Naval Travails
Fisher’s obsession with the need to conserve the best of the Royal Navy’s resources for what he saw the decisive battle of the war, against the German High Seas Fleet, meant that the battleships allotted to force the Chanak Narrows, then support land operations at Gallipoli were all vintage specimens, pre-dreadnoughts, some of which had been commissioned in the early 1890s. They were ,however, adequate for use as floating batteries, although their main armament of four 12-inch guns proved almost useless for giving close fire support for the infantry ashore; they were essentially ship-smashers, high velocity guns whose armour-piercing shells followed a flat trajectory whereas close fire support requires guns that have the ability to lob their fire over natural obstacles. Thus, when the allied fleet tried to force the Straits on 18 March 1915 the Turks , on the advice of their German tutors, used mobile field howitzers which could attack the decks of the warships from a near-vertical angle. Together with the great Krupp guns installed in the fixed shore fortifications, this gave the defence a distinct advantage.
Minefields were laid in the
Dardanelles immediately Turkey entered the war and were
progressively thickened until, by early March 1915 a considerable
mine sweeping effort was necessary. The resources available to
Admiral Carden were totally inadequate; flotillas of trawlers
manned by their peacetime crews, embodied in the Royal Naval
Reserve. These were expected to face the full force of the Turkish
defences as they used wire sweeps to tackle the successive
minefields. In the teeth of the perennial current flowing down the
Straits at about 4 knots, the trawlers, whose best speed in still
water was no more than 8 knots, could not expect to make more than
walking speed when deploying their sweeps. After several had been
hit by shore fire their crews stated that they would not continue
and even the addition of regular officers and petty Officers failed
to achieve success. The loss of three battleships on 18 March was
due to mines - notably those laid secretly in Eren Keui Bay from
the steamer Nusret - as well as the devastating fire of the shore
batteries.
Once the fleet's task became that
of providing fire support for the troops ashore,. battleships were
anchored close offshore in this role. Their presence gave heart to
the troops ashore but exposed them to attack. The first went the
Goliath, torpedoed with great loss of life by a Turkish gunboat at
night in Morto Bay. By mid-May German U-boats were arriving in the
Mediterranean after a long and perilous voyage, to be based in
Austro-Hungarian naval ports in the Adriatic. One of these, the U
21, torpedoed HMS Triumph,then HMS Majestic within 48 hours of each
other, in full view of the dismayed troops ashore and to the
jubilation of their opponents. After that the navy withdrew its
battleships from close support of land operations. Fire support was
now provided by cruisers, destroyers and monitors - shallow draught
gunboats originally designed for operations in the coastal waters
off the German coast.
Mention has been made of the
achievement of the submarine B 11 which penetrated the Turkish
minefields in December 1914 to sink the elderly battleship
Messudieh off Chanak. This gave great encouragement to the Royal
Navy's hitherto discounted submarine branch. Fisher had earlier
been a strong proponent of underwater warfare but his retirement in
1911 had allowed opponents with conservative views to starve the
fledgling submarine branch of resources. Whilst Fisher, on his
return to the Admiraly as First Sea Lord in 1914, was adamant that
no modern surface ships could be spared for the Dardanelles, he
readily agreed to send a flotilla of submarines and these were to
perform outstandingly throughout the campaign. The first attempt to
penetrate the minefields and enter the Sea of Marmara was made on
17 April by the E 15, which was detected and sunk before reaching
the Narrows; it was followed early on 25 April, the day of the
Gallipoli landings, by AE 2, Australian mannded, which had a short
but spectacular career in the Sea of Marmara before being scuttled.
After this, the Marmara became the submariners' hunting ground .
soon, it became impossible for the Turks to sustain their forces on
the Gallipoli peninsula by sea as the British submarines
established their supremacy; the names of their commanders - Boyle
and Dunbar-Nasmith above all others - became legends. On several
occasions their submarines penetrated Constantinople harbour,
torpedoing ships at the entrance to the Bosphorus.
As Kitchener had forbidden Hamilton
the services of the Royal Flying Corps. Hamilton's air support had
to be provided by the Royal Naval Air Service whose pilots
displayed remarkable initiative, pioneering the use of the torpedo
bomber, using wireless telegraphy to direct and adjust the fire of
the fleet's guns, and, through aerial photography, providing
accurate battlefield mapping for the first time. With the arrival
of more modern fighter aircraft the RNAS was able to secure air
superiority and, once Bulgaria had entered the war, to attack
strategic targets in that country, through whose territory ran the
key railroad bringing military supplies and munitions to
Constantinople from the arsenals of Germany .
Throughout 1915 the two former
German warships, the Goeben and Breslau, had operated under their
commander, Admiral Souchon, as part of the Ottoman fleet in the
Black Sea. In 1918, however, they emerged into the Sea of Marmara
on the assumption that the allies had withdrawn their capital ships
following the evacuation of the peninsula. It was a disastrous
sortie, however. After sinking a few smaller warships off the
entrance to the Straits, both struck British mines. Breslau sank
with great loss of life and the badly holed Goeben after beaching
for emergency repairs, limped back to Constantinople where she
remained.