagara. On 27 January 1918, it was *E14*’s turn to launch a surprise attack on the stranded *Yavuz* but *E14* reached Nagara only to discover that *Yavuz* had been towed back to Istanbul just hours before. However, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Saxton White, *E14*, fired a torpedo

at another vessel, but it exploded prematurely and alerted the Ottoman forces. *E14* now had to make its way down the Dardanelles under fire.



The E14 alongside SS Oruba [Reproduced courtesy of The Royal Navy Submarine Museum, Gosport (Negatives 3135 & 5341)]

Damaged and flooding *E14* navigated through the dense minefields and anti-submarine nets and almost made it to the entrance of the Dardanelles, but suddenly her controls became unresponsive and the air on board began to run out. As White climbed up on deck to navigate, the vessel was instantly battered by intense bombardment by shore batteries. Realizing the submarine could not reach the open sea, he directed her towards a nearby beach, in an effort to save the crew. A survivor recalled that his last words were – “*We are in God’s hands now*”, uttered moments before he was killed by a shell and soon afterwards, the submarine went under. Only nine of *E14*’s crew were rescued and taken prisoners by the Turks. For his self-sacrifice, Lieutenant-Commander White was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. He has no known grave and is commemorated on the Portsmouth Naval Memorial.

So we have long been anxious to locate this unique submarine of the Royal Navy – the only one in which the two commanding officers won the Victoria Cross for their exploits aboard. After collecting and researching information from the National Archives in Kew regarding HMS *E14*’s loss near Kumkale on 28 January 1918, Selçuk Kolay and I carried out side-scan sonar survey and proton magnetometer search in the area. Approximately one mile to the west of a related wreck marked on the Admiralty chart, our three-year search against sea traffic, heavy seas and swift currents of the Dardanelles Strait yielded some positive results. But as this location is within a

restricted military zone, we had to seek special diving permits from the Turkish General Staff to confirm our expectations. Unfortunately, in 2010, our official applications were turned down and our hopes were delayed.



Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Saxton White

Two years later, only after a film crew from Turkish Radio and Television dived first, the permits we had been waiting desperately for were granted. In June 2012, about 350m. off Kumkale, we dived against the 4 knot currents, where *E14* had fought and possibly lost control some 94 years ago. We were in two separate groups; one included me and the technical diving supervisor Erol Öztunalı. Selçuk Kolay, underwater (U/W) photographer Adnan Büyük and U/W cameraman Engin Aygün were in the second group. Below 12 meters it was strangely calm and the great excitement was to discover that the wreck of *E14* lies in just 20 m. of water. [See photograph on page 35 of the Autumn issue]. The submarine is largely buried at an angle of 45 degrees in a 30 degrees sloping sandy bottom, with only 7-8 m. of the coral-encrusted bow and the forward hydroplanes remaining visible. The other visible part is the approximately 2m. of its periscope now popping out of the sand (see photographs of both features on pages 34-35).

We forwarded the U/W photos and asked for the comments of various experts. It is now certain that the wreck we discovered is indeed the *E14* Mr R G Todd, Key Specialist Curator, Historic Photographs & Ship Plans Section at the National Maritime Museum, London has kindly supplied us the following information:

‘The British submarines E14, E15 and E16 were unique in this class in that they were the only ones that had their forward hydroplanes in the upper casing. These hydroplanes

were stowed flat on the fore-and-aft line within the casing when not in use and were rotated 90 degrees horizontally when deployed for underwater transit. They are clearly shown on your photograph of the wreck and this feature alone positively identifies the wreck as one of these three vessels. E16 (1914) can be discounted because she was sunk by mine in the North Sea. E15 (1914) can also be discounted as her demise by stranding at Kephez Point on 15 April 1915 and her subsequent destruction and demolition are very well documented. The wreck therefore has to be the E14 (1914) which was mined and sunk off Kum Kale on 27 January 1918.

As built these three submarines had "hooked" bows and no guard rails to their hydroplanes. During 1915-1916 every attempt was made to make these boats less susceptible to being caught up on mine cables or nets. The work undertaken included fitting "straight" bows instead of the "hooked" type and fitting guard rails round the hydroplanes but E15 (1914) was sunk before these alterations could be implemented.

Considering the shape of the hydroplanes, 2 torpedo tubes and their location, the distance between the periscope and the bow, the shape of the walking deck, the hawser openings and the fact that no other submarine was lost in this area, there is no doubt that this is the E14. And clearly every effort should be made to protect E14 wreck site as a war grave in respect to the 23 submariners who were lost on board.

A photograph of the diving team can be found on page 35.

Finally, readers may like to know that the book *Echoes from the Deep: Wrecks of the Dardanelles Campaign* (to be published in Turkish & English) will be launched in May 2013. This will contain the secrets of shipwrecks from the *Bouvet* to *Ocean*, *Goliath* to *Carthage*, and from *Joule* to HMS E14. The book is illustrated with 3D multi-beam sonar survey images, underwater photographs and archive stills of 32 wrecks related to Gallipoli Campaign. The project is led by Mr Selçuk Kolay of Kolay Marine Ltd. and Mr Okan Taktak of Derinsu (Deepwater) Ltd., with Mr Kolay being the head of the research team and Mr Taktak responsible for the 3D multi-beam sonar surveys. In addition, the book will include a documentary DVD, produced by Savaş Karakaş Productions, showcasing how the sonar survey was done, how dives to photograph the wrecks took place and the book was compiled.

BAD DAY AT MUDROS

Michael Hickey

The evocative photograph of the wrecked submarine E14 in the Autumn issue of *The Gallipolian* reveals a story of calamitous mistakes leading to the loss not only of E14 but of two Royal Naval monitors, the destruction of the former German cruiser *Breslau* and

the crippling of the ex-*Goeben* whose presence throughout the war in Constantinople and the Black Sea exercised a major influence on allied naval strategy.

In January 1918, nearly two years after the withdrawal of allied forces from the Gallipoli peninsula, the allied naval blockade of the Dardanelles was still in force. The great harbour of Mudros on the island of Lemnos was the location for the Senior Naval Officer (SNO) and Flag Officer commanding the Aegean squadron, Rear Admiral Hayes-Sadler. The heavy elements of the squadron were the pre-dreadnought battleships *Lord Nelson* (flagship) and *Agamemnon* (Captain Dumas). The headquarters and depot ship was an old cruiser, and two monitors, *Raglan* and M28, were normally at anchor in Kusu Bay, at Imbros, some 15 miles from the Dardanelles entrance, and observation posts were located on the offshore islands and on Rabbit island just off the entrance.

In the first week of the new year there seemed no sign of the emergence of *Goeben* or *Breslau* (since 1914 *Sultan Selim* and *Medilli* respectively). One British submarine, E12, was on station; but having mechanical problems when, on 16 January, Hayes-Sadler sent a curious message to Captain Dumas: '*I shall go to Salonika in Lord Nelson tonight...better keep quiet about LN leaving, I'm not telling anyone except those intimately concerned. Hope you are not getting too many worries...*'. Dumas was now wearing several hats; Captain of *Agamemnon*, SNO Lemnos, and Military Governor of Lemnos, Imbros and Tenedos. He was dumbfounded by his admiral's decision to use half the battle squadron as a private yacht, for he had the steam yacht *Triad* at his disposal. Should the two enemy ships emerge to give battle the pre-dreadnoughts would have stood little chance anyway; they could barely exceed 15 knots and each carried four elderly 12 inch guns (the monitors could muster two 14-inch and one 9.2 inch between them) The former *Goeben* could easily outgun and outpace Hayes-Sadler's obsolete battleships and destroy them with its sophisticated gunnery system (whose mechanical computers are still displayed in the Turkish naval museum in Istanbul).

On the night of his admiral's departure in the flagship, an unhappy Dumas wrote in his diary: '*Personally I think it is mad & if anything could make Goeben come out this will, and we with hopelessly divided force...*' He guessed correctly; enemy aerial reconnaissance detected the absence of the flagship, and Vice-Admiral von Ribeur-Paschwitz, the aggressive commander of the German *Mittelmeerddivision*, ordered *Sultan Selim* and *Madilli* to break out of the Dardanelles on a raiding mission. Very early on 20 January they emerged into the Aegean undetected by the observers on Rabbit Island in the morning haze. At once they attacked the two monitors at Imbros, both caught at anchor. The surgeon of *Raglan*, ashore for a morning's shooting, was the appalled spectator of what happened. *Raglan* took fire and was scuttled and M28 blew up. The surgeon ran to the shore where he found desperately wounded men '*... running around without hands or arms...*'. Dumas was about to breakfast when the unwelcome news reached him:

'Was called at 7.55 from Tenedos....G & B out and attacking Raglan and M28 in Kusu

Bay ...ordered steam for full speed for immediate action... shaved bathed dressed and had breakfast quite calmly, while on deck the ship was prepared for battle. While weighing anchor was astonished to hear that Breslau was apparently sinking & then that she had sunk which I piped and the cheers were general and heartfelt. Then a signal that Goeben was returning to the Straits.

Dumas' action in preparing for battle against odds that would certainly have destroyed his ship would have commended him to Nelson and Drake but he doubtless shared his crew's relief. *Raglan's* surgeon, now down on the beach attending to the wounded crewmen, was surprised to see a heavy explosion near *Goeben's* stern. She had hit an unexpected mine; soon after, *Breslau* hit several mines in succession and sank rapidly.

Captain Dumas faced up to the situation calmly, signalling the Admiralty, Commander in Chief Mediterranean, despatching two destroyers to bring the truant Hayes-Sadler back to Lemnos, sending another destroyer to pick up *Breslau's* survivors – some 170 of them before Turkish destroyers arrived on the scene and opened fire on the rescuers who had to leave over 200 German sailors in the water. *Goeben* had managed to get back as far as the Chanak Narrows and was now beached at Nagara Point (where Lord Byron had swum the Straits nearly a century earlier). Further news now came from Hayes-Sadler who had changed his mind, returned to Salonika and re-embarked in *Lord Nelson*, arriving back at Mudros at 11am. '*Quite cheerful & actually looking for credit whereas in my opinion he is damned for ever*' wrote the incensed Dumas in his diary, very understandably ending with '*very tired and bed early...*'. The only submarine immediately available to arrack the damaged *Goeben* was E12 but she had one shaft out of action and Dumas was dubious of its ability to carry out this hazardous attack.

To maintain the offensive, a series of bombing attacks were now made by the RNAS on the stricken Battle cruiser; all were ineffective as the bombs were feeble and even when hitting their target failed to inflict damage. Vice Admiral Calthorpe, Naval C in C, now arrived at Mudros and a council of war was convened on 25 January to address the situation. Little was achieved and two days later Dumas recorded in his diary that '*Goeben has got off which is an everlasting disgrace to our initiative...*'. On the previous evening he saw off E14 – E12's replacement – setting out for the narrows in a forlorn attempt to torpedo *Goeben*. He recorded '*... I believe they are all going to certain death & no prospect of success so that it was rather pathetic to wave them goodbye and wish them good luck...*'. On 30 January news arrived the *Goeben* was back at Constantinople; Dumas recorded '*... and the whole reason is just apathy and lack of energetic understanding on the part of Calthorpe and Hayes-Sadler....also heard of the sinking of E14*'.

The tragedy of the loss of E14 is dealt with in a report by Sir Eric Geddes, 1st Lord of the Admiralty from 1917, following a fact-finding tour of the Mediterranean, from which it is clear that Hayes-Sadler had been given authority '*...because of the great value of success*' to send the damaged E12 up the Dardanelles whilst *Goeben* was still stranded at Nagara but failed to do so.. After Dumas had seen E14 off on her last mission she was

taken up through the Narrows only to find that the victim had escaped. Ominously, on the evening of 28 January heavy gunfire was heard from up the Dardanelles and Dumas commented ‘...*we fear the worst*’. As noted in the article by Savaş Karakaş⁹ above, E14’s Captain, Lieutenant-Commander, attacked a merchant ship off Chanak but there appears to have been a premature detonation of the torpedo almost immediately after launch. E14, now badly damaged, attempted to regain the open sea but was flooding and White decided to surface at the mouth of the Straits, off the heavily armed fort at Kum Kale, which immediately scored direct hits, jamming the conning tower hatch; White managed to get the forward hatch opened and ordered the crew to abandon ship. He was last seen trying to get as many of his men to safety as possible. He was awarded a posthumous VC. Hayes-Sadler was removed from his command.

ROBERT GIBBINGS (1889-1958)

– Artist and Gallipoli Veteran

Timothy Daunt

The *Three War Artists at Gallipoli* featured in the Spring 1998 issue of *The Gallipolitan* (No. 86) were not the best-known artists at the Dardanelles. That distinction belongs to Robert Gibbings, a prolific artist and author, who sadly seems to have produced only two works on Gallipoli: two etchings – of *Achi Baba* and *W Beach* – engraved on copper in 1918 from sketches made at Gallipoli in 1915. Gibbings wrote and illustrated a dozen travel books and illustrated many by other authors. He was a founder of the Society of Wood Engravers and, as owner/director of the Golden Cockerel Press from 1924 to 1933, he collaborated closely with Eric Gill, most notably in publication of *The Four Gospels*, a copy of which was recently on sale for £10,000^[1].

The Anglo-Irish son of a Church of Ireland parson, Gibbings was born and brought up in Cork. He was cycling home on 1 August 1914 on a stretch of road beside the river Lee, when a car overtook him and stopped:

“Hello Bob, what are you going to do if war breaks out?” asked the cheery R.A.M.C. major who was driving.

“What war?” I asked.

“Against Germany”, he said. “Any day now, looks mighty like it”.

“I suppose I’ll come along and enlist”, I said.

“Nonsense, man”, he answered; “get a commission. Go down to the Munster depot at Kinsale and they’ll give you one. Of course they will.”


.....On 15th August I was gazetted second lieutenant in the 4th Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers Some time in September I reported in shining new uniform, not

knowing with which hand I ought to give or take a salute. Six months later I was confirmed in my commission with high marks, the troops temporarily at my disposal being determined to make the right manoeuvres however wrong my commands ^[2]..

After the carnage on V Beach, the Munsters needed reinforcement: Gibbings, now a full lieutenant, sailed for the Eastern Mediterranean with a draft in late April. They were thrilled:

I had my first sight of Malta with its mediaeval battlements and then of the Aegean Islands, unsubstantial as mist, rising from a mirror-like sea. "Almost worth it even if we don't come back," I thought ^[3].

Writing home on 5 May from the trenches on the peninsula, Gibbings wanted Woodbines sent for the 'awfully good fellows' under his command. His ear for dialect and close sympathy with rank and file are demonstrated in letters to his father recounting the snatches of conversation he overheard. "*Be japers when this war's over if I see as much as two dogs fighting in the street, I'll dig meself a dug out on the spot*". On inspection of a large shell fragment: "*Well now, aren't they dangerous things after all*" ^[4]. He reported that the trenches at the front '*... are not bad except to put it crudely for the smell of 'dead Turk' which is noticeable practically everywhere*' ^[5].



W Beach by Robert Gibbings

In temporary command of his company, he moved forward with its leading elements on 28 June in the attack in the area of Gully Beach. As enemy fire intensified, he suddenly felt '*what seemed like a blow from a sledge hammer tearing my whole throat away & at the same time a heavy bang on the left arm*'^[6]. He had been hit by a bullet which went right through his neck just below the jaw, burying itself in his left arm. He spent eighteen hours on a stretcher at a dressing station before being shipped to Lemnos. The bullet, which he kept as a lucky charm for the rest of his life, could not be removed until 12 July. Writing to his father from hospital on Lemnos, he was glad to be '*... away from the continual noise. I had exactly 4 weeks of it & I never want to see any more... I am glad that I was hit early in the day as I hear the bloodshed was awful on both sides but we took our 5 lines of trenches as ordered..... I may be coming home. I sincerely hope so. I don't feel capable of any more fighting*'^[7].

Gibbings's wounds were grave; and mentally the scars went even deeper. He was not back on light duties until the autumn of 1916. Posted to Salonika as a captain in February 1917, his wounds again caused trouble and he was evacuated to hospital in Malta and then to a desk job in the Ministry of Munitions^[8]. He was invalided out of the Army in April 1918. The prolonged neuropathic effects of his Gallipoli experiences delayed but did not prevent the start of a career as a wood engraver, sculptor and author, who illustrated a total of 61 books and, by the time he died in 1958, had his work displayed in 21 public collections worldwide.

Notes:

1. Website of William Reese Co, New Haven, CT, USA
2. R Gibbings in *The Wood Engravings of Robert Gibbings* J M Dent 1959: page xxxiv of *Some Recollections ...*
3. Ibid
- 4–7. R Gibbings: letters to his father
8. *The Life and Work of Robert Gibbings* – M J Andrews; Primrose Hill Press 2003, pages 25 – 31

AN INTERESTING FIND

Readers will recall that the Spring 2012 issue of *The Gallipolian* (No. 128) featured a veteran's account of the Third Battle of Krithia (*75 Years On – A Veteran Remembers*) which touched on the role of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) Armoured Cars. I also included a photograph from *The War Illustrated* showing a number of cars in partially entrenched positions.

More recently, I received a photograph taken by **Richard Szwed** near Pink Farm Cemetery in May 2012 showing several large parallel pits, clearly man-made, near the remains of trenches – see photograph on page 36. Initially, Richard didn't know what

they were for but following further research he believes that they used to ‘house’ armoured cars. In support of this, he drew attention to the article by Stephen Chambers in the Autumn 2001 issue of *The Gallipolian* (No. 96) entitled ‘*Royal Naval Armoured Car Division at Gallipoli – 1915*’. This noted that:

‘... Eight Rolls Royce armoured cars were brought ashore at Cape Helles in May and parked in specially prepared dugouts just off the West Krithia Road between Pink Farm and the beach...’

This article featured a photograph showing ‘*Sub-Lieut. The Hon. Francis McLaren with his car in a dugout, Helles, May 1915*’ together with an illustration showing ‘*RNAS Armoured cars advancing along the Krithia road to the front.*’

PORTIANOS CEMETERY, WEST MUDROS


Readers will recall that the Portianos Cemetery, West Mudros was mentioned in the article, ‘Lemnos and the Great War’, by Nigel Crompton, which appeared in the Winter 2010 issue of the *Gallipolian* (No. 124) ^[1]. More recently, when reviewing a number of papers and photographs ‘inherited’ from my predecessor I came across the photograph on page 57 showing a group of six soldiers or sailors working in Portianos Cemetery, which was donated by member, **Mr W J Kemp**. The photograph originally belonged to **Pte. G A Fairbanks**, Portsmouth Battalion, Royal Marines. Sadly, there is no information as to when the photograph was taken but the 1st Royal Naval Brigade was on Lemnos for the first few months of 1916.

The photograph attracted my attention because it is possible, using a magnifying glass, to identify several of the names on the wooden crosses in the first two rows, which now form Rows A & B of Plot III in the cemetery. Interestingly, when establishing the cemetery on a permanent basis the then Imperial War Graves Commission retained the graves and rows in Plot III in their original position. This was presumably because the cemetery, being outside the battle area, had been laid out in a uniform way with a degree of permanence rather than in an ad-hoc manner as was often the case elsewhere. This meant that I was also able to identify a number of other graves adjoining those already identified through the photograph.

The Commonwealth War Graves Commission’s (CWGC) Debt of Honour website provides the following information about the cemetery and its location:

The hamlet of Portianos is situated on the west side of Mudros Bay, on the Greek island of Lemnos (Lemnos), in the north-east Aegean Sea. Because of its position, the island of Lemnos played an important part in the campaigns against Turkey during the First World War. It was occupied by a force of marines on 23 February 1915 in preparation for the military attack on Gallipoli, and Mudros became a considerable Allied camp. The 1st

and 3rd Canadian Stationary Hospitals, the 3rd Australian General Hospital and other medical units were stationed on both sides of Mudros Bay and a considerable Egyptian Labour Corps detachment was employed. After the evacuation of Gallipoli, a garrison remained on the island and the 1st Royal Naval Brigade was on Lemnos, Imbros and Tenedos for the first few months of 1916. Portianos Military Cemetery was begun in August 1915 and used until August 1920. The cemetery now contains 347 Commonwealth burials of the First World War and five war graves of other nationalities.



The Casualties

I have been able to identify the following graves in Plot III shown in the photograph .

Front Row (Far left) [Row B, Grave 294]: No. 2745 Pte. **Hubert H Rosser**, 10th Bn. Australian Infantry. Died 27 December 1915. Son of James and Elizabeth Rosser of Jamestown, South Australia. Native of Hallet, South Australia.

Front Row (Second from left) [Row B, Grave 295]: No. 24018 Pte. **J Duffy**, 11th Bn. Manchester Regiment. Died 17 December 1915. Son of Mr P Duffy of 17 Castle Street, Rochdale, Lancashire.

Front Row (Third from left) [Row B, Grave 296]: No. 30673 Pte. **William W**

Brierley, 'C' Coy. 4th Bn. Worcestershire Regiment. Died 29 December 1915. Age 22. Son of Samuel and Jane Brierley.

Front Row (Fourth from left) [Row B, Grave 297]: No. 105 **Pte. Frederick Stanley Farrell**, 12th Bn. Australian Infantry. Died 29 December 1915. Age 19. Son of D and the late Jane Farrell

Second Row (Far Left) [Row A Grave 264] – Black Cross: No. 22811 **Pte L J Waghorn**, 1st Garrison Bn. Essex Regiment. Died 12 December 1915. Son of Mr J Waghorn of 117 Pembury Road, Tonbridge, Kent.

Second Row (Second from Left) [Row A Grave 265]: No. 3849 **Acting Bombardier H Carr**, 22nd Division, Royal Garrison Artillery. Died 13 December 1915. Age 48. Son of Francis and Elizabeth Carr of Stockton-on-Tees.

Second Row (Third from left – obscured by soldier with one arm on hip) [Row A Grave 266]: Pte. 20906 **J Collins**, 9th Bn. Worcestershire Regiment. Died 14 December 1915.

Second Row (Fourth from left) [Row A Grave 267]: No. G/13585 **Pte. John J Willis**, 2nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers. Died 13 December 1915. Age 29. Son of Mrs W M Macfarlane (Formerly Willis) of Sydney, New South Wales.

Second Row (Fifth from left – obscured by the NCO with both arms on hip) [Row A Grave 268] 42968 **Gnr. E Hotchkiss**, Royal Field Artillery. Died 14 December 1915. Son of Mr W Hotchkiss, of Lomore Common, Winstanton, Salop.

Second Row (Sixth from left – obscured by soldier with both arms on hip) [Row A Grave 269] No. G/7055. **Pte. William J Wagerfield** 2nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers. Died 14 December 1915. Age 19. Son of James and Kate Wagerfield, of 29, Lancaster Rd., Ealing, London.

Second Row (Seventh from left – Black cross with circular panel) [Row A Grave 270]: No. M2/116687 **Pte. C Whitelaw**, Army Service Corps. Died 15 December 1915. Age 35. Husband of Mrs Belle Whitelaw of 67 North Park Street, Glasgow.

The Cemetery Today

The photograph reproduced on page 59 was kindly provided by **Nigel Crompton** and although not an exact match it shows a general view south-eastwards across the cemetery from the Cross of Sacrifice overlooking Plot III, which lies beyond the HMS *Endymion* Memorial; the first row being Row C (not visible in the 1916 photograph), then Rows B and A.



Portianos Cemetery, West Mudros in 2009

Note 1. See also the article by Jim Claven on ANZAC Day commemorations on Lemnos on pages 15–17 of this issue.

GALLIPOLI LEGION OF ANZACS

Member **David Kirton** from Perth, Western Australia has provided an interesting follow-up to Simon Kleinig's article '*An Original ANZAC'S Dinner*' which appeared in the last issue of *The Gallipolian*. The latter mentioned that in 1934 the ANZACs formed themselves into 'The Gallipoli Legion of ANZACS' membership being open to anyone who had served at Gallipoli between April and December 1915.

David sent me a copy of the Sydney Club's *Gallipoli Legion Gazette* dated March 1941. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that Australia was involved in another war, the Sydney Club's *Gazette* contained little about Gallipoli campaign, the focus being on Club and sporting events, news items about the campaign in the Western Desert and the work of the *Australian Legion of War Veterans* together with an article, written with some foresight, entitled 'The Menace of Japan.'

David also enclosed the *Syllabus of the Victoria Club* for 1954, which included a 'Welcome to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth and His Royal Highness, The Duke of Edinburgh on 24 February', together with reports on other events – a Pilgrimage on 25 April to 'Simpson and his Donkey, wreath laying at the Shrine of Remembrance, and, on 19 December, a Commemoration Service to mark the Evacuation from Gallipoli. He also sent me a photograph showing three Legion lapel badges, which are reproduced on page 36.

I also received the following information from **Peter Trounson**, who has been researching the Victorian Branch of the Legion. Peter writes:

‘The Victorian branch of the Legion had its first formative meeting in November 1936. The branch had to abide by the constitution of the N.S.W. branch which was formed first. Under the original constitution a member had to have set foot on Gallipoli itself to be allowed to become a member, which meant a number of the Victorian committee were not entitled to hold office. A motion was put forward asking if the constitution could be amended and it was eventually agreed that anyone who served within three miles of Gallipoli would be eligible to become a member. One could understand the rationality of this as apart from naval and medical personnel on the ships, a serviceman could have been wounded on a boat coming in and had never attained landfall and on that basis would not have fulfilled the membership criteria.

There is one instance noted after the constitution had been amended where a serviceman who landed there in 1922 was refused membership! There was also a sad case of a wife of a serviceman asking if she could pay the membership on his behalf as her husband was at the time in a Mental Hospital. The committee couldn’t give a definitive answer at that meeting as it needed to be discussed. It is also interesting to note that the City of Geelong had its own Gallipoli ANZAC Association at this time and they were being asked to amalgamate with the Gallipoli Legion’.

A GALLIPOLI CASUALTY

I am grateful to **Mr Ralph Davidson** who sent me the following article which was published in the *Oldham Evening Chronicle* on 4 September 1915.

RECOMMENDED FOR THE VC – MILNROW MAN’S GALLANTRY

On Saturday morning Mr Thomas Bamford who resides at 86 Shaw Road Newhey, received the following letter from his son, Sgt W Bamford, of the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers:- “ We have just had another terrible battle with the Turks. It was hell on earth, and I am again one of the lucky ones to be left alive. Rochdale will go mad when they see the lists this time. It was awful. The battle lasted three days, but we once again covered ourselves with glory. The Turk’s didn’t half fight. This is my third engagement I have been through, but this has capped the lot, and I might tell you I have avenged our Bob’s death a few times. I also have some good news for you for which I think you will be proud. I have been recommended for the VC for saving a wounded comrades life under a terrible fire from the Turks, but I got him in safe. How I missed being shot God alone only knows, but I am here and still kicking. I don’t think we shall be long now with this job. Sam Broadbent got badly hit with a shell, and I hear his leg is gone.”

Ralph, who is researching soldiers from the Oldham area adds that the ‘Bob’ mentioned

in his letter, was an Uncle of Sgt. Bamford who was killed on 4 June at the Dardanelles – presumably during the Third Battle of Krithia.

Unlike today, where there are strict rules relating to the confidentiality of recommendations for gallantry awards, in the First World War it was seemingly not uncommon for officers to tell men, or their next of kin in case of death, that a recommendation for an award had been made. 240026 CSM Bamford William Edward C Coy 1/6th Lancashire Fusiliers never received the VC, or indeed any gallantry award. He survived the war but died at home from mitral regurgitation and cardiac failure on Tuesday 12 October 1920 aged 36. He was thus regarded as a war casualty and is commemorated by a CWGC headstone in St Thomas' Churchyard, Newhey, Rochdale.

THE 2012 'WALKING GALLIPOLI' TOUR – AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE

Greg Pullen

Between 16–21 September my wife Maryanne and I together with my brother Michael and his wife Sue were privileged to be members of the 'Walking Gallipoli' tour organized by the Gallipoli Association in conjunction with Clive Harris and his company Battle Honours Ltd. Our group of 13 was hosted by the Association Webmaster and author Stephen Chambers, whose encyclopaedic knowledge of the Gallipoli campaign was complimented by Major Hugh Jenner's military perspective. Clive and Rory Stephens led an additional group of 15 people travelling under the Battle Honours Ltd. banner. Having previously toured the peninsula twice before I was amazed at how much more detail could be learned about the events of 97 years ago when tutored by experts. The other nice thing was to be surrounded by a group of enthusiasts who shared, if not exceeded, my own interest in the topic and to be able to swap stories and anecdotes with group members.

Travelling from Australia, we met the group at Ataturk Airport in Istanbul on Day 1 before travelling the 5 hours to Canakkale, where we lodged at the very comfortable and friendly Hotel Grand Anzac. Each morning, fortified by a nice breakfast and accompanied by our packed lunch we would walk the short distance to the ferry terminal for the 20 minute crossing of the Narrows and then board the bus, which would take us to the day's walk site and be there on time to collect us at the walks' scheduled completion time. Organisation was first rate and not have to think for yourself was an added bonus!

Day 2 saw us at Anzac Cove and walking up to Plugge's Plateau, which has a panoramic view of both Suvla Bay to the north and to the south east, Shrapnel Valley and the critical ridges that formed the front line for the majority of the campaign. Standing in the shadow of The Sphinx, I was tempted to walk along the Razors Edge to Russell's Top as my brother and I had done 12 years ago, however a combination of advancing

years and common sense won out. We lunched at the Lone Pine Memorial and in the afternoon visited the 4th Battalion Parade Ground Cemetery (well worth the walk), Quinn's and Courtney's Post and The Nek, where the grand uncle of a former work acquaintance, Lt. Keith Borthwick of the 8th Light Horse, was killed in the first line of the unsuccessful diversionary charge that took place on 7 August. Arriving back at Canakkale at about 6pm, there was sufficient time for a bit of chit chat and reflection over a glass or two of excellent *Efes* beer before an early night.

Day 3 had us visiting Cape Helles and walking along W Beach (Lancashire Landing) and visiting the cemeteries and the Helles Memorial. We spent some time trying to locate names known to tour participants on this magnificent structure. Lunch was at the small café just above V Beach, in the shadow of Sedd-el-Bahr and only yards from where the *River Clyde* was beached. Looking at old photographs, the difficulty of the task was easily discernible, as was the fact that the topography and geography had changed little since 25 April 1915 when soldiers of The Royal Munster Fusiliers, The Royal Dublin Fusiliers and The Hampshire Regiment gave their all so bravely. I managed a refreshing dip in the ocean at this point, and from 100 yards out I was able to look back at the steep cliffs, the capacity they offered for enfilading fire and the lack of beach cover; the enormity of the task faced was obvious even to a layman like me – the poor blighters had the odds stacked firmly against them, yet so many still managed to claw their way ashore. We reflected on this over a glass or two that evening.

The story of Gully Ravine, the main objective of the afternoon, is largely unknown to the majority of Australians (or at least those of my acquaintance) but ought not to be. We walked the length of the gully starting at the beach, stopping to listen to Stephen and Hugh describe the First and subsequent battles of Krithia and as they identified the various points of interest along the 3 or so miles of the ravine. Climbing out, we looked over Y Beach and marvelled at how on the night of 12 May 1915 the 1st/6th Ghurkha's climbed up the 300 feet of almost sheer cliff face of what is now known as Ghurkha Bluff to silence the Turkish machine gun position which until then had been decimating British soldiers on the beach. The bluff was eventually recaptured by the Turks but through no fault of the Ghurkhas.

On the final day we travelled to Suvla Bay and visited the numerous cemeteries, all beautifully maintained. A feature of the tour was the identification of some of the more important or interesting graves – Doughty-Wylie's at Helles and David Niven's father at Suvla being just two examples. At Suvla we saw Chocolate Hill and visited Green Hill and Scimitar Hill, and at Suvla Bay itself, prior to lunch and a swim, former WW2 Burma campaigner, Dennis Greenslade QPM, conducted a short but moving ceremony in remembrance of his late father who served at Suvla. In the afternoon we retraced the steps of the 5th Bn. The Norfolk Regiment 'the lost Sandringham Company', who allegedly disappeared while attacking on the night of 12 August. We learned that rather than 'disappeared', a large number, but not all, were killed by bullets or shells while advancing over exposed ground.

Our final excursion was a visit to Chunuk Bair and a walk from it down Rhododendron Spur towards the beach. Looking back towards the peak one can well imagine how difficult the task of taking Chunuk Bair would have been for the Wellingtons and the 7th Gloucesters on the night of 8 August, and of the sacrifices made by these as well as the other battalions of British, Australian and New Zealand reinforcements who helped to hold the high ground, albeit briefly, during the August offensive.

The French cemetery, largely unvisited, is a poignant reminder that our allies had a significant role at Helles that is largely unreported. Our visit, before our return home, reminded us of their sacrifice.

On the final night we held a group dinner at a local Turkish restaurant, where tales were told, addresses exchanged and promises to maintain contact solemnly given; I for one intend to keep in contact with a another visit in mind. From my perspective, the tour represented exceptional value and is a 'must do' for any member wishing to learn more through interacting with others, hearing from the experts and actually treading lightly on the land previously walked on by our young forbears and fellow countrymen. Thoroughly recommended!

QUARTERMASTER'S STORES

The following items are available from the 'Stores'. It has been necessary to increase the price of some items to reflect the costs charged to the Association by the manufacturers together with the recent stiff increase in postal costs. There have been no increase in prices since Autumn 2009.

The Gallipolian Archive CD – as noted on page 7, the CD is currently out of print but it is proposed to issue an updated version in 2013.

Standard Ties – in Association colours are available price **£8.50** including UK postage. [Europe £10.30. Rest of the World £10.90]

Silk Ties – silk, non-crease ties in the Gallipoli Association colours – green bands for the land of Gallipoli and blue-grey for the waters of the Dardanelles, with narrow stripes of navy-blue and scarlet for the services – are available at **£17.50** including UK postage. [Europe £19.30, Rest of the World £19.90]

Blazer Badges – hand embroidered wire and silk blazer badges are available at **£8.00** including UK postage. [Europe £9.80, Rest of the World, £10.40]

Lapel Badges in the Association colours are available, price **£6.50** including UK postage. [Europe £8.30, Rest of the World £8.90]

Simpson Badges – produced by the Anzac Day Commemoration Committee of Queensland. The badge is oval in design and 3/4 inch in size showing Simpson in

classic pose with his donkey. Each badge costs **£4.20** including UK post. [Europe £6.00, Rest of the World £6.60]

Binders, which hold 6 copies of *The Gallipolian* are available finished in attractive simulated leather, coloured maroon, with the title blocked in gold on the spine. Price per Binder is **£7.50** including UK postage [Europe £9.50, Rest of the World £11.20]

New Items

Polo Shirts in ‘Green’ or ‘Maroon’ with Association badge. Sized: ‘Small’, ‘Medium’, ‘Large’ and ‘X Large’. Please state colour and size required with order. Price: **£14.50** including UK postage [Europe £16.00, Rest of the World £18.00]

‘**Gallipoli Trench Map CDs**’ – includes over 400 maps and 10 Watercolours, the latter by Sapper Moore-Jones, the New Zealand Official War Artist. **Price £17.00** including UK postage & packing. [Europe £18.80, Rest of the World £19.40]

Orders with payment, cheques and postal orders made out to ‘The Gallipoli

Association’, to the Secretary, James Watson Smith, Earleydene Orchard, Earleydene, Ascot, Berkshire, SL5 9JY.

BOOK REVIEWS

GREAT CONTEMPORARIES

Author: Winston Churchill. Publisher: ISI Books, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 3901 Centerville Road, Wilmington DE 19807-1938 USA [www.isibooks.org]. Edited by The Churchill Centre – United Kingdom www.winstonchurchill.org ISBN 978-1-935191-99-5

WSC wrote this series of penetrating personal assessments of the good, the notably evil and the great of his day in the 1930s. This new edition, containing a number of entries excluded from the original, is the result of close research. It boasts no less than 1,178 invaluable scholarly footnotes, added for the benefit of later generations by a team of editors one of whom is an Association member, Col. Paul Courtenay of the Churchill Centre UK, whose father served at Gallipoli. The essays on Asquith, Jacky Fisher and Kitchener are particularly relevant to our knowledge of the Gallipoli campaign.

Anyone who relished the original publication will be delighted with the latest version and like this reviewer, will discard the well-thumbed older volume. It is unlikely, alas to be found in most bookshops but available via Amazon for c. £18.50.

Michael Hickey



OBJECTIVES

*To keep alive the memory of the
Gallipoli campaign of 1915.*

*To ensure that the men who fought and died
in the campaign are not forgotten.*

*To encourage and facilitate the study of the
campaign so that lasting benefit can be
gained from its valuable lessons.*

The Gallipoli Campaign is characterised by countless deeds of heroism and endurance. It took place in an area smaller than Southampton amid appalling conditions, such as heat, flies, lack of water, equipment and proper sanitation. Later on, rain and a freak spell of sub-zero temperatures had to be endured, to say nothing of the desperate close quarter fighting throughout the campaign. Some 559,000 Allied personnel were committed, of whom 420,000 were British and Empire troops, 80,000 French, 50,000 Australians and 9,000 New Zealanders. The cost in human terms was terrible. The Allies had 250,000 casualties, of whom 50,000 were killed with only 10,000 having known graves. Turkish forces with some Germans, numbered between 300,000 and 400,000 and of these some 87,000 were killed. The evacuation in December and early January 1916 was a masterly operation – one of the great feats of military history.